

RESPONSE BY TOYOTA AND NHTSA TO INCIDENTS OF SUDDEN UNINTENDED ACCELERATION

---

HEARING  
BEFORE THE  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND  
INVESTIGATIONS  
OF THE  
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND  
COMMERCE  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS  
SECOND SESSION

FEBRUARY 23, 2010

**Serial No. 111-96**



Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce  
*energycommerce.house.gov*

**RESPONSE BY TOYOTA AND NHTSA TO INCIDENTS OF SUDDEN UNINTENDED ACCELERATION**

RESPONSE BY TOYOTA AND NHTSA TO INCIDENTS OF SUDDEN UNINTENDED ACCELERATION

---

HEARING  
BEFORE THE  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND  
INVESTIGATIONS  
OF THE  
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND  
COMMERCE  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS  
SECOND SESSION

FEBRUARY 23, 2010

**Serial No. 111-96**



Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce  
*energycommerce.house.gov*

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

76-008

WASHINGTON : 2012

---

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office  
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800  
Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402-0001

## COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California, *Chairman*

JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan

*Chairman Emeritus*

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts

RICK BOUCHER, Virginia

FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey

BART GORDON, Tennessee

BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois

ANNA G. ESHOO, California

BART STUPAK, Michigan

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York

GENE GREEN, Texas

DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado

*Vice Chairman*

LOIS CAPPS, California

MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania

JANE HARMAN, California

TOM ALLEN, Maine

JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois

CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas

JAY INSLEE, Washington

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin

MIKE ROSS, Arkansas

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York

JIM MATHESON, Utah

G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina

CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana

JOHN BARROW, Georgia

BARON P. HILL, Indiana

DORIS O. MATSUI, California

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, Virgin Islands

KATHY CASTOR, Florida

JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut

ZACHARY T. SPACE, Ohio

JERRY McNERNEY, California

BETTY SUTTON, Ohio

BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa

PETER WELCH, Vermont

JOE BARTON, Texas

*Ranking Member*

RALPH M. HALL, Texas

FRED UPTON, Michigan

CLIFF STEARNS, Florida

NATHAN DEAL, Georgia

ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky

JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois

JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona

ROY BLUNT, Missouri

STEVE BUYER, Indiana

GEORGE RADANOVICH, California

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania

MARY BONO MACK, California

GREG WALDEN, Oregon

LEE TERRY, Nebraska

MIKE ROGERS, Michigan

SUE WILKINS MYRICK, North Carolina

JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma

TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania

MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee

PHIL GINGREY, Georgia

STEVE SCALISE, Louisiana



SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

BART STUPAK, Michigan, *Chairman*

BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa

*Vice Chairman*

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts

DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado

MIKE DOYLE, Pennsylvania

JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois

MIKE ROSS, Arkansas

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, Virgin Islands

PETER WELCH, Vermont

GENE GREEN, Texas

BETTY SUTTON, Ohio

JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan (*ex officio*)

GREG WALDEN, Oregon

*Ranking Member*

ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky

MIKE FERGUSON, New Jersey

TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania

MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas



## CONTENTS

	Page
Hon. Bart Stupak, a Representative in Congress from the State of Michigan, opening statement .....	1
Hon. Joe Barton, a Representative in Congress from the State of Texas, opening statement .....	4
Hon. Henry A. Waxman, a Representative in Congress from the State of California, opening statement .....	5
Hon. Michael C. Burgess, a Representative in Congress from the State of Texas, opening statement .....	7
Prepared statement .....	10
Hon. Marsha Blackburn, a Representative in Congress from the State of Tennessee, opening statement .....	16
Prepared statement .....	17
Hon. Bobby L. Rush, a Representative in Congress from the State of Illinois, opening statement .....	18
Hon. Phil Gingrey, a Representative in Congress from the State of Georgia, opening statement .....	19
Hon. Edward J. Markey, a Representative in Congress from the Common- wealth of Massachusetts, opening statement .....	20
Hon. John Sullivan, a Representative in Congress from the State of Okla- homa, opening statement .....	21
Hon. Diana DeGette, a Representative in Congress from the State of Colo- rado, opening statement .....	22
Hon. Donna M. Christensen, a Representative in Congress from the Virgin Islands, opening statement .....	22
Hon. Gene Green, a Representative in Congress from the State of Texas, opening statement .....	23
Hon. Betty Sutton, a Representative in Congress from the State of Ohio, prepared statement .....	25
Hon. Janice D. Schakowsky, a Representative in Congress from the State of Illinois, opening statement .....	26
Hon. Bruce L. Braley, a Representative in Congress from the State of Iowa, opening statement .....	27
Prepared statement .....	29
Hon. Peter Welch, a Representative in Congress from the State of Vermont, opening statement .....	33
Hon. Jerry McNerney, a Representative in Congress from the State of Cali- fornia, prepared statement .....	127

### WITNESSES

Eddie and Rhonda Smith of Sevierville, Tennessee .....	34, 42
Prepared statement .....	38
Sean Kane, President of Safety Research & Strategies, Incorporated .....	43
Prepared statement .....	47
David Gilbert, Associate Professor of Automotive Technology at Southern Illinois University .....	52
Prepared statement .....	54
Answers to submitted questions .....	372
James E. Lentz, President and Chief Operating Officer, Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc .....	86
Prepared statement .....	89
Answers to submitted questions .....	376
Raymond H. LaHood, Secretary of Transportation, U.S. Department of Trans- portation .....	134
Prepared statement .....	137

# VI

	Page
Raymond H. LaHood, Secretary of Transportation, U.S. Department of Transportation—Continued	
Answers to submitted questions .....	396

## SUBMITTED MATERIAL

Letter of February 23, 2010, from Exponent to the Committee .....	166
Report dated February 5, 2010, entitled Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration .....	168
Report dated February 21, 2010, entitled Toyota Electronic Throttle Control Investigation .....	353
Letter of February 21, 2010, from Neil Hannemann to the Committee .....	368

## **RESPONSE BY TOYOTA AND NHTSA TO INCIDENTS OF SUDDEN UNINTENDED ACCELERATION**

---

**TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 23, 2010**

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS,  
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE,  
*Washington, DC.*

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:02 a.m., in Room 2123, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Bart Stupak [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.

Present: Representatives Stupak, Braley, Markey, DeGette, Doyle, Schakowsky, Ross, Christensen, Welch, Green, Sutton, Dingell (ex officio), Waxman (ex officio); Sullivan, Burgess, Blackburn, Gingrey, and Barton (ex officio).

Also Present: Representatives Gonzalez, Rush, Engel, Gordon, McNerney, Shimkus, Buyer, Whitfield, Terry, and Pitts.

Staff Present: Phil Barnett, Staff Director; Kristin Amerling, Chief Counsel; Bruce Wolpe, Senior Advisor; Timothy Robinson, Counsel; Anna Laitin, Professional Staff Member; Dave Leviss, Chief Oversight Counsel; Anne Tindall, Counsel; Scott Schloegel, Investigator; Ali Neubauer, Special Assistant; Derrick Franklin, Detailee; Karen Lightfoot, Communications Director, Senior Policy Advisor; Elizabeth Letter, Special Assistant; Lindsay Vidal, Special Assistant; Earley Green, Chief Clerk; Jen Berenholz, Deputy Clerk; Mitchell Smiley, Special Assistant; Matt Eisenberg, Staff Assistant; Alan Slobodin, Chief Minority Counsel; Kevin Kohl, Minority Professional Staff; and Garrett Golding, Minority Legislative Analyst.

### **OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BART STUPAK, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN**

Mr. STUPAK. This meeting will come to order.

Today, we have a hearing titled Response by Toyota and NHTSA to Incidents of Sudden Unintended Acceleration.

We have a number of Members who are present for this hearing who are not members of the subcommittee but are members of the full committee. We welcome them, and I note that they will be allowed to submit written statements for the record but will not be able to deliver opening statements.

In addition, after all subcommittee members complete their questioning, full committee members will be allowed to ask questions. Members who are not on the subcommittee or the full committee

are welcome to observe, but they will not be permitted to give a verbal opening statement or ask questions due to time constraints.

I ask unanimous consent that Congressman Burgess be allowed to serve as ranking member for today's hearing.

Without objection, the request is accepted.

The chairman, ranking member, and chairman emeritus will now be recognized for a 5-minute opening statement. Other members of the subcommittee will be recognized for 3-minute opening statements. And Mr. Rush, the chairman of the CPTC Subcommittee, will also be allowed to give an opening statement along with the ranking member, if they so desire. So we will begin with the opening statements. I will begin.

Ten years ago, this committee investigated the Firestone tire recalls which caused the deaths of dozens of people and expressed vulnerabilities in the government's oversight and recall authority. In response, Congress quickly passed the THREAT Act which was intended to provide enhanced authority for the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration to gather and analyze data from automobile manufacturers and provide an early warning system for catastrophic defects. Now, a decade later, we face a serious auto safety problem that calls into question whether the THREAT Act is achieving the purposes we intended.

Today's hearing will examine whether Toyota Motor Corporation and NHTSA acted in a timely fashion to address countless complaints of sudden unintended acceleration in Toyota vehicles. Sudden unintended acceleration describes a broad range of events in which a vehicle accelerates rapidly and a driver is unable to immediately slow down or stop the vehicle.

Over the past several months, Toyota Motor Corporation has issued two major recalls for defects associated with accelerator problems in eight popular models. The first recall, announced in October of 2009, addressed floor mats that can jam against the gas pedal, causing it to become trapped in a full throttle position. Toyota eventually opened this floor mat recall to 4.26 million vehicles, and just last month Toyota announced another recall of gas pedals that can stick or return slowly.

Toyota's leadership has been ambiguous about whether these two recalls fully account for and address the problem of sudden unintended acceleration. Thousands of Toyota owners whose cars were not subject to either recall have reported to the company that their vehicles suddenly surged or accelerated to high speeds. A staff analysis of documents Toyota provided to the committee shows that roughly 70 percent of the sudden unintended acceleration events recorded in Toyota's own customer call database involved vehicles that are not covered by the a floor mat or sticky pedal recalls. The fixes Toyota has advertised for this problem do not provide much assurance to these drivers.

Our investigation has shown that Toyota has repeatedly dismissed the possibility of electronic failures could be responsible for incidents of sudden unintended acceleration. At the same time, Toyota provided software upgrades to certain vehicles to ensure that in instances where the gas and brakes were both depressed the brakes will override the gas. It seems like this software upgrade provides important safety protection, but we are left to ask,

what will Toyota do for owners of its cars that cannot receive the safety upgrade?

Equally troubling is that officials at NHTSA appear to have bought into Toyota's explanation of these events. In closing investigations and in briefings of committee staff, NHTSA has repeated Toyota's insistence that sudden unintended acceleration is caused by human error or limited mechanical problems, rather than problems in the electronic system. NHTSA made this determination without having electrical or software engineers review the problem.

One of our witnesses today will tell us how a NHTSA investigator sent to inspect her vehicle, "seemed to arrive with a preconceived idea to sell to us that it was a floor mat problem," end of quote. This begs the question of whether NHTSA is too cozy with the industry they oversee or whether they are simply stuck in a mechanical mind-set, rather than evolving to keep up with the new generation of electronics and computer-run components.

In an attempt to quell concerns that sudden unintended acceleration occurs, Toyota attorneys commissioned a study titled, Testing and Analysis of Toyota and Lexus Vehicles and Components for Concerns Related to Unintended Acceleration by a company called Exponent. Toyota has presented this preliminary report to prove that the electronic system cannot cause sudden unintended acceleration.

However, this committee requested an independent expert assessment of the Exponent study; and these experts identified numerous shortcomings, including the review did not follow sound scientific method; major categories of testing such as electromagnetic interference and radio frequency interference were not addressed; only one of the seven vehicles used in the study was on the recall list; and the study did not examine a single vehicle that had experienced sudden unintended acceleration.

It is clear that the flawed Exponent study is nowhere near adequate for a valid scientific review.

Toyota owes it to its customers, the American people, and government regulators to complete a comprehensive and scientifically sound review of their electronic system.

One individual who has taken a close look at Toyota's electronic gas pedals is Dr. David Gilbert at Southern Illinois University in Carbondale, Illinois. Dr. Gilbert will release his interim report showing how he was able to short-circuit the electronic gas pedal and mimic an unintended acceleration incident without triggering any diagnostic trouble codes in the vehicle's computer. Dr. Gilbert's report is the first study of this kind, and we are fortunate to have him and Mr. Sean Kane here to explain it.

In summary, what we have found is quite troubling. Toyota all but ignored pleas from consumers to examine sudden unintended acceleration events. They boast in a briefing of saving Toyota \$100 million by negotiating a limited recall. They claim that they first became aware of sticking pedals in late October of 2009 when, in fact, they had received numerous complaints many months and years earlier. They misled the American public by saying that they and other independent sources have thoroughly analyzed the electronic system and eliminated electronics as a possible cause of sudden unintended acceleration when, in fact, the only such review

was a flawed study conducted by a company retained by Toyota's lawyers.

Toyota and NHTSA, for that matter, have a lot of explaining to do to the American people, to Toyota owners and dealers. I look forward to an informational and productive hearing.

I next yield to the gentleman, Mr. Barton from Texas, for an opening statement.

Mr. BARTON. Thank you, Chairman Stupak.

This is a little housekeeping before I give the opening statement.

As you know, the ranking member on our side on this subcommittee is Congressman Greg Walden. He has stepped off the committee so that we can put Parker Griffith of Alabama on the committee. Therefore, for today's hearing, we officially don't have a ranking member. I have asked Congressman Burgess if he would do that today. But to give the opening statement, it will be myself.

Later this week, Chairman Waxman—I think—has indicated that he will have a regular business committee meeting in which we will formally replace Mr. Walden. So that is why I am here.

Mr. STUPAK. But for today's hearing, Mr. Burgess will be ranking?

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOE BARTON, A  
REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS**

Mr. BARTON. Yes, sir, as soon as I give this opening statement.

Mr. Chairman, I am going to put my opening statement in the record in its entirety, so I am going to speak extemporaneously.

When the Republicans were in the majority, we held similar hearings on Ford and Firestone tires. So I felt, as the ranking member of the full committee when Mr. Waxman and you approached me about these hearings, that it was only fair that the Republicans support this investigation. The American people do have a right to know, Mr. Chairman, and this subcommittee has always—regardless of which party controlled the Congress and regardless of which member of this committee chaired this subcommittee—has got a great record of getting the facts on the table. And I will say on the record, Mr. Chairman, that you are one of the best at getting the facts on the record.

Having said that, we do want to have an open mind on what the problem is.

I was stunned to learn yesterday that—you know, it shows how long it has been since I have worked on a car. But I was under the impression that the steering mechanism and the fuel acceleration mechanism was like it was years ago, that it was mechanically linked. It is not. It is all electronic now. When you push that gas pedal, engineers actually have gone out of their way to create the feel of when it was linked—to show how old I am—to the carburetor, but it is really an electronic signal. There is no mechanical linkage. They actually create a spring-loaded system under the gas pedal to make it feel like, when you push down on the pedal, there is a linkage that is going into the engine, that is going up to the fuel injection system, the carburetor and making it work. It is all electronic.

The recall that Toyota was undertaking and the actual changes, the modifications, what they are doing is they are going in and



shaving part of the gas pedal off at the bottom, and then they are putting a metal washer insert behind the pedal so that it feels a little differently. They have exhaustively looked at the computer programs and electronics to see if there is some computer malfunction. So far, they can't find it.

Now, maybe there is. And like the study you have indicated, Mr. Chairman, maybe there is something in their program that is wrong.

But I was under the assumption, as an industrial engineer, that it was still a mechanical system and there was something wrong with their design or something wrong with their linkage system or something wrong with their connection. Well, that is all electronic.

And what we need to do, Mr. Chairman—I don't believe that we should—and I am not saying that you are attempting to do this—that we should go on a witch hunt. We should actually try to find out in the true and best sense of protecting the American people that, if there is a problem, what it is. If there is a problem, what Toyota is going to do about it. And if we do that, the American people will be well served.

What we don't want to do, in my opinion, Mr. Chairman, is just assume automatically that Toyota has done something wrong and is trying to cover it up. Now maybe they have. If that comes out in these documents and in the testimony, I hope the Congress will come down on Toyota very forcefully. But if they haven't, you know, the people that I talk to have worked in the automotive industry for 30 years or more, and they have got absolutely no interest in covering up a problem that kills people, that hurts people, that endangers people's lives. But it appears to be that, unless there is some electronic problem, it is possible that it could just be too many people putting too many floor mats in their cars.

And I know that sounds silly, and it would seem incredulous to stipulate that that might be the problem. But, based on the observation of the 16 million vehicles, I believe, that Toyota has investigated or have records on, they have had a handful, maybe a dozen, that have had some problems. So we need to find the facts, and I know, Mr. Chairman, you and Mr. Waxman are great at finding the facts, and myself and the Republicans on the committee are going to help you.

So, with that, I would yield back.

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Barton. It has been a cooperative effort. I look forward to continuing to work with you on this matter.

A statement from the chairman of the full committee, Mr. Waxman, sir.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY A. WAXMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA**

Mr. WAXMAN. Chairman Stupak, I want to thank you for holding today's hearing on reports of sudden unintended acceleration in Toyota vehicles.

I am a great admirer of Toyota. Toyota makes good cars. I have driven one pleasurably and safely for years, and the company has been a strong corporate citizen. The Prius is a breakthrough vehicle that is making a crucial contribution to our environment and

energy security. Perhaps that is why I am so disappointed in the company's response to reports of Toyota vehicles racing out of control too often with fatal consequences.

Over the last decade, cars have become moving computers. They have dozens of microprocessors and millions of lines of code. This development has brought many improvements in vehicle performance and vehicle safety. Airbags are triggered by electronic controls. Electronic vehicle stability controls keep cars from swerving out of control, and fuel efficiency has increased.

Like any advancement, the increased reliance on electronics can bring new risks, and these need to be carefully examined. But this did not happen.

In preparation for this hearing, the committee analyzed over 100,000 pages of documents from Toyota and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. These documents show that both Toyota and NHTSA have received thousands of complaints of runaway Toyota vehicles, and they show that these complaints increased after the introduction of electronic throttle controls.

But what is most significant is what is missing from the documents. There is no evidence that Toyota or the government's agency, NHTSA, took a serious look at the possibility that electronic defects could be causing the problem. Toyota did not initiate a study into possible electronic effects until just 2 months ago, and NHTSA still does not have an electrical or software engineer on staff.

Our review indicates that Toyota received as many as 2,600 complaints of runaway vehicles through its telephone hotline alone. Over 700 of these incidents resulted in accidents. Toyota had three responses: first, blame the driver; second, blame the floor mat; third, blame a sticky gas pedal. And NHTSA, without doing any meaningful independent review, accepted Toyota's explanations.

Today, we will hear from Toyota's U.S. President, Jim Lentz, who will testify; and he has cooperated with our investigation, which I very much appreciate. He has said that Toyota was "very confident that the fix in place is going to stop what's going on." As we will learn today, that seems unlikely.

On our first panel, we are going to hear from Rhonda and Eddie Smith, who will describe Rhonda's harrowing account of driving a runaway Toyota vehicle. Their account does not sound like a driver error, a floor mat problem, or a sticky pedal. It sounds like an electronic defect.

On the same panel, we are going to hear from two automotive experts, Sean Kane and David Gilbert. They have been trying to identify possible electronic defects in Toyota vehicles. I am not an electronics expert, but if what they say is true, Toyota vehicles have a serious flaw in their electronic control systems that leaves them vulnerable to sudden unintended acceleration.

One question we will ask today is, why didn't Toyota and the government agency do the kind of investigation that Mr. Kane and Dr. Gilbert have done? Toyota failed its customers, and the government neglected its responsibilities. Today we will try to find out why.

Given all that Toyota has achieved over the past 50 years, it would be wrong for Toyota to be permanently impaired as a result of the safety failures that have occurred. Toyota is a great com-

pany, and I hope it will have a great future. But fundamental reforms are needed in Toyota's leadership. Consumer complaints need to be taken seriously. The possibility of electronic defects must be actively investigated, and safety must start coming first.

Fundamental reforms are also needed at NHTSA. The agency lacked the expertise and resources to critically assess Toyota's insistence that its vehicles could not fail.

Ultimately, I believe that addressing this problem will require legislation. Carmakers have entered the electronics era, but NHTSA seems stuck in a mechanical mind-set. We need to make sure the Federal safety agency has the tools and resources it needs to ensure the safety of the electronic controls and onboard computers that run today's automobiles.

Again, I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses so that, as a result of this hearing, we can take a constructive step forward to correct this problem and make sure that future problems that may even affect people's lives are dealt with so that they will not occur.

I yield back my time.

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Next, we will hear from the ranking member, Mr. Burgess of Texas, for 5 minutes, please.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL C. BURGESS, A  
REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS**

Mr. BURGESS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank you and Chairman Waxman for convening this important hearing.

I thank our witnesses for being here. Thank you to the Smiths from Tennessee for sharing your compelling story with us today.

So far, this committee has received thousands of documents from both Toyota Motor Company and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, showing the complaints they have received over the years and their investigations into those complaints. While this committee's investigation is ongoing, it is clear that Toyota and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration received numerous complaints about sudden unintended acceleration in Toyota vehicles.

Lately, you can't pick up the newspaper without reading a new announcement about a problem with a Toyota—Lexus, Camry, Prius, and now Corolla. In 4 short weeks, we heard in rapid succession that there was a problem with floor mats, then the pedals got stuck in the floor mat, that the pedals themselves were sticky and stayed depressed even after the driver took his or her foot off the gas.

Many of us are surprised at the swiftness, the breadth, and the depth of this recall by a company that, really, we are all familiar with for having had a good reputation as a car company that makes quality, safe products; and many owners are very loyal to the brand. In fact, last year, Toyota was the number one in auto sales in the United States. Corolla is the number one seller worldwide.

Unfortunately, the issue at the heart of this hearing is not about loyalty. It is the battle between economics and safety, and safety must always come first. The economics of this debate says that

Toyota made more money last year in the recession than any other automaker, over \$800 million; and Toyota's infrastructure is built on 1,500 auto dealers in this country and numerous manufacturing plants, all of which provide 200,000 needed jobs in this recession.

In fact, Mr. Chairman, I have a letter from my Governor about the Toyota plant in San Antonio, Texas; and I will submit that for the record.

I am uncomfortably aware of the fact that this government, through the Troubled Asset Relief Program, has given \$64 billion to prop up General Motors and Chrysler. This is an inherent conflict of interest, and it has only grown since last month when the General Accountability Office said that the American taxpayer would lose over \$30 billion of their investment into those two companies. So we really are not just a disinterested panel of individual car owners and stockholders. This is why we need to get out of the business of bailing out business.

But, again, nothing should surpass the safety of the American consumer, which is why we are here. A document created by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's staffer during the course of the 2004 investigation into sudden acceleration shows a spike in these problems starting in 2002, the year that Toyota put in electronic throttle control in some of its cars. We have also learned that State Farm noted an increase in claims related to unintended acceleration as early as 2004 and shared its claims data with the agency in 2006.

Yet here we are, 4 years later, and there isn't a conclusive answer as to what caused the unintended acceleration. Is it Toyota's fault? Is it the fault of the parts dealer, the operator?

These questions, of course, are cold comfort for the families who lost loved ones in accidents following an acceleration event, and they deserve answers. But even as we work now to figure out as soon as we can what happened it is important that we get the full story and the correct answer so we can fix the problems going forward.

We know that there were signals that Toyota and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration both received in the form of driver complaints and warranty claims. We know NHTSA attempted to look into the issue; and, for reasons I hope that Secretary LaHood will explain today, NHTSA did not find an electrical problem with Toyota's electronic throttle control.

We also note Toyota did lots of testing and field investigations of these events and concluded that the problems were floor mats and sticky pedals, both problems that can be termed mechanical in nature. We do not yet have a good handle on what electrical test Toyota did on its cars during preproduction. We do not know how Toyota reached a conclusion that cars were not having electrical problems. We know that Toyota has recently hired an outside firm to run down these problems, but did Toyota do anything as these complaints were coming in? And, if not, why not?

I hope we start getting a better idea of Toyota's response to these questions today and a fuller picture of what is wrong with these cars. Toyota's reputation for safety and reliability has been its stock in trade. I would say to Mr. Lentz, it is why people buy your cars and drive their families in them. It is why I own a Prius. We

hope you can explain today why Toyota is confident that floor mats and sticky pedals have caused some of these events and what you are doing to figure out the causes of the other unintended acceleration events.

I also welcome Secretary LaHood. He has always worked in a bipartisan manner. I would like to publicly thank him for coming to my district last fall for a transportation event. His courtesy is always appreciated.

But I do look forward to hearing Mr. LaHood explain why it seems that NHTSA has been engaging in a sudden acceleration of Toyota-related inquiries. Why the sudden ramp-up? What was NHTSA doing for the last 5 years as the drivers called the agency to complain about runaway cars? Were the Toyota complaints that NHTSA was seeing different in nature or number from the complaints related to other manufacturers? And I do hope we can get some insight into how NHTSA investigated these complaints.

Thank you again, Chairman Waxman, Chairman Stupak, for convening this hearing. I know this will be the start of a long and multilayered process to discover the truth and what initiated the recalls and what we do going forward to fix the problem for the American consumer.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Burgess follows:]

**Opening Statement of the Honorable Michael C. Burgess  
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations**

**Hearing on  
“Response by Toyota and NHTSA to  
Incidents of Sudden Unintended Acceleration”**

**February 23, 2010**

Thank you Chairman Stupak and Chairman Waxman for convening this important hearing on sudden unintended acceleration in Toyota cars.

So far, this Committee has received thousands of documents from Toyota and NHTSA, showing the complaints they have received over the years and their investigations of those complaints. While this Committee’s investigation is ongoing, it is clear that Toyota and NHTSA received numerous complaints about sudden unintended acceleration in Toyota vehicles.

And lately, you can’t pick up a paper without reading a new announcement about a problem with a Toyota car. Lexus; Camry; Prius; and now Corolla. In four short weeks, we heard in rapid succession there was a problem with floor mats, and then the pedal becoming stuck

in the floor mat, and then there were stories about “sticky pedals” that stayed depressed even after a driver took his foot off the gas.

Many of us are surprised at the swiftness, breadth and depth of this recall by a company who we are all familiar with for having had the reputation as a good car company who makes quality, safe products, and many owners are very loyal to the brand. In fact, last year Toyota was number one in auto sales in the United States.

Unfortunately, the issue at the heart of this hearing is not just about loyalty. It’s a battle between economics and safety, with safety always foremost.

The economics of this debate says that Toyota made more money last year, in a recession, than any other automaker. Over \$800 million. And Toyota’s infrastructure is built upon 1,500 auto dealers in this country and numerous manufacturing plants, all of which provide 200,000 needed jobs in this recession.

And I am uncomfortably aware of the fact that this government, through TARP, has given \$64.2 billion dollars to prop up General Motors and Chrysler. This inherent conflict of interest has only grown since last month the GAO said that the American taxpayer would lose

\$30.4 billion dollars of their so-called investment into GM and Chrysler. So really we are not just a disinterested panel of individual car owners and individual stockholders. This is why we need to get out of the business of bailing out business.

But again nothing should surpass the safety of the American consumer, which is why we are here. We need to know who knew what and when?

A document created by a NHTSA staffer during the course of a 2004 investigation into sudden acceleration shows a spike in these problems starting in 2002, the year Toyota put Electronic Throttle Control in some of its cars. We have also learned that State Farm noted an increase in claims related to unintended acceleration as early as 2004, and shared some of its claims data with the agency in 2006.

Yet four years later, there isn't a conclusive answer to why there is unintended acceleration. Is it the fault of Toyota? Is it the fault of the parts dealer? Or is it the fault of the individual users? These questions are cold comfort for the families who lost loved ones in accidents following an acceleration event and *they deserve answers.*



But even as we work now to figure out as soon as we can what happened, it is important that they get the full story, and a right answer.

At best, right now, we have half the story.

We know there were signals that Toyota and NHTSA both received in the form of driver complaints and warranty claims. We know NHTSA attempted to look into the issue, and for reasons I hope Secretary LaHood will explain today, NHTSA did not find an electrical problem with the Toyota's Electronic Throttle Control.

We also know Toyota did lots of testing and field investigations of these events and concluded that the problems were floor mats and sticky pedals, both problems that can be termed "mechanical" in nature. We do not yet have a good handle on what electrical tests Toyota did on its cars during pre-production. We do not know how Toyota reached a conclusion that the cars were not having electrical problems. We know that Toyota has recently hired an outside firm to run down these problems, but did Toyota do anything as these complaints were coming in? And if not, why not?

I hope we start getting a better idea of Toyota's response to these questions today and a fuller picture of what exactly is wrong with these

cars. Toyota's reputation for safety and reliability has been its stock-in-trade. Mr. Lentz, it is why people buy your cars and drive their families in them. It's why I own a Prius. We hope you can explain today why Toyota is confident that floor mats and sticky pedals have caused some of these events, and what you are doing to figure out the causes of other unintended acceleration events.

I also welcome Secretary LaHood. Secretary LaHood has always worked in a bipartisan manner and I would like to publicly thank him again for coming to my Transportation summit in the District. I couldn't even get the Transportation Secretary during the Bush Administration so this courtesy is particularly appreciated.

I look forward to Mr. LaHood explaining why it seems that NHTSA has been engaging in a sudden acceleration of Toyota-related inquiries. Why the sudden ramp-up? What was NHTSA doing for the last five years as the drivers called the agency to complain about runaway cars? Were the Toyota complaints NHTSA was seeing different in nature or number than the complaints related to other manufacturers? I hope you can give us some insight about how NHTSA investigated these complaints.

Thank you, again, Chairman Waxman and Chairman Stupak for convening this hearing. I know today's hearing will be the start of a long and multi-layered process to discover the truth of these recalls. I look forward to getting all my questions answered.

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Burgess.

Mr. Dingell for an opening statement, please.

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, I commend you for this hearing. I thank you for your efforts.

I will be asking yes-or-no questions today, and I hope no one will perceive this as discourteous or mean-spirited. I know you will conduct a fair hearing. And I ask unanimous consent to insert my full statement in the record because I would rather use the time for questioning. Thank you.

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Dingell.

Mrs. Blackburn for an opening statement, please.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARSHA BLACKBURN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TENNESSEE**

Mrs. BLACKBURN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, I want to welcome Eddie and Rhonda Smith, who are from Tennessee; and I want to thank them for taking the time to come up today. We are appreciative of that.

This hearing is of utmost importance, but I am starting to become a little bit concerned about the tone that is surrounding it. This should not be a trial but rather a hearing to get to the bottom of some very important consumer safety issues, and I hope that that is how we will proceed.

Every day we are hearing a combination of new information and, unfortunately, some new misinformation that clouds the debate, and my hope is that that misinformation is not being circulated for political purposes or to be hurtful.

This is a very, very serious issue involving the loss of lives. In addition, it has resulted in the loss of jobs; and the loss of thousands of paychecks are being sacrificed, also.

Also, again, Mr. Chairman, let me say that this is too important an issue for us to play around with or to play politics with. And it is not a new issue. While I feel that many Members of this body and, unfortunately, this committee are inserting themselves at the 11th hour, this is something that I have been working on for years.

I have three letters that I sent in 2007 on this issue. I sent one to Chairman Dingell, another to Toyota, and another one to NHTSA, encouraging and urging this committee and the administration to look at the issue of unexpected acceleration in the Toyota Tacoma.

In conclusion, I would just ask that we all listen to our expert panelists today in an effort to find out the truth and to draw reasonable conclusions as to how to best move forward to assess the lessons learned and to be certain that mistakes of the past are not repeated in the future. To do anything else would be irresponsible at a time when there is so much on the line.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and I ask unanimous consent to submit my letters for the record.

Mr. STUPAK. Without objection, your letters will be submitted for the record.

[The information was unavailable at the time of printing.]

[The prepared statement of Mrs. Blackburn follows:]

The Honorable Marsha Blackburn (TN-07)  
Committee on Energy and Commerce  
Subcommittee on Communications, Technology, and the  
Internet  
Hearing: "Response by Toyota and NHTSA to Incidents of  
Sudden Unintended Acceleration"  
Opening Statement  
February 23, 2010

---

Thank you Mr. Chairman. First, I would like to welcome Eddie and Rhonda Smith and thank you for coming up from Tennessee to be with us today.

This hearing is of the utmost importance, but I am starting to become bothered by the tone. This should not be a trial, but rather a hearing to get to the bottom of some very important consumer safety issues.

Each day we hear new misinformation that unfortunately clouds the debate. My hope is that this misinformation is not being circulated for political purposes.

This is a serious issue involving the loss of lives. In addition, it has resulted in the loss of jobs and thousands of paychecks being sacrificed. Again Mr. Chairman, let me say that this is too important an issue to play politics with.

This is not a new issue. While I feel like many Members of this body, and unfortunately this Committee, are inserting themselves at the 11<sup>th</sup> hour, this is something I've been talking about for years. I have a couple letters I will submit for the record from 2007 that I sent Chairman Dingell urging this Committee and the Administration to look into the issue of unexpected acceleration in the Toyota Tacoma.

In conclusion, I would just ask that we all listen to our expert panelists today in an effort to find out the truth and draw reasonable conclusions as to how to best move forward to assess the lessons learned and be certain mistakes are not repeated. To do anything else would be irresponsible at a time when so much is on the line.

Mr. STUPAK. By unanimous consent, I am going to ask Chairman Rush, who is chairman of the Consumer Protection Subcommittee who has jurisdiction over NHTSA, to give an opening statement at this time.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOBBY L. RUSH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS**

Mr. RUSH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I really appreciate you recognizing me, although I am not a member of this subcommittee, but I do have an opening statement.

Currently, there are more than 205 million licensed motorists in the United States. And as our families and workforce become increasingly mobile, our society has, likewise, become more dependent on the so-called smartness features, energy efficiency factors, and the safety of our automobiles. Understanding this reality all too well, automobile dealers and makers, especially manufacturers of the high quality that Toyota has historically represented, basically brag in all sorts of slick advertising that their vehicles are the biggest, the baddest, and the boldest and, indeed, the safest car on the road.

So what happened to Toyota? Hear me when I say that I am profoundly discomfited and disturbed by the findings of our committee staff.

My concerns, Mr. Chairman, go far beyond Toyota's safety practices and recall decisions. They stand to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's apparent sluggishness in reinventing itself. It appears as if NHTSA failed to assign an appropriate mixture of staff and resources to keep up with the evolving and changing auto design technology, especially with respect to increased computerization.

I am adamant about getting to the bottom of the causes for sudden unintended acceleration in Toyota's fleet of passenger vehicles. As chairman of the Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection Subcommittee, I will be conducting a separate hearing in March to look into further NHTSA resources, staffing, and management philosophies as part of that agency's reauthorization.

Mr. Chairman, my sympathies and condolences go out to these families who have lost loved ones and certainly those consumers who have sustained grave injuries in crashes and accidents involving faulty Toyota and Lexus automobiles. I also extend these same sentiments to any automobile driver on the highways and streets and byways of our Nation who had the misfortune of encountering one of these faulty vehicles.

The fact is that when these motorists and passengers took the simple routine step of getting into their cars, they had no idea that their entrusted vehicles had the potential to become literally killing machines. This is beyond the expectations, and this is totally unacceptable.

I, along with millions of Americans, will be paying close attention to the answers given here today as well as to their testimony before other congressional committees today and in the future. Quite frankly, if some of the alleged behavior and failure to act that I have read in the media turns out to be true, then Toyota is perhaps driving down the road to an inquiry by the Justice Department.

Mr. Chairman, I promise all motorists, passengers, and pedestrians that my subcommittee will do everything in its power to restore confidence in NHTSA; and I will also work to ensure that affected Toyota and Lexus owners have full and immediate recourse to whatever equipment they need to remedy these safety defects. My hope is that consumers will once again have peace of mind when they turn on their vehicles and, yes, when they apply their brakes.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and I appreciate this hearing and opportunity to provide testimony at the hearing.

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Rush.

Mr. Gingrey for an opening statement.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. PHIL GINGREY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF GEORGIA**

Mr. GINGREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate this opportunity to offer a few opening remarks, and I certainly look forward to listening to the testimony of our witnesses as we seek to understand the full scope and impact of sudden unintended acceleration.

While I believe that this subcommittee has a responsibility and a duty to thoroughly investigate this matter, including the responses by Toyota and by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, NHTSA, I would like to echo the concerns of others on the subcommittee that more could have been done in preparation for the hearing, even if it required a little bit more time to thoroughly vet a full range of witnesses, review over 70,000 pages of documents, and more deeply look into the underlying complex mechanical and electronic issues. Certainly we have an obligation to investigate potential threats, but we also have an obligation to get the whole truth to apply wisdom in our deliberations.

Additionally, I know some have expressed concern at the possibility that since the Federal Government now has a vested interest in some of our domestic auto manufacturers it may have some incentive to highlight potential flaws with competing manufacturers. While I hope and I believe this is not the case, just because I am paranoid doesn't mean somebody isn't out to get me. We have to be cognizant of perception, especially in this post-bailout world where the Federal Government has already placed itself in the business of picking economic winners and losers.

Nonetheless, our first and foremost obligation is to the safety and security of the American people; and if there is a problem here that can jeopardize people's safety and lives, we must identify it, understand it, and assure that it is addressed and it doesn't happen again. So I look forward, along with my colleagues, to listen to and very carefully consider the testimony of our witness as we seek to get to the root of this issue.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you; and I yield back.

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Gingrey.

Mr. Markey for an opening statement, 3 minutes, please.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD J. MARKEY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS**

Mr. MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.

Like millions of Americans, I drive a Toyota, a Camry hybrid that has thus far not been recalled. Like millions of Americans, one of the reasons that I purchased a Toyota in the first place was its stellar reputation for safe, reliable, and fuel-efficient vehicles. And like millions of Americans, I am troubled by the series of revelations that have led us to today's hearing; and, as the recall continues, I also find myself wondering what went so wrong.

The October 2009 recall of more than 4 million vehicles due to floor mats that were entrapping accelerator pedals raises troubling questions about what Toyota knew and when they knew it. While the government seemed to have first started to investigate this problem in 2007, I have learned of a Lexus recall undertaken by Toyota in the United Kingdom in the year 2000 because—and I quote—“there is a possibility that the driver's side carpet mat may rotate around the central fixing and interfere with the operation of the accelerator pedal.”

And then in Canada in 2003, Toyota Celicas were recalled because “the driver's floor mat may slide along the interior floor carpet when pressure is applied to the mat by getting in and out of the vehicle. As a result, the floor mat may come into contact and interfere with the accelerator pedal.”

If Toyota first learned that this could happen 10 years ago in the U.K. and then again in Canada 7 years ago, why didn't it do something before additional fatalities and other serious accidents occurred?

Toyota's response to increased scrutiny of its safety record leaves much to be desired. In recent days, we have learned of internal documents that cite Toyota's success at limiting the outcome of the government's safety investigations which reportedly saved \$100 million. Saving money should not come at the expense of saving lives.

And, finally, many safety experts who have reviewed complaints regarding sudden acceleration in Toyota vehicles do not believe that floor mats and sticky pedals can fully account for all of the complaints. Some have speculated that there may be more problems, particularly in the areas of the vehicles' electronic controls.

While Toyota asserts that its outside experts found nothing wrong with their cars' electronics, those tests were based on incomplete examinations of only six vehicles. Clearly, much more must be done. The question is whether the problem with these vehicles is due to how you put your boot on the gas pedal or whether it is because Toyota needs to reboot the electronic software in its cars. That is what this hearing will be all about, and that is what the reforms will be that we ultimately pass as legislation.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Markey.

Mr. Sullivan for an opening statement, 3 minutes, please.



**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN SULLIVAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA**

Mr. SULLIVAN. Thank you.

I first want to thank Chairman Stupak and Ranking Member Burgess for holding this hearing. I am pleased to be a part of this important discussion as consumer safety and in this case in particular auto safety is extremely important to our Nation for many different reasons.

With well over 250 million passenger vehicles on the roads, safety must remain our number one priority; and statistical information indicates that we are meeting that goal. Over the last 50 years, significant technological advancements in the design and construction of automobiles and reasonable Federal regulatory initiatives have increased overall road and vehicle safety. As a result, fatalities and serious injuries resulting from motor vehicle crashes in the U.S. are at the lowest level in 49 years, despite constant growth in licensed drivers and registered vehicles.

Over the past week, I had the privilege of visiting and speaking with a Toyota dealer, Jim Norton, in my district and saw some of these problems and the remedies firsthand.

While vehicle safety must remain our goal, I think it is important to hear all sides of the story, look at all available data, and examine the entire process before we jump to any conclusions at the expense of one manufacturer and potentially do more harm than good by misleading the consumer with presumptions based on unfinished studies.

Thank you in advance to our panel before us, and it is my hope that our discussions here today do what it is meant to do by shedding light on this situation so that we can maintain the U.S. position as the world's leader in auto safety.

I yield back my time.

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Sullivan.

On this side, Mr. Doyle for an opening statement.

Mr. DOYLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be very brief.

Mr. Chairman, this investigation is not intended to attack any one person or one company. This investigation is to see if the cars we drive are safe. It is to help us determine whether car manufacturers have done all they can do to ensure our safety, and it is to determine whether the regulators did all they could to double-check their work. That should be the focus of this investigation, and I know we have three panels, and I look forward to hearing from them.

Thank you.

Mr. STUPAK. On this side, we have other Members who are here but are not members of the subcommittee. They are welcome to submit a written statement. Thank you for being here, Mr. Shimkus, Mr. Buyer, Mr. Whitfield, and Mr. Terry.

On this side, next will be Ms. DeGette for an opening statement, please.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DIANA DeGETTE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF COLORADO**

Ms. DeGETTE. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, you need to look no further than me to find a loyal long-time Toyota owner. I have three Toyotas, and I have two daughters. My 1988 Camry is the car that I brought my 20-year-old daughter home from the hospital in, and it is the car she drives now.

Most recently, after years of satisfaction with the Toyotas, I was excited to get one of the very first Camry hybrids. And imagine how I felt when my staff came in and told me what Toyota told us to do if the accelerator sticks and we can't slow the car down.

How did we get from 1988 to this? While Toyota has always had great consumer loyalty and, as they will remind you, a low percentage of safety recalls in the U.S., persistent questions exist.

When and how did Toyota learn of these acceleration issues and how did they respond? Was this revealed to U.S. regulators and how did they respond? What was the role of NHTSA and did they take this investigation seriously? Did they make a deal with Toyota that limited a tough and thorough investigation? Has Toyota adequately analyzed all of the potential consequences of unintended acceleration, including whether or not electronic throttle systems may be a part of the cause? Do the recalls to date encompass the entire problem?

Now, look, these questions, to me, they are not partisan questions. They are questions all of us should be asking on behalf of our constituents who drive Toyotas and, like me, have been satisfied Toyota customers for many, many years. And in the end, for me, the answers to these questions are not academic, and here is why: In less than 2 months, my 16-year-old daughter will be getting her license, and the car that she is going to be driving is the 1994 Camry wagon. So let's get this right. Let's make sure these cars are safe for all American teenagers and adults to drive.

I yield back.

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you.

Mrs. Christensen, opening statement, please.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE VIRGIN ISLANDS**

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

After years of buying only American-made make and model cars, because I was also trying to be a responsible global citizen, when it was time to replace my 12-year-old car, I went in search of a hybrid. I decided on a Prius but ended up with a cute little Solara convertible, soothing my conscience by reminding myself that Toyota made cars in this country and, of course, of what was then your stellar history for safety quality and service.

To tell you how I felt about my car, when that commercial asked, when you turn on your car, does your car return the favor, I used to be able to answer yes. Now I am weary as I drive it, and when I go online, all I find out is that it is no longer being made. We Solara owners also need to know if there has ever been a problem

and what was done to correct it so that we know we don't have to worry.

But that is not the most important part of my story. The one that gives me sleepless nights right now is that my two daughters and three and a half grandchildren drive in Toyota-made cars every day, a 2006 RAV4 and a 2005 RX330 Lexus. So I want to hear from Mr. Lentz and Secretary LaHood assurances that they are and will be safe from any manufactured cars' failures and that, if they have a problem, they won't have to go through the ordeal that Mr. and Mrs. Smith had to go through.

And I want to say that I do appreciate the efforts Toyota is undertaking, but it is too late for the family in San Diego and only by the grace of God do we have an intact Smith family here with us today.

So take much more than your press releases and lobbying. And I must say that those of your lobbyists with whom I have worked I have great respect for you, but it is time for you to not just rebuild your image but to rebuild our trust. I hope that you will be able to do that quickly, not just for Toyota's good name but for the lives you carry in your cars every day and for the many direct and indirect jobs you provide in the United States and the families that those jobs support.

I also want to use this opportunity to say to other car manufacturers—because Secretary LaHood will attest that similar complaints come in on every make of car—that I also depend on all of you to put quality and safety over profits, to do the right thing by all of us consumers, to respond to complaints immediately, to investigate the complaints fully, and not to wait to be asked or to be made to issue a recall but to do so early when lives are at risk for whatever reason.

And to the NHTSA and to all who have regulatory authority, we need you to exercise that authority as though the lives of your children and grandchildren, like mine and countless others, depend on your decisions.

I want to thank Mr. and Mrs. Smith for their persistence and for being here today to tell their personal story, to welcome Mr. Kane, Mr. Gilbert, and Mr. Lentz.

Secretary LaHood, when you arrive, it is always good to see you and to have you back.

Thank you, Chairman Stupak and Ranking Member Walden for ensuring once again that we fulfill our oversight responsibility on yet another very important issue in such a timely manner.

I yield back my time.

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you.

Mr. Green for an opening statement, please.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. GENE GREEN, A  
REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS**

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing today on the recall of Toyota vehicles.

I would like to recognize a person in the audience, when I was much younger, as a State legislator in Texas, Joan Claybrook, who is here and a former administrator I think in the Carter administration on the highway safety issue.

Mr. Chairman, I think with opening statements you will hear personal stories from our own members but also I think express our disappointment in the Federal and Toyota's response to the initial accidents.

And, on a personal note, like my colleagues, I have to admit I have always driven Chevrolets. But the second generation in my family, my two children who are now adults, actually drive Toyotas. My son loves his Toyota Tundra. In fact, he is on his second truck; and it is built in Texas, he tells me. I remind him my Chevrolet Tahoe is also built in Texas.

So I guess that is where the frustration is, is that Toyota has had such an image of perfection and if there is a problem fixing it. We know from at least the publicity and from the hearing and testimony that is under review that that fell down, and that just wasn't what people expected.

Since national attention was brought late last summer, Toyota has recalled more than 6.5 million cars for two different problems. But as we hear from our first panel today, Mr. and Mrs. Smith, this issue was present in Toyota cars for several years, and we are here today to examine whether Toyota and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration responded in a necessary and timely manner.

Mr. and Mrs. Smith, I want to thank you for being here to recall your harrowing experience and to shed some light on the problems you faced when you tried to bring this matter to the attention of both Toyota and the government officials.

The two separate issues for recall of Toyota vehicles were so-called pedal entrapment and the sticky pedal. In September of 2007, Toyota first issued a recall for all-weather floor mats in Lexus and Camry vehicles that caused the pedal entrapment. While this took place over 6 months after NHTSA initially opened its investigation into the pedal entrapment issue, response to the recall was low.

It took another crash due to pedal entrapment—luckily not fatal—for NHTSA to urge Toyota to reissue the recall notice in January of last year, 2009. Unfortunately, the recall was still not widely responded to by consumers and even a dealer, who last August loaned a car to a Mark Saylor and his family. The loaner car had a floor mat from a different model that trapped the accelerator.

After that crash, NHTSA determined Toyota address the issue more thoroughly than just replacing floor mats, which resulted in a Toyota recall of vehicles in October of 2009 and expanded in November to reshape or replace the accelerator pedal for 4.26 million vehicles.

What we need to look at today—and I hope some of our witnesses can answer it—is why neither NHTSA nor Toyota realized there was not enough clearance for the accelerator when the issue first came up in 2007 and why this issue was not addressed more quickly.

The second issue of the sticky pedal did receive a quicker response, and I commend Toyota for bringing information to NHTSA before an investigation was open for quickly issuing a recall.

There are, however, other issues in Toyota vehicles that have been reported to NHTSA involving accelerator problems; and it is

important NHTSA investigate these issues thoroughly before dismissing them. To do that, NHTSA must have the necessary resources and hire staff to investigate all issues, whether it is mechanical or something in the electrical system.

I look forward to hearing from today's witnesses on what we can do to support NHTSA's mission and what changes are being made following this series of recalls. Again, I want to thank the witnesses for being here; and, Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this very timely hearing.

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Green.

Ms. Sutton of Ohio for an opening statement of 3 minutes, please.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BETTY SUTTON, A  
REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF OHIO**

Ms. SUTTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this important hearing.

For almost every American buying an automobile is one of the most important purchases, the biggest purchases of their lives. Consumers spend countless hours researching vehicles as they prepare to make this large and important purchase.

And why do they do that? They do that because they know they need a vehicle they can count on. They know that they will need a car to transport them as they go about their daily lives; and, most importantly, they want to know that they have purchased a car that will transport the most precious cargo that they have, which is their families, their children.

Trust is a fragile thing. It is hard to win, and it is easy to lose, and it finds its hold in promises kept and honesty sustained, which is why the problems that the millions of Toyotas have been experiencing have been so shocking.

As documents have become public, we have learned that Toyota has been aware of these problems for years. It was revealed this week that Toyota officials took credit for saving \$100 million by successfully negotiating a limited recall on floor mats with NHTSA several years ago.

Consumers deserve better. It is unacceptable when companies and importers pay more attention to their costs than to the safety of their customers. According to NHTSA's data, 34 people have died in the past decade in crashes that may have been caused by sudden unintended accelerations in Toyota vehicles. Toyota and NHTSA have received thousands of complaints involving unintended accelerations from across the country.

Yes, this hearing is extraordinarily important. In many instances, consumers were told that they installed the floor mats incorrectly, but the installation of floor mats can't possibly explain thousands of complaints.

Recently, Toyota identified a problem with sticky pedals and are currently altering or replacing these devices. But the committee's investigation has revealed that Toyota's own counsel stated that a sticky pedal "typically does not translate into a sudden high-speed acceleration event," which leaves Americans wondering about the extent of the problems.

Toyota says that the problems are not related to the electronic throttle control system, but 6 years ago NHTSA compiled data that showed that Toyota Camrys with electronic throttle controls had over 400 percent more vehicle speed complaints than those with manual controls.

These are very concerning issues that we have to get to the bottom of. There is little doubt that Toyota's disappointing actions and the disappointing things that have come to light in the course of this investigation have to be looked at, and they have resulted in the loss of sales for this company. I am very concerned that they will also result in the loss of jobs for workers who have done nothing through the fault of their own to face that potential consequence.

But for the safety of all Americans this recall needs to be done right, and the problems need to be fixed, and the American people need to have the solace of knowing that NHTSA and Toyota are giving the highest of priority to ensuring the safety of the vehicles and the precious cargo that they carry.

I yield back.

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you.

Next, we will hear from Ms. Schakowsky of Illinois, a member of the subcommittee. Ms. Schakowsky.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS**

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank all of our witnesses for coming. I want to just especially note David Gilbert, who teaches in my State as an associate professor of automotive technology at Southern Illinois University. I look forward to the testimony of all of our witnesses.

Like my colleagues, I am extremely concerned about the circumstances that bring us here today. I am concerned that Toyota put unsafe products on the market. I am concerned that Federal regulators had knowledge of unintended acceleration in some Toyota models in late 2003, as Secretary LaHood has acknowledged, but that it took 3 years before an initial investigation into floor mat problems was started.

I am pleased that Toyota has taken action on the issue of pedals being caught in floor mats as well as the issue of sticky pedals and that recalls have followed, but I remain concerned about reports of other unintended acceleration incidents that don't fit neatly into either of those categories and that the company has dismissed those reports. If there is a problem with the electronic system that controls acceleration, we need to know what it is, and it needs to be fixed immediately.

We have also heard reports that State Farm Insurance reported Toyota had acceleration problems to the Department of Transportation in 2004 and that since 2000 there have been more than 2,600 complaints about unintended acceleration in Toyota vehicles and possible links to 34 deaths. I am concerned about whether NHTSA has had the resources necessary to sufficiently investigate these complaints; and I look forward to hearing from my former

colleague, Secretary LaHood, about what he needs to effectively rebuild the agency.

In the coming months, Chairman Rush and I, as the Vice Chair of the committee, will be working on NHTSA reauthorization; and the pieces of the puzzle that we are talking about today are critical to our discussions about the future of the agency and whether it needs additional resources in terms of funding, expertise or authority.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and I yield back.

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you.

Last, but not least, a member of our subcommittee, Mr. Braley of Iowa, for 3 minutes for an opening statement, please.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BRUCE L. BRALEY, A  
REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF IOWA**

Mr. BRALEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to make this clear at the beginning in response to some of the concerns mentioned on the other side of the aisle: I am an equal opportunity consumer safety advocate. I think every manufacturer that sells products in this country should be able to justify that they are doing everything they can to ensure that those products are safe and protect consumers from harm. That includes American automobile manufacturers and foreign automobile manufacturers that do business in this country.

But here are some questions that I think American consumers deserve answers to at this hearing:

One, why has Toyota, with the deserved reputation for its commitment to excellence and safety that you have heard mentioned here today, why do they refuse for so long to seriously address the possibility of a failure of its electronic throttle control system as a contributing factor to sudden unintended accelerations?

Two, once this committee began its investigation of this problem, why did Toyota turn to its product liability defense attorneys at Bowman and Brook to hire its independent expert, Exponent, Inc., to analyze this problem.

Three, was the interim report produced by Exponent, Inc., to justify Toyota's position the equivalent of junk science, and how much credibility should it be given by this committee and American consumers?

Four, is NHTSA, with its important jurisdictional responsibilities, capable, without major changes to its funding and its staff, of making an independent determination of the underlying causes of this problem, given the changing nature of the automobile industry and the increasing reliance upon electronic and computer data?

Five, is there data available in these vehicles that is being withheld from the American public and from regulators of public safety that would give us clues into the underlying cause of these problems, and I am talking specifically about the black boxes that now provide countless amounts of data, and yet are protected from public disclosure in every attempt to try to find out what type of computer data might be available to try to justify and explain why these problems happen.

These are some of the questions I hope that American consumers get answers to today.

I ask unanimous consent to submit my full statement for the record, Mr. Chairman.  
[The prepared statement of Mr. Braley follows:]



BRUCE L. BRALEY  
1ST DISTRICT, IOWA

WASHINGTON, DC OFFICE  
1019 Longworth Building  
Washington, DC 20515  
(202) 225-2911  
Fax (202) 225-8666  
<http://www.house.gov/braley>

ENERGY AND  
COMMERCE COMMITTEE  
VICE-CHAIRMAN, OVERSIGHT  
AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

POPULIST CAUCUS  
CHAIRMAN

**Congress of the United States  
House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515**

**Statement of Congressman Bruce Braley  
Committee on Energy and Commerce  
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations  
"Response by Toyota and NHTSA to Incidents of Sudden  
Unintended Acceleration"  
February 23, 2010**

WATERLOO DISTRICT OFFICE  
501 Sycamore St., Suite 610  
Waterloo, IA 50703  
Phone: (319) 247-3233  
Fax: (319) 247-5104

DAVENPORT DISTRICT OFFICE  
209 W. 4th St., Suite 104  
DAVENPORT, IA 52801  
Phone: (563) 323-4988  
Fax: (563) 323-5231

DUBUQUE DISTRICT OFFICE  
350 W. 6th St., Suite 222  
Dubuque, IA 52001  
Phone: (563) 557-7789  
Fax: (563) 557-1324

Thank you, Chairman Stupak, Chairman Waxman and Ranking Member Barton, for holding this important hearing today on Toyota and the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration's (NHTSA) response to the problem of sudden unintended acceleration in Toyota vehicles.

I'm extremely concerned and disappointed by Toyota's and NHTSA's delayed and insufficient responses to this deadly problem. Even though Toyota has recalled millions of vehicles and stopped the sale and production of eight models involved in the latest recall, I remain concerned that the company and NHTSA have not gone far enough to get to the root of the problem and ensure the safety of Toyota products, and concerned that there may be dangerous Toyota vehicles still on the road today.

Since 2000, NHTSA has received 2,600 complaints of sudden unintended acceleration in Toyota vehicles, as well as six defect petitions requesting investigations. According to NHTSA, in the past decade 34 people have died in crashes alleged to have been caused by sudden unintended acceleration in Toyota vehicles. These alarming numbers should have spurred Toyota and NHTSA to aggressively investigate and fix any problems in Toyota vehicles. Instead, the company appears to have engaged in denial and blaming drivers for the problems, and NHTSA appears to have conducted only preliminary, inadequate, and ineffective investigations.

I'm especially concerned that, despite evidence to the contrary, Toyota continues to insist that the sudden acceleration problems are only the result of entrapment of the accelerator pedal by floor mats or "sticky" pedals, and are not caused by electronic defects. NHTSA data indicates that complaints of sudden unintended acceleration of Toyota vehicles increased after the introduction of electronic throttle controls, including a 400 percent increase in the rate of complaints regarding vehicle speed after the introduction of electronic throttle controls in Toyota Camrys. In addition, according to the Committee's

review of consumer complaints in Toyota's customer call database, approximately 70 percent of the sudden unintended acceleration events involved vehicles that are not subject to the 2009 and 2010 floor mat and "sticky pedal" recalls.

These facts raise serious questions about why Toyota – without conducting a credible investigation – continues to publicly dismiss the possibility that electronic defects could be responsible for sudden unintended acceleration. These facts also raise serious questions about the safety of Toyota vehicles which have not been recalled but which have generated complaints about unintended acceleration.

The top priority for Toyota, NHTSA, and all of us here today must be to ensure the safety of Americans on the road. I know that local Toyota dealers in Iowa have been working hard to repair recalled vehicles and serve their customers well. However, we will not be able to truly fix these problems without thorough and credible investigations that definitively identify the problem and the solution to the problem.

I look forward to hearing the testimony of the witnesses and I hope this hearing will be an important step in ensuring that all

potential causes of this dangerous and deadly problem are identified  
and fixed once and for all.

Mr. STUPAK. Without objection, your statement and all statements of members will be submitted for the record.

I misspoke, Mr. Welch is a valuable member of this subcommittee. I didn't see you down there, Peter, if you have an opening statement?

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. PETER WELCH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF VERMONT**

Mr. WELCH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

There really is one proposition that is not negotiable, and that is the safety of the American people, the American consumer, and that proposition requires us to ask two questions: Is the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration up to the task of the job, and what do they need to do in order to do that job better?

Second, what did Toyota do, did it do it soon enough, and is it doing it now aggressively enough?

But this question of protecting the public does require governmental response, whether it is involving a car or a toy manufactured from China that is imported here and used by our kids. And the fundamental responsibility when it comes to safety is both with government to have agencies that are looking out for the interests of the American people, and government has been woefully inadequate in doing that, not just in some consumer safety issues, but even in financial products like subprime mortgages.

Mr. Chairman, I am glad our committee is back on the job.

But, secondly, we have an obligation to be fair to all concerned, that is to the dealers, to the manufacturer, to the folks who work in my case Toyota dealerships in Vermont. I have had a chance to speak to Dave Birmingham and Karen and Dan Luneau who are very proud of the work they do. 640 Vermonters work in this. So this hearing is going to make certain that we get to the bottom of these questions about the government and about Toyota, but it has to be fair to all concerned.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Welch.

Let me also thank other members of the committee who are present but are not members of the subcommittee but are interested in this hearing, but they are here and their presence is appreciated. Mr. Gonzalez is here, Mr. Engel is here and Mr. Gordon is here. Thank you for being here. If you want to submit any written opening statement, we will be happy to receive it.

That concludes all of our opening statements. Before we have our first panel, Mr. Lentz of Toyota has been here with some of his staff and they were courteous enough and didn't want to interrupt the opening statement. If they would like to come forward and have a chair, we would be happy to have them. I always appreciate it when witnesses, no matter what panel they are on, will sit through a full hearing so they get a full favor of our hearings.

So if Mr. Lentz and his staff would like to come up, that will be great. We will recess for a minute while they do that. There is about six seats up front here, if you would like to take the seats up front. That would be great.

Let me call our first panel of witnesses. On our first panel we have Mr. Sean Kane, who is President of Safety Research and

Strategies, Incorporated; Dr. David Gilbert, who is an Associate Professor of Automotive Technology at Southern Illinois University; Eddie and Rhonda Smith of Sevierville, Tennessee, who own a Lexus ES350 that experienced sudden unintended acceleration in 2006. I ask the witnesses come forward.

It is the policy of this subcommittee to take all testimony under oath. Please be advised that you have the right under the rules of the House to be advised by counsel during your testimony. Do any of you wish to be represented by counsel?

Everyone indicating nodding their head no. I take it as a no then. I am going to ask you to please rise and raise your right hand to take the oath.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. STUPAK. Let the record reflect that the witnesses replied in the affirmative. Each of you are now under oath.

We will hear a 5-minute opening statement from our witnesses. You may submit a longer statement for inclusion in the hearing record.

Mr. Smith, if you don't mind, do you want to start, or would you like Mrs. Smith to start? Rhonda, do you want to start first? I am going to ask you to pull that mike up, turn on that button there. The green light should go on. I understand you are going to go 5 minutes and you are going to give it to your husband and he is going to go 5 minutes. Is that correct?

Mrs. RHONDA SMITH. Yes.

Mr. STUPAK. When you are ready. Thank you for being here.

**STATEMENTS OF EDDIE AND RHONDA SMITH OF SEVIERVILLE, TENNESSEE; SEAN KANE, PRESIDENT OF SAFETY RESEARCH & STRATEGIES, INCORPORATED; AND DR. DAVID GILBERT, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF AUTOMOTIVE TECHNOLOGY AT SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY**

**STATEMENT OF RHONDA SMITH**

Mrs. RHONDA SMITH. I would like to begin by thanking the honorable members of this committee and also Mr. Sean Kane and his staff for inviting us here to testify today regarding the much publicized sudden unintended acceleration, or often known as SUA, that has been and is currently being experienced by Toyota drivers, not only in the United States, but all over the world.

SUA has been the cause of numerous deaths and will continue to be unless addressed by this committee, Toyota, and NHTSA. We truly appreciate this opportunity to share our story now since we have attempted numerous times since October 2006.

My name is Rhonda Smith and this is my husband—

Mr. DOYLE. Mr. Chairman, could we get the microphone up? It is hard to hear her.

Mr. STUPAK. Try that.

Mrs. RHONDA SMITH. Is that better?

My name is Rhonda Smith, and this is my husband of 38 years, Eddie Smith. I am a retired social worker with the State of Tennessee and Eddie is a Senior Vice President at a bank in Sevierville, Tennessee. I am truly thankful to be here today, and I feel I am speaking on behalf of those who lost their lives need-

lessly, unnecessarily, and I would like to share an incident with you concerning SUA that I experienced October 12, 2006, in our new Lexus ES350.

This car had 2,728 miles on it when the incident occurred. The vehicle had a keyless push button ignition and required a key fob to be present inside the car in order for it to start.

On that Thursday, October 12th, 2006, and I am going to read this, because I tell you, it still upsets me today, I was driving from my home in Sevierville down Highway 66 to the interstate, Interstate 40, and upon entering the interstate, I accelerated with everyone else into the flow of traffic. And at this point I merged into the second lane, not going into passing gear.

At this time, I lost all control of the acceleration of the vehicle. The car goes into passing gear and the cruise light comes on. At this time, I am thinking that maybe the cruise is what caused the car to keep accelerating as my foot is not on the gas pedal. I take off the cruise control, but the car continues to accelerate.

To make a long story short, I put the car into all available gears, including neutral, but then I put it in reverse and it remains in reverse as the car speeds to over 100 miles per hour down the interstate.

I placed both feet on the brake after I firmly engaged the emergency brake, and nothing slows the car. I figured the car was going to go its maximum speed and I was going to have to put the car into the upcoming guardrail in order to prevent killing anyone else, and I prayed for God to help me.

I called my husband on the Bluetooth phone system. I knew—I am sorry—I knew he could not help me, but I wanted to hear his voice one more time. After six miles, God intervened as the car came very slowly to a stop. I pulled it to the left median.

With the car stopped and both feet still on the brake, the motor still revved up and down. At 35 miles an hour, it would not shut off. Finally, at 33 miles per hour, I was able to turn the engine off.

After my husband arrived, he found nothing unusual about the accelerator or the floor mats, but the strange thing was that the dash lights and the radio were still on. After the wrecker arrived, we gave the vehicle fob to the wrecker driver. When he hooked the car and prepared to winch it onto the rollback, he asked my husband to put the car in neutral so he could start the winch.

The driver was standing 20 to 25 feet away at the rollback controls. Without thinking, my husband sat down in the car without the key fob and was able to shift the car into neutral, which he shouldn't have been able to do. But when he did that, the car actually tried to start itself. We have a notarized statement from Tommy Clayton, the wrecker driver, attesting to this.

Toyota said they would inspect our Lexus and contact us. After 10 days, we still had not received a call back. We called again and got the same assurances. Toyota promised us they would look into our complaint several more times over the next few weeks.

When we finally forced Toyota to respond in writing, we received a five-sentence analysis stating, and I quote, "When properly maintained, the brakes will always override the accelerator." Well, we know that is a lie. And we were outraged that Toyota would suggest in that statement also that the brakes had not properly been

maintained in order for that to happen, and the car had less than 3,000 miles on it.

Once again we contacted our dealer and expressed our disgust with Toyota's handling. They recommended we contact NCDS, which is the National Center for Dispute Settlement, and ask for an arbitration hearing.

Our NCDS hearing was a total farce. The representative for Lexus was Mr. Leonard St. Amand, their Tennessee district field technician. Mr. St. Amand, although only an hour away in Kingsport, did not show his face, and he attended via speakerphone. He insisted that he could not recreate the incident and that I had more than likely caused this problem by standing on the brakes while spinning the tires.

Well, of course, we were furious that Toyota called us liars the second time. NCDS denied our claim for a total refund of our purchase price for this specific car, which is all we were asking for.

In mid-March 2007 we turned to NHTSA for help. Mr. Steve Chan and Mr. D. Scott Yon, safety defects engineers, responded. Mr. Yon took over our claim and seemed to be receptive of our concerns that sudden unintended acceleration in Lexus vehicles could cause serious injury, and we told them possibly death at that time, that somebody was really going to get hurt. We furnished pictures of the car and documentation of what had transpired since October 2006.

On April 11, 2007, Mr. Yon flew to Knoxville, Tennessee, and drove to Sevierville to inspect the car. My husband will address that in a moment.

Since neither Toyota nor NHTSA took us seriously, we tried to alert the public through the news media back then. We contacted numerous news agencies, a lot that are probably here today, and we tried all types of media, only to have one local station take an interest in our claim that Toyota and NHTSA were ignoring a deadly problem.

Only one local station, Don Dare with WATE-TV channel 6 in Knoxville, did the story, which aired spring of 2007. We repeated our strong belief that the problem was somewhere in the electronics.

After the Santee, California, crash that killed a California highway patrolman and his family, WATE-TV did a second story on Toyota's sudden unintended acceleration. This was broadcast in February 2010, showing our original interview and a current interview. We have never wavered from our belief that our problem was electronic, not wandering floor mats. We forwarded this 2010 video to Toyota and NHTSA and received no response.

In early 2008, we reluctantly let go of our mission to persuade Toyota and NHTSA to deal with the problem because the effort was too traumatizing. But we are here today because for the first time we feel our story has been given more than a token of attention. Unfortunately, it took almost 4 years and injuries and lives lost to prompt Congress to take up this important issue.

In 2006 and 2007, we hoped that our efforts spared others the unnecessary terror and pain of an SUA incident, and it pains our hearts deeply to realize that we failed. But this failure is surely shared by Toyota and NHTSA today. In our view, they have dem-



onstrated an uncaring attitude and disregard for life. The results have been tragic, and today I must say, shame on you, Toyota, for being so greedy, and shame on you, NHTSA, for not doing your job.

It is our hope that this testimony will help all of Toyota's customers in a way that Toyota has not yet done to this day.

Once again, I would like to thank this committee for taking the time to listen to our story. It is about time we were heard, and I hope that Toyota and NHTSA will be held accountable for the poor decisions that have cost some people their lives. We would also like to ask this committee to set a higher standard for NHTSA to be held more accountable in the future.

I thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. and Mrs. Smith follows:]

February 23, 2010 Committee on Oversight and Investigations

Testimony by Rhonda and Eddie Smith

We would like to begin by thanking each of the Honorable Members of this committee for inviting us to testify today regarding the much publicized "sudden unintended acceleration"(SUA) that has been, and is currently being experienced by Toyota drivers not only in the United States, but all over the world. SUA has been the cause of numerous deaths and will continue to be, unless addressed by this committee, Toyota and NHTSA. We truly appreciate this opportunity to share our story now, since we have attempted numerous times to bring this deadly problem to Toyota and NHTSA's attention since October, 2006.

My name is Eddie G. Smith and I reside in Sevierville, TN. I am a senior vice president with Citizens National Bank in Sevierville, TN. This is my wife of 38 years, Rhonda Smith. She is a retired social worker with the State of Tennessee. We have 2 children and 2 grandchildren.

We would like to share our experience with you concerning a SUA incident experienced by my wife on October 12, 2006 in our new Lexus 350 ES. This car had 2728 miles on it when this occurred. The vehicle has a keyless, push button ignition and requires a key fob to be present inside the car in order for it to start. My wife was driving the car and called me on my cell phone at work during most this horrifying experience. Rhonda wrote down this experience October 13, 2006, as we knew this was a potential deadly malfunction that could possibly affect many other Toyota drivers. She is going to read her experience to you, as written by her that day.

" I am writing these words to try and convey some of my feelings of a near death experience, which occurred on October 12, 2006 between approximately 10:50 and 11:00 a.m.

On this Thursday, I had planned on visiting my 85 year old father in Knoxville. I was driving my 2007 Lexus 350 ES from my home in Sevierville down Hwy 66 to I-40 East. Upon entering I-40 I accelerated with everyone else, into the flow of traffic. At this point, I merged over into the second lane, NOT going into passing gear.

It is at this time I lost all control of the acceleration of the vehicle. The car goes into passing gear and the cruise light comes on. At this time, I am thinking that maybe the cruise is what has caused the car to accelerate, as my foot is NOT on the gas pedal. I take off the cruise control. The car continues to accelerate. The car is now up to 80 mph. The brakes do not slow the car at all. Now I am at 85-90 mph. I push the car into NEUTAL and it makes a revving noise. I push the emergency brake on... nothing helps. I continue hitting and slamming the brakes. Now I am at 85-90 mph. I look at the traffic ahead to see if I can maneuver in and out of the upcoming cars and trucks, or if I am going to need to put the car into the guardrail and into the trees.

The last time I looked at the speedometer it read 100 mph. At this time, I had the emergency brake on while frantically shifting between ALL the gears (besides park) but mainly had it in REVERSE and with the emergency brake on. I finally figured the car was going to go to its maximum speed and was praying to God to please help me. After about 3 miles had passed, I thought it was my time to die, and I called my husband (on bluetooth). I knew he couldn't help me in this particular situation, but I just needed to hear his voice. What an awful 911 call he received at work.

At almost exactly 6 miles God intervened. I had not tried anything different that I had frantically tried before to slow the vehicle, yet the car began to slow down ever so slowly. It slowed enough for me to pull to the left median, with the motor still revving up and down. At 35 mph it would not shut off. Finally, at 33 mph I was able to turn the engine off. However, the radio remained on and I was not about to touch ANY button on that car, or ever again."

Rhonda C. Smith

Eddie arrived approximately 5-10 minutes later at my location, still on the phone with me. After trying to calm me down he inspected the vehicle to make sure it was turned off and secure. At this time he made a visual inspection for anything out of the ordinary that might have caused this. There was nothing unusual concerning the accelerator or anything that might have jammed it open. The car radio and inside lights were still on, even though I had exited way away from the car and had turned it off. He immediately called a wrecker, as I knew I was never going to drive that car again. After the wrecker arrived, the wrecker driver was given the key fob and asked to tow it back to Sevierville. When he hooked to the car and prepared to winch it onto the rollback, he asked my husband to put the car in neutral so he could start his winch. The driver was standing 20-25 feet away at the rollback controls. Without thinking, my husband sat down in the car with no fob on him and was able to pull the car from park to neutral. This should not have happened. As the car went into neutral, the car actually tried to start by itself with the engine turning over several times. This shocked my husband and he immediately exited the vehicle. At that time the wrecker driver walked back and they were dumbfounded as to how the vehicle could try to start with no key fob inside the vehicle. We have a notarized statement from Tommy Clayton, the driver with Baker's Wrecker Service, stating this fact to be true. The vehicle was then towed back to Sevierville and then to the dealership in Kingsport, TN. The dealership was told this story and they advised they would thoroughly check it out. After several weeks we were advised they could find nothing wrong with the car. We refused to accept this answer and attempted to contact Toyota by phone to let them know that we felt they had an electronics issue that could lead to serious injury and death. Toyota advised they would check on our situation and contact us. After a week to 10 days we had not received a call back. We called again and got the same story of "we will check on it and contact you as soon as possible". This happened the same way several times over the next few weeks and we finally forced a written reply from them that stated, and I quote, "when properly maintained, the brakes will always override the accelerator". Once again we contacted our dealer and expressed our disgust with Toyota's handling of this and they advised us to contact NCDS (National Center for dispute Settlement) and ask for an arbitration hearing. We were eventually set up by NCDS to have a hearing in Gatlinburg, TN, on March 1, 2007. The representative for Lexus was Mr. Leonard St. Amand, their TN District Field Technician. Mr. St. Amand, although in Kingsport at the time (a 1 hour drive), did not bother to show up but chose to attend via speaker phone. This turned out to be a farce with Mr. St. Amand stating he could not re-create the incident and that we had more than likely caused this problem by standing on the brakes while spinning the tires. Of course we were insulted and furious over being called liars. Needless to say, NCDS denied our claim for a total refund of our money for this "possessed" car, and for the record we did not owe any money on this vehicle.

During this time we had contacted NHTSA and after some prodding, we were contacted by Mr. Steve Chan and Mr. D. Scott Yon, Safety Defects Engineers. This was about the middle of March, 2007.

Mr. Yon took over our claim and seemed to be very receptive of our concerns for this SUA (Sudden Unintended Acceleration) causing serious injury and possibly death. We furnished pictures of the car and documentation of what had transpired since October, 2006. On April 11, 2007, Mr. Yon flew to Knoxville, TN, and drove to Sevierville to inspect our vehicle. The vehicle had been towed to a local Sevierville car dealer's lot and secured for Mr. Yon's inspection. He seemed to arrive with the pre-conceived idea to sell to us, that it was a floor mat problem. We continually insisted that it was not the mats, but instead somewhere in the electronics. Mr. Yon, along with my husband, took the vehicle on a short test drive. Mr. Yon performed several tests at a speed of 50 mph or less. These tests included placing the car in neutral while accelerating, and trying to stop the vehicle with the accelerator engaged and the foot brake fully applied. The transmission did disengage when put in neutral, but the car would not come to a complete stop with the foot brake engaged. Upon returning to the car lot, Mr. Yon and my husband placed the vehicle on a hydraulic lift and removed the wheels and tires. All of the brake pads were totally burnt up and the rotors and drums were ruined. Eventually this was something we had to pay to repair ourselves.

After insisting it was "probably" floor mats, Mr. Yon issued his final report and put the blame on the floor mats. These floor mats were a heavy gauge rubber mat placed on top of the summer mats by the dealer. It would have taken a magic trick for this mat to turn up enough or slide forward enough to cause this SUA. The report was issued on May 2, 2007. In it Mr. Yon claimed to have performed a test with the floor mat in our presence that would show cause for the floor mat to be blamed. This was never demonstrated to us or shown to us that it could ever happen accidentally. Once again we advised NHTSA and Mr. Yon that this SUA problem was going to eventually cause the loss of life and serious injury.

At this point we contacted numerous news agencies across the United States, only to have one local station take an interest in our claim of Toyota and NHTSA ignoring this potential deadly problem. Don Dare with WATE-TV, Channel 6 News, Knoxville, TN called and did a full broadcast interview with us, showing where Toyota and NHTSA claimed that SUA was caused by floor mats. He also showed that we believed it to be somewhere in the electronics and not the floor mats. This was aired in the spring of 2007. WATE-TV did another broadcast interview in February, 2010 showing the first interview along with the current interview and showcasing the highway patrolman and his family's horrible 911 call shortly before their deaths. The 2010 interview seemed to confirm our 2007 assertion that it was not floor mats, but in the electronics. We did forward this 2010 video to Toyota and NHTSA and received no response.

This was all done by the news station and us to hopefully warn the American public that there was a tremendous and possibly deadly issue with Toyota vehicles, and that Toyota and NHTSA were aware of SUA at least since 2006 but chose to blatantly ignore it.

Eventually in early 2008, due to the traumatizing effect this had taken on Eddie and me, we decided to give up our mission to get Toyota and NHTSA to address this electronics problem in the hopes that they had somehow corrected it. Unfortunately, it took almost 4 years, a mass of injuries and numerous lives being lost for Toyota and NHTSA to confess their sins in this joint dismissal, or cover up, whichever the case may be.

In summary, we would like to inform this committee and the American public that we feel we put forth our best effort in 2006 and 2007 to inform Toyota Motor Company and NHTSA of the potential for SUA to become a deadly issue.

Our hopes were that our efforts might help spare the unnecessary injury and loss of innocent lives. However, we failed miserably, all due to Toyota and NHTSA's uncaring attitude and total disregard for human life.

One would think that Toyota, along with NHTSA's help, would have stepped up and used some of their massive profits to address this now major, deadly problem.

It is our hope that this testimony will in some way help the families of those killed and those that sustained serious injuries from SUA. We also hope they will somehow benefit from the knowledge that we provided critical information to Toyota and NHTSA showing that the problem was not floor mats but in the electronics of their vehicles at least 3 ½ years ago.

Once again, we would like to thank this committee for taking the time to hear our story and hope that somehow Toyota and NHTSA will be held accountable for choosing the path of not preventing the unnecessary loss of life. We would also like to ask this committee to set a higher standard for NHTSA to be held accountable for in the future.

Thank you,

Rhonda and Eddie Smith

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mrs. Smith. Mr. Smith, your opening statement. Please pull that mike up.

#### STATEMENT OF EDDIE SMITH

Mr. EDDIE SMITH. Good morning. I am sorry, it is good afternoon.

I would also like to take an opportunity to thank the honorable members of this committee for inviting us to testify today and to share our sudden unintended acceleration experience, along with my thoughts and feelings. As my wife told you, my name is Eddie G. Smith. I am the husband of Rhonda, who you just heard speak.

We purchased this 2000 Lexus ES350 because of Toyota's exemplary claim of safety, as we have young grandchildren.

It has been a true experience trying to decide what to say today. You have all heard my wife describe her experience. Now, take a minute and put yourself on the other end of the cell phone listening to what you think are the last words you will ever hear her speak and the imminent death of your lifelong best friend and spouse and not being able to do anything about it.

Besides this being the most terrifying, traumatizing experience of my wife's entire life, it is also the most frightening and heart-wrenching thing I have ever experienced. Needless to say, she was spared by the grace of God and is still by my side today.

We have never been crusaders for any cause, other than our God, family, and freedom. However, we have been on a mission to get this injustice to the American people noticed, addressed, and fixed.

Toyota was informed of this potentially deadly problem in 2006 and was warned by us numerous times that lives would be lost if this was left unattended. We phoned, e-mailed and wrote numerous letters trying to get Toyota to correct this sudden unintended acceleration problem.

Our complete customer satisfaction that we received, as Rhonda said, was a statement from Toyota stating if properly maintained the brakes would always override accelerations. They called us liars.

Next, Toyota pushed this to arbitration with the National Center for Dispute Settlement. This was one of the biggest wastes of my time and my wife's time and money we have never seen. It was a complete setup meeting to try and make us go away, and we didn't. Once again we were called liars, and actually accused of ruining our own brakes and transmission. This had the complete smell of a prearranged decision by Toyota and NCDS.

Now we have NHTSA. As you know, NHTSA by their own admission on the Web site is that it is our U.S. administration responsible for reducing deaths, injuries, and economic losses resulting from crashes. Their mission statement is to save lives, prevent injuries, and reduce traffic-related health care and other economic costs.

At first we got the good warm feeling that someone actually did believe us who cared enough to try and prevent any further possibility of loss of life. They even made a trip to inspect our vehicle. We finally felt our government would actually step in and bring Toyota to task and resolve this issue, thus sparing others from going through the experience my wife went through.

Were we ever wrong again. Now their claim was it was probably the floor mats, thus a massive mail-out of small orange warning stickers to place on the rubber mats. This was their fix.

After reading Mr. Yon's report, we realized that NHTSA had only sat in to sell us on the idea that this problem was not electronics, rather a floor mat. They went through the motions and tried to appease us with this absurd theory.

I was present during the complete investigation by Mr. Yon. The floor mat test referred to in Mr. Yon's report, as you have all read, was a complete fabrication of the truth. This never happened and was never shown to us at any time during his visit. Once again we felt we had only received lip service.

Now that lives have been lost and sudden unintended acceleration seems to finally have been admitted an electronic issue, why do Toyota and NHTSA not remember Rhonda Smith's pleas in 2006 for someone to take heed and fix this killer problem.

My point from all this is to say for a purported reliable and safety concerned company, such as Toyota claims to be, they sure took the easiest and cheapest route on the electronic issue brought to their attention by us in 2006. How many American lives should have been spared? My customer satisfaction from Toyota and NHTSA consists of an extremely traumatized wife. I was labeled a destructive, lying idiot. And I paid the repair bill to fix the brakes, rotors and drums on our 2007 Lexus.

Many have experienced sudden unintended acceleration, and unfortunately some are not alive today to be able to tell their story. Rhonda is here today to testify before this committee for all those who have died and their families. Hopefully some justice will finally be served.

To Toyota, I say your quality and safety record has been totally destroyed by your past and present words and actions. Now your integrity has come into play. How are you going to handle this? We are here today to help see that you don't shove the American people under the rug again and that your true colors are finally revealed.

To NHTSA, I feel you have totally failed the American public, and I personally feel you as our government watchdog need to stop feeding from your Japanese bowl.

Thank you very much for your time.

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. and Mrs. Smith.

Next we will hear from Mr. Kane from Safety Research and Strategies. Your opening statement, please, sir.

#### **STATEMENT OF SEAN KANE**

Mr. KANE. Yes, thank you, Chairman Stupak and members of the committee.

Mr. STUPAK. Hold that up a little bit closer.

Mr. KANE. Thank you, Chairman Stupak and members of the committee, for holding this important hearing, for inviting me to come testify before you today.

I am the President and Founder of Safety Research & Strategies. We are a research and advocacy firm that specializes in automotive and consumer product safety issues.

In addition to providing factual research to attorneys, engineers, corporations, and government, we leverage our understanding of the safety issues to advocate on behalf of consumers. That is part of my company's mission. That is what I have been doing for nearly 20 years.

I have been invited here to really help the committee in understanding how did we get here today with Toyota unintended acceleration, how this problem unfolded, and to address the various related electronic issues that seem to be part of this issue today.

For the record, I am submitting our report, Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration, which provides a detailed examination of the issue. We released our report on February 5th and we had an addendum on the 19th to provide the committee and the public with context for the crisis that has been really in its making for many years.

I am also submitting a preliminary report, Toyota Electronic Throttle Control Investigation, which we commissioned with automotive technology professor Dr. David Gilbert of Southern Illinois University at Carbondale. Dr. Gilbert's preliminary report provides critical insight into the fail-safe detection capabilities of the electrical circuitry designed to prevent unintended acceleration in some electronic throttle controlled vehicles manufactured by Toyota.

In our report, we look at the complexities and inconsistencies in the public record. Almost everything we have been informed by is in clear view and in the public record. It is difficult to find sometimes, but we spent a lot of time reviewing those records. And what we have concluded from the records that we have examined is that neither Toyota nor the National Highway Safety Administration has identified all the causes of sudden unintended acceleration in Toyota and Lexus models, nor has the auto maker implemented remedies that address the types of complaints that consumers are reporting, and that concerns us greatly.

We are really concerned about the unintended acceleration circumstances that many drivers and witnesses have reported to Toyota in their Lexus models and how they have been handled. They are rooted in the fact that many of these incidents don't relate to the recalls. In our analysis of about 2,263 complaints, we found that nearly half of those complaints fall outside of any recall whatsoever.

Listening to the experiences of the Smiths of a Lexus that raced down the highway, they are fortunate to be here today. Others are less fortunate. The problem may be rare, but it is serious.

Jeff Pepski of Plymouth, Minnesota, he petitioned NHTSA to investigate the defect in his Lexus. He also experienced unintended acceleration at a highway speed. To try and bring his car under control, he put his foot underneath the pedal to pull back on the pedal. He had carpeted floor mats in his car.

Neither one of those relate back to these recall issues. If it was a sticky pedal, that pedal would have returned with the foot. If it was a floor mat, it would have been crept up and forward, and it would have to have been an all-weather floor mat. He had carpeted floor mats in his vehicle.

Using mounting evidence, including eight NHTSA investigations, six of them at the request of consumers, countless unintended ac-



celerations that were summarily dismissed by Toyota as driver error or floor mats, yielded only a couple of small recalls. It took a horrific crash, one that we all know about, that occurred on August 28, 2009, that killed a CHP officer and his family, that haunting 911 call. It was a watershed moment in this crisis.

Due to neglect and the failure to address these root causes and by NHTSA's failure to thoroughly investigate some of the consumer claims, despite the steady stream of these claims, it is hard to understand why a CHP officer couldn't bring control to his car. The evidence in NHTSA's public record is ambiguous. If it was a floor mat, Toyota is guilty of failing to acknowledge a very serious and real consequence of pedal entrapment for years.

Since the agency pointed out in a 2007 investigation drivers could easily stop a runaway vehicle, the very fact that a mispositioned or incorrect floor mat could even cause this kind of problem, this significant outcome, speaks volumes to the way Toyota has handled this safety issue today. The simplest of problems, a floor mat interference, hasn't been handled appropriately.

If the floor mat didn't confine the pedal, then Toyota and Lexus owners have a real cause for worry that their vehicles have an unidentified defect constituting a severe safety hazard.

Based on our surveillance of the complaint data, which is in the public record, extensive interviews with consumers who have experienced SUA, the benefit of a scientific statistical analysis by the folks at Quality Control Systems, we chose to focus our attention on the electronic throttle control system, which is often called drive-by wire.

Following an SUA incident, consumers frequently report to Toyota dealers that their field technical specialist could find no vehicle-related problems. Specifically, they report the absence of what is called a diagnostic trouble code, a DTC, an error code.

Toyota has consistently argued that its electronic throttle control design in fail-safe systems was built with multiple redundancies and that the electronic throttle cannot malfunction with its diagnostic system without it catching an error and employing fail-safe modes.

In response to NHTSA, the company flatly rejected the concept of unintended acceleration. In fact, they stated, "With regard to allegations of unintended acceleration, Toyota does not believe that uncontrolled acceleration can occur without the driver applying the accelerator pedal. If an abnormal condition occurs, such as the ETC, the electronic throttle control, sending the signal to a throttle body to open the throttle without applying the accelerator pedal due to a failure of a component or a malfunctioning of the system, or the throttle were to simply open on its own, the system would go into fail-safe mode."

Because drivers' real-world experiences are running counter to what these statements reflect and Toyota's unshakeable belief that their system was infallible, we felt it was important to examine that malfunction detection system and the fail-safe capabilities of Toyota's vehicles with ETC.

As a result, we commissioned some research in this area. The findings are still very preliminary, but they are urgent. The urgent

nature of them has had us working long nights and weekends with Dr. Gilbert to get the preliminary report to this committee.

We have learned from Dr. Gilbert's preliminary study that there are conditions in the Toyota Lexus models tested in which the redundancy of electronic circuits in the electronic throttle control are lost, particularly in what is called the accelerator pedal position sensor. Losing circuit redundancy in the system creates a loss of fail-safe modes that Toyota has programmed, and notably the system will not detect an error. No DTC, no diagnostic trouble codes are found.

Once this happens, you have now loaded the gun. In this State, lacking a redundant fail-safe, various scenarios can be introduced in the electronic control module, the computer, that read wide open throttle without any input from the driver, and again without setting a single diagnostic trouble code, no errors. This should never happen.

Simply increasing voltage to the pedal position sensor while in a compromised state can induce this uncommanded wide-open throttle condition. These scenarios can occur because Toyota's fail-safe parameters are broad. The design allows a wide window of opportunity for problems to occur that are not seen as abnormal by the computer.

Dr. Gilbert's testing demonstrates that vehicles can react to sensor areas in ways that appear consistent with consumer complaints of unintended acceleration. We must emphasize that at this point it is going to take additional research to make the connection between the two, but his work provides an important baseline for understanding potential electronic root causes of unintended acceleration in Toyota vehicles.

At this point we simply have two bookends. One end of it is Dr. Gilbert's analysis which finds there are holes in the Toyota system that can allow these failures to occur undetected. On the other hand, we have got reports from folks like the Smiths where clearly their incidents are related to electronic problems, and yet no diagnostic trouble codes are found when their cars are brought in.

Mr. STUPAK. I am going to have to ask you to wrap it up.

Mr. KANE. So how do we get here today? We get here today because like many large scale problems, they are complicated, they are multifaceted, they are multi-root caused. There is no one simple solution.

At this point, there is much work to be done, and we believe that both Toyota and National Highway Traffic Safety Administration play a role in how we got here today. But this is squarely Toyota's problem. They created this crisis, and this problem has been festering beneath the surface for years. It took a crisis and it took a crash that captured the Nation's attention to get this to a place where it is today.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kane follows:]



**Safety Research & Strategies, Inc.**  
 340 Anawan Street / Suite 200  
 Rehoboth, MA 02769  
 Ph. 508-252-2333, Fax 508-252-3137  
[www.safetyresearch.net](http://www.safetyresearch.net)

February 23, 2010

The Honorable Bart Stupak  
 Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations  
 2125 Rayburn House Office Building  
 Washington, D.C. 20515

***Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration***

Thank you Chairman Stupak and the honorable members of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations for holding this important hearing, and for the opportunity to testify before you today.

I am the president and founder of Safety Research & Strategies, a research and advocacy firm specializing in automotive and product safety. In addition to providing research to attorneys, engineers, corporations and government, we leverage our understanding of safety issues to advocate for consumers on important safety matters – this is part of my company's mission.

I have been invited to help the Subcommittee understand how the Toyota unintended acceleration problem unfolded and to address concerns related to the electronics in these vehicles. For the record I am submitting Safety Research & Strategies' report *Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration*, which provides a detailed examination of these issues. We released this report on February 5 and an addendum on February 19, 2010, to provide the Committee and the public with context for this crisis that has been in the making for years. I am also submitting a preliminary report, *Toyota Electronic Throttle Control Investigation*, which we commissioned with automotive technology professor Dr. David Gilbert of Southern Illinois University Carbondale (SIUC). Dr. Gilbert's preliminary report provides critical insight into the fail-safe detection capabilities of the electrical circuitry designed to prevent unintended acceleration of some electronic throttle controlled vehicles manufactured by Toyota.

Our report examines the complexities and inconsistencies within the public record on Sudden Unintended Acceleration (SUA) incidents involving Toyota vehicles. We have concluded that neither Toyota nor the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has identified all of the causes of SUA in Toyota and Lexus model vehicles, nor has the automaker implemented remedies that address the types of complaints consumers are reporting.

We are extremely concerned about the unintended acceleration circumstances that many drivers and witnesses have reported in their Toyota and Lexus models. They are rooted in the fact that many of these incidents do not relate to the recalls Toyota has initiated and nearly half of the more than 2,263 complaints we have examined involve vehicles outside of any recall campaign.

The experience of Rhonda Smith of Sevierville, Tennessee – a Lexus that raced to more than 100 miles per hour, accelerated and decelerated, and tried to start itself after being shut down – belies the floor mat and or “sticky pedal” recalls and is certainly not “driver error.” The Smiths are not alone in their experience. Jeffery Pepski of Plymouth, Minnesota, who petitioned NHTSA to investigate this defect in Lexus vehicles, also experienced sudden unintended acceleration at highway speed, and fought to bring it under control as he pulled up on the pedal with his foot. His vehicle was only equipped with original equipment carpet mats, and his pedal had not been entrapped.

Years of mounting evidence – including eight NHTSA investigations – six at the request of consumers – and countless unintended acceleration incidents that were summarily dismissed by Toyota as driver error or floor mats has yielded only a couple of small recalls. It took a horrific crash on August 28, 2009, that killed California Highway Patrol Officer Mark Saylor, his wife, young daughter and brother-in-law for this issue to reach the tipping point.

It was a watershed moment in a crisis, caused by Toyota’s neglect and failure to address the root causes, and by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s failure to thoroughly investigate consumer claims despite the steady stream of complaints. Many could not understand why a highly experienced California Highway Patrol officer couldn’t safely bring the vehicle under control and to a stop. Was the floor mat really the cause? The evidence in NHTSA’s public record is ambiguous. If the floor mat was to blame, Toyota is guilty of failing to acknowledge the very serious and real consequences of pedal entrapment for at least two years, since the agency pointed out in a 2007 investigation that drivers could not easily stop a runaway vehicle. The very fact that a mis-positioned or incorrect floor mat could cause create such a significant outcome speaks volumes to the slim margin of safety in these vehicles.

If the floor mat did not confine the pedal, then Toyota and Lexus owners have real cause to worry that their vehicles have an unidentified defect constituting a severe safety hazard.

Based on our surveillance of the complaint data, extensive interviews with consumers who experienced SUA, and with the benefit of a scientific statistical analysis of the complaints, we chose to focus our attention on the Electronic Throttle Control System (ETCS) – often called drive-by-wire – found in many Toyota vehicles.

Following an SUA incident consumers frequently report that Toyota dealers and Toyota’s Field Technical Specialists could find no vehicle-related problems. Specifically, they report the absence of Diagnostic Trouble Codes (DTCs) – error codes – in the vehicle computer.

Toyota has consistently argued that its Electronic Throttle Control design and failsafe systems were built with multiple redundancies and that the electronic throttle can not malfunction without its diagnostic system catching the error and employing one of four failsafe modes. In response to NHTSA the company flatly rejected the very concept of unintended acceleration stating:

“With regard to allegations of unintended acceleration, Toyota does not believe that uncontrollable acceleration can occur without the driver applying the accelerator pedal ... If an abnormal condition occurs, such as the ETC sending the signal to the throttle body to open the throttle without applying the accelerator pedal due to a failure of a component

or a malfunction of the system, or if the throttle simply were to open on its own, the system goes into failsafe mode.”<sup>1</sup>

Because drivers’ real-world experiences ran counter to Toyota’s unshakeable belief that its system was infallible, we examined the malfunction detection and fail-safe capabilities of Toyota vehicles equipped with Electronic Throttle Control. The research we commissioned in this area is still preliminary. However, because of the urgent nature of this problem and the significance of the findings, we are disclosing the results thus far.

What we have learned from Dr. Gilbert’s preliminary study shows that there are conditions in the Toyota and Lexus models tested in which the redundancy of electronic circuitry in the Electronic Throttle Control is lost – particularly in the Accelerator Pedal Position Sensor (APPS). Losing circuit redundancy in the system creates a loss of the fail-safe modes that Toyota has programmed and notably the system will not detect an error – no “Diagnostic Trouble Codes” are set. Once this happens, you’ve now “loaded the gun” so to speak. In this state, lacking a redundant failsafe, various scenarios can be introduced in which the Electronic Control Module (ECM) can read a wide-open-throttle condition without any input from the driver, again without setting any error codes. Simply increasing the voltage to the APPS while in a compromised state can induce an uncommanded wide-open throttle condition, again resulting in no detectable codes. These scenarios can occur because the Toyota failsafe parameters are broad – the design allows a wide window of opportunity for problems to occur that are not seen as abnormal.

Dr. Gilbert’s testing demonstrates that vehicles can react to sensor errors in ways that appear consistent with consumer complaints of unintended acceleration. We must emphasize that it will take additional research to determine the connection between the two. However, his work provides an important baseline for understanding a potential electronic root cause of unintended acceleration in Toyota vehicles.

How did we get before this committee today? Like many large-scale defect-related tragedies, there is rarely a singular cause or event at the root of a problem; rather, a number of issues align. Firestone tire/Ford Explorer rollovers that dominated the news at the beginning of the decade were the result of design and manufacturing defects in the tires, combined with an application on a rollover-prone vehicle that was sensitive to tires. In addition, the tire’s long wear on the best-selling SUV ensured wide exposure.

There are many parallels between that crisis and Toyota’s problems today. It is becoming increasingly apparent that Toyota SUA incidents stem from multiple causes. Complaints have been found across many years, makes and models of Toyota vehicles, under a range of driving conditions. Consumers’ descriptions of SUA incidents do not all fit the current recall descriptions. Many consumers report sudden full-throttle occurrences when parking at low speeds with the brake applied. Others describe on-highway events in which the vehicle continues to increase in speed without pedal application. In many cases floor mats are secured or simply absent. Further, Toyota dealer and field service representatives’ inspections report no physical impairments, such as a “sticky pedal.”

Toyota initially blamed customers for improperly installing accessory floor mats and resisted taking widespread action. In 2005 and 2007, the automaker launched two small recall campaigns. The first corrected an accelerator that could stick in Lexus IS250 vehicles; the second replaced

<sup>1</sup> DP05002; Toyota Response; November 15, 2005

all-weather floor mats in a limited group of 2007 and 2008 Lexus and Camry vehicles. More recently, under growing public pressure, Toyota has initiated much larger recalls to redesign floor mats, shorten the accelerator pedal, and in some vehicles, install a brake override feature. The automaker has also launched a second recall for sticky accelerator pedals.

Toyota has been slow to accept its responsibility in creating this safety hazard. That floor mats could so easily entrap the accelerator pedal suggests design flaws that could encompass the mat, the floor arrangement on the driver's side, the pedal mechanism itself, the pedal placement or any combination of these factors.

An accelerator pedal that is slow to return to idle requires repair, but does not cause Sudden Unintended Acceleration incidents many consumers report.

NHTSA's investigations have been too brief and cursory to find other causes. Its decisions to open or close probes, based on shifting and narrow premises, have contributed to a continuing safety issue. That may be the result of a lack of electronic expertise or the resources to fully investigate the electronic causes, or a bias against non-mechanical causes, rooted in the 25-year, and frequently controversial, history of SUA.

In 1995 I photographed a display on a board in front of the Office of Defects Investigation in NHTSA. On the board was a larger poster analyzing ODIs goals and areas that needed improvement. Bullet point five under Existing Problems reads: "Have passive screen areas: certain complaint issues (engine stalling, transmission park to reverse, sudden acceleration, etc.) are frequently reported but passively screened because ODI has not successfully pursued recalls in those areas."

The Sudden Unintended Acceleration debate was born in the 1980s, when angry Audi owners, claiming that their vehicles could suddenly accelerate, were crashing their vehicles with alarming frequency. Audi blamed drivers unfamiliar with its vehicles. Drivers could not be persuaded that they had made an error. Five recalls ensued. Whether you believe that Audi was unfairly maligned or that the regulators failed, the lessons of the past are not necessarily instructive to the problems of the present. The Bowden cable, the linchpin of mechanical throttle designs, is rapidly becoming an obsolete technology. Vehicles are now complicated interfaces where mechanicals systems are controlled by increasingly sophisticated electronics. Any examination of SUA must fully explore the interactions between the two, as well as simpler, easy-to-understand causes. This has not yet been done for the Toyota SUA incidents.

We understand that it is difficult to tease out the factors that contribute to sudden acceleration. Nonetheless, Toyota and the regulators must look more closely at the vehicle control systems, including the electronic throttle control assembly and the associated sensors. Random, intermittent electronic faults are hard to detect, but they do occur – the electrical contacts, electromagnetic interference, and the programming of the electronic controls and sensors are all possible points of breakdown or interruption in an electronic system.

Regardless of the causes of sudden unintended acceleration in Toyota and Lexus vehicles, the automaker's first step should be measures to protect the public. The implementation of a brake-to-idle feature across all model lines and years is a significant step in that direction. This design, found in many other manufacturers' vehicles with electronic throttles, will bring the engine to idle if both the brake and the accelerator pedals are applied. A significant number of motorists who experienced frightening SUA events reported that no amount of braking would stop the vehicle once it took off. The brake override allows drivers to regain control of a runaway vehicle.

So far, Toyota has only been willing to add a brake-to-idle feature on some Camry, Avalon and Lexus ES 350, IS 350 and IS 250 models as an "extra measure of confidence." This is inadequate.

We want to be clear: this problem is Toyota's own creation. For years the company has ignored or blamed its consumers. Instead of listening carefully to the safety issues consumer have presented them, Toyota has turned them away, assuring them that nothing is wrong. The company now has a duty to immediately address the unintended acceleration problems and provide its customers vehicles with appropriate failsafe designs.

With respect to NHTSA's role, we are pleased to see the new administration's willingness to step up its enforcement role and to look at the electronic issues that appear to be playing a role in unintended acceleration. It is also imperative that the Office of Defects Investigation have support from the agency's counsel to pursue the challenges they face with complex defects and that NHTSA examine its defect surveillance strategies in ways that will help them efficiently and productively use the many sources of data available to them.

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Kane.

Mr. Gilbert, your opening statement please. I am going to ask you to turn that mike on and pull it towards you more.

#### STATEMENT OF DAVID GILBERT

Mr. GILBERT. Chairman Waxman, Subcommittee Chairman Stupak, and the honorable members of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, I thank you for holding this important hearing and allowing me the opportunity to testify before you today.

Like so many of you have expressed, I have nothing against the Toyota Motor Company. They have a fine reputation of building a traditional line of very dependable vehicles. They have been very supportive of the school at which I work. I thought enough of the product brand to put my son in one.

So, with that said, a little bit about myself. I have been a technical educator involved with automotive diagnostics and troubleshooting for almost 30 years. I have been witness to many evolutionary changes over that time.

When I first began teaching at Northeastern Oklahoma A&M College, electronic fuel injection vehicles were relatively new. Over the years, automotive technologies continued to progress, from fundamental mechanical systems to more sophisticated electrical and electronic systems.

Now, as an automotive technical educator at Southern Illinois University in Carbondale, I have found electrical diagnostic skills to be supremely important in diagnosing and repairing modern automobiles and I have spent many hours studying and analyzing new circuits and components.

Based on my knowledge of real world failures in components, I purposely duplicate multiple types of electronic problems in donated vehicles for my students to study and diagnose. This provides my students with an opportunity to analyze wiring schematic, service information, and actively diagnosed problems.

SIU automotive technology graduates have found employment in virtually every aspect of the automotive industry. Students graduating from SIU have the technical skills to work closely with automotive design engineers to ensure reliable vehicle service in real world situations. I believe the exemplary student placement record is a result of the rigor of the program and the emphasis is on problem solving.

It stands to reason then that my daily teaching responsibilities would include application and understanding of electronic throttle control diagnostics. I have the unique perspective in my employment to research and study multiple vehicles and electronic throttle control system diagnostics.

In this preliminary report, my initial findings question the integrity and consistency of Toyota electronic control modules to detect potential electronic throttle control system malfunctions. The absence of a stored diagnostic trouble code in the vehicle's computer is no guarantee that a problem does not exist. I instruct all my automotive students of this fundamental statement: You can have a code with no problem, and you can have a problem with no code.

My curiosity with Toyota electronic throttle control systems began simply with a search for the truth concerning unintended ac-



celeration. I recently purchased a 2010 Toyota Tundra, and with the growing attention in the media to what seemed to be increasing events of sudden unintended acceleration, I made the decision to investigate the foundation of these claims on my own.

Based on my working knowledge of electronic throttle controls, I did not expect the system to be easily fooled without detecting a circuit fault and setting a diagnostic trouble code. It was late one evening when I made a startling discovery. Electrical circuit faults could be introduced in the electronic throttle control system without setting a code. The discovery opened a window of opportunity within the electronic throttle control system for a potential problem without a code.

Without a code set, the vehicle computer will not logically enter into a fail-safe mode of operation. All vehicle manufacturers have recognized the importance of electronic throttle control systems to perform exactly as they intended.

Since the vehicle computer will only react to defective sensor inputs outside the range of the program limitations if the circuit is defective, as far as the computer is concerned it must be good. Knowing properly operating electronic throttle control systems and components are vital to safe operation, I proceeded to investigate the problem with much more urgency.

Because of its role to accurately convey the vehicle driver demands for throttle opening, accelerator pedal sensor voltage inputs need to be confirmable by the vehicle's computer as absolutely correct. A complete or partial failure of these electrical circuits, sensors, wiring or actuators in combination with an absence of fail-safe strategies could potentially result in a runaway engine.

The importance of these issues raised in electronic throttle control system fail-safe strategies should not be underestimated. Sudden unintended acceleration of vehicles is a very serious safety concern that needs to be addressed without delay.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gilbert follows:]

**David W. Gilbert, PhD.  
Professor of Automotive Technology  
Southern Illinois University Carbondale**

**Testimony for the Committee on Energy and Commerce,  
Sub-Committee on Oversight Investigations  
Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration  
February 23, 2010**

Chairman Waxman, Sub-Committee Chairman Stupak and the honorable members of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, thank you for holding this important hearing and allowing me the opportunity to testify before you today.

I have been a technical educator involved with automotive diagnostics and trouble shooting for almost 30 years. I have been witness to many evolutionary changes over that time. When I first began teaching in 1981 at Northeastern Oklahoma A&M College, electronic fuel-injected vehicles were relatively new technology. Over the years, automotive technology has continued to progress from fundamental mechanical systems to more sophisticated electrical and electronic systems. Now, as an automotive technical educator at Southern Illinois University Carbondale (SIUC), I have found electrical diagnostic skills to be supremely important diagnosing and repairing modern vehicles. And, I have spent many hours studying and analyzing new electrical circuits and components. Based on my knowledge of real world failures of components, I purposely duplicate multiple types of electrical problems in donated vehicles for my students to study and diagnose. This provides my students an opportunity to analyze wiring schematics and service information, and actively solve diagnostic problems. SIUC Automotive Technology graduates have found employment in virtually every aspect in the automotive industry. Students graduating from SIUC have the technical skills to work closely with automotive design engineers to ensure reliable vehicle service in real-world situations. I believe the exemplary student placement record, is a result of the academic rigor of the program and the emphasis on technical problem solving.

It stands to reason, that my daily teaching responsibilities would include the application and understanding of electronic throttle control diagnostics. I have the unique perspective in my employment, to research and study multiple vehicles and electronic throttle control system designs. In this preliminary report, my initial findings question the

integrity and consistency of Toyota Electronic Control Modules to detect potential electronic throttle control system circuit malfunctions. The absence of a stored diagnostic trouble code in the vehicle's computer is no guarantee that a problem does not exist. I instruct all my automotive students with this fundamental statement: You can have a code with no problem - and a problem with no code.

My curiosity in the Toyota electronic throttle control system began simply with a search for the truth concerning sudden unintended acceleration. I recently purchased a 2010 Toyota Tundra, and with the growing attention in the media to what seemed to be increasing events of sudden unintended acceleration, I made the decision to investigate the foundation of these claims on my own. Based on my working knowledge of electronic throttle controls, I did not expect the system to be easily fooled without detecting a circuit fault and setting a diagnostic trouble code. It was late one evening when I made a startling discovery; electrical circuit faults could be introduced into the electronic throttle control system without setting a diagnostic trouble code. This discovery opened a window of opportunity within the electronic throttle control system for a potential problem with no code.

Without a diagnostic trouble code set, the vehicle computer will not logically enter into a fail-safe mode of operation. All vehicle manufacturers have recognized the importance for electronic throttle control systems to perform exactly as they intended. Since the vehicle computer will only react to defective sensor inputs outside of the range of programmed limitations if the circuit is not defective; it must be good. Knowing that properly operating electronic throttle control system circuits and components are vital to safe vehicle operation, I proceeded to investigate the problem with more urgency. Because of its important role to accurately convey vehicle driver demands for throttle opening, accelerator pedal sensor voltage inputs need to be confirmable by the vehicle's computer as absolutely correct. A complete or partial failure of these electrical circuits, sensors, wiring, or actuators in combination with an absence of fail-safe strategies could potentially result in a runaway engine.

The importance of these issues raised in the electronic throttle control system fail-safe strategies should not be underestimated. Sudden unintended acceleration of a vehicle is a very serious safety concern that should be addressed without delay.

Vehicle manufacturers clearly recognized the important requirement for ETC systems to perform exactly as they intended. A failure of the electrical circuits, sensors, wiring, or actuators could potentially result in a runaway engine. Electronic Throttle Control (ETC) systems needed the added redundancy of certain sensors and electrical circuits to ensure safe and reliable operation. In addition, the ECM's were programmed to detect operational abnormalities or defects in ETC components and their related electrical circuits. The intent was to build an ETC system that would always fail-safe in the event of potential problem.

The purpose of my research study was to contribute to a better understanding of electronic throttle control system malfunctions and the fail-safe detection capabilities of selected vehicles equipped with electronic throttle controls. More specifically, this research examined the fail-safe detection capabilities of electrical circuitry designed to prevent sudden or unintended acceleration of electronic throttle controlled vehicles manufactured by Toyota Motor Co. The Accelerator Pedal Position (APP) sensor was identified in the review of manufacturers' service literature as a significantly important ETC input for all vehicles used in the study. Since vehicle driver demands are electrically conveyed through this high priority sensor, basic testing was focused on the APP sensor, voltages, and associated wiring circuits. A secondary purpose was to identify areas of further research of ETC fail-safe detection capabilities of Toyota Motor Co. vehicles and other vehicle brands. This limited analysis attempted to identify and characterize potential safety concerns of Toyota Motor Co. vehicles, as well as other vehicle manufacturers using electronic throttle control systems.

After completing preliminary tests for Accelerator Pedal Position (APP) sensor signal voltages for the Toyota Electronic Throttle System I examined, it was determined that Electronic Control Module (ECM) malfunction detection strategies were not sufficient to identify all types of fundamental APP sensor and/or circuit malfunctions. Some types of Electronic Throttle Control (ECT) circuit malfunctions were detectable by the ECM, and some were not. Most importantly, the Toyota detection strategies were unable to identify malfunctions of the APP sensor signal inputs to the ECM. APP sensor signal circuits must be undeniably correct to electrically convey the appropriate driver commands to the ECM.

With the two APP sensor signals shorted together through a varying range of resistances, all four Toyota vehicles tested thus far reacted similarly and were unable to

detect the purposely induced abnormality. The types of signal faults introduced into the APP circuit should have triggered the vehicles' ECM to illuminate a warning lamp within seconds. The ECM should have then set a Diagnostic Trouble Code (DTC), entered the vehicle fail-safe mode, and reduced engine speed and/or power. When the two APP signal circuits are shorted together, the redundancy of the APP circuit design is effectively nullified and lost. In other words, neither of the shorted APP signal circuits can be verified by the ECM as either; correct or incorrect. The condition then exists for a serious concern for driver safety. In the tested Toyota ETC vehicles, incorrect or corrupted APP sensor signal inputs could potentially result in unwanted engine speeds. Additional research should be done to determine if other vehicle manufacturers may have similar inconsistencies in ETC circuit fault detection.

Using shorted APP signal circuit fault conditions purposely installed on the test vehicles, and with known resistance values that would not set a DTC, vehicle operational behaviors were also noted. It was observed that all test vehicles could be operated without the ECM detecting the induced malfunction. Depending on the resistance value of the APP signal circuit fault, a vehicle may or may not experience noticeable changes in accelerator pedal operational behavior. Observed accelerator pedal operational characteristics included: normal response, sluggish response, and travel with inconsistent engine speeds. It is conceivable that a driver of an ETC vehicle may not notice that an APP sensor and/or circuit malfunction currently exists. Without the aid of an illuminated MIL, a driver could be unaware of electrical problems within the ETC system. In addition, the shorted APP signal circuits were connected momentarily to the sensor's five-volt supply circuit with the vehicle in drive. In all test vehicles, the ECM did not set a DTC and the engine speed increased rapidly to full throttle. This result shows that unusual or sudden unintended acceleration of the vehicle was possible in the ETC test vehicles. It should be noted that in all test vehicle cases, the electronic throttle valve instantaneously moved to wide-open position when the fault was introduced. More research should be done to determine the extent of Toyota ETC vehicles that could be affected by this condition.

In review of the Toyota service information, collected vehicle data, and performance observations; some general assumptions can be drawn from the research completed to date. The inability of the Toyota ECM to detect certain types of short circuit malfunctions could fall back to the basic design of the normal APP signal voltage limitations. The parameters

for APP signal short circuit fault detection are apparently too lenient. In the Toyota ETC system, the APP sensor signal voltages rise simultaneously in direct response to accelerator pedal depression. With this design, interconnected signal circuits could be more difficult to identify with a circuit fault detection strategy that uses only threshold voltage limitations.

In this preliminary report, the initial findings question the integrity and consistency of Toyota ECMs to detect potential ETC system circuit malfunctions. The importance of these issues raised in the ETC system fail-safe strategies should not be underestimated. While the small sample of Toyota vehicles cannot be representative of all, these primary findings most certainly warrant further investigation and study. Additional Toyota vehicles of different build years and models should be evaluated for their capabilities of ETC system circuit malfunction detection.

A second recommendation should be a thorough technical investigation and evaluation of ETC fail-safe strategies of Toyota, and possibly other vehicle manufacturers, that experience sudden unintended acceleration that do not appear to be caused by floor-mats or sticking pedals. Priority would be studies of identified vehicles with a high incidence of ETC system related incidences, concerns, or failures involving sudden unintended acceleration.

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Gilbert.

That concludes the testimony. We will go to questions. I am going to start with the chairman of the full committee, Mr. Waxman, please.

Mr. WAXMAN. Thank you very much. I want to thank all the witnesses for your testimony on this first panel.

Toyota has maintained over and over again that it is not the electronics. It is not the electrical system. There are other reasons to explain the sudden unintended acceleration. But the only document that they gave us to address the phenomenon of sudden unintended acceleration in a systematic way was a report from this month done by an outside engineering consulting firm called Exponent. And we have asked people to evaluate Exponent's analysis, and they said it was not a very good analysis. In fact, they thought it failed to follow a scientific—it failed to stand up to a scientific evaluation. So if Exponent's analysis doesn't adequately explain things, we need to find another explanation.

Now, we are going to hear from Mr. Lentz, and he is going to say to us that we have designed our electronic throttle control systems with multiple fail-safe mechanisms to shut off or reduce engine power in the event of a system failure; we have never found a malfunction that caused unintended acceleration. That is Mr. Lentz's testimony. We are going to hear it in a little bit.

Dr. Gilbert, you have given us a preliminary report. You looked at an alternative explanation to test this hypothesis. Briefly and in layman terms, what did you find, that it is possible to have electronic failure?

Mr. GILBERT. First off, it requires a thorough understanding of the system. The accelerator pedal position sensor input into the PCM is an input directly from the driver. If that circuitry or if that sensor is in error, then it is quite possible that that command that is being given to the vehicle's onboard computer will be accepted as a valid request to open the throttle. As a result of that, that is where I focused my investigation at the very beginning.

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, they have a fail-safe built in. Are you saying the fail-safe failed?

Mr. GILBERT. The fail-safe will only come into play if the vehicle's onboard computer is able to detect a fault in the circuit. What my preliminary findings have shown is that there is a large amount of leniency in the programming of the fail-safe strategies that will allow certain abnormalities to occur without the vehicle's onboard computer being able to detect that a fault exists.

Mr. WAXMAN. Is this like an electronic short between two pedal sensors that could override the fail-safe, meaning that a failure would not be read as an error and would not cut off engine power in a sudden unintended acceleration situation?

Mr. GILBERT. It could be interpreted as a short. Yes, it could.

Mr. WAXMAN. So, in other words, you discovered a scenario where a failure in Toyota's accelerator pedal sensors would not trigger an error code and would not cut off the engine power in the event of a failure. How long did it take you to discover this problem? Did you spend millions of dollars and spend years studying it?

Mr. GILBERT. Well, if I might say, after 30 years of automotive technology teaching and electronic engine controls, I discovered it in about 3-1/2 hours.

Mr. WAXMAN. Three-and-a-half hours.

Mr. GILBERT. Yes.

Mr. WAXMAN. And how much money did this take for you to spend to come up with this conclusion?

Mr. GILBERT. With the equipment that I had on hand, basically very little, if anything.

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, it is really astounding, because what you are describing are findings for us that relate to reports of sudden unintended acceleration, and my understanding is that you did this but Toyota did not. Did you report your findings to Toyota and have you heard from the company about your report?

Mr. GILBERT. Yes, sir, I did. I placed a call to Toyota in California through the channels that I knew, and days went by without a reply. Eventually they did call me back and I talked with I am told some engineers with Toyota, and I told them exactly what I had done and expressed my concern for this type of a problem.

And in that conversation I told them, specifically I said what I have done is I have introduced a fault within the electronic system that should have been detected as a circuit fault, set a DTC and reduced engine power.

Mr. WAXMAN. Can we say with certainty that what you concluded is the absolute cause for the sudden accelerator problem?

Mr. GILBERT. No, sir. What this does is this opens the opportunity to have other problems occur without detection.

Mr. WAXMAN. So the essential point here is that if Toyota didn't believe this could happen, they didn't look for it. They looked for other explanations. The driver was stepping on the pedal. The floor mat was a problem. The pedal was sticky. They didn't look at the fact that the electronic throttle might have been a problem because they had a fail-safe, but they didn't look to see if the fail-safe failed.

Mr. Chairman, I just think that we need to look at all the explanations and not put blinders in the way, which Toyota apparently did, in trying to assess the reason for serious problem in many of those vehicles.

Thank you very much.

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Waxman.

Mr. Barton for questions.

Mr. BARTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to ask some questions of Mr. Gilbert, but I want to ask Mr. and Mrs. Smith some questions first.

I listened to your testimony or watched it on television in my office, so I have been participating visually in the hearing, even though I haven't been here in person.

Mrs. Smith, when your car was going down the highway, it just kind of went crazy, that is a very non-technical term, and you apparently did everything you could. You tried to put it in neutral, you tried to turn the engine off, you put both feet on the brake, and it just kept going, isn't that right?

Mrs. RHONDA SMITH. That is correct.



Mr. BARTON. And somehow God intervened and it slowed down and you finally got out of the car. When you called the Toyota people to come, did they take physical possession of your car?

Mrs. RHONDA SMITH. We didn't call the Toyota people.

Mr. BARTON. You didn't call the Toyota people?

Mrs. RHONDA SMITH. No. We just called—we had AAA.

Mr. BARTON. Did anybody inspect the car to see if there were physical cuts in the wiring or somehow the electrical components had been shorted out? Did anybody do that inspection?

Mr. EDDIE SMITH. May I answer that? I was in my vehicle trying to catch up with her, which was impossible, or just at least to be there. When I got there, she was still sitting in the vehicle. I inspected what a man would normally inspect to see if there was anything wrong, which includes floor mats, and this was not a floor mat problem.

My answer to your question is we had the car towed to Sevierville and then directly to the Lexus dealer in Kingsport, Tennessee, on a rollback wrecker. No one touched the vehicle until it got to the Lexus dealership. Now, were there wires cut or were there not wires cut?

Mr. BARTON. I am not insinuating anything.

Mr. EDDIE SMITH. We don't know.

Mr. BARTON. I will stipulate your testimony is credible, you had a runaway vehicle. It wasn't caused by a floor mat problem. It wasn't caused by you putting your foot on the pedal and going to sleep. Something went wild in your car.

Mr. EDDIE SMITH. Yes, sir.

Mr. BARTON. So what I am trying to figure out is based on what Mr. Gilbert said, he has created some sort of a fault situation in the electronics, and I was just interested if anybody inspected your car after the fact to see if in fact there was a short circuit. And, again, I looked under the hood of a Toyota yesterday, and there is so much stuff under there now, I couldn't work on one if my life depended on it. But I would assume if Toyota actually inspected your car, they would have torn the thing apart trying to find out what the problem is. Did that happen?

Mr. EDDIE SMITH. Mr. Lamont, he was the field technician for Lexus that was sent to Kingsport. His report back to us was there was nothing wrong with it.

Mr. BARTON. Mr. Chairman, has my time already expired?

Mr. STUPAK. Go ahead, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BARTON. Because I see I am minus 4 minutes and 20 seconds.

Mr. STUPAK. No, go ahead.

Mr. BARTON. OK. Now I want to go to Mr. Gilbert. The minority has not had an opportunity, the minority staff, to interview you. We only found out you were going to testify late yesterday afternoon. But it appears just looking at your biography that you are very credible and respected in the industry.

If I understood what you said, you decided on your own to look into this, or did Toyota approach you and ask you to look into this?

Mr. GILBERT. I did this on my own.

Mr. BARTON. You did this on your own.

Mr. GILBERT. Yes, sir.

Mr. BARTON. And you actually went out and bought a car, or you got access to a car?

Mr. GILBERT. I should explain a little bit. Toyota Motor Company has been very generous with vehicle donations. We had a number of Toyota vehicles in the fleet, and they are listed in the report, that were donated for educational purposes, and those were at my disposal. So one of the first vehicles that I looked at was a 2007 Toyota Tundra, which is similar to the vehicle I purchased. And that was part of my interest.

Mr. BARTON. You got access to some Toyotas.

Mr. GILBERT. Absolutely.

Mr. BARTON. From what little minority staff and myself have been able to evaluate your testimony, you are saying that there could be some sort of an electronic physical fault in the electronic system, a physical impairment that would cause an electric circuit malfunction? Or are you saying there is a physical defect, an actual impairment in terms of a cut or some sort of a friction point that gets thin and there is a short that occurs because of that?

Mr. GILBERT. First of all, you have to understand a little bit about the fail-safe strategies that they have in place for all accelerator pedal position sensors that vehicle manufacturers put on.

Typically they try to run circuitry that is redundant. In other words, if you look in the preliminary report, you can see an example of this. They run separate—they actually have two signal circuits within the pedal position sensor itself. Each has their own power supply, each has their own ground circuit, and each has their own signal circuit back. The reason for that is so that one circuit is able to verify the integrity and work with the other.

Do I make myself clear?

Mr. BARTON. I took electrical engineering. I made C's, but I did take it.

Mr. GILBERT. OK, great. It is like having a witness. One signal is a witness for the other to make sure that both are exactly on track so that whatever is being sent to the vehicle's onboard computer is exactly correct.

OK. With that said, if for some reason that circuit becomes compromised, shorted to power, shorted to ground, or shorted signal-to-signal, then at that point you should be able, within the vehicle's computer, to detect that circuit abnormality and set a DTC. That would allow the vehicle to turn on an MIL, or a malfunction indicator lamp, warn the driver, and—

Mr. BARTON. Well, there should be, to be non-technical, if something starts going wrong in the circuitry, there should be a default program that stops the engine.

Mr. GILBERT. Exactly. And that is the other thing that happens.

Mr. BARTON. Applies the brake. That is what the Toyota engineers told me. They said if something goes wrong, we give the brake circuit power over the accelerator circuit so that it stops the car. That didn't happen in Mr. and Mrs. Smith's case.

Mr. GILBERT. That is not true with all Toyota vehicles at this point. They are in the process of reprogramming their vehicles' onboard computers to introduce into this this fail-safe characteristic. It is important to note that the fail-safe is going to be looking at two driver inputs instead of just one from the accelerator pedal.

Logically, why would you be driving down the road at 60–65 miles an hour or maybe even faster with your foot on the brake and your foot on the accelerator pedal at the same time?

Mr. BARTON. Well, logically you shouldn't. But if something—

Mr. GILBERT. Logically you should not. But if something was to fail, I am looking at intuitively for people driving, when something fails like that and your vehicle starts to accelerate on its own, your first intuitive thing is to step on the brake. So at that point, if we have an incorrect signal going into the vehicle's onboard computer, plus the application of the brake, the PCM would say hey, we have got a problem, shut her down.

Mr. BARTON. Right. And that didn't happen in their case. I know my time has about expired. Last question, and hopefully we can really get into this later in detail.

To do the test that you did, did you physically impair the electronics of the cars you tested in any way?

Mr. GILBERT. As far as changing their driving characteristics, no.

Mr. BARTON. I am talking about to create these faults or shorts, did you cut anything?

Mr. GILBERT. No, sir. The only thing that we did was we tapped into the accelerator pedal position sensor circuits so we could monitor voltages and modify those circuits in such a way that we could manipulate, if you would, the signals going to the onboard computers.

Mr. BARTON. But in layman's terms, your hypothesis is it is possible there could be a computer malfunction, and it is possible if they don't have this default mechanism that overrides it, in the absence of the computer knowing exactly what to do, it just doesn't do anything—

Mr. GILBERT. It takes the command.

Mr. BARTON. —and the renegade signal runs away?

Mr. GILBERT. It takes the command as one that is valid, and as a result of that it opens the throttle.

Mr. BARTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Barton.

Mrs. Smith, let me ask you this question, if I may. When you were driving down the highway and your vehicle was a runaway vehicle, you said you put your vehicle in reverse?

Mrs. RHONDA SMITH. Yes.

Mr. STUPAK. And what happened when it went into reverse?

Mrs. RHONDA SMITH. Nothing.

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Smith, was the transmission ripped up or anything when you got the vehicle? I mean, if you are going close to 100 miles an hour and you throw your vehicle into reverse, you are going to be dropping your transmission.

Mr. EDDIE SMITH. My suggestion to her was to put it in reverse, hold on, and hopefully the transmission will yank loose and you will survive the crash. No, sir, the transmission didn't yank loose.

Mr. STUPAK. Let me ask you this then. You also state in your testimony that when the wrecker driver, you were standing back there, you went to put it in neutral.

Mr. EDDIE SMITH. Yes, sir.

Mr. STUPAK. And the vehicle started up?

Mr. EDDIE SMITH. Yes, sir. It attempted to start with me.

Mr. STUPAK. The engine started up.

Mr. EDDIE SMITH. Yes.

Mr. STUPAK. Should it start as a general rule in neutral?

Mr. EDDIE SMITH. It absolutely will not.

Mr. STUPAK. But you didn't have the fob, right?

Mr. EDDIE SMITH. That is exactly right.

Mr. STUPAK. Mrs. Smith, in your testimony you have attached the documents provided to the committee in Exhibit B in which you received a response from Toyota, is that correct?

Mrs. RHONDA SMITH. The response from Toyota about the——

Mr. STUPAK. Dated December 4, 2006. It was from Toyota sent to you and your husband on your complaint, is that correct?

Mrs. RHONDA SMITH. Yes.

Mr. STUPAK. And in there do they say if properly maintained the brakes will always override the acceleration?

Mrs. RHONDA SMITH. That is what it says.

Mr. STUPAK. OK. And in this case, they talked about your incident. Two totally different systems would have to fail at exactly the same time, the throttle linkage and the brakes, and if properly maintained the brakes would always override the acceleration. Is that what they told you?

Mrs. RHONDA SMITH. That is the letter I got. That is what they told me.

Mr. STUPAK. All right. Mr. Gilbert, Dr. Gilbert——

Mr. GILBERT. Yes, sir.

Mr. STUPAK. You heard the Smiths' testimony. You heard their incident. In order for it to occur as the Smiths said, would two totally different systems have to fail at exactly the same time, the throttle linkage and the brakes? Can you defeat those systems?

Mr. GILBERT. Without actually looking at the transmission and what is allowable under normal conditions, it is possible that at that high a speed, for safety reasons, because obviously if you go down the road and throw your transmission in reverse, it is not a very good thing, that may not have been allowed by the transmission controls.

Mr. STUPAK. OK.

Mr. GILBERT. So it is possible that maybe reverse wasn't a good choice.

Mr. STUPAK. Was or was not a good choice?

Mr. GILBERT. Was not. Neutral would be my choice.

Mr. STUPAK. But she already did that. That didn't work.

Mr. GILBERT. You know, I don't know now exactly how that could happen.

Mr. STUPAK. Without an override.

Mr. GILBERT. Well——

Mr. STUPAK. I guess what I am trying to get at, you have I believe they say there are four fail-safe systems here in these Toyotas. So having been a police officer and spent a little time doing this, if I am going 100 miles an hour and I throw something in reverse, my car is coming to a halt. And you are right, there is going to be a pretty good crash, and I hope I can survive. That didn't work here. So obviously something is wrong here.

Mr. GILBERT. I can't answer exactly what happened in her case without——

Mr. STUPAK. When your car is on a wrecker and you come to put it until neutral so you can tow it, the engine should not start up and start revving, should it?

Mr. GILBERT. No, sir, it should not.

Mr. STUPAK. OK. So besides all these electronics, we've just got some basic mechanics, at least in this car, that's not working.

Mr. Kane, you said you went to the public record and looked at NHTSA's public records; and you saw 2,263 incidents, if you will, of sudden unintended acceleration. Half of those could not be explained away or, if my math is pretty good, that's 1,131 cases can't be explained away. So if it's not the pedal sticking, if it's not the mat, what else can it be under this electronic throttle control system? What else is left? Electronics, right?

Mr. KANE. I think that when we look at the complaints and you eliminate the physical impediments that could possibly cause this—and in this case remember the physical impediments are very limited because we have all electronics controlling these cars—and you rule out the driver error issue, you have only one thing left, which is the control systems of these cars.

In interviewing many, many consumers and in reviewing incidents of complaints what we are seeing are incidents that cannot be explained by either one of the sticky pedal or by the floor mat recall simply because the drivers and witnesses have often seen this, including folks who have actually brought them to Toyota dealers, and the dealers have witnessed the cars racing without any driver, without any floor mat interference, and without any sticky pedal.

Mr. STUPAK. So for these 1,130-some incidents you have sort of ruled out the physical part.

Mr. KANE. You can never conclusively rule out physical just from all of those complaints, but certainly the evidence suggests very strongly that there is more going on.

Again, one of the things that has happened in this crisis is the consumer voice has been tamped down. You heard from the Smiths. Their story is very similar. What they report they are told is not credible. Consumers' complaints have been used against them, saying it's not credible. These are scenarios where folks get into this, are urgent, and people certainly can make mistakes. But there are too many problems that continue to be reported by consumers that are consistent and can't be explained away as simply driver error or some kind of physical impediment.

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you. Thank you for your testimony.

My time has expired. Mr. Burgess for questions.

Mr. BURGESS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Again, thank you to the Smiths for sharing your very compelling story with us. I've always wondered what would happen if I inadvertently went into reverse going down the road. I have always been fearful of accidentally doing that. Now to understand that nothing happens, I guess—I don't know that I am mollified by that.

Mr. Gilbert, let me ask you a question on this. You said that you did these tests that you and Mr. Barton just went through and that you concluded that this may be a very serious problem.

Mr. GILBERT. Yes, sir.

Mr. BURGESS. And you called Toyota and they took some time getting back to you. But they did get back to you?

Mr. GILBERT. They got back with me. I explained the situation in detail. I told them even, you know, a resistance value for them to begin testing with. They asked me for that. So I gave it to them. And they said that they would look into it and get back with me. But, of course, I have not heard back from them to date.

Mr. BURGESS. So what was the length of time between the moment the light bulb went off above your head and Toyota got back with you about getting more information?

Mr. GILBERT. First off, I wanted to be careful that I wasn't crying wolf; and so I wanted to make sure that what I had found was repeatable. And, of course, I wanted to look into the literature to see how in the world could this possibly fall within the guidelines of setting a DCT.

In addition to that, I wanted to test it on another vehicle. I should say for the record that the Toyota Tundra that we worked on was clearly labeled as a prototype. So, as a result of that, it could be somewhat different. So I tried it on another vehicle and had very similar results. And at that point I became very alarmed.

Mr. BURGESS. So from that point to the point where Toyota gets back with you, what's the time interval? What are we talking about?

Mr. GILBERT. Probably a matter of a few days.

Mr. BURGESS. A few days. Were you satisfied with the response you got from Toyota after talking with them?

Mr. GILBERT. Initially, you know, I expressed a concern. Days went by, and I didn't hear a response back. But then I did, and the gentleman I spoke with at Toyota had set up a conference call with some design people to look into it. He took it very seriously or, you know, expressed his concern.

Mr. BURGESS. Well, if you weren't satisfied that things were proceeding with correct dispatch, at any point did you consider calling the Federal agency, the NHTSA folks?

Mr. GILBERT. Actually, almost simultaneously with that, I sent an electronic letter to NHTSA to their hotline.

Mr. BURGESS. And——

Mr. GILBERT. And also a written letter.

Mr. BURGESS. And——

Mr. GILBERT. And it was registered to——

Mr. BURGESS. And their response to you was——

Mr. GILBERT. I have not—I got a response back on the electronic version. It said, you know, thank you very much for your concern, and we'll look into it.

Mr. BURGESS. So, to the best of your knowledge, they've not duplicated your tests at this point? Or——

Mr. GILBERT. I'm not sure what——

Mr. BURGESS. Let me ask you a question. We hear this compelling story of this harrowing high-speed chase down the freeway. And what would you expect to see? If you were called on the scene after the car was pulled away to the resale lot, what would you expect to see? Would you expect to see—like is there like a bundle of wires? Are there cable holders? Would you expect some chafing? Or what would you be looking for to see the real-world—how the

real-world event occurred with the theoretic that you produced in the laboratory?

Mr. GILBERT. If I may, I will use an analogy that I use in class a lot of times. If you're sitting at home watching your television and that television screen blinks, do you take it in for a repair? No, you don't. How come? Well, it just blinked once.

Mr. BURGESS. Problem solved.

Mr. GILBERT. However, if you are dealing with electronics on a car and it blinks once, it could be a very serious thing. And in this case it might have blinked.

Mr. BURGESS. But I guess, if I understood your answers to Mr. Barton's questions, there would have to be some breach in the insulation, there would have to be two wires coming in contact with each other, or could this all be the fault of the computer chip and the logic employed therein?

Mr. GILBERT. If you reviewed the service information, you will see that typically, you know, what is our problem? Our problem is we need to ensure that the integrity of what is being sent to the computer is consistent with what's being done and everybody is on the same page. So the problem lies in where does the problem lie? It can actually be in a number of places. It could be within the sensor itself, the APP sensor itself. It could be in the wiring itself.

Mr. BURGESS. Would there be any diagnostic feature where someone could look at that and say, here is a problem with the sensor?

Mr. GILBERT. Possibly.

Mr. BURGESS. The problem being a breach in insulation or a—

Mr. GILBERT. It could be, but it may not be an obvious problem. It may be something that is in a microchip somewhere that's malfunctioned. If you will—if you will look at the report—

Mr. BURGESS. Yes, here is our problem. We just got your stuff really late in this sequence, like 10:13 this morning.

Mr. GILBERT. If you will look, please, on page 5.

Mr. BURGESS. Of which document am I looking at?

Mr. GILBERT. At the preliminary report. There should be a picture there similar to this. Can you see it?

Mr. BURGESS. We're there.

Mr. GILBERT. If you will look at the printed circuit board, if you will, that is a microchip. Essentially both of those electronic circuits are contained within that small tiny chip. I am told by Toyota—when I talked with them, I asked a question. I said, are those two separate circuits within that microchip? They assured me that it was. Those are in very—

Mr. BURGESS. I'm going to break you off. I have gone too long. The Chairman's going to smack me.

Have you done this on any other make or model of car besides Toyota products?

Mr. GILBERT. As far as this type of test?

Mr. BURGESS. Yes.

Mr. GILBERT. Absolutely.

Mr. BURGESS. And—

Mr. GILBERT. They are able to detect a circuit abnormality almost instantly.

Mr. BURGESS. And what is it about the Toyota design that doesn't allow it to detect that abnormality, the proximity of the two sensors?

Mr. GILBERT. I would say it's not so much the proximity of the two sensors but the strategy that they use to detect circuit faults between the two. These two voltages rise together on a plane as you increase the accelerator pedal opening. As a result of that, if they're somehow interconnected—because these are signal circuits. It's all about voltage. And if these two are somehow interconnected through a resistance or a defective chip or chafed wiring a bad connection, you know, I don't know. I need to have a vehicle that's actually failed to investigate further under normal conditions.

Mr. BURGESS. And have you had the opportunity to inspect a vehicle like the Smiths that has actually failed?

Mr. GILBERT. No, sir, I have not.

Mr. BURGESS. I know our time is up. Let me ask you, Mr. Chairman—and I realize I am just the acting ranking member, so I don't know the rules very well. But we did just get Mr. Gilbert's testimony very recently. Would it be permissible to ask him to remain with us through not the next panel but the panel after that and perhaps some things will come up when Mr. Lentz testifies that we would like to get clarification and Mr. Gilbert would be able to participate in that? Would that be permissible?

Mr. STUPAK. I'm not going to guarantee we're going to call Mr. Gilbert back. I'm not sure what his plans are.

But time is up. We're going to the next one. If Mr. Gilbert wants to stay around, there would be a possibility to recall. That would take unanimous consent of the committee to do that.

Mr. BURGESS. Thank you.

Mr. GILBERT. I would be more than happy to stay.

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Dingell for questions.

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, thank you. No questions at this time. I would like to express my sympathy and condolences to the panel members who have suffered personal or family losses.

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Gingrey for questions, please.

Mr. GINGREY. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and for Mr. Kane and Mr. Gilbert. But, also, I want to express my gratitude to the Smiths for being strong and brave and coming before the committee and explaining to us the harrowing experience that you went through, Mrs. Smith.

Listening to Mr. Gilbert, it's almost like I am thinking of Marisa Tomei in *My Cousin Vinny* as you started explaining some of these things to us about what happened to the car. I feel like the judge, actually, listening to that testimony.

Can either of you please explain the differences between the electronic throttle control system used by Toyota and those used by other makes which also have the electronic throttle control system? Is there any unique difference?

Mr. GILBERT. The most unique thing that I detected with the throttle—the accelerator pedal strategy, if you will, for verification of the two signals is the fact that those two signals rise on the same plane in unison, separated by a given amount of voltage.

I might also add that that difference between those two voltages is very, very small according to their—is allowed to be almost ex-



actly, if you will, the same voltage. So they only have to be separated by 2/100 of a volt to still be considered by the vehicle's on-board computer as correct.

With that said, if you look at some other vehicle manufacturers—and one of the first electronic throttle systems that I investigated was one that was made by Honda, and I actually did some training in Atlanta, Georgia, for the Honda training instructors where I investigated how it worked, fail-safe properties and that sort of thing, and basically gave the Honda instructors some information so that they could use it in their class. As a result of that, I was able to look at a lot of differences between the two.

The thing that's interesting—and if you will look, there is—I did include a different—if you look on page 13, there is, you know, an example of the rising planes for Toyota. And then if you look at the very next page in the upper right-hand corner, that is a typical example of what you might find on a Ford or a Honda or some other manufacturers—significant difference between that.

Mr. GINGREY. Mr. Gilbert, you are getting me a little bit confused. I was just simply going to ask you to tell me what a ute was.

Let me go ahead. Toyota maintains that their electronic throttle control has built-in redundancies and sensors and that if there was a problem with a sensor, the car's computer would recognize the different signals and it would go into this so-called fail-safe mode.

Mr. GILBERT. Yes, sir.

Mr. GINGREY. Can you identify a point where Toyota should have realized that the problems the cars were experiencing were not mechanical but they were probably electrical? What is the signals that Toyota missed in this instance?

Mr. GILBERT. If I might refer to the Exponent report, one of the things that I thought was interesting about that report was the very thing that I did to introduce a fault within the system was exactly the thing that they left out of their report. They did 19 tests but they did not do a circuit analysis of a short between the two circuits, between the two signal circuits, and that was one of the things that I did very up front was to see if those two circuits could be somehow intertwined or interconnected.

The reason I did that was because they rose on the same plane of voltages. If I would have done that on a Buick or a Honda, it's quite possible that that vehicle's CCM, as soon as it detected any sort of connection and saw those two voltages not operating within their normal plane of operation, it would have set a DTC or a code.

Mr. GINGREY. Either Mr. Kane or Mr. Gilbert, is Exponent involved in your talks with Toyota?

Mr. KANE. I don't believe they were involved. They may have been on the phone. We don't know.

If I can just step back, because I think that we can help answer your question in looking at is the Toyota system different from other electronic control systems. I think what Dr. Gilbert has identified is in fact, yes, it is. It's different in a couple of key ways.

First of all, it's different in the way it's designed. Its very strategy and how they detect error codes has a wide window of opportunity where errors can be introduced into that wide window without setting an error code. This is in stark contrast to some of the other cars that have been examined.

Now again, the report is preliminary. Dr. Gilbert has been working literally around the clock to help document as much as is possible. What he has found so far is other manufacturers' cars do not have that same strategy. They employ a multitude of other strategies to ensure that a DTC is set so the error code is in fact set under these conditions so you don't, in other words, load that gun. Because what Toyota has in their system is essentially a sensor that goes into nonfail-safe. So whatever happens to that sensor, whatever that sensor reacts to, the computer is just going to do what it says because there is no fail-safe any longer. So there is an outlier.

Mr. BRALEY [presiding]. We have a lot of witnesses on our second panel, and we really need to move as quickly as we can. And you have a right, Mr. Gingrey, to submit additional questions, and we will attempt to get those answered, if you prefer.

The Chair recognizes Mr. Rush at this time for 3 minutes.

Mr. RUSH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Kane, how many years have you been following this area of concern here? How many years have you been following the issues surrounding automobile safety?

Mr. KANE. Well, I started this work back in 1991 at the Center for Auto Safety; and sudden unintended acceleration has been a controversial and difficult issue since the very day I stepped into this problem.

Mr. RUSH. As recently as last month, you released a comprehensive report regarding NHTSA's history and pattern of treatment of sudden unintended acceleration. Is that correct?

Mr. KANE. That's accurate.

Mr. RUSH. I want to note that your study reached similar conclusions as this committee's preliminary investigation, and that is that NHTSA did not prioritize consumer concerns about certain unintended acceleration and did not conduct thorough investigations into the possible causes of these incidents. Do you concur with that conclusion?

Mr. KANE. Yes, I do agree with that. I think when you look at what happened—and I don't take lightly my criticism of the agency, because, frankly, I have worked very closely with a number of the folks in the defects office. They work very hard. They have an impossible job. They are always chasing a constantly moving technological environment that is moving at a rapid pace beyond, often-times, what their resources allow them to deal with.

Mr. RUSH. Thank you. And I totally concur with that.

But my question is, under the current authority that NHTSA has, what more could NHTSA have done to protect consumers in this area? And what is it you would like for them to do?

And following that question, are there answers that you would like NHTSA to take but that they may not be legally authorized to do? What can we do as we look forward to reauthorizing NHTSA to making them a leaner, meaner fighting machine for the American consumer?

Mr. KANE. That's a real good question. We've looked at this very closely, and I can say that one of the things that really needs to happen, because we often are evaluating data NHTSA has as well and we can reach some different conclusions—but at the end of the

day, I think they really need to pay close attention and use the tools that are already there.

I think a number of errors were made in the process of these investigations, not so much that the tools weren't available as much as the tools were not employed. When we looked, for example, at surveillance systems like the early warning reporting system that this committee was involved in following Firestone, the use of that data in a meaningful way would have triggered some investigations into the electronic throttle control.

Doing statistical analyses of the complaints like we did with the quality control systems folks, their analyses have given us—again, the very public data we have access to have given us the tools to look in the right direction. So it's the informed information we use to then go do our investigations and I think that those tools need to be employed more properly and the consumer voice has to be heard.

This is a very controversial issue. Since day one when I started working on these issues sudden acceleration has consistently been blamed on drivers. We have a report from NHTSA from 1989 that was thrown out in response to a most recent defect petition. That report, frankly, is irrelevant to today's technology in the fact that it really points mostly to driver error issues.

We have to listen to the consumers, what are they saying, and listen carefully. I think what we've heard in our interviews with many consumers who experience firsthand NHTSA investigators, the NHTSA investigators came in with a very preconceived notion that this could not possibly happen. They took Toyota's word for what happened that this can't possibly happen, and that's really what concerns us is that the investigations need to be open-minded without the preconceived notion and the tools need to be in place and, furthermore, the counsel at the agency must be willing to sink their teeth into complex issues even though they may take time and a great deal of effort to pursue to get to an end.

Mr. RUSH. Does NHTSA have the authority, do they have the personnel, do they have the resources to accomplish what you have laid out in your opinion?

Mr. KANE. Clearly, the agency is always the underdog here, and we certainly—I can empathize being an underdog in a small company, working against the tide. You have to really use your resources well. And I know the agency struggles with that. They certainly could use the technological expertise or certainly be able to reach out more frequently and have the ability to reach out more frequently to folks who have the expertise like we were able to do as we reached out to Dr. Gilbert and he reached out to us. We can move quickly in doing that without the bureaucracy. I think that the agency would benefit from the ability to do that and particularly in this rapidly moving technological environment today.

Mr. RUSH. Do you have any additional comments along those lines?

Mr. GILBERT. I don't believe so.

Mr. RUSH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. BRALEY. Thank you.

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. Sullivan, for 5 minutes.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In Mr. Kane's statement, he states—this is to you, Mr. Gilbert—he states that you were commissioned to test Toyota's electronic throttle control system. What direction or parameters were you given and what was the purpose of this study?

Mr. GILBERT. The purpose of the study was to—and that's what I outlined in the report. The purpose of the study was to basically contribute to a better understanding of electronic engine controls and the system malfunctions. That was the purpose of that, OK? Because of what I had discovered with the anomalies, if you will, within the fail-safe capabilities of this, this electronic throttle control system, that's where I focused my preliminary report; and so that's what I looked at, was how can a fault occur or how could a fault occur within this system, this particular system that could possibly not be detected by the vehicle's onboard computer and lead to some sort of an unsafe condition?

Mr. SULLIVAN. And what directions were you given?

Mr. GILBERT. Pretty much freedom to do whatever I needed to do.

Mr. SULLIVAN. And when did you start your work?

Mr. GILBERT. Good question.

Mr. KANE. I think—if I could jump in here for a moment, I think Dr. Gilbert and I, we had some communications between him and my engineer in my office over a period of time and he reported his findings. My inclination at that point was immediately that he was on to something interesting; and we said, great, what will it take to get to you investigate this further? And Dr. Gilbert indicated that he needed some additional tools and he needed a little bit of time because he had some vehicles, and we authorized him to do whatever he needed to do to document this as quickly as possible.

He and I were both very concerned about the public safety aspect of this, which is, frankly, why we have very little parameters. We simply were all putting together a Herculean effort to get some testing done and to document what we could. Because, clearly, there is a diagnostic strategy within Toyota there is appearing to be an outlier.

Now, again, I want to emphasize, do we know that this is the cause of unintended acceleration? The answer is no. We have a bookend here with Dr. Gilbert's work. We have a bookend on this end with consumer complaints, and the interesting part is that this matches up against what Dr. Gilbert is telling us.

Are there other possibilities? Absolutely. We have always—from the very beginning, we have maintained that this problem is multifaceted and multi-root cause. There is no one singular problem here. But what Dr. Gilbert is pointing out to us is informing us to look at the next steps.

Mr. GILBERT. If I could expand on that a little bit. You know, my curiosity was first piqued by watching the news media and the—you know the publicity that was going on about that. I first called Mr. Kane—and I believe it was November something. It was just a casual conversation, some questions about it. And, you know, it kind of piqued my interest; and that's why I went ahead and

looked into it on my own. There was no agreement between us to do anything. I just simply investigated.

When I found what I did initially, the first thing I did was I drafted a letter to NHTSA. I contacted Toyota, and then I also contacted Mr. Kane to tell him of what I had found. Literally within seconds I had an e-mail response back from Mr. Kane, and that's where it proceeded from then. And he was willing to give us whatever we needed equipment-wise and that sort of thing to jump ahead, if you will, into investigating that. So that's what I did. With approval of the university, we proceeded into our research.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, Mr. Gilbert, were you told when you began your work that this may be used in preparation for litigation?

Mr. GILBERT. You know, I assumed that that was where it could go, OK? My main search was for the truth. If you would have said that I would be sitting here today, I would have been really floored. But, you know, my main purpose was to get to the bottom of this, and that's where I would like to be. I would like to take this research a little farther.

Mr. SULLIVAN. How many vehicles or how many brands or manufacturers did you do similar tests on?

Mr. GILBERT. Have we done? Currently, today, within this research—and, of course, it's not included in this report—but we've simply—you know, we've looked into a Buick Lucerne that we have. We've looked into a Ford F-150. We also have a Chrysler product that we had planned on using. We just simply ran out of time to be able to do the time for the exhaustive testing that we need to be able to.

Because other systems are different, we have to approach their strategies from a different direction. None were quite as easy as the Toyota to crack. And as a matter of fact, the Buick Lucerne, we've not been able to do it, anything close to what we've done with this.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Mr. Gilbert, how does Toyota fix the problem you demonstrated in your study?

Mr. GILBERT. How would they fix it? My first recommendation would be the brake pedal fail-safe, where if the accelerator input was high along with the brake pedal application that the vehicle would go back to the fail-safe mode, set an DTC, and reduce power. That's the first thing that needs to be done. They need to be reprogrammed. Currently, it's my understanding that some vehicles have that; some do not. Some are scheduled to be reprogrammed; some are not.

The next thing that needs to happen is they need to re-evaluate their fault detection strategy in this area. They either need to tighten their parameters, change the strategy altogether, or do something to ensure that the type of problem that I have been able to introduce into the system is detectable. By detection, that means that then the fail-safe reduced engine power and that sort of thing is now in play.

Mr. STUPAK. [presiding.] The gentleman's time has expired.

Ms. DeGette for questions, please.

Ms. DEGETTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. and Mrs. Smith, I really want to thank you for coming today. I think the thing that has got to be the most frustrating is that this horrible thing happened to you and then nobody believed you.

We had the same situation in Colorado around the same time where we had a family—a mother of young children. She was driving a Prius, and this happened to her on the highway in the mountains and went—and she finally she did what you did, Mrs. Smith. She went off the highway and drove into some trees so that she wouldn't hurt anybody else. Luckily, she lived.

But the same thing happened. The Toyota lawyer sent them letters saying, obviously, it was some problem with your maintaining the car, because there was nothing wrong.

So thank you for—it's hard for you to sit here and say this and for people to deny your credibility. So I just want to say that.

I have a couple of questions for you, Mr. Gilbert. You heard the Smiths talk today about what happened, and I'm sure you have read their testimony as well. Is what Mrs. Smith accounts as happening with her car consistent with a floor mat failure in your experience?

Mr. GILBERT. I think we need to be perfectly clear in that floor pedal or accelerator pedal entrapment with a floor mat is considerably different than what I've—

Ms. DEGETTE. So your answer would be no?

Mr. GILBERT. Restate the question, please.

Ms. DEGETTE. Is what she testified happen to her car consistent with a floor mat problem?

Mr. GILBERT. It's more consistent—

Ms. DEGETTE. Is it consistent with a floor mat problem? Yes or no, if you can.

Mr. GILBERT. I would say no.

Ms. DEGETTE. Would her problem be consistent with an accelerator sticking?

Mr. GILBERT. Sticking? It doesn't sound like that to me.

Ms. DEGETTE. OK. Would it be a problem with the brake, some kind of a worn brakes or something like that?

Mr. GILBERT. I might address the brake statement a little bit further.

Ms. DEGETTE. Sir, I apologize. If you can make it short, because I only have 5 minutes. Thanks.

Mr. GILBERT. If the brakes are applied while the vehicle is going down the highway and the throttle suddenly snaps to wide open throttle, you have two things to overcome. Not only do you have the kinetic energy of the vehicle moving forward that you have to get to bring to a halt, but you also have the full power output of the engine. At that point, the brakes are going to get very hot very quick, and they're going to start to fade fast.

Ms. DEGETTE. But would the original problem be caused by a brake problem of the acceleration that Mrs. Smith experienced?

Mr. GILBERT. No. Brakes don't have anything to do with the acceleration.

Ms. DEGETTE. Right. OK.

Now here is something you might not know. Just today, Toyota's lawyers told the committee staff that Toyota was able to duplicate your tests. The Toyota lawyers also said that they had the same

outcome that you had in your test but with no error codes. But they also said, the conditions that you imposed on your testing were “sabotaged” because you manipulated the electronics to make that happen. And they claimed that this could happen if you “sabotage” any car. Can you talk very quickly—

No, let me ask you this. Could what you did to those Toyotas get that outcome happen to Toyotas in real-world conditions?

Mr. GILBERT. In my opinion, yes.

Ms. DEGETTE. OK. And now certainly most of us aren’t engineers. I never even got a C in any kind of engineering class, because I never took one. Can you explain the types of conditions that might cause these results in the real world?

Mr. GILBERT. It could be an anomaly in the accelerator pedal sensor itself. It could be a problem within the wiring harness. It could be a problem within the vehicle’s onboard controller as well. The important question to ask here is, if I am able to interconnect these two signals, it is possible that accelerator pedal position sensors could have been mismanufactured from the very day that they were built. The fail-safe detection capabilities of the onboard computer are going to accept that as valid. So it’s possible that mismanufacturing of some component along the line has somehow compromised the safety. I don’t know exactly.

Ms. DEGETTE. So it could happen in the real world?

Mr. GILBERT. Absolutely.

Ms. DEGETTE. And is it significant to you that Toyota’s independent consultant confirmed your tests? Does that make a difference to you?

Mr. GILBERT. They said that they were able to duplicate my conditions without setting a DTC.

Ms. DEGETTE. Yep.

Mr. GILBERT. I think that’s significant. They should look at that and say, why didn’t it?

Ms. DEGETTE. One last question, why do you think Toyota wasn’t able to figure this out previously?

Mr. GILBERT. Maybe they didn’t ask the right questions.

Ms. DEGETTE. Thank you.

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Doyle for questions.

Mr. DOYLE. Yes. Mr. Chairman, I will be brief.

To the Smiths, thank you so much for your testimony today. We appreciate you being here.

Mr. Gilbert and Mr. Kane, you said Toyota will be introducing a software fix or some sort of patch to institute a fail-safe where, if the accelerator and brakes are both on, the brakes win. But you also said that not all cars could be updated with this patch. What do you think Toyota should do for the cars that are on the road that can’t be easily updated? I mean, is this something where NHTSA should be called for some sort of a hardware fix or to swap the CPU? How do we deal with the cars that aren’t easily addressed with this software patch?

Mr. KANE. I think that that raises the question from the very get-go, what are the technological problems that give rise to that? I mean, frankly, these vehicles have substantially similar electronic throttle control systems going back as far as 2002, and I have not heard that there is a technological obstacle to installing a brake to

override. It is something we have advocated independently of Dr. Gilbert in his work. We believe that it is a critical safety omission on behalf of Toyota that has led us in part to where we are today simply because there is no driver control in the event of a runaway engine. Dr. Gilbert and I have talked about this subsequently, and it's something that has to happen. The technological obstacles need to be looked at closely to see if they're legitimate.

Mr. DOYLE. Do you have anything to add to that, Dr. Gilbert?

Mr. GILBERT. I think it's important to note that the very initial problem needs to also be addressed in that the fail-safe detection capabilities of this electronic throttle control system apparently fall short of where they need to be. The fail-safe or the brake pedal override, if you will, is just an added measure of safety in the event that if for some reason this circuit was not detected as being defective then at least the driver has some second course of action that should force it into a fail-safe mode. That's exactly what it would want. It may be possible that other vehicle manufacturers may want to address this same situation as well, and I'm told that there is a number of them that do.

Mr. DOYLE. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, I will yield back.

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Doyle.

Mrs. Christensen for questions, please.

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and, again, I thank all of you for being here, particularly the Smiths.

Mr. and Mrs. Smith, I am not clear. In light of the recalls that have happened now, have you been contacted by your dealer, the district field technician, NHTSA, or anyone to rectify the problems that you have gone through over the last couple of years?

Mrs. RHONDA SMITH. Have I been contacted by anyone?

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Yes. You got no response from your dealer, from the technician, and from NHTSA over the last few years, is that correct?

Mrs. RHONDA SMITH. That's correct, yes.

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. In light of the recalls, has anyone come back and contacted you?

Mrs. RHONDA SMITH. No, ma'am.

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. And we've been told I think that in case of unintended acceleration, what should happen is to apply the brake, put the car in neutral, and bring it to a safe stop. Isn't that what you did? Would that be—

Mrs. RHONDA SMITH. I tried.

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. And it did not stop the car?

Mrs. RHONDA SMITH. It did not. But also I think there is something I didn't mention. Of course, you all on the panel know about my letter. But this car also, something electronic, it was doing the revving up and down, also, and I think other people in this room did not know that. But my car, even when it was parked on the side of the road and I was trying to push that button to stop it, it was still revving up and down. So that was another little extra nice thing there about the electronics.

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. I did read that in your testimony.

I had a question about the break override, but I think that that was answered.



Mr. Kane, you are laying most of the blame on Toyota; and I would like to know, in your experience, judging—looking at your experience with Toyota and their response or their lack of response, what is it that you have generally seen in your work with other manufacturers? Is this the usual response, the way that it—

Mr. KANE. That's a good question. Certainly—we've certainly seen other manufacturers try and push these safety measures down.

I think what's particularly troubling is that Toyota holds a special place here in the United States amongst owners. As you know, we've heard from many of the members here that Toyota is a lauded brand. People look at Toyota as being the most reliable, as a company that we can all stand behind and that we know that their products are reliable.

I think what is the crisis that we're in today is in part because that vaunted image that they've created is not meshing with their response and certainly not the response that they've given to consumers. And that's particularly troubling, and I think that's why we've seen them fall so hard and so fast.

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. But the answer to your question, though, I think is—because while Toyota's on the spot today, your response from other manufacturers has been similar?

Mr. KANE. Unfortunately, in crises, we see manufacturers act in ways that often ignore some of the public safety issues that need to be up front. That's been my experience.

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. OK. Unless Dr. Gilbert has anything to comment on that question, I have no further—

Mr. GILBERT. I would like to comment on a statement that Mrs. Smith has made. She mentions the fact of the engine revving, oK. One of the things that the onboard computer will do is, if the RPMs of an engine get to a certain limit, in order to keep from destroying the engine the rev limiter will kick in. And what that will do is it will give a very pronounced audible revving of the engine. This is consistent with a situation where wide-open throttle exists.

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you for that clarification.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you.

Mr. Braley for questions, please.

Mr. BRALEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. and Mrs. Smith, you graciously accepted the responsibility earlier in your testimony of speaking on behalf of the people who aren't alive to tell their stories of what happened with the sudden acceleration that they did not anticipate, and I want to thank you on behalf of all those people for having the courage to come tell your story.

But as you have sat here throughout this hearing, I am struck by the fact that you both seem like reasonable, intelligent, articulate, sophisticated people, and yet every time you have raised a concern about this problem, people treated you like you were crazy. So speaking for all those consumers who have gone through similar frustrations, I want you to tell this committee what it's like to know that you're not crazy, that you know what happened and have nobody in a position of authority who is willing to do something about it.

Mrs. RHONDA SMITH. Well, it made us very, very angry. I tried and my husband tried so hard to send it out to the media, and I knew no one would listen to me as a little person or to my husband. So I knew from the very first. And so I even—you don't know some of the movie stars and Oprah and all those big people. I thought if I can just get them—if I can just get them to get on to this, because I knew I couldn't fight, we could not fight the a big company like that. But we got no response from that.

But to be treated like we were, there are no words to express the anger that was there. I mean, to even get slapped in the face time after time and to literally—and to be literally be called liars, which we are not. But what are you going to do? We did all we could do.

Mr. BRALEY. And I congratulate you for that. I think you should have called Joe Pesci and Marisa Tomei.

I want to talk about My Cousin Vinny with Mr. Kane and Mr. Gilbert. It is probably one of the best movies on trial advocacy and engineering I have ever seen. And one of the scenes, a classic scene in that movie is when they are sitting in this rundown hotel room arguing over who is responsible for a leaking faucet. And Marisa Tomei, Mona Lisa Vito, the character in that movie, said to Joe Pesci that she turned off the faucet. He said, are you sure? She said, I am sure. And he said, are you sure you are sure? And she said, I am.

One of the reasons that scene is so important is because I have right here the reference manual on scientific evidence that is used in Federal courtrooms all over the country to deal with scientific evidence and engineering, and there is a specific chapter in here called Success and Failure in Engineering that gets right to the heart of that faucet scene. It talks about the role of failure in engineering design.

Failure is a central idea in engineering. In fact, one definition of engineering might be that it is the avoidance of failure. When a device, machine, or structure is designed by an engineer, every way in which it might credibly fail must be anticipated to ensure that it is designed to function properly. But, gentlemen, if you completely exclude from your analysis one potential problem that might be contributing to sudden unanticipated acceleration, you're not doing your job as an engineer, are you?

Mr. GILBERT. Absolutely.

Mr. BRALEY. And one of the things that we know is that—and this is something that is true in a lot of disciplines, not just engineering. But another part of this manual says, one of the apparent paradoxes of science and engineering is that more is learned from failures than from successes. Isn't that true in the fields that both of you work in, that it's the rigor of a discipline of repeated testing and ruling out of potential causes that leads you to the ultimate truth of what's causing a problem?

Mr. GILBERT. Yes, sir.

Mr. BRALEY. And this same manual goes on and talks about how successful designs can lead to failure. And we've seen that, where a product which is used on multiple applications, hundreds and thousands, maybe millions of times does not encounter an outside event like the ones you've been talking about that will trigger a catastrophic incident that can lead to the sudden death of people

like we've heard about at this hearing. And it's not that these companies are bad or are intending to build defects into the product. It's just sometimes the rigorous application of design analysis and failure analysis has not been applied to correct a problem. Do you agree with that?

Mr. KANE. I do.

Mr. GILBERT. Yes.

Mr. BRALEY. Mr. Chairman, I think that's been one of the problems of getting to the core of this problem all along is that we've been looking for mechanical failures that are a cheap, easy fix and haven't done the type of rigorous failure analysis to get to the heart of the problem.

And I will yield back.

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Braley.

That concludes questions by all members of the subcommittee. Oh, Ms. Schakowsky. Sorry. I didn't see you there, Jan. You are recognized for 5 minutes.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Thank you.

Mr. Gilbert and Mr. Kane, you have both done extensive research on the electronic throttle systems of Toyota. Have you done any similar research on other brands? Do you intend to do so? Do you think that the problem that you found in Toyota might be common to other vehicles or present in other vehicles?

Mr. GILBERT. It is possible that there may be other vehicles that may use a strategy that's not ironclad as well. You know, that requires a much more in-depth investigation of those systems as well. You've got to remember that in order for you to be able to look into what it takes to set a diagnostic trouble code or a fault in this system you first have to identify what the parameters are for the vehicle's manufacturers to allow such a thing to occur. Most of them are very, very tight.

When I first started into this, I had a preconceived notion that it was probably going to be an impossible task. So you can imagine my surprise when I found that it was as straightforward as it was to be able to introduce a fault.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Mr. Kane?

Mr. KANE. Yes. I think generally looking at—as someone who does defect detection work and surveillance on problems in the field and using the various data sets, there clearly could be problems with other manufacturers. But what's interesting in looking at these problems is that we're now at a place where our regulations are still very behind in the technology. The technology that's in these cars and controls these cars—I mean, the fact that we don't have requirements, for example, for a brake to idle override on electronics despite the recognition of the problems that can occur may be some shortcomings that could address that on a more broad basis.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Thank you.

I wanted to ask the Smiths a question and add my thanks to both of you for being here. You absolutely did the right thing, and you went to Toyota, and you went to NHTSA. It sounds like you went to Oprah. But you stated that prior to inspecting your vehicle, NHTSA seemed to have already decided that the event you experienced was caused by a floor mat trapping of your accelerator pedal.

And you must have been surprised. You must not have been surprised when NHTSA's incident report blamed the floor mats for your harrowing experience. Do you think that it was the floor mat that caused the unintended acceleration?

Mrs. RHONDA SMITH. No.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. And the committee received a copy of a vehicle and incident site inspection memorandum for your vehicle drafted by Scott Yon, an investigator with NHTSA on May 2nd, 2007. And Mr. Smith, halfway through the first paragraph, states—NHTSA states, "No electronic interrogation of any vehicle system was performed." That means that NHTSA decided that it did not need to investigate whether electronics played a role in your wife's experience. How do you feel about NHTSA's decision not to even inspect your car's electronic system?

Mrs. RHONDA SMITH. Well, it was when I received that in the mail, I called Mr. Yon and questioned him about that. Because I told him all along, even when he came down, I said it was not my floor mats. My floor mats did not make all those other things happen to my car. They couldn't have. And I told him that something else needed to be checked out. The electronics needed to be checked out on that car.

And I have a note—I don't know if it's on that original one there—but I have a note at the top that he told me that further investigation was going to be done on that type of vehicle, that it was an ongoing investigation.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. And did you receive any further notification about what happened? Or did you inquire about—

Mrs. RHONDA SMITH. I received nothing else. And also at that point he said that he was being taken off of the investigation, and I thought that was rather strange.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Thank you.

Mrs. RHONDA SMITH. So I never—no, I just gave up on it then.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Thank you, all of you.

I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. STUPAK. That now concludes questions from members of the subcommittee. There are a number of members here from the full committee, as I recognized earlier. They will be allowed to ask questions.

Mr. Buyer, questions, please, 5 minutes.

Mr. BUYER. Thank you very much.

For the purpose of open disclosure, just down the road from where I live is Lafayette, Indiana. Subaru makes the Toyota Camry there in Lafayette.

I also personally know a lot of people who work on the line, and they are very sharp. They take a lot of pride in what they do.

And I would also recognize—I don't care whether it's Toyota or any other company out there—if, in fact, they've done things to cover up an error, I assure you that their brand is blemished, and it requires good-faith commitments on their part to then restore trust and confidence in people to buy that product. So I can recognize that Toyota has to get off their heels and on their toes to do this.

At the same time, with regard to open disclosure, I am uncomfortable here today, Mr. Chairman, with regard to some of the tes-

timony. The testimony—the reason I say that is that one of the nice things about our advocacy system in America is that the truth will always come out somehow, somehow and that we also have to make sure that the advocacy is pure.

So, Mr. Kane, I am uncomfortable with regard to your advocacy here today. I just want you to know that. And also that of Mr. Gilbert.

Mr. Kane, your firm, Safety Research & Strategies, has released a report on February 5 detailing a number of allegations against Toyota related to sudden unintended acceleration. You noted in your report that it was not funded by attorneys, consumers, advocacy groups, or experts interested in the subject matter. It was not produced for litigation against Toyota Motor Company. You would nonetheless like to acknowledge five attorneys who sponsored some of your research into sudden unintended acceleration in Toyota vehicles. You then go on to list the five firms.

What does the word “sponsored” mean?

Mr. KANE. Let me tell you that—

Mr. BUYER. No, what does the word “sponsored” mean?

Mr. KANE. The word “sponsor” means we have done work for these folks to represent the victims—

Mr. BUYER. How much have you been paid by these firms?

Mr. KANE. Frankly, I have not a lot of calculation on that, but what I can tell you is—

Mr. BUYER. Is it \$1 million?

Mr. KANE. No, sir.

Mr. BUYER. Is it \$500,000?

Mr. KANE. It is far less than it cost me to be here today.

Mr. BUYER. Is it \$100,000?

Mr. KANE. No, sir.

Mr. BUYER. Then what is it?

Mr. KANE. I don't know the answer.

Mr. BUYER. You don't know how much lawyers are paying you with regard to your report? Of these five attorneys who have sponsored your research, how many of these law firms right now are suing Toyota?

Mr. KANE. I believe every one of them. They represent the voice of a victim in the problem that we are dealing with today. We are informed by those victims.

Mr. BUYER. So you are acknowledging that you are being sponsored by five litigation trial lawyer firms of whom are suing Toyota, is that correct?

Mr. KANE. If your intimation is—

Mr. BUYER. No, that is not my intimation. Is that correct?

Mr. KANE. It is correct that we have worked for those—

Mr. BUYER. Is it correct?

Mr. KANE. If your intimation is that our advocacy is somehow informed by—

Mr. STUPAK. OK. OK. Hold on here. Hold on. Buyer, hold on. You can't be talking over each other.

Mr. BUYER. I directed him to answer a simple question, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. STUPAK. Then tell him he is not responsive.

Mr. BUYER. You are nonresponsive.

Mr. KANE. I am responsive to your question, Congressman. I have answered your question.

Mr. BUYER. Do you acknowledge—

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Kane.

Mr. BUYER. Do you acknowledge that the five law firms that have sponsored you are involved in litigation against Toyota?

Mr. KANE. That is accurate.

Mr. BUYER. Thank you. Thank you.

Now with regard to Mr. Gilbert, I don't understand what the word—now we've kind of dissected what the word "sponsored" means. Sponsored means being paid. What does the word "commissioned" mean? Are you being—when Mr. Kane commissions to you do a report, are you doing it for free? Or are you being paid?

Mr. GILBERT. I am being paid.

Mr. BUYER. All right. How much money are you being paid for this report by Mr. Kane? Is it more than \$100,000?

Mr. GILBERT. No.

Mr. BUYER. How much money are you being paid by Mr. Kane?

Mr. GILBERT. Whatever he is paying me, it's not enough, trust me.

Mr. BUYER. Mr. Kane, how much have you paid?

Mr. KANE. I can answer that question if you would like.

Mr. BUYER. Mr. Kane, how much have you paid?

Mr. KANE. I have paid Dr. Gilbert \$1,800, and I have sent him some technical equipment that cost me approximately \$4,000, sir.

Mr. BUYER. How much more money is to be paid?

Mr. KANE. We have entered an agreement where as his time he will be paid \$150 per hour for his service moving forward.

Mr. BUYER. Moving forward. So what we have here is you are being sponsored by five law firms of whom are suing Toyota and you have now hired someone to prepare a report that could also be used in litigation later on. Now I am getting a better picture.

Now with regard to this question about manipulation, Mr. Gilbert, in order for you—I don't understand what the word "manipulation" means. In order for you to—the vehicles that you use, are these vehicles that had an acceleration problem or they did not?

Mr. GILBERT. No, sir. They did not. These were normally—

Mr. BUYER. Did you cut three wires in order to manipulate this?

Mr. GILBERT. No, sir. The circuit remained intact from the accelerator pedal to the ACM. The only thing that I did—because of safety purposes—is I tapped into those circuits so I could watch them with an oscilloscope and understand what was going on.

I might back up and say that I had the decision on whether to push the send button to NHTSA. I had the decision on my own to contact Toyota. I had the decision on my own to contact Mr. Kane. To be quite honest, at the moment that I discovered this, I was sick at my stomach.

Mr. BUYER. Mr. Chairman, I think what you're doing here is the right thing. We will find the problem. There will be a lot of research done out here. I don't think this is the—this is just the starting point to find the problem. And I think America, Mr. Chairman, has learned that whenever—you know, from the Dateline incident whereby they re-created the staged crash for the fuel tank, that when you manipulate to exaggerate and show there is a prob-

lem, that doesn't work very well. But I believe that smart minds are actually going to resolve this problem, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you holding this hearing.

Mr. STUPAK. As the ranking member said, we've looked at over 100,000 pages of documents. We will continue to have further hearings in this area. This is probably the first of a number of hearings we will have.

Next, Mr. Gonzalez is a member of the committee. Your turn for questions, please.

Mr. GONZALEZ. Mr. Chairman, thank you very for this opportunity.

I guess I need to start off by just making an observation that I think you can be a Member of Congress, you can be a plaintiff's lawyer and you can be a manufacturer, and we would all still have safety first. So I will ask Mr. Kane and Mr. Gilbert, the fact that you have these relationships as has been explained, has that altered or modified any of your testimony here today?

Mr. Kane?

Mr. KANE. No, it has not. We prepared our report at our own—

Mr. GONZALEZ. Yes or no would be fine. Mr. Gilbert?

Mr. GILBERT. No, it has not.

Mr. GONZALEZ. The Toyota Tundra plant located in San Antonio, Texas, is not in my district. I represent half the city. But I would have been really proud to have had that particular enterprise in my district because of the type of corporate citizen that Toyota has been in our area, the opportunities that it has presented. But that doesn't mean that any individual or corporation is not going to be held to the same standard, whether they are in your district or not.

Now, I do have a question. Mr. Kane, you would attribute sudden unintended acceleration to floor mats in certain instances, would you not?

Mr. KANE. Absolutely. As we have said in our report, we agree that that can happen.

Mr. GONZALEZ. And Toyota has addressed that?

Mr. KANE. Very late. Yes, they have lately.

Mr. GONZALEZ. They have addressed it. It is not an existing condition that you should be concerned about.

Mr. KANE. It is a problem they have experienced for years and they have not addressed it in all models.

Mr. GONZALEZ. I do wish we were in a courtroom, because I would have the help of a judge that you would answer the questions succinctly without any editorializing. Unintended acceleration could also be caused by a sticky accelerator. You don't dispute that, do you?

Mr. KANE. Yes, I do.

Mr. GONZALEZ. You do dispute that the present corrective action being taken by Toyota on the sticky acceleration pedal is not—

Mr. KANE. It does not result in unintended acceleration as we have looked at unintended acceleration.

Mr. GONZALEZ. Well, it is going to be how you are going to define it, if it is going to be sudden, if it is going to be constant and so on. But you are saying it has nothing to do—you are on the record today saying that a sticky pedal has nothing to do with unintended acceleration or maintaining acceleration at a certain point?

Mr. KANE. Maintaining at one point is different. It is not sudden unintended acceleration, sir.

Mr. GONZALEZ. And we can get into that debate. But we have confused all of that, if you haven't noticed, but no one, and I am hoping maybe other panels and other committees will go into the different distinctions of when you have hit the accelerator and it gets stuck as opposed to when you don't even touch it and the car goes out of control. These are huge differences which we are not even touching on, is my understanding.

So I gather what you are saying is what hasn't been tested might be a third culprit, and that is going to be the electronic system. Is that what you are saying?

Mr. KANE. Yes, sir.

Mr. GONZALEZ. But at this point you would not go on record and say that would be the only cause?

Mr. KANE. No, sir.

Mr. GONZALEZ. Mr. Gilbert, have you ever heard of Leonard Evans?

Mr. GILBERT. No, sir.

Mr. GONZALEZ. I hadn't either, to be honest with you. But he was on Linda Wertheimer's recent NPR program, and this is what he said. And I always believed this, and I think Click and Clack agree, the weakest brakes are stronger than the strongest engine. All right?

So what happened to the Smiths, which wasn't their fault and totally out of control, it shouldn't happen to anyone. But if you applied the brakes with all the humanly possible pressure that you have, should it have stopped the car? Should it have brought the car to slowing it down or stopping it? And, if not, why? What would cause someone to be able to put that much pressure on that pedal and not have any result what ever?

Mr. GILBERT. First off, let's ask the question, let's say that the vehicle was at speed, 60 miles per hour. It took a certain amount of horsepower to get there, would you agree?

Mr. GONZALEZ. Sure.

Mr. GILBERT. Most of us don't drive our car at wide open throttle. Most of the time when you are driving down the interstate you are looking at a partial throttle opening at best. If you were at speed and the throttle snapped full open, you have two things to overcome: You have the kinetic energy that was built up in that vehicle to get there, which took a lot of power. You also have now the full amount of the engine to try to overcome.

So, at that point, and I believe that there has been some studies done about braking distances, even if your brakes were sufficient to bring that car under control, it is going to extend the stopping distance considerably. And when you do that, the brakes start to overheat. The hotter they get, the less effective they become. Essentially that is all a brake system does. It takes that energy that you stored in that car and it changes it into heat as you apply the brakes.

Mr. GONZALEZ. So that may explain what happened, but not necessarily that the brake computer malfunctioned at the same time that your accelerator computer. Because you have two different computers in that model, don't you?



Mr. GILBERT. Would you explain that, please?

Mr. GONZALEZ. My understanding is that you have two separate computers in that model car. Now, I may be wrong, and I don't know that they had brake override or whatever.

Mr. GILBERT. Your brake system is still hydraulic. Excuse me. Your brake system is still hydraulic. Your brake system is still hydraulic. The electronics that we put in place on the brake systems are there primarily for analog brake purposes. They are for safety, so that you can steer without losing control of the vehicle. So it is possible that you could lose your anti-brake capability, but still have full brake application because of the simple hydraulics of the system. That is the way it works.

Mr. GONZALEZ. The brakes should work. I am over my time, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for being so generous.

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Terry for questions, please.

Mr. TERRY. No questions.

Mr. STUPAK. No questions for Mr. Terry.

Mr. Ross, is he still here or did he leave?

Well, that concludes then all of the questions of everybody on this panel. I want to thank the witnesses, the Smiths, Mr. Kane, Dr. Gilbert. You are welcome to stay for the rest of the hearing if you would like.

Mr. Burgess wants to ask one more question. I know better, because Mr. Burgess never asks one question. We will try it, Mike.

Mr. BURGESS. Mr. Gilbert, if I could just ask you to address this, what happened when that car was put into reverse? Why did that not seize up the transmission and drop it on the road?

Mr. GILBERT. Some transmissions are designed—and, you know, you are asking me to speculate here a little bit, because—

Mr. BURGESS. Well, let me ask you this. Is there anything that you have found that would have prevented the vehicle from engaging the reverse gear? Does it have something that stops it from going into reverse?

Mr. GILBERT. Hydraulically speaking, and you need to speak to someone who works more on transmissions, I have not been into transmissions for quite some time, there are a number of conditions where you don't want to go into reverse. So it is possible that hydraulically or electronically it was not capable of going into reverse at speed like that.

Mr. BURGESS. Then what about the on-off switch, the button in that car?

Mr. GILBERT. I can't address that.

Mr. BURGESS. Thank you.

Mr. STUPAK. That now will conclude the questions for this panel. Thank you again for being here.

It has been a long hearing so far. We have two more panels. Let's go in recess until 2:15. We will be back here in 7 minutes. Let's give everyone a chance to stretch their legs. We are in recess.

[Recess.]

Mr. STUPAK. The committee will now come back to order. We will resume. I ask members and members of the media to take their position, please, so we can continue.

On our second panel we have Mr. James E. Lentz, President and Chief Operating Officer of Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Incorporated.

Mr. Lentz, it is the policy of this subcommittee to take all testimony under oath. Please be advised that you have the right under the rules of the House to be advised by counsel during your testimony. Do you wish to be represented by counsel?

Mr. LENTZ. Yes, I do.

Mr. STUPAK. Would you please identify him?

Mr. LENTZ. Ken Hester from King and Spaulding. As well, Mr. Chairman, if you would like to hear from an expert that has done testing on Dr. Gilbert's as well as Exponent, there was another attorney present today, Vince Galvin of Bowman and Brooke. He is here with me as well.

Mr. STUPAK. Any time during questions or testimony if you want to consult with them, you can, but we would look to you for the answers to the questions.

Mr. LENTZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. STUPAK. As I said, it is our policy to take our testimony under oath. I would ask you to please rise and raise your right hand and take the oath.

[Witness sworn.]

Mr. STUPAK. Let the record reflect that the witness has replied in at firm. He is now under oath.

Mr. Lentz, I would ask for an opening statement. You may begin, please.

**STATEMENT OF JAMES E. LENTZ, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF  
OPERATING OFFICER, TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, USA, INC.**

Mr. LENTZ. First I am here with my tour de famille. Dealers are here, associates are here, as well as the plant associates, and I thank them for coming.

Chairman Waxman, Subcommittee Chairman Stupak, Ranking Member Barton and members of the committee, thank you for inviting me here today. My name is Jim Lentz. I am the President and Chief Operating Officer of Toyota Motor Sales, USA. In my testimony, I will address Toyota's recent recalls and the decisive actions that we are taking to restore trust in the tens of millions of Americans who purchase and drive our vehicles.

For two generations, we have provided Americans with cars and trucks that are safe and reliable and we fully intend to produce even safer and higher quality vehicles into the future even as we pave the way for the next generation of electric vehicles and hybrids that our society needs.

In recent months, we have not lived up to our high standards our customers and the public have come to expect from Toyota. Put simply, it has taken us too long to come to grips with a rare but serious set of safety issues, despite all of our good faith efforts. The problem has also been compounded by our poor communications within our company and with regulators and consumers.

While all auto companies have recalls and all major auto companies have experienced complaints about unintended acceleration, Toyota's recalls have caused concern among our customers. I would like to assure the committee and the American people that nothing is more important to Toyota than the safety and the reliability of the vehicles that our customers drive.

We are committed to not only fixing the vehicles on the road and ensuring that they are safe, but making all of our new vehicles better, even more reliable, through strict quality controls, enhanced communication, and redoubling our focus on putting the customer first.

Our 1,500 dealers are making tremendous efforts to complete our recalls as quickly and as conveniently as possible for our customers. Some dealers are staying open 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and they are repairing vehicles at the rate of about 50,000 a day. Thus far, we have repaired nearly 800,000 vehicles. We have rigorously tested our solutions and we are confident that these repairs to Toyota vehicles will make them among the safest on the road today.

Our engineers have identified two specific mechanical causes of unintended acceleration covered by recalls and we currently address these through our open recalls. One involves floor mats, that when loose or improperly fitted can entrap the accelerator pedal. The other concern is accelerator pedals that over time can grow sticky with wear and humidity. The solutions that we have developed are both effective and durable.

We are confident that no problems exist in our electronic throttle systems in our vehicles. We have designed our electronic throttle system with multiple fail-safe mechanisms to shut off or reduce engine power in the event of a system failure. We have done extensive testing on this system, and we have never found a malfunction that has caused unintended acceleration.

Additionally, in December we asked Exponent, a world-class engineering and scientific consulting firm, to conduct a comprehensive independent analysis of our electronic throttle system with an unlimited budget. Their interim report confirms that it works as it is designed. Toyota will make the results of this comprehensive evaluation available to the public and the Congress as soon as it is completed.

So, why did it take so long to get this to this point? With respect to pedal entrapment, Toyota conducted investigations of consumer complaints which focused too narrowly on technical issues without taking full account on the way consumers used our vehicles.

In the case of sticking accelerator pedals, we failed to promptly analyze and respond to information emerging from Europe and the United States. We acknowledge these mistakes. We apologize for them. And we have learned from them. We now understand that we must think differently when investigating complaints and communicate faster, better and more effectively with our customers and with our regulators. Our recent voluntary recalls of certain 2010 Prius and Lexus hybrids and certain 2010 Tacoma trucks illustrate this approach.

We are also going further. Our President Akia Toyoda has announced a top-to-bottom review of our operations that he will personally lead with the support of a new chief quality officer from North America and our other principal regions. We will ask independent outside experts to evaluate the findings to make sure that we meet or exceed industry standards. We are expanding our network of technical offices in the U.S. so we can gather information faster and respond more aggressively to incident reports. And we

will install advanced brake override systems in all of our new models, making us one of the first full-line manufacturers to offer this customer confidence feature as standard equipment.

Additionally, we are announcing that we will install this system on an expanded range of vehicles, including Tacoma, Venza and Sequoia models, that are capable of accepting this new software. We have previously announced this system would be involved in Camry, Avalon, Lexus ES and IS models.

These actions underscore that Toyota is going above and beyond what is necessary in terms of vehicle modifications and repairs to ensure that our customers can be completely confident in the safety and reliability of their cars and trucks.

Chairman Waxman, Subcommittee Chairman Stupak, and ranking members, as well as members of the committee, these are only some of the steps that we are taking to earn back the confidence of Congress and the American people. Our 200,000 team members, dealership employees and suppliers in the U.S. are the backbone of that effort. I am confident that we will succeed in restoring customer trust in our quality, safety and reliability of our vehicles.

Thank you very much. I am ready for your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lentz follows:]

PREPARED TESTIMONY OF

JAMES LENTZ

PRESIDENT AND CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER

TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, U.S.A., INC.

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE

FEBRUARY 23, 2010

Chairman Waxman, Subcommittee Chairman Stupak, Ranking Members Barton and Walden, members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me here today. My name is Jim Lentz, and I am the President and Chief Operating Officer of Toyota Motor Sales, USA.

In my testimony, I will address Toyota's recent recalls and the decisive steps we are taking to restore the trust of the tens of millions of Americans who purchase and drive our vehicles. For two generations, we have provided Americans with cars and trucks that are safe and reliable. And we fully intend to produce even safer, high quality vehicles in the future, even as we pave the way with the next generation hybrid and electric vehicles that our society needs.

In recent months, we have not lived up to the high standards our customers and the public have come to expect from Toyota. Put simply, it has taken us too long to come to grips with a rare but serious set of safety issues, despite all of our good faith efforts. The problem has also been compounded by poor communications both within our company and with regulators and consumers. While all auto companies have recalls and all major auto companies have experienced complaints about unintended acceleration, Toyota's recalls have caused concerns among our customers.

I would like to assure the Committee, and the American people, that nothing matters more to Toyota than the safety and reliability of the vehicles our customers drive. We are committed not only to fixing vehicles on the road and ensuring they are safe, but to making our new vehicles better and even more reliable through strict quality control, enhanced communication and a redoubled focus on putting our customers first.

Our 1,500 dealers are making extraordinary efforts to complete our recalls as quickly and conveniently as possible. Some dealers are staying open 24/7 and they are repairing vehicles at a rate of about 50,000 a day. To date, we have repaired close to a million vehicles.

We have rigorously tested our solutions and are confident that with these repairs, Toyota vehicles will be among the safest on the road today. Our engineers have identified two specific, mechanical causes of unintended acceleration covered by the recalls and we are currently addressing these through the open recalls. One involves floor mats that when loose

or improperly fitted can entrap the accelerator pedal. The other concerns accelerator pedals that can, over time, grow “sticky” with wear. The solutions we have developed are both effective and durable.

We are confident that no problems exist with the electronic throttle control system in our vehicles. We have designed our electronic throttle control system with multiple fail-safe mechanisms to shut off or reduce engine power in the event of a system failure. We have done extensive testing of this system and have never found a malfunction that caused unintended acceleration.

Additionally, in December we asked Exponent, a world-class engineering and scientific consulting firm, to conduct a comprehensive, independent analysis of our electronic throttle control system with an unlimited budget. Their interim report confirms that it works as designed. Toyota will make the results of this comprehensive evaluation available to the public when it is completed.

Why did it take so long to get to this point? With respect to pedal entrapment, Toyota conducted investigations of customer complaints which focused too narrowly on technical issues without taking full account of the way customers used our vehicles. And in the case of sticking accelerator pedals, we failed to promptly analyze and respond to information emerging from Europe and in the United States.

We acknowledge these mistakes, we apologize for them and we have learned from them. We now understand that we must think differently when investigating complaints and communicate faster, better and more effectively with our customers and our regulators. Our recent voluntary recalls of certain 2010 Prius and Lexus hybrids and of certain 2010 Tacoma trucks illustrate this new approach.

We are also going further. Our President Akio Toyoda has announced a top-to-bottom review of our operations that he will lead personally, with the support of new Chief Quality Officers for North America and our other principal regions. We will ask independent, outside experts to evaluate the findings to make sure we meet or exceed industry standards.

We are expanding our network of technical offices in the U.S. so we can gather information faster and respond more aggressively to incident reports.

And, we will install advanced brake override systems in all our new models – making us one of the first full-line manufacturers to offer this customer confidence feature as standard equipment. Additionally, we are announcing that we will install this system on an expanded range of vehicles – including the Tacoma, Venza and Sequoia models – that are capable of accepting the new software. We had previously announced that the system would be installed onto the Camry, Avalon and Lexus ES 350, IS 350 and IS 250 models. These actions underscore that Toyota is going above and beyond making the necessary vehicle modifications and repairs

to ensure that our customers can be completely confident in the safety and reliability of the cars and trucks they drive.

Chairman Waxman, Subcommittee Chairman Stupak, Ranking Members Barton and Walden, members of the Committee, these are only some of the steps Toyota is taking to earn back the confidence of Congress and the American people. Our 200,000 team members, dealership employees and suppliers in the United States are the backbone of that effort – and I am confident we will succeed in restoring customer trust in the quality, safety and reliability of our vehicles.

Thank you. I look forward to your questions.

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Lentz.

Chairman Waxman for questions, please.

Mr. WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Lentz, thank you for your testimony, your cooperation with this committee's investigation. These past few months have not been a happy time for your company or for your customers. People have been very anxious about what appears to be a rare situation, but it is a very scary and possibly fatal situation if a car has a sudden acceleration and the car seems to be out of control.

For the future, you are suggesting that you are going to put in a system where the brake will override the gas pedal?

Mr. LENTZ. Yes. 2011 model year vehicles. So with the exception of maybe one vehicle by the end of this calendar year, most of the vehicles that come into the U.S. will have as standard equipment the brake override system.

Mr. WAXMAN. That will be helpful. But let me ask you about the cars that are already on the road. People have these vehicles. You are not planning to do any retrofit of the brake over the gas pedal in those cars, are you?

Mr. LENTZ. There are seven of those vehicles that are currently on the road that we are retrofitting. There are seven models. Camry, Avalon—

Mr. WAXMAN. You are going to retrofit all the vehicles?

Mr. LENTZ. Those that are technically possible we are retrofitting.

Mr. STUPAK. Is your microphone still working, Mr. Lentz?

Mr. LENTZ. The green light is on.

Mr. STUPAK. Just get a little closer, if you can.

Mr. WAXMAN. How many vehicles will then be on the road with the possible problem if the problem is due to something other than the mats or the sticky pedal?

Mr. LENTZ. I don't know the exact number of vehicles on the road that will have the BOS system. It is the majority, but I can't tell you exactly what that percentage is. I don't know.

Mr. WAXMAN. The majority of the vehicles on the road, that are already on the road, will be retrofitted?

Mr. LENTZ. Yes, vehicles on the road will be retrofitted.

Mr. WAXMAN. Now, I mentioned in my opening statement, and it has been well publicized, that I have been critical of your assurances to the American people, and I think we have a film that we can show you. Let's see if we can get that in.

[film shown.]

Mr. WAXMAN. We are having some trouble with our sound system.

Do you stand by that statement? Are you still confident that the two recalls that you put into place will solve the problem?

Mr. LENTZ. Let me make sure that it is very clear on my statement. Unintended acceleration, as I view it and define it, is any time that a driver removes their input from the accelerator and the vehicle continues at some speed. And there are many different causes for that. There are mechanical causes, whether it is a software issue in a transmission, whether it could be an idle-up from an air conditioner, whether it could be a faulty cruise control, whether it could be a pedal, in this case an entrapped pedal.



Mr. WAXMAN. What concerns me, Mr. Lentz, is that there seems to be a difference between your statement that was given on television and the statements other Toyota officials have given to our committee staff. Even your own counsel in a letter to us said that the sticky pedals become lodged in a partially depressed position, which typically does not translate into a sudden high speed acceleration event.

Also, it appears that you are trying to give assurances to people, convince them, that both of Toyota's recent recalls will address the problem. But our committee's investigation calls into accuracy your statement because 70 percent of the complaints of sudden unintended acceleration that come into Toyota's customer call line were from drivers of vehicles who were not included in either of these recalls.

How do you respond to that?

Mr. LENTZ. Well, if I could, the week, it seems like a week, the day that I was in New York doing interviews, there were a number of television interviews. There was also an audio conference call with about 150 journalists. And if I could read to you just a response that I made to a question?

Mr. WAXMAN. It is different from the one on television?

Mr. LENTZ. Yes.

Mr. WAXMAN. And is it more consistent with what we are being told privately by your counsel and by your own technical people?

Mr. LENTZ. I don't know exactly what it is.

Mr. WAXMAN. Let me ask you the question directly?

Mr. LENTZ. Please.

Mr. WAXMAN. Do you leave believe that the recall on the carpet changes and the recall on the sticky pedal will solve the problem of sudden unintended acceleration?

Mr. LENTZ. Not totally.

Mr. WAXMAN. What do you need to do?

Mr. LENTZ. We need to continue to be vigilant and continue to investigate all of the complaints that we get from consumers that we have done a relatively poor job of doing in the past.

Mr. WAXMAN. And why haven't you looked at the possibility of the electronics and the computer system being a possible fault, as we heard from the first witnesses, the witnesses on our first panel?

Mr. LENTZ. We have looked into the electronics. And based on the testing we have done in Japan and now Exponent, that you saw the initial response from their testing, we continue to test the ETCS in Japan, as well as now what Exponent is doing, and we have not found a malfunction. It doesn't mean that we stop.

Mr. WAXMAN. But Exponent's evaluation has been very, very criticized as not being well done, not scientifically, the sample was too small, and an unreliable report. Do you have something more from Japan that you haven't given us?

Mr. LENTZ. I am relying on the information that I have received from Japan, that they are confident that testing has been done in Japan and they are confident that there are not issues with the ECU.

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, Mr. Lentz, my time is up. Let me just tell you that I am not confident that you are looking for something that you don't think exists, because if you are not looking for it you

won't find it. And we had these two witnesses earlier who spent 3 hours and came up with the possibility that this sudden acceleration could take place because of the electronics and the computer system. That report that you gave to our committee from Exponent does not justify ruling that possibility out.

Mr. LENTZ. It is not intended to do that. That is just the beginning of their investigation. They have many, many more steps to complete, and we will provide you with the final when they get it done. That is just the beginning.

Mr. WAXMAN. That report is the beginning, but that beginning only started this month.

Mr. LENTZ. It started—

Mr. WAXMAN. In February of 2010. You are only starting to look at it, and you had an analysis done that was quite inadequate. We need to be sure that you are doing a full and adequate analysis of something you have denied, but which other witnesses have shown us is very possible as an explanation for the sudden acceleration.

Mr. Chairman, my time has expired. I know other members will want to pursue this with Mr. Lentz.

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Burgess for questions.

Mr. BURGESS. Well, Mr. Lentz, just to continue on that same line that the chairman was just following, yes, you have a responsibility to do these things, but there is also a Federal agency who is responsible for traffic safety that has an oversight role here. What have they told you about their independent testing of your electronic throttle control systems?

Mr. LENTZ. I don't know specifically of the results of the tests, other than there have been many, many cases in the past that have been opened, investigations, that have been closed and they have not found anything. I can't tell you specifically what their testing paradigm was.

Mr. BURGESS. Of course, we have had so much data in front of us today. There is one graph here that shows the complaints of unintended uncommanded acceleration that really start in 2002, which my understanding is that that is the year that the electronic throttle control actually came into being on your cars, is that correct?

Mr. LENTZ. I believe 2001 might have been the first year on LS, but it is very close.

Mr. BURGESS. You heard Mr. Gilbert testify here, and actually it was in response to Mr. Buyer's question, that he cut no wires when he did his simulation. Have your guys been able to reproduce his results without cutting wires?

Mr. LENTZ. Exponent in their initial study, I was up at Exponent a few weeks ago and they showed how they tested a vehicle for a vehicle short and other situations that involved the electronics from the pedal to the throttle ECM.

Mr. BURGESS. Were they able to reproduce what Mr. Gilbert showed?

Mr. LENTZ. No. In every case they went into an error code. As you, we received Mr. Gilbert's information very, very late.

Mr. BURGESS. Let me ask you this. Are you going to hire him now? It took him 3 hours to find the problem. If he is correct, we have to make that leap of faith.

Mr. LENTZ. But quite frankly, we encourage people to try to find this. It is not in our interest if a problem exists to not find it and not figure it out. So if it exists, we encourage the Mr. Gilberts of the world to look at it. It just seems a little too good to be true that somebody could figure this out in 3½ hours, when an industry has been looking for this for 10 years.

Mr. BURGESS. It may not be fair to ask you to testify to this, but you heard Mr. Gilbert's testimony. Do you or someone in your organization think it is possible that what he has described would be responsible for what happened, and if it did, would you expect to see some physical evidence, chafing of wires, crossing of wires, or something that actually brought two circuits into contact with the correct amount of resistance and then putting the 5 volts on top of it to create uncommanded acceleration? Is there anyone in your organization who is able to talk to us about that?

Mr. LENTZ. Vince is here, he is one of our attorneys and he has been working with Exponent. And at some point we would love to get Exponent and Mr. Gilbert maybe together. But if you would like, Vince can give you a very quick explanation of what they found. I am not an engineer, so I would probably mess this up.

Mr. BURGESS. Since we are taking testimony under oath, I don't know what is permissible here.

Let me just ask you a question on the fix, because I know your dealers in my area, Toyota of Lewisville, they have been Johnny-on-the-spot with this. They have been getting people in, it takes them 20 minutes to fix it. But if they are fixing the wrong problem and they really need to be developing whatever you call the advanced override for the brake system, then you wonder if we are going to have to call people in for yet another fix to the problem.

Now, what actually fixes the accelerator pedal? What have you developed that will fix that problem on the recall?

Mr. LENTZ. There are two different issues. In the case of a sticky accelerator pedal, they are actually putting in a precision cut steel plate.

Mr. BURGESS. We call that a shim, right?

Mr. LENTZ. Yes.

Mr. BURGESS. How many different sizes of precision cut plates are you producing?

Mr. LENTZ. I believe it is either seven or nine.

Mr. BURGESS. Seven or nine.

Mr. LENTZ. Yes.

Mr. BURGESS. Presumably this material that is hydroscopic and absorbing water and becoming incompatible with proper function, presumably that is a precision manufactured component, is it not?

Mr. LENTZ. I would assume so. I don't know anything about the manufacturing.

Mr. BURGESS. The fact that you have to have seven or nine different size shims?

Mr. LENTZ. I believe it has to do with the amount of wear that is actually on that shim. So when the technician takes the pedal

off, they actually measure how large the gap is, and that determines the size of the shim that they put in, the steel plate.

Mr. BURGESS. But it does strain credulity that a precision-designed chronometer, this shim that we are talking about, it just doesn't seem reasonable that there would have to be so many different sizes in order to fix the problem if the problem was the pedal absorbing atmospheric moisture.

Mr. LENTZ. Well, the size difference is in very small millimeters. To the naked eye, you can tell the difference between the biggest and the smallest, but as you go down the row, they are very, very close in total size.

But what it really does is it ensures that excess friction won't build up in the pedal. And what happens in the past is with wear it gets shiny and once humidity is added to that, it actually builds up too much friction, and that is when the pedal starts to bind or possibly stick.

Mr. BURGESS. Now this fix on this recall, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, they have signed off on this and feel that this fixes the problem? Have they looked at it themselves?

Mr. LENTZ. They don't sign off. We show them our solution and they don't disagree. So we are confident it is the right fix.

Mr. BURGESS. What about the fix of putting the advanced brake override system in?

Mr. LENTZ. Advanced brake overrides in production vehicles has already started on vehicles like ES and Camry.

Mr. BURGESS. But for those of us that have older model Toyotas that wanted to have that degree of safety built in for our families, how do we go about getting that done?

Mr. LENTZ. It is a reflash on those seven vehicles, and it varies by vehicle by model year.

Mr. BURGESS. By reflash, you mean you reset the computer?

Mr. LENTZ. It is a reflash of the computer to be able to add that.

Mr. BURGESS. Technically, how difficult is that to do?

Mr. LENTZ. It takes anywhere from 15 to 30 minutes.

Mr. BURGESS. And how much does it cost?

Mr. LENTZ. We are providing that.

Mr. BURGESS. It just seems reason that that is something that really should happen in addition to all these other things, just to be on the safe side.

Mr. LENTZ. It is for added consumer confidence.

Mr. BURGESS. Thank you.

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Burgess.

On this rebooting of this computer there, why are only some of the vehicles going to be rebooted and not the other ones?

Mr. LENTZ. It depends on the feasibility of the unit. Some of the computers have different types of chips in them. Some are not re-writable. Basically they are hard coded.

Mr. STUPAK. So can't you rewrite the programs so that all of your vehicles are covered? What do you say to these owners who are not going to have this safety feature added to it? They are just going to continue to drive down the road and hope they don't have a sudden unintended acceleration?

Mr. LENTZ. Well, again, the possibility of that happening is very, very slim, but understanding if it happens to you, it is a very, very important incident.

Mr. STUPAK. Sure. Very, very slim. Let's take a look at that. From slim let's go to shim.

You talked a lot about the shim there with Mr. Burgess, but the documents we asked for, and I put this in our letter on February 22nd on the second page, I was going to ask you this question. We wrote to you on February 2nd to request any analysis of Toyota that shows sticky pedals can cause some unintended acceleration. You didn't produce any analysis. In fact, your counsel actually said, "Typically, a sticky pedal does not translate into a sudden high speed acceleration event." So, this shim isn't going to solve this sudden unintended acceleration.

Mr. LENTZ. It will prevent unintended acceleration. High speed, most likely not, because in the few incidents where we had a pedal stick, it is a very low throttle opening.

Mr. STUPAK. As Chairman Waxman pointed out, of the complaints you have in your own database, approximately 70 percent of the sudden unintended acceleration events in your own database involves vehicles that are not subject to the floor mat or the sticky pedal recall. So 70 percent of the problem isn't being addressed by the recall, correct?

Mr. LENTZ. Well, a couple of issues. The most important part about it is those in many cases are customer generated—I don't want to call them complaints, but feedback to us that they are having an issue. What is most important is we are able to investigate those as quickly as possible so we can understand what is going on. And in the past, we have not done a very good job of doing that.

Mr. STUPAK. You haven't done a very good job doing that. We had Mr. Kane on the last panel, they had over 2,000 complaints, and when they went through it, he figured maybe half of them, 1,130-some, cannot be explained other than what the driver said, which is this sudden unintended acceleration. You disagree with that?

Mr. LENTZ. Well, I am not sure if his database is sudden or unintended. I don't want to get into what "is" is here. But there is a big difference between unintended and sudden unintended.

My understanding is the database through NHTSA includes other things such as surges, whether it be from a cruise control, a transmission, or other issues. So I can't tell you from the data that they are using.

Mr. STUPAK. But some of the complaints are like recently, I put it into park, I popped over the curb and hit a tree. One gentleman went off a cliff and his wife died.

Mr. LENTZ. Yes.

Mr. STUPAK. And that wasn't a high speed. But that was a sudden unintended acceleration. It doesn't always have to be at high speed.

Mr. LENTZ. Correct.

Mr. STUPAK. That is why I think all of them have to be taken seriously.

Mr. LENTZ. Yes, there is no question.

Mr. STUPAK. So for 70 percent of those complaints in your database, we don't have an answer yet.

Mr. LENTZ. There are answers with other mechanical breakdowns, from transmissions, from other engine surges. There is pedal misapplication that is the possibility as well. And we are not here blaming customers, but it does take place.

Mr. STUPAK. But it sort of sounds that way. I don't mean to be nitpicking here, but when Mr. Waxman asked you a question about unintended acceleration, you said "as I would define it." That is what you said to the chairman. And it seems like when we get this sudden unintended acceleration, it is the way Toyota wants to define it, not the customer.

Mr. LENTZ. Well, but I think we are defining it as a customer is defining it, and that is a much broader spectrum of any type of surge or movement in the vehicle that the customer doesn't expect to take place. And that can happen from a number of different sources. To me, I would rather have the broad spectrum to look at than a more narrow spectrum of high speed.

Mr. STUPAK. Let's talk about the customer here, because this started in the 2001–2002 model year. You went from the mechanical to the computer electronically-driven throttle system. And by 2004, NHTSA has presented Toyota with a document showing you a 400 percent increase in complaints. That was in 2004.

We learned, and you testified or mentioned in one of your interviews, that you had a recall in Europe, in what, April or May, of this sudden acceleration. Didn't you do some things in Europe, in England, in Ireland? Did you have a recall there?

Mr. LENTZ. That is on the sticky pedal?

Mr. STUPAK. Right.

Mr. LENTZ. Yes.

Mr. STUPAK. So in Europe, excuse me, in England and Ireland, is that just sticky pedal?

Mr. LENTZ. That was a sticky pedal in Europe.

Mr. STUPAK. That is in response to sudden unintended acceleration?

Mr. LENTZ. Again, it is in response to unintended, the possibility of unintended acceleration, which is a safety issue. To me——

Mr. STUPAK. When you did the recall in Europe and did your fix in Europe, in England, did you notify NHTSA of this?

Mr. LENTZ. We knew about it. I knew about it in November——

Mr. STUPAK. But did you notify NHTSA?

Mr. LENTZ. We notified NHTSA as soon as we knew about the situation in the U.S. We didn't——

Mr. STUPAK. Wait a minute.

Mr. LENTZ. November of 2009.

Mr. STUPAK. OK. It took you until November of 2009 when you have had a 400 percent increase in complaints since 2004 to realize there might be a problem in the United States after a recall in Europe?

Mr. LENTZ. Well, I am speaking specifically about sticky pedals. Those don't go back to 2002. The sticky pedal event began in the United States—there was one instance I believe in 2006 or 7. But it was October of 2009 that we had three Corollas, and that gen-

erated our investigation and we notified NHTSA immediately that we had seen that.

Mr. STUPAK. And you still—do you have any analysis, any evidence, that sticky pedals can cause a sudden unintended acceleration?

Mr. LENTZ. It depends on the definition of “sudden.” If it means that you can be depressing a pedal, take your foot off the pedal and the car continues at speed, it does cause that.

Mr. STUPAK. Quoting your counsel, typically it does not translate into a sudden high speed acceleration event, sticky pedals. So sticky pedals isn’t doing anything about sudden high speed?

Mr. LENTZ. Not for high speed.

Mr. STUPAK. And you agree with me there is 70 percent of the customers in the database we still don’t have an answer for their unintended acceleration, if I can use that word?

Mr. LENTZ. There are many factors that lead to it.

Mr. STUPAK. But 70 percent of them we don’t have an answer for, is that fair to say?

Mr. LENTZ. That is probably fair to say.

Mr. STUPAK. If I can just ask you one more question. This is Saturday’s Washington Post, February 20th. It is on the righthand side. “Suspicion lingers over acceleration in Camrys.” OK. The reason why I bring it up is because they cite three fatalities of 2005 Camrys.

It says, on each of these three fatal episodes, the car involved was a 2005 Toyota Camry, a model that the company has indicated is free of acceleration defects. It has not been recalled for either the sticky pedal or the floor mat interference, is that true?

Mr. LENTZ. I believe so.

Mr. STUPAK. Any suggestions on why the Camry has this acceleration problem?

Mr. LENTZ. When the model year changed in 2004, there was an acceleration issue that had to do with the transmission, that there was a surge between 38 and 42 miles per hour, and that surge was caused by a torque converter locking up that wasn’t very smooth. It was a shift shock basically. And that was reported by customers as an unintended acceleration. That software was changed, and that tended to subside that particular issue.

Mr. STUPAK. Have you gone back and fixed the software in the 2005 Camrys then? Because these fatalities I am talking about is the one that went across the parking lot and went over a 70-foot cliff where his wife died.

Mr. LENTZ. Again, I don’t know that.

Mr. STUPAK. Have you put out a recall on the 2005 Camry to fix this? A recall?

Mr. LENTZ. On the pedal?

Mr. STUPAK. On this torque issue.

Mr. LENTZ. The torque converter was 2004.

Mr. STUPAK. These are 2005 Camrys.

Mr. LENTZ. I understand.

Mr. STUPAK. We still have Toyota vehicles that have acceleration and we don’t know what the problem is?

Mr. LENTZ. There is the possibility through either mechanical or human or some other type of error that could cause that.

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you.

Mr. Barton, questions?

Mr. BARTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for those questions. I thought they were excellent.

Mr. Lentz, what is your background? You said you are not an engineer. What are you?

Mr. LENTZ. Sales and marketing. I have a degree in marketing, in economics, and an MBA in finance.

Mr. BARTON. OK. So you do agree from a marketing standpoint that what is going on now is fairly detrimental to your company. Two of your principal dealerships in Texas yesterday met with me, one in Houston and one in Arlington, and their sales are down about 30 percent. I would assume from a marketing standpoint that is not a good thing.

Mr. LENTZ. No, sir, it is not.

Mr. BARTON. OK. You are the CEO of Toyota in the United States. How much authority do you have to solve this problem? Can you pretty well call the shots, or do you have to ask for authority from headquarters in Tokyo?

Mr. LENTZ. Well, I am the Chief Operating Officer for the U.S. From a marketing standpoint, I call the shots.

Mr. BARTON. A marketing standpoint.

Mr. LENTZ. If you are talking about from a defect standpoint or a determination of a recall standpoint, those decisions have been made in Japan in the past.

Mr. BARTON. OK. And I am not saying that is a bad thing.

Mr. LENTZ. But it is changing.

Mr. BARTON. I just want to know how far you can go if you make a promise today that you can deliver on it.

Mr. LENTZ. But that is changing. There are a number of different organizations being put into the company that are going to make things much more transparent around the globe, much more transparent with regulators, and allow us to have input into defect decisions that in the past were always made in Japan. There will be a North American on the committee that makes defect recommendations now, and there will be a process if we don't agree with the decision of that committee that we can have a process to override. Today, that is not existent.

Mr. BARTON. In the prior panel, I don't know if you were in the room or not, but we had a couple I believe from Tennessee, the Smith couple, and the wife, her car experienced an out-of-control acceleration for a number of minutes. She was literally in this car long enough she put it in neutral, she put her foot on the brake, she tried to turn the ignition off, she put it in reverse, she called her husband on her cell phone. That was not a sticky pedal because of a floor mat. Something happened to that car that is unexplainable so far.

Now, we normally when something bad happens in a product, if there is a plane crash, we go to the scene and investigate the plane. If there is a bridge collapse, we go to the collapse of the bridge and we look for structural defect, or design defect if there is a building collapse.

In this case, we have a car that had out of control acceleration and apparently all that was done was it went to a dealership and



they did a routine computer program review. Why has Toyota not obtained that vehicle and taken it to your laboratory and done everything possible to discover what caused the malfunction?

Mr. LENTZ. I don't know specifically in her case, other than I did hear her comment that she had mentioned that a field technical specialist looked at her car.

Mr. BARTON. A field technical specialist.

Mr. LENTZ. Right. That is somebody that works for Toyota.

Mr. BARTON. So you sent one person you are paying \$50,000 a year, and they spent an hour and they hooked up their little program and they said we don't see a problem, and they filled out a form we don't see a problem. You have got a multi-billion dollar company that is experiencing a multi-billion hit in the marketplace. Why in the world won't you get that vehicle and do everything possible to determine—it really doesn't matter that you have got 5 million vehicles that are performing flawlessly if you have got 10 that have failed. Her problem is not a floor mat problem. It is not a floor mat problem.

Mr. LENTZ. I don't know. I can't—

Mr. BARTON. Well, I know. I take her at her word. In fact, she is going down the highway at 100 miles an hour, she has got enough sense to pull the damn floor mat from underneath the pedal if that is what is causing it. You know that and I know that. You can't say it because of all the lawsuits. So why don't you all get the cars that have had the problem, and if you need NHTSA there to verify what you are doing, get them. But if I am President of Toyota, I am going to get the cars that we know had a problem and I am going to do everything I can to find out what caused that problem, and then I am going to fix it if it is fixable.

With Gulf States Toyota and Vandergriff Toyota, those are good people. They want to sell your cars and they are doing this fix, and in my opinion it is a sham. Not because they are not fixing that. They are making it feel better. They are shortening the pedal about an inch and a half and putting this shim that Mr. Burgess has talked about so that it feels differently. But unless it is a floor mat issue, which in some cases it may be, you are not solving the problem that Mrs. Smith had. She didn't have a floor mat problem.

So, again, why don't you get that car, it is still in existence, and check it out? Tear it apart. Do whatever. And do it with witnesses that are credible, because my guess is you have got some really, really smart engineers.

Mr. LENTZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. BARTON. Hopefully they will shoot straight with you, and whatever the issue is, it is—you know, I am an engineer. Engineers are trained. We identify the problem, develop an optimal solution, implement the solution. You probably can solve this problem, if you really try to.

Mr. LENTZ. Well, in terms of going out and seeing what the situation is, we today have two engineering centers here within the U.S. with about 80 engineers. We are adding three more of those. Because our goal is on any unintended acceleration, is to be able to contact the customer—

Mr. BARTON. You are not answering. Why won't you get that car and check it out?

Mr. LENTZ. That is what I am saying. The goal is with these added centers and added engineers, is within 24 hours we want to be at that vehicle and we will inform NHTSA of the situation if they would like to join us. NHTSA has joined us in some of these cases in the past. So we can get that car and see exactly what is going on.

Mr. BARTON. But you haven't gotten the Smiths' car?

Mr. LENTZ. The Smith car, I have written down to find out what happened with that. I have to tell you—

Mr. BARTON. Again, my time has expired. If I am CEO and I have the authority, as soon as I walk out of this hearing, I pick up the phone and I say get that car. If I have to pay \$100,000, get that car, put the best engineers on it, let's tear the damn thing apart and let's find out what is happening to it. Because you can do all this other stuff, but if you don't go where the problem is, you know, you are probably never going to figure out what is going on.

Mr. LENTZ. I can tell you, listening to Mrs. Smith, I am embarrassed for what happened, and we are going to go down and talk to them and get that car so that they feel satisfied. I want her and her husband to feel safe about driving our products. I was embarrassed to hear the story.

Mr. BARTON. Well, my time has expired. We are happy—I have a GM assembly plant in my district, so I have got a good relationship with General Motors. I have a Toyota sub-assembly vendor plant in my district that makes component parts for Toyota. So I am not on any—I want the truth and I want, whether my constituency wants to buy a GM product or a Toyota product or any other product in the automotive sector, to feel that those products are safe, period. And I have confidence in your engineering department. You can solve it if your legal department will let you solve it.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Dingell for questions. Mr. Dingell waived his opening statement and also waived questioning the last witness, so I will give him some leeway with this panel.

Mr. Dingell for questions.

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your courtesy.

Mr. Lentz, please tell me the date that Toyota first heard of incidents of sudden acceleration in its vehicles sold in the U.S.

Mr. LENTZ. I don't know the answer to that.

Mr. DINGELL. Please submit that to the record.

Now, Mr. Lentz, please tell me the date on which Toyota commenced the first recall to address this problem in the United States?

Mr. LENTZ. If I don't know the answer to the first one, I don't know the answer to the second one.

Mr. DINGELL. Please submit that for the record. I had heard that the first notice of it in the U.S. was in November, and that your first notice of it in Europe was in May of the same year. Is that correct? Yes or no?

Mr. LENTZ. I am sorry. I thought when you talked about sudden acceleration—

Mr. DINGELL. I am talking about sudden acceleration.

Mr. LENTZ. But in November, sudden acceleration has been around in the industry for 15 or 20 years.

Mr. DINGELL. I just want an answer, not a speech.

Now, since 2001, how many complaints of sudden unintended acceleration in vehicles sold in the United States has Toyota Motor Sales USA received?

Mr. LENTZ. I don't know that number.

Mr. DINGELL. Please submit that for the record.

How many of those complaints has Toyota Motor Sales USA forwarded to NHTSA?

Mr. LENTZ. I don't know that number.

Mr. DINGELL. Please submit that for the record.

Mr. Lentz, yes or no, prior to the U.S. recalls, were you empowered to authorize recalls for Toyota products manufactured or sold in the United States?

Mr. LENTZ. No.

Mr. DINGELL. Who was responsible for that?

Mr. LENTZ. Japan is responsible.

Mr. DINGELL. That was Japan's responsibility.

Now, Mr. Lentz, yes or no, is it true that the Toyota recall process for vehicles manufactured and/or sold in the United States requires the decisions concerning these recalls to be made in Japan or with Japanese oversight? Yes or no.

Mr. LENTZ. Yes.

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Lentz, yes or no, is it true that Toyota had not reached a decision about whether to recall vehicle models linked to sudden unintended acceleration prior to being visited by Acting NHTSA Administrator Ron Medford in December 2009? Yes or no.

Mr. LENTZ. I think you have to be more specific about is that the floor mat recall issue or is that the sticky pedal issue?

Mr. DINGELL. Well, apply it to both.

Mr. LENTZ. OK. In the case of the sticking pedal issue, I know Mr. Medford went to Japan. I can't tell you specifically if that is the reason. Obviously, NHTSA was clear with us that we were going to have to do something with those vehicles.

Mr. DINGELL. And you had not previously to that time done anything?

Mr. LENTZ. In the case of the sticky pedal situation, I first knew about that in November of 2009. We had reports of three vehicles——

Mr. DINGELL. And he went there in December of 2009.

Mr. LENTZ. Correct.

Mr. DINGELL. Had you done anything about a recall prior to that time?

Mr. LENTZ. No, sir. It was still under investigation.

Mr. DINGELL. Now, Mr. Lentz, yes or no, did Acting Administrator Medford's December 2009 visit to Japan and discussions with Toyota executives have any influence on the decision to recall vehicle models linked to the sudden unintended acceleration problem?

Mr. LENTZ. Again, if you are speaking of the sticking pedal, I don't know. Specifically I was not in the meeting, but I would think it probably did.

Mr. DINGELL. Now, Mr. Lentz, in correspondence addressed to this committee, certain elected officials have communicated their concern that the United States Government's financial stake in Chrysler and General Motors represents a conflict of interest that may be influencing its regulation of Toyota. If that is true, I am outraged.

Do you believe that that statement is true, or not?

Mr. LENTZ. I don't believe that is true. I think the government is acting fairly.

Mr. DINGELL. Thank you.

Now, Mr. Lentz, yes or no, are the reporting requirements for early warning of possible vehicle safety defects different in Japan than in the United States?

Mr. LENTZ. I am not familiar with the process in Japan.

Mr. DINGELL. Would you submit that for the record, please?

Mr. Lentz, are the Japanese requirements in regard to this matter more or less stringent than American standards?

Mr. LENTZ. Again, my responsibility is the United States. I don't know the standards for Japan.

Mr. DINGELL. Now, Mr. Lentz, if the Japanese requirements are less stringent, does that affect how Toyota evaluates potential defects in its vehicles and influence what information the company provides to U.S. Regulators? Yes or no.

Mr. LENTZ. I would think not. The decision to make a recall in the United States is based on our experience in the United States.

Mr. DINGELL. Now, Mr. Lentz, yes or no, has Toyota definitively ruled out nonmechanical failures as the source of sudden unintended acceleration in vehicles recalled in late 2009 and early 2010?

Mr. LENTZ. We never rule out anything that could cause sudden unintended acceleration?

Mr. DINGELL. So you have not ruled that out?

Mr. LENTZ. We are vigilant and we continue to look for potential causes.

Mr. DINGELL. Now Mr. Lentz, put another way, has Toyota definitively determined that electromagnetic interference with or other failures in electronic throttle controls are the cause of sudden unintended acceleration in the vehicles recalled in 2009 and early 2010, yes or no?

Mr. LENTZ. We are studying, through the Exponent study you have now which was preliminary, there was a lot more investigation to go on. So it's been looked at as well as there is going to be an advisory board on quality and safety for the United States.

Mr. DINGELL. Thank you. Now Mr. Lentz, I understand from your testimony that Toyota has called upon Exponent to conduct tests on certain Toyota vehicles to determine possible causes of unintended acceleration. That is true, is it not?

Mr. LENTZ. Exponent is checking our ETCS, yes.

Mr. DINGELL. Now Mr. Lentz, did the report conclude that electromagnetic interference was a potential cause of sudden unintended acceleration, yes or no?

Mr. LENTZ. It has not tested electromagnetic as of yet. What you've seen is—

Mr. DINGELL. So they have not tested it so they don't know.

Mr. LENTZ. It has not been tested yet. It is going to be tested, and we will provide you with the final testing when it's available.

Mr. DINGELL. Thank you. How many models of Toyota vehicles did Exponent test?

Mr. LENTZ. I do not know that.

Mr. DINGELL. How many did they not test?

Mr. LENTZ. When I was there, I saw five different models being tested.

Mr. DINGELL. Would you please submit the response to those questions for the record, please. Now Mr. Lentz, yes or no, do you feel that this is an adequate sample of vehicles for the purposes of Exponent's tests?

Mr. LENTZ. If you look at—

Mr. DINGELL. You said yourself, five vehicles there.

Mr. LENTZ. If you look at the ETCS system, the system from vehicle to vehicle is very, very similar. The throttle body may be a different size, but the general architecture of the system is similar.

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Lentz, I am just a poor Polish lawyer from Detroit. Would you please tell me yes or no so that I can understand it.

Mr. LENTZ. I don't know how to answer that in a yes or no. I think they are testing multiple vehicles. They are testing the system, not particularly how does it work on a Camry versus an FJ Cruiser.

Mr. DINGELL. Thank you, Mr. Lentz. Now, yes or no, are the event data recorders EDRs installed in all Toyota vehicles sold in the United States?

Mr. LENTZ. As of today, no.

Mr. DINGELL. As of today?

Mr. LENTZ. As of today they are not. EDRs are not in 100 percent of our vehicles.

Mr. DINGELL. Yes or no, would these EDRs contain information such as recordings of vehicle component failures that would be useful to investigators in determining the cause of an accident?

Mr. LENTZ. I don't know exactly what they provide. I can tell you they provide information five seconds prior and one second after an accident. I can tell you that by the end of—

Mr. DINGELL. Would you please, Mr. Lentz, submit to me for the record the answer to that question. Now, can data from—again, yes or no, from EDRs installed in Toyota vehicles be easily read by non-Toyota personnel, such as NHTSA investigators?

Mr. LENTZ. Yes, with the proper scan tool of which we are going to produce and get 100 of them in the United States by April.

Mr. DINGELL. So they have not been previously made available to NHTSA?

Mr. LENTZ. There is only one prototype in the United States today, but we will take available—

Mr. DINGELL. All right. What percentage of your vehicles imported into the United States or are manufactured here have EDRs?

Mr. LENTZ. I don't know the exact percentage. I think it's all vehicles except for—I can—if I can look at notes, I can give you—

Mr. DINGELL. Please submit that for the record. Mr. Lentz, in general, prior to Toyota recalls this year and last, by whom and

where could such data from Toyota EDRs be read in the United States?

Mr. LENTZ. I don't know the answer to that because there was only——

Mr. DINGELL. If you would please, Mr. Lentz, submit that for the record.

Mr. LENTZ. There is only one prototype tool available in the United States today.

Mr. DINGELL. So whoever wanted to look at that had to go look at that prototype, right?

Mr. LENTZ. Yes. And I don't know how accurate that prototype tool is.

Mr. DINGELL. So you don't know how accurate it was?

Mr. LENTZ. It's a single prototype tool, the standard for EDRs comes in December of 2012.

Mr. DINGELL. Now, Mr. Lentz, yes or no, did NHTSA require Toyota in 2006 to conduct the tests on electronic throttle components for a 2006 Camry?

Mr. LENTZ. Could you repeat the question?

Mr. DINGELL. Did NHTSA require Toyota in 2006 to conduct a test on an electronic throttle component for a 2006 Camry?

Mr. LENTZ. I don't know the answer to that.

Mr. DINGELL. Please submit the answer for the record. Now Mr. Lentz, if so, did Toyota or a designated third party conduct the tests?

Mr. LENTZ. I don't know the answer to that.

Mr. DINGELL. If it was conducted by a third party, will you please tell the committee its name and submit an answer to those two questions for the purposes of the record, please.

Mr. LENTZ. Congressman, I don't know the answer but we can get that information for you.

Mr. DINGELL. Now Mr. Lentz, are reports on this kind of inquiry generated by Toyota by third parties or by its own internal investigations submitted to NHTSA?

Mr. LENTZ. I'm not sure I understand the question.

Mr. DINGELL. Well, you have these studies being made in-house or by others and the question is, are the reports on those studies submitted to NHTSA or not?

Mr. LENTZ. The study that's being done by Exponent will be given to the public, to Congress as well as NHTSA.

Mr. DINGELL. Has it been done so prior to this time?

Mr. LENTZ. I don't know which specific study you may be speaking of.

Mr. DINGELL. Well, I will let you choose. Have any of them been given to NHTSA or have they not?

Mr. LENTZ. I don't know, given—you know, given my responsibility which is on the sales end of the company, I can't——

Mr. DINGELL. You have been very gracious and kind with your time. But what I am trying to figure out is, are you responsible for these matters? You don't seem to have the information that I have been questioning for. And I am curious, you told us that you were responsible for sales. Are you responsible for manufacturing? Are you responsible for safety? Are you responsible for decisions of this sort? Are these decisions made elsewhere in Japan?

Mr. LENTZ. I am not responsible for manufacturing. I am not responsible for defect or quality decisions. Defect decisions, recalls specifically, are, in fact, made in Japan.

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, you have been most generous with the time. And Mr. Lentz, I thank you for your courtesy.

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Rush for questions, please.

Mr. RUSH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Lentz, I see some attendees who are sitting in the front row with some buttons on which say "I am Toyota America." Are these some of your employees?

Mr. LENTZ. These are some of the employees from our assembly plants that do a great job for us.

Mr. RUSH. Right. Well, I want to commend you on your diversity. I think that you have a very diverse workforce, and I want to welcome all of your workers here.

Mr. LENTZ. Thank you, sir. They are hardworking Americans.

Mr. RUSH. Thank you. We have heard some compelling and disturbing testimony from the Smiths this morning. The committee learned over the course of its investigations that Mr. and Mrs. Smith are not alone in their experience with sudden unintended acceleration and also with their frustrations of dealing with Toyota. In fact, Toyota has received thousands of complaints from its customers about frightening sudden unintended acceleration incidents, and many of these incidents, unlike the Smiths, resulted in serious injuries or even fatalities. And I would expect your company would respond to these complaints with a sense of urgency and complete a serious investigation of these problems. But that's not exactly what Toyota did in the Smiths' case.

One of the most striking things that the committee heard during this investigation and also from testimony is how dismissive Toyota has been on this customer's report of sudden unintended acceleration. Mr. Lentz, just to tell you, I have received just a few moments ago this text written to one of my staff members from my district in Chicago. I'm going to try to pull it up.

It says here—it's from one of the executives at a local newspaper, the Chicago Defender. And it says, "Stephanie"—this is one of my staff members—"if Representative Rush wants to put a face to this Toyota mess, my sister-in-law died December 28 in a car accident near Dallas, Texas. She and three others were riding in a Toyota Avalon when it left the road, hit a tree, flipped in the air and landed upside down in a pond. Everyone died. The police said there was no evidence of any braking, giving rise to the idea that it was an accelerator problem. My sister-in-law, Sharon Love Ransom, was a senior executive with IBM. This is another indication. You have indicated to this committee this morning or this afternoon that you will retrieve the Smiths' car. Would it be asking you too much to look into this matter, and if possible, treating the car involved in this accident?

Mr. LENTZ. If it's the accident that I'm thinking of—and we can have our staff check—both Toyota engineers and NHTSA did, in fact, inspect that vehicle.

Mr. RUSH. And do you know what they determined?

Mr. LENTZ. I don't know what was determined.

Mr. RUSH. Would you check further into this?

Mr. LENTZ. Yes, we will check into it if it's been the car.

Mr. RUSH. Has there been any issues with the Avalon brand?

Mr. LENTZ. There have been cases of both sticking pedals as well as floor mat entrapments, yes.

Mr. RUSH. Mr. Lentz, do you have any reason to believe that out of the thousands upon thousands of complaints that Toyota or Lexus owners are inventing these terrifying stories about their driving experiences?

Mr. LENTZ. No. But from an engineering standpoint, it's critical that we get information so that we can go and investigate today. In many cases, information that's submitted on NHTSA's Web site, unless there is an investigation opened, we don't have the name of the customer or the full VIN number. And I think going forward, one thing that we should think about doing is make that available to the manufacturers so that we can cross-reference that against our databases, and we can investigate these much sooner and not have to wait for an investigation to be opened to be able to do that.

Mr. RUSH. From a marketing perspective, don't you feel as though Toyota and yourself—don't you feel as though you owe your customers who some have gone through some serious injuries, a lot of hurt and pain, don't you feel as though that you owe them a sincere apology for your company, your vehicles, your product causing them sincere pain? Can't you just apologize to them?

Mr. LENTZ. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. We have. Because I will tell you—and whether it is an accident, an injury—I mean, we heard the Smiths today. You didn't have to have a death to understand the terror that she had from that accident. I mean, that's a terrible thing to have to put one of our customers through. And it doesn't even have to be an accident. I mean, we have apologized to our consumers just for the concern that we have given them with their current recalled vehicles. We are sincerely sorry for that concern and anxiety we put people through. I mean, myself, my wife drives a Toyota Prius. It's a recalled vehicle. My son drives a Prius. It's a recalled vehicle. My mother-in-law is in an ES 2006. My father has a Sequoia. They're recalled vehicles. I want to make sure that my loved ones are safe as well.

Mr. RUSH. But switching back over to the engineering. But you still have been pretty evasive here about the cause, the actual cause of all this pain and suffering. There are a lot of inconsistencies there and a lot of dualities that you are operating from. I am not sure if the apology—what is it based on? Is it sincere? Is this really a problem from an engineer's perspective that you assume responsibility for?

Mr. LENTZ. Any time there is one death in one of our vehicles, that—that pains us to have it take place, regardless of how it happens. But it's critical today—and we weren't doing a good job in the past—of investigating those quickly enough, especially when it had to do with unintended acceleration. And with adding these new engineers, these SWAT teams that we're going to be able to get onsite as rapidly as we can, our goal is to make it in 24 hours. We need to be able to do that so we can understand what's happening and make the necessary changes so that it doesn't happen again. I can tell you, I lost a brother in an accident a week after his 30th birthday, and that was 20-some years ago, and there is not a day that



goes by that I don't think of that. So I know what these families go through.

Mr. RUSH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Rush. Mr. Markey, questions, please.

Mr. MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Lentz, it seems to me that Toyota got the first dilemma back in 2000 when the British ordered a Lexus recall due to acceleration problems. Toyota got a second alarm back in 2003 with the Canadian recall. Toyota is a global corporation. Those two alarm bells should have sent your engineers scrambling to figure out what was wrong and what was needed to be done to fix the problems. Instead, the same types of problems cropped up in additional Toyota models, resulting in the recalls that bring you here today.

So instead of deploying your engineers after Toyota got those early warnings in 2000 and 2003, they waited until problems cropped up in the United States, and then Toyota deployed lawyers and lobbyists to convince the Department of Transportation that this was a small floor mat issue and not something more serious. And that, Mr. Lentz, has done a disservice to Toyota's customers and ultimately also to Toyota's dealers and to Toyota's employees. So according to documents obtained by my office, Toyota recalled a Lexus in the United Kingdom in 2000 and a Celica in Canada in 2003 because of floor mats were entrapping the accelerator pedal and the exact same problem that has caused fatalities in this country. Why didn't Toyota take immediate action to prevent the much later accidents when Toyota clearly knew the problem existed as far back as 2000?

Mr. LENTZ. Specifically on those two incidences, I can't tell you the specifics of those because I do not know. But I can tell you that a weakness in our system has been that within this company, we didn't do a very good job of sharing information across the globe. Most of the information was one way. It would flow from the regional markets, like the United States, Canada or Europe back to Japan.

Mr. MARKEY. So what you are saying is that ultimately the decisions are made in Japan and that notwithstanding problems that are identified in the United Kingdom, in Canada, the information goes back to Toyota headquarters in Tokyo and whether or not you, in America, are given orders to correct the problem identified in other countries, is not in your hands, is that what you are saying?

Mr. LENTZ. Correct. But that is changing. There is going to be a number of different groups set up. There is an overall quality group that Akio Toyoda is going to chair.

Mr. MARKEY. Well, you know, that's an important change. It obviously is a policy that I'm sure all Americans are shocked to learn existed. That is, that this system of quality control that Toyota represents to be at the heart of their corporation was not something that shared information about defects in products that were being sold in the United States even though it was identified in other countries. And that's just unacceptable. It's just plain unacceptable to the consumers here in America. Let me move forward quickly if I can. You have told The Today Show that the sticky accelerator pedal and the mat problems were the only problems and that you

fixed them. You have said today that you are only just beginning to test whether or not the electronics are the problem and that you have acknowledged that you can't rule out that possibility. So the reality is, you don't know what is causing all the vehicles to suddenly accelerate and you don't know if you've solved the problem, do you?

Mr. LENTZ. There are many, many causes. In terms of the recalled vehicle—

Mr. MARKEY. But you don't know if you've solved the problem.

Mr. LENTZ. I don't think anyone any manufacturer knows 100 percent exactly what is causing—

Mr. MARKEY. No. What I'm saying is that since you are only beginning the investigation, you don't know if you've solved the problem, is that correct?

Mr. LENTZ. ETCS has been looked at in the past in Japan as they developed the products.

Mr. MARKEY. You said that you had solved the problem. The truth is, you don't know if you have solved the problem, isn't that correct?

Mr. LENTZ. Let me clarify my statement. In terms of solving the issues of those recalls, we've solved the problem. And if—in documents that we have also sent you, when I did a number of interviews with journalists, I made it quite clear that my feeling is—and this is a quote—my feeling is that these two fixes solve the issues that we know of. Are we going to remain vigilant? Of course we will. But we are confident that entrapment is a cause. We are confident that this pedal issue is a cause. And we are confident in those two fixes. But we are also confident that from what we know today it is not an electronics issue.

Mr. MARKEY. What you know today. But again, you're only at the beginning of your investigation, so you don't know what caused the problem, do you?

Mr. LENTZ. We have not seen failures in the ETCS, and we have—this isn't the first time ETCS has been looked at. It is the first time that we have gone to Exponent to look at it. And when we put in our quality North America advisory board, they will have total independent control of another study of their choosing, and that's going to take place—that committee is going to be in place by the end of March. So there is going to be another study soon right after this.

Mr. MARKEY. And is the same thing true for the problem with the electronic throttle control system in your vehicles? Do you know what's wrong there?

Mr. LENTZ. That's what I'm talking about. The electronic—the ETC is the electronic control system.

Mr. MARKEY. You don't know what's wrong there either?

Mr. LENTZ. Again, we have not seen failures. It has been looked at in Japan in the past.

Mr. MARKEY. If there is no possible problem with your electronic throttle control systems, why do you need to find a way to override the electronic throttle? If there is no problem, why do you have to find a way to override?

Mr. LENTZ. I think you always have to keep your eyes and ears open in the event that there is something.

Mr. MARKEY. But you can't have it both ways. You can't say there is no problem but you are trying to find a way to override something that is not a problem. It leaves people with the impression that there must be a problem.

Mr. LENTZ. That's why you have to continually test and test and test in the event that something develops. It could be a change in EMI. It could be a number of different things that we have to continually test and verify.

Mr. MARKEY. I appreciate that. But I just wish that there was a little bit more humility here with regard to what you don't know, that you just say you don't know. And then the public, as they're driving around, carries that kind of cautionary warning with them as they're driving, pending the completion of all of your studies. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Markey. Next for questions go to Ms. DeGette.

Ms. DEGETTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Lentz, I don't know if you saw our opening statements or the previous panel's testimony, but I probably hold the record among the committee members because I have three Camrys. So I am very, very concerned that we get this right, just like you are for your family.

Mr. LENTZ. Thank you.

Ms. DEGETTE. I want to ask you a couple of questions. The first one is, you just told Mr. Markey that this is not the first time that you folks have looked at the ETCS, and you folks provided a number of documents in response to our February 2, 2010, request. As far as you know, has Toyota provided all of the documents relating to previous tests of the ETCS?

Mr. LENTZ. Again, I can't you if it's a test or it's just the development cycle of the ETCS.

Ms. DEGETTE. I mean, we know that you have provided thousands of pages of documents relating to the development. What we want to know is, are there additional documents relating to the testing of the ETCS that you just testified that you folks—that it's not the first time that you have looked at it. And I want to know, are have we received all of the documents relating to previous testing of the ETCS? Because that's what we care about here.

Mr. LENTZ. I understand. I have to check. I don't know specifically.

Ms. DEGETTE. If there are additional documents, will you provide us those to this committee?

Mr. LENTZ. Of course. Of course.

Ms. DEGETTE. Thank you. Now the only document that Toyota has produced to us that we've seen that claims to address the phenomenon of sudden unintended acceleration is this February 2010 report that we've been talking about that was conducted by Exponent. My first question is, that report was commissioned in December of 2009 just 2 months ago by Toyota's defense attorney Bowman & Brooke, correct?

Mr. LENTZ. Yes, I believe so.

Ms. DEGETTE. And how much money was paid—I know Mr. Buyer would want to know the answer to this question. How much money was paid to Exponent to produce that report for your defense attorneys?

Mr. LENTZ. I don't know. Do you guys know?

Ms. DEGETTE. Would you mind supplementing your response with that information? Was it over \$1,800 as far as you know?

Mr. LENTZ. I am sure it probably was.

Ms. DEGETTE. I am sure it is too.

Mr. LENTZ. And my understanding is, we have given them an unlimited budget to test as much as they can to find out about that.

Ms. DEGETTE. Unlimited. And I am glad that you have. But just as you wouldn't question the efficacy of what the previous witness testified to because he was paid a few thousand dollars, you wouldn't think that that would taint the scientific results of your experts either, would you?

Mr. LENTZ. Well, and that's why we have an advisory board—

Ms. DEGETTE. Yes or no is a good answer for me.

Mr. LENTZ. I can understand why you would feel that way, but—

Ms. DEGETTE. No. But you don't think that your people would be tainted any more than the last witnesses were by being paid some kind of a money, correct?

Mr. LENTZ. No, no.

Ms. DEGETTE. Thank you.

Mr. BUYER. I would.

Ms. DEGETTE. Let me ask you this: The Exponent report was considered to be an interim report, correct? So they're still conducting tests, is that right?

Mr. LENTZ. Correct.

Ms. DEGETTE. Will you provide the committee with the final test results when they are obtained?

Mr. LENTZ. Yes. We are going to make that public.

Ms. DEGETTE. And when do you expect that to happen?

Mr. LENTZ. I don't know.

Ms. DEGETTE. Now, it's my understanding that Toyota's counsel, Mr. Hester, who is sitting right behind you, told committee staff today that Toyota had, in fact, replicated Dr. Gilbert's tests and that Toyota was able to produce the same conditions without triggering an error code, is that correct?

Mr. LENTZ. Yes. Exponent—

Ms. DEGETTE. And did Exponent do that test?

Mr. LENTZ. Exponent did that test.

Ms. DEGETTE. And when did Exponent do that test?

Mr. LENTZ. In the wee hours of the night last night.

Ms. DEGETTE. Last night. So this is new information for us.

Mr. LENTZ. Yes.

Ms. DEGETTE. And I am assuming Toyota will be willing to share the results of that testing also with this committee.

Mr. LENTZ. Yes, we will.

Ms. DEGETTE. Now in your opening statement, you have said that Toyota had done extensive testing in electronics and has found no issues. Do you wish to change or clarify this remark in light of the findings disclosed to the committee today?

Mr. LENTZ. Again, I am relying on the representation from our engineering side in Japan that they have told me that they have done extensive testing. I have not physically seen it myself. I have

not seen test results. I am relying on their information to me that they have tested it extensively.

Ms. DEGETTE. OK. In light of these new revelations revealed by your attorney, Mr. Hester, that Exponent was able to replicate the same conditions as Dr. Gilbert last night, does that change your testimony today?

Mr. LENTZ. I'm not sure I understand.

Ms. DEGETTE. OK. Late last night, according to your testimony—

Mr. LENTZ. Oh, OK. Now I understand. We will provide that. I will tell you—again, I don't know exactly how Mr. Gilbert has done this.

Ms. DEGETTE. Are you disagreeing with Exponent who apparently was able to replicate the same tests?

Mr. LENTZ. No. What I am saying is I am not sure if what Mr. Gilbert has done is necessarily something that's real-world that can happen. And I can also tell you that Exponent was also able to do this on a competitive vehicle with the same result. So this is not necessarily something unique to Toyota. It may be unique to his test paradigm.

Ms. DEGETTE. OK. Now I just have one last question for you. I would assume in light of the questions raised by Dr. Gilbert's testimony today as well as the witnesses Mr. and Mrs. Smith and we have a lot more anecdotal information—I have got this couple in Colorado that I have been talking about and on and on and on—I am going to assume that Toyota is going to take this seriously, that they're not going to deny that these acceleration issues could be happening because of the ETCS and that they're going to expeditiously investigate this and are going to provide the results to this committee. Would that be a fair statement of your intentions?

Mr. LENTZ. Yes.

Ms. DEGETTE. I look forward to hearing from you. Thank you.

Mr. LENTZ. Thank you.

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Ms. DeGette. Mr. Doyle for questions, please.

Mr. DOYLE. Thank you. And Mr. Lentz, thank you for all the questions that you've answered. So you heard the testimony of the first panel, and Dr. Gilbert sounds like a pretty reasonable guy. And you just found that your testing company Exponent was able to duplicate what he did. Doesn't make a whole lot of sense—and I think that Joe Barton said the same thing—that you guys talk to Dr. Gilbert when the hearing is over, probably offer him a little more than \$1,800 and ask him to come down to Toyota or with Exponent and the three of you sit together and see if there is something—what's the downside to testing this gentleman's theory here?

Mr. LENTZ. There is no downside. That is why I don't want to downplay what he has done. Again, I am not sure about his testing paradigm, but we welcome anyone that can find any issues with our electronics. I mean, if there is a problem, we want to find it, and we want to fix it. So yes, there is no problem with him getting together with Exponent.

Mr. DOYLE. It is in your best interest to find—I mean, no one has more to lose than you and your employees and your dealers to not

fix this problem. I mean, you should have every incentive—and I believe you do want to fix the problem. Your company has a very good reputation and it's been put into question. You know, perception is reality. We know that in our business. If the public thinks that your car isn't safe, you need to go out of your way to prove that it is.

Mr. LENTZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. DOYLE. So I just think that before you leave Washington, you ought to get this guy's phone number, and he should be sitting down with your people and you ought to test his paradigm and see whether it has any merit.

Mr. LENTZ. And what's important is, when I was at Exponent, I drove a vehicle as they did the test to short-circuit the accelerator pedal. So I had the sense and the feel of what happens when it gets into limp mode, how they can measure based on the scan device what happened. And that's why I just have to really understand as has Exponent what Mr. Gilbert did because my understanding is, we were splicing wires together.

Mr. DOYLE. Well, if I were you, I would want to know what he did too. There is no good outcome from you not trying to get this problem fixed. It's not good for America. It's not good for all the people that work for your company here in this country and all the people that drive your cars for you not to go the extra mile and test any theory that seems to have any merit to it.

Mr. LENTZ. I agree 100 percent. And that's also why going forward anytime we have a reported incident of UA, we're going to send a swat team out there—the goal is within 24 hours—so we can learn as much as we can. That's also why it would be helpful if we could get full vin numbers from NHTSA. Because sometimes they get a complaint that we don't ever receive. And the current thing—unless an investigation is opened up, we can't get that information. It would be very helpful to the entire industry, not just for us.

Mr. DOYLE. OK. Mr. Chairman, in the interest of time, I am going to yield back.

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you Mr. Doyle. Mrs. Christensen for questions.

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to take this opportunity to welcome the dealers and the workers in the audience. I didn't realize they were here when I made my opening statement. But I did say at the time that we wanted Toyota to fix this quickly, not only for the customers but for the workers and the families that depend on them having a job.

Mr. LENTZ. Yes.

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Mr. Lentz, how long have you been in your position?

Mr. LENTZ. Since July of 2006. As an EVP then president and then president COO but basically the same responsibility.

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. I read an article—I don't remember what paper—about a week and a half ago, maybe, that was really talking about the history that Toyota has in not responding to complaints. But it started out by saying that in the late 80s, Toyota would actually go to a customer's home and—say your car has a problem, they would pick it up and they would take it and fix it.

By the late '90s, and beyond that, Toyota started maybe fixing problems that they found in future cars and not even telling the other customers about the problems and then we have the failures that have brought us here today. So that's a total culture shift over that period of time. Can you tell us what happened? I mean, what happened to the Toyota of the '80s to bring us to the Toyota of 2010?

Mr. LENTZ. One comment before that is, there are dealers that still make house calls. My father who lives in Colorado, his salesman lives about 3 or 4 miles away and every time he needs service, the salesperson drops his demo off, picks up my dad's car and takes it in for service. So that does still happen. We're not totally out of the '80s yet. But I think what happened—I think we lost sight of the customer. I think we—I don't think it was a goal for us to grow faster but we did. We had a lot of customers who loved our product. Our loyalty rates were growing higher and higher, and our volume grew. The complexity of the product line grew from the number of models to the number of engines to the number of transmissions to everything else that goes with it.

And I think we outgrew our engineering resource, and I think when that happens—and we have strategies to deal with that, but the strategies didn't work. And I think as a result of that, we're suffering from that today. And I think the most important thing is, we lost sight of our customers. And I'll give you an example even in the floor mat issue.

In the very beginning, back in 2007, we recalled vehicles because of the all-weather mat. The mat was too thick, and there was risk it would bind up underneath the accelerator pedal. And it would happen if the mat wasn't properly put down. So from an engineering standpoint is if the mat's properly in place, it's no big problem, but we didn't understand a simple thing like how customers use a floor mat because in climates like this, people double-stack mats. They put their rubber mat on top of their carpet mat, not just in our cars but in others. We didn't understand something as simple as that.

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. And just to get one other question. I am really disturbed by what sounded like a real snap diagnosis—I'm a physician—in the case of the mats. When we're presented with a problem, we can almost diagnose it by listening to the history but we always look at every other possible cause before we really make a diagnosis and we start to treat. And you know that doesn't sound like it happened here. In your business and in my profession, lives depend on the decisions that we make, and it's really important to really examine all of the possible things, do a rule-out for every other possibility. Can you assure me—I hear you saying that it's not this electronic thing. Can you assure us today that not only with this but with every complaint, that you're going to do a complete diagnostic check?

Mr. LENTZ. Yes. I can tell you that the company's processes from top to bottom are being evaluated and it's starting with the president of the company who is going to speak to one of the committees. He is responsible for a global quality committee. It's a brand-new committee that's going to look at just at quality and safety. And there are representatives from each of the large regions

around the world that are on that. There is an independent advisory board that will report to that, to look over his shoulder.

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. What was the independent advisory board? We talk about people paying and stuff. How do you get this independent?

Mr. LENTZ. You go out and hire safety and quality experts from outside of the company to oversee what's happening, to make sure that we're doing the right thing, and that's the North American region of that, and these committees are going to be announced by the end of March. They are going to be responsible for an independent, totally independent safety testing of the throttle control system.

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you. Ms. Sutton for questions, please.

Ms. SUTTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Lentz, I would like a little bit of clarification on some of the points that have been raised here today during your testimony. A few moments ago in response to one of the questions you were talking about that we welcome anyone who can find a problem so we can fix it, something to that effect. Is that accurate?

Mr. LENTZ. Yes.

Ms. SUTTON. When you say "we," who do you mean? We welcome?

Mr. LENTZ. Toyota.

Ms. SUTTON. Toyota International?

Mr. LENTZ. Yes. Again, TMS USA is a distributor for Toyota in the United States. My group does not design or engineer products.

Ms. SUTTON. And I would like to talk about that a little bit.

Mr. LENTZ. Sure.

Ms. SUTTON. Because you are the president of Toyota Motor Sales in the U.S., as was pointed out by Ranking Member Barton. Does Toyota Motor Sales make safety determinations? Does your department make safety determinations?

Mr. LENTZ. No. What we do is we get feedback from a number of different sources. We get feedback from customers that call in or contact us online. We look through the Internet. We look at NHTSA data. We look at a number of different sources. We get reports from our dealers. We have product reports, all of that information from my side gets put together in reports and they go to Japan to the quality side. So to say that I'm not involved in quality, I am from an antenna standpoint.

Ms. SUTTON. OK. But you also said during your testimony that the communication was pretty one-way with respect to safety and reporting back to Japan because you have testified here today in relation to Mr. Markey's questions about the alarms that were going off in other parts of the world, and we just sort of had—we have a plea of ignorance that we didn't know here, and it might have made a difference in some of the accidents that could have been avoided. So I am a little bit perplexed by the idea. Does Washington staff, safety staff that deals with NHTSA report to you as the head of sales?

Mr. LENTZ. No. No.

Ms. SUTTON. OK. Who does that safety staff that reports to NHTSA report to within your company?



Mr. LENTZ. It reports to TMA Washington, D.C., office.

Ms. SUTTON. OK.

Mr. LENTZ. So there is—Mr. Inaba, who is testifying tomorrow is the chairman of Toyota Motor Sales USA, but he is the president of TMA. So that reports in through him, New York and Washington, D.C.

Ms. SUTTON. So he is the person who is responsible for safety decisions in the USA?

Mr. LENTZ. No.

Ms. SUTTON. It's still in Japan?

Mr. LENTZ. Still in Japan.

Ms. SUTTON. Why would Toyota send the head of sales to discuss safety issues here today?

Mr. LENTZ. I was invited to attend.

Ms. SUTTON. OK. All right. So it was a decision made by the committee, is that what you're—you were invited by who to attend?

Mr. LENTZ. By this committee.

Ms. SUTTON. By the committee. OK. Let me ask you this, because you said in your testimony—"In recent months we've not lived up to the high standards our customers and the public have come to expect from Toyota." And we're all concerned about that, and there are two groups of people who I think that we've all expressed concern for. Most obviously the consumers out there who put their trust and faith and families in those Toyota vehicles.

Mr. LENTZ. Yes. Yes.

Ms. SUTTON. And of course, the workers, the workers who rely on Toyota to make a living and take care of their families. I guess that's why I asked you the question about the "we" because we've also heard a lot of confusing testimony about the electronic throttle control system. Six years ago, NHTSA compiled data showing that Toyota Camrys with electronic throttle controls had over 400 percent more vehicle speed complaints than those with manual controls. So it's rather difficult to—do you think that that's an acceptable sort of number to suggest that there isn't something to it? I mean, it's 400 percent more.

Mr. LENTZ. There is no question it's a big number. But I think, again, we have to understand what those complaints are surrounding. I don't know if all of those are sudden acceleration incidences.

Ms. SUTTON. Right. Well, why don't we know all of that? 400 percent. We might not know everything but when you say, "I don't know if all are," that's a big statement too. We must know more than that statement reflects.

Mr. LENTZ. Well, I can't tell you—again, if you are speaking off of the NHTSA database, unless those are investigated, I can't tell you just from the database exactly what's going on. And that's why it's important that we are able to get that information. And quite frankly, I would love to be able to get confidentiality agreements with insurance companies as well where they can supply us with that kind of information so we can see what's happening.

Ms. SUTTON. Well, Mr. Lentz, the American people and the American market has been very, very good to Toyota. A lot of money has been made by the company in decades past. And so when we read, "I'd like to assure the committee and the American

people that nothing matters more to Toyota than the safety and reliability of the vehicles our customers drive. We are committed not only to fixing vehicles on the road and ensuring they are safe but to making our new vehicles better,” and your testimony continues.

When we read that and then we hear the testimony about the safety decisions being made in Japan in a vacuum, isolating those who are selling these cars to our constituents and their families and who are having the workers and the dealers sell these cars, you know, it begs the question about why people would be concerned of where the facts match up with the testimony. And I yield back.

Mr. LENTZ. I understand. That’s why the process is changing where there is going to be a person from the United States that sits on the defect committee in Japan to be able to make those decisions, and if they don’t agree with that decision, there is going to be a possibility for us to then appeal that decision. And it’s not just in the United States but from around the globe, we’ll be on that.

Ms. SUTTON. OK, Mr. Lentz. But I have to tell you, it comes very late. We appreciate that things get fixed and that is the goal that things get fixed and no more, you know, loss of life is suffered. But again, one has to ask, would it have happened but for some of the mistakes coming to light? And I am glad for the change. I hope it’s enough. I yield back.

Mr. LENTZ. Thank you.

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Ms. Sutton. Ms. Schakowsky for questions, please.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Mr. Lentz, are you asking us to believe that no one at Toyota USA knew about recalls in Canada? I mean, it’s just strains credulity to—

Mr. LENTZ. Again, specifically on the 2003 Celica, I don’t know the specifics on that. I don’t know if that was a vehicle that was recalled here as well. I don’t know the specifics if that, again, was a certain floor mat issue that was unique to Canada. I just don’t know details about that particular recall.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Except that you gave before as a reason that these things are not shared. And it’s just really hard to imagine that whether it was deliberately shared or not that given the fact that many Americans can see Canada from their house, that we did not know about the—

Mr. LENTZ. Again, I can’t speak specifically to that exact incidence. I don’t know the details of what it was recalled for.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. In 2008, a woman named Guadalupe Alberto was killed when her 2005 Camry suddenly accelerated, jumped a curb and struck a tree. Her car didn’t even have floor mats at the time. So why wasn’t this incident further investigated then? It says—I mean, we know as recently as November—or you say in November of 2009, Toyota—or at least up until then—was still claiming that floor mats were the only problem.

Mr. LENTZ. Again, I don’t know the specifics of that particular accident. I can look into it for you.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. That would be fine.

Mr. LENTZ. But the floor mat issue came around earlier than that. The issue in November was really as we got into this issue of the sticky pedal that we learned about.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Right. But here was a 2008 accident, and she didn't have a floor mat. But anyway, you know, we're all in the customer service business ourselves. We have constituent service, personnel in our offices. We take it very, very seriously. I heard you say that you apologized to customers for the problems with Toyotas. Did you apologize to customers who were treated like they were crazy when they made these complaints? Did you apologize to the Smiths?

Mr. LENTZ. I have not spoken to the Smiths, but I am going to. Again, it was embarrassing to hear what happened to them. I don't know the specifics of the situation, but it's—just to hear that, especially on the Lexus side of the business, that's a very unusual way for business to be done.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. It's a very unusual way. Let me quote to you from a letter that was sent to a customer. A 2005 Toyota Tacoma driver told your company that his truck accelerated by itself despite stepping on the brakes, slammed into four parked cars. Here was the answer: The throttle was inspected and moved freely without any binding and was found to operate as designed. The brakes will always override the accelerator, which may not have been true at the time. You said you are making that change, but anyway, in order for this accident to have happened as reported, two totally separate systems, the brakes and the throttle, would have to fail at exactly the same time. This is virtually impossible. And that phrase, that sentence, "This is virtually impossible" seems to have been repeated over and over to your customers. You are in charge of sales. Is this any way to deal with customers, just to tell them—absolutely impossible?

Mr. LENTZ. No, it's not. And I have talked to our group that I am going to be involved in every event of unintended acceleration so that I know what happens. So you know, just overall customer complaints that come in, I get probably 20 or 25 complaints a week. Each and every one of those complaints I have to receive a buck slip back to know exactly what the issue was, what the solution was and whether the customer is satisfied or not.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. You also review—I review letters that go out to my constituents. Do you review—does someone in authority review letters that are sent out so that the credibility of the customer is not only questioned but just negated?

Mr. LENTZ. I personally do not. I will find out. What—is that a recent letter?

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Well, I am looking at three answers that use the same phrase about "virtually impossible." So I don't know the date.

Mr. LENTZ. OK.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. I am sure our staff has those and they can check the date on the letters. My time is up, but I hope you will also make sure that recalls that happen in other places become part of the calculation of how you respond. Thank you.

Mr. LENTZ. Thank you.

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Braley for questions.

Mr. BRALEY. Mr. Lentz, I want to begin by commending you for sharing your personal story of loss with the committee here today. That takes great courage. I would encourage you to share the story

with the decision makers in Japan who are making the key decisions on product defects, product recalls, product retrofits and failure analysis because I think they need to hear that story from you.

Mr. LENTZ. Thank you.

Mr. BRALEY. I also want to commend you for commending the dealers in this country who have done an extraordinary job responding to your recalls and performing retrofits and tying up their staff all over this country. Some of them are my friends and my constituents. So I appreciate your recognition of the sacrifice they're making. I want to focus specifically on the comment that you made on page 2 of your statement which you repeated here today where you said, We are confident that no problems exist with the electronic throttle control system in our vehicles. We have done extensive testing of the system and have never found a malfunction that caused unintended acceleration. I am having a hard time squaring that with Toyota's 2002 technical service bulletin which noted that if customers complained of surging accelerators reprogramming their engine, which you mentioned earlier, was a way to fix that problem and that, sir, sounds like an electronic problem to me.

Mr. LENTZ. I don't know that for certain because I can't tell you if it's a software issue, if it's a transmission issue. There are a number of different reasons for surges. It could be a high idle up that takes place sometimes when air conditioning kicks on, as an example.

Mr. BRALEY. But reprogramming the computer would not be a mechanical fix, would it?

Mr. LENTZ. No.

Mr. BRALEY. And the other reality of that notice is that these 2002 to 2006 Camrys which were the subject of that technical service bulletin, you are not addressing the problem of the brake override retrofit with those models, are you?

Mr. LENTZ. Camry, I would have to look and see what year it goes back to, but we are going back in the case of Camry.

Mr. BRALEY. All right. Now, one of the things you also mentioned in your statement was that in December you asked Exponent, a world-class engineering scientific and consulting firm, to conduct a comprehensive independent analysis of your electronic throttle control system with an unlimited budget. So let's talk just a little bit about that. Your counsel who is with you today is with a very well known firm that defends not just Toyota, but other auto manufacturers in product liability and crash-worthiness cases all over the country. You agree with that, correct?

Mr. LENTZ. Yes.

Mr. BRALEY. And I am in no way impugning them for their role, but I find it very odd that when you were presented with this challenge of getting to the root of this problem, you went to your defense firm to go make the contact to arrange for this independent testing.

Mr. LENTZ. Again, our legal staff put together the request. I can tell you that that report in its entirety is going to be made public.

Mr. BRALEY. And we look forward to it, sir.

Mr. LENTZ. So if there are issues in it, it's going to come out.

Mr. BRALEY. Let's talk about the company you retain, Exponent. Because they are a successor corporation to a company called Failure Analysis Associates, which has done extensive work for not just Toyota but all of the big auto manufacturers and the motorcycle manufacturers on not only failure analysis, but also providing expert witness testimony. You are familiar with that?

Mr. LENTZ. I'm not sure about the expert witness, but I know they have worked for other automotives in things like vehicle stability control and other things that have been developed that have been great for the industry.

Mr. BRALEY. Sure. And one of the things that I can tell you is that I have a copy of a deposition that their chief technical officer, Roger McCarthy, provided in 1998. And in that deposition, he testified that Failure Analysis Associate, then known as Accenture, received between \$30 million and \$40 million a year for the work they did for the auto industry. Were you aware of that?

Mr. LENTZ. No.

Mr. BRALEY. Isn't it true that Toyota has paid them over \$1 million in the past for the work that they've done?

Mr. LENTZ. Exponent?

Mr. BRALEY. Yes.

Mr. LENTZ. I do not know.

Mr. BRALEY. But would you be willing to provide us with documentation of what Toyota has paid to Accenture not just in relation with this study that's being done or in relationship with Mr. Gilbert's follow-up analysis, but over the period of time that these recalls that are being considered or have been issued have been performed, can you do that?

Mr. LENTZ. I am sorry, could you repeat the question?

Mr. BRALEY. Mr. Chairman, I would make a formal request that we get as much information as we can from Toyota International, Toyota North America, documenting the financial relationship between their company and Accenture or its predecessor, Failure Analysis Associates, not just in relationship with the study that was done that has been the subject of this testing?

Mr. LENTZ. That is fine. We will do that.

Mr. BRALEY. Now, one of the things you talked about was the fact that you were present during some testing that was done at Accenture.

Mr. LENTZ. Exponent.

Mr. BRALEY. Exponent, yes. Is that something that you were part of when there was filming that was done to document the testing?

Mr. LENTZ. No. No. I just wanted to go see how they test. I have never been in a vehicle that has gone into fail-safe mode, so I wanted to understand what it feels like from the consumer's standpoint, what fail-safe feels like as you are driving down the road.

Mr. BRALEY. Were you involved in any way in the analysis in terms of defining the scope of that project or how the results would be submitted?

Mr. LENTZ. No. The only portion I was involved in was that when that research becomes available in its entirety, it would be made public. It would be made available to Congress and then NHTSA.

Mr. BRALEY. Did Toyota make a direct relationship for the performance of those services with Exponent, or was that something handled by Bowman and Brooke?

Mr. LENTZ. I don't know.

Mr. BRALEY. Because when you indicate in your statement that you requested them to do a comprehensive, independent analysis with an unlimited budget. I am just wondering whether there are documents that would define the scope of that request and the terms under which Exponent would be compensated for what they were performing. Are you aware of that?

Mr. LENTZ. I am not aware of it, but I am sure it must exist.

Mr. BRALEY. Then I would also request that, Mr. Chairman, and I would yield back.

Mr. STUPAK. That concludes questions by members of the subcommittee. We will now go to questions by members of the full committee.

Mr. Buyer.

Mr. BUYER. Yes. As far as I know, Accenture has not been hired by you to do any engineering or testing, have they?

Mr. LENTZ. Exponent.

Mr. BUYER. Right. Accenture is like an accounting financial firm, right?

Mr. LENTZ. Yes. Right.

Mr. BUYER. You are being asked questions from a Democratic colleague about Accenture and I just want to make sure for the record it is clear.

With regard to the firm that you hired, Exponent, as far as I am aware, even the United States Government turned to this firm to help us come to the solutions as to why we lost the shuttle Columbia, is that correct?

Mr. LENTZ. Yes.

Mr. BUYER. So this is not a fly-by-night firm. This is someone who is one of the best in the United States when it comes to problem-solving.

Mr. LENTZ. Yes. We wanted to find the best. Again, there will be another review of the CTCS done by this independent study group. They may choose to go with them. They may choose someone else.

Mr. BUYER. Now with regard to some testimony that you—I wrote this down because it was bothersome to me. You said that with regard to testing that was done last night with regard to the methodology used by Dr. Gilbert on the first panel, you said “it is not a real world scenario.”

So, can you explain that a little bit further? In other words, he did testify that he used manipulation. He told me that he did not cut three wires. But when you say that there was a methodology that is not a real world scenario, help me understand.

Mr. LENTZ. Well, I think he said tapped in, which is how he gets into the harness. Our understanding is, and again, this happened just 12 hours ago, so I don't want to attack him without knowing exactly what his process was, but my understanding is he took the plug off the back of the accelerator pedal. There are six wires on the back of that; two that go to the sensor, two that go to the power, and two that go to the ground. And he tapped into the two

that go to the sensor, and basically through some device tied those two together and then tied one of the power wires into another one.

So, again, it just doesn't seem as if that is something that may necessarily happen in the real world. And Exponent has tested what happens if you lose ground, what happens if the sensors break down, but in a very different way. So I would just like to understand his methodology and make sure that it is not the testing paradigm that is causing this.

Mr. BUYER. So when ABC showed this, in order to have these results, your testimony would be that Dr. Gilbert had to induce fault by manipulation to create and generate an artificial voltage for the result for which he was seeking?

Mr. LENTZ. Yes, and go around the sensor.

Mr. BUYER. So that normally isn't going to happen as I am driving one of your products down the road, would that be correct?

Mr. LENTZ. I believe so. Again, I am not an engineer. That is what I need to study through Exponent, because they did the same study.

Mr. BUYER. All right. Earlier I made the comment about I think the American public, we have seen what happens when NBC Date-line staged a staged crash between two trucks to claim that General Motors' fuel tank design caused fire on a crash test on television, and we were all pretty upset about it. So now what we have is a repeat scenario with regard to ABC, also using a manipulation, not using a real world scenario. So that type of thing can be left to the credibility of the viewer and the American public.

Now I am going to shift. The reason I am going to shift is let's go back to Columbia. When there is a crash in America and we have a concern, we go to the product. So Exponent looks at Columbia and tries to gather as much information as they possibly can. Data and what is left.

Mr. LENTZ. Right.

Mr. BUYER. When there is an airline that crashes, NTSB will go in and try to recreate and rebuild that aircraft.

When I look at what Exponent is doing and I look at the report and I look at the thousands of vehicles that they are looking at, what bothers me is why wouldn't you, when an automobile that has been identified as this sudden unintended acceleration, why isn't that product pulled aside and ripped apart so you can understand what is exactly going on? Those are the thousand ones that if I were in your seat that I would be going after and applying the greatest minds of the world to understand.

Mr. LENTZ. Yes. In many cases one of the field technical specialists or one of the quality specialists, they do go out. And if there is a component failure, they would take that component off and send it to the quality side to see what is going on. But in the case of the electronic throttle, if they don't get a code reading out that shows the failure and they can't recreate it, it is very, very difficult to be able to do that.

Now, they may take the throttle body off if it is cracked or if it is somehow defective. They will take a pedal off if it is defective. If an ECU is defective, they will take that off. But in many cases, that is what is so frustrating about unintended acceleration. It is

very, very difficult to duplicate, and unless they can duplicate it they have no way of knowing exactly what has taken place.

Mr. BUYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Gonzalez for questions.

Mr. GONZALEZ. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Lentz, in my limited view of things, I always think in terms of how is the consumer protected, how is the best interest promoted. I have concluded that, one, it is the manufacturer's own moral behavior first and foremost. Then we go into the governmental regulatory oversight. And then we have our civil justice system. I am a great believer in the civil justice system. The problem is that is always after the fact, way after the fact.

So I am looking at the manufacturer's moral behavior and I am looking at the capabilities, proficiency and competency of the regulatory scheme that Congress has in place.

When any of this breaks down, Congress will move forward. And you heard Mr. Waxman say, look, we may need legislation, and that is a process that we are engaging in at this time. It is going to get hot and heavy and you are going to see all the different interests.

Last week I was on the radio, and when I simply said let us not rush to judgment, that goes to whether it is Toyota, whether it is GM or Ford. I don't care who it is, an individual or a corporation. The interviewer then said, are you apologizing for Toyota? So we have that issue.

Now, we have members of Congress who may be a little aggressive in fulfilling their duties. You have letters going out that are saying it does sometimes appear, however, that the negative news is being encouraged by plaintiffs' trial lawyers, union activists and those interested in cutting into Toyota's market share.

That is the environment. It is not healthy. It is not good. And all these reasons which are totally wrong and ridiculous are being attributed to those individuals simply trying to do their jobs as Members of Congress. So I am hoping that this process will be fair.

But in the meantime, if there is a rush to judgment, this is the danger, not just to Toyota, but to everybody that will be similarly situated sometime in their lives, whether it is an individual, a company or a corporation, is that months from now we may discover that it wasn't electronic, and that all of the action taken was timely and diligent. But it really won't matter.

We have an old saying, and I said this the other day, everyone will remember the accusation; no one will remember the exoneration. And for a business in the United States, people are making decisions today on what car they are going to buy. By the time we figure out what the truth may be, that decision has been made. And I am going to tell you that I believe what is going on today will affect that decision. That is why we all have to be so careful in how we do this and that we are fair to all parties, whether it is going to be the consumer, the Smiths, or even Toyota, but to be fair to everyone.

I want to know what you can tell Toyota owners today regarding the safety of their vehicles.

Mr. LENTZ. What I can tell them, and I am not going to go through the detail of—all of my family drive products. I would not



have my loved ones driving products, recalled or not, if I didn't feel they were safe. So that is number one.

Number two is we have processes in place, new processes in place, that are going to ensure a lot more transparency and responsibility to make sure we make faster decisions that are the right decisions.

Everybody has defects. Everybody is going to have recalls. But how quickly we react to protect that consumer, how much the consumer sees us standing behind their product, that is what is most important.

I can tell you another thing. We have a lot of dealers sitting behind me. The way we start to build trust in our brand is through our dealers, because our dealers are the true contact with the customer, and they are doing a tremendous job in taking care of these situations. I mean, almost 800,000 customers already taken care of in about 20 days is an amazing number. And you will hear from the dealers that the customers are understanding. Sure, there are one or two customers in each dealership that are pretty upset at what is going on. But for the most part, our loyal customers, they know for the last 50 years that we have stood behind our product, we have done the right thing for them.

Mr. GONZALEZ. Let me ask this, because I think you touched on it. I have 35 seconds. But quickly, you drive Toyotas, your family drives Toyotas, everybody you care about drives Toyotas. Are you going to quit driving Toyotas?

Mr. LENTZ. No, sir.

Mr. GONZALEZ. You heard that Members of Congress on this committee drive Toyotas. I am not going to ask them whether they are going to quit driving their Toyotas. My suspicion is that they will not. So I think maybe that is the message that comes from his hearing today. We are going to be aggressive, we are going to be vigilant, diligent, we are going to get to the bottom of this. The question is to what degree can we protect the American consumer, and I believe that we are going to measure up to that duty and responsibility that we owe them.

I just again thank you for your testimony.

Mr. LENTZ. Thank you. It starts with us.

Mr. GONZALEZ. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Gonzalez.

Mr. McNerney has joined us, a member of the full committee. Questions, please, 5 minutes.

Mr. MCNERNEY. Thank you. I appreciate you allowing me to address the hearing. Mr. Lentz, thank you for appearing today and taking some tough questions.

Addressing the safety issues we are discussing today is vitally important, but I would like to focus my questions on a related matter that I believe reflects on Toyota's disregard for its loyal customers and its loyal employees. I am referring to the decision recently to shut down operations at NUMMI plant in Fremont, California, which will cost us about 35,000 jobs in the State of California, and I don't believe that Toyota has done nearly enough to prevent this loss of jobs.

I have an opening statement that I would like to include in the record, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. STUPAK. Without objection.  
[The prepared statement of Mr. McNerney follows:]

**Opening Statement:**

Mr. Chairman, thank you for allowing me to submit my comments for the record. I would also like to thank Mr. James Lentz, President and Chief Operating Officer of Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., for appearing today, as well as the other witnesses for their presence. Today's hearing addresses Toyota safety failures, an issue of national concern. I am grateful for the opportunity to be here, and I would like to focus my remarks on a related issue.

I believe that closing the New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc (NUMMI) would be a mistake for Toyota and would be harmful for thousands of California families. I urge Toyota in the strongest terms to reconsider this decision because I am convinced that keeping NUMMI open would benefit the public and the company. As I recently wrote in a letter to Toyota's President, Mr. Akio Toyoda, Toyota can hardly afford the public opinion backlash that will result if the company is seen as abandoning thousands of loyal employees during this difficult economic time. The announced closure of NUMMI would result in the layoff of nearly 5,000 workers at the facility and as many as 35,000 people in California. This closure would have a devastating impact on NUMMI employees and supporting businesses throughout the state.

I am pleased to have the opportunity to question Mr. Lentz about Toyota's efforts to maintain operations at NUMMI. General Motors announced that it would end its participation in NUMMI last summer, and it is my understanding that Toyota made the decision to discontinue manufacturing operations at NUMMI in August, only a short time later. I have serious doubts as to whether Toyota, during that brief period, made an earnest and complete effort to explore possibilities that would keep NUMMI open. I have written to Toyota, both personally and in conjunction with Congressional colleagues, to urge the company to reverse its poor decision. Unfortunately I have not yet received complete or satisfying answers to the concerns I have raised.

Private corporations have the right to make independent decisions about their own business operations. However, I do not believe that closing NUMMI in the current economic climate would benefit Toyota's future profitability. Toyota's reputation for producing dependable cars is facing unprecedented challenges because of tragic, and fatal, safety failures that were not publicly acknowledged in a timely manner. Reversing the decision to close the NUMMI facility, thereby saving tens of thousands of jobs, would be a strong indication that Toyota is committed to rebuilding its image in California and the rest of the country. Toyota would be seen as a dependable partner with California during tough economic times.

Californians rightfully expect Toyota to continue producing cars in our area if the company continues to expect our patronage. Keeping the NUMMI plant open would send a clear message that Toyota has confidence in American workers, wishes to retain its customers' loyalty, and cares about the well-being of California families. Toyota also benefitted tremendously from the taxpayer-funded Cash for Clunkers program, and Americans are correct to insist that Toyota display a commitment to preserving and creating American jobs.

Mr. Chairman, thank you again for your leadership on the safety issues that have so many Americans concerned for their well-being. I yield the balance of my time.

Mr. MCNERNEY. Mr. Lentz, Toyota is currently experiencing major public relations problems and the public concern about safety failures is going to hurt your bottom line. California is one of your biggest markets and it is obvious that keeping NUMMI open will help rebuild your image. Wouldn't that be beneficial to Toyota?

Mr. LENTZ. Our image is beneficial, but specifically NUMMI, I think we have to be clear that Toyota is not shutting down NUMMI. NUMMI is shutting down NUMMI. It is a separate corporation that was 50 percent owned by Toyota and owned by General Motors. And when General Motors moved into bankruptcy and the new partner became Motors Holding, Liquidation Holding, it was General Motors abandoning NUMMI that set this in play. That is the truth of the matter.

When they pulled out and they pulled out 30 percent of their volume, that plant was difficult to become commercially viable. It is a long way from our supply lines. We supply a—

Mr. MCNERNEY. It is not a long way from your customer lines. Mr. Lentz, I understand that the Pontiac Vibe was only about 20 percent of production at NUMMI in 2008, with Toyota vehicles making up the rest of that production. Surely Toyota could modify its operations to account for a 20 percent drop in production. It seems to me that you are putting NUMMI out of business because of antipathy toward West Coast workers, not out of necessity.

Unfortunately, Toyota hasn't demonstrated that it has made any meaningful effort to explore possibilities that would keep NUMMI open, and I was asking you, do you expect Californians to believe that in the brief time between GM's announcement and your decision to close, were you able to definitively determine that it was impossible to maintain operations at NUMMI?

Mr. LENTZ. Yes. It is not financially viable to do. It is a long way from our logistics lines. The volume, 20 percent is a pretty big number. I mean, California sells about 13 to 14 percent of the Nation's sales. That is a plant that has capacity for almost 400,000 vehicles that is building around 300, at the most.

You have got to remember that when this industry collapsed after Lehman, we had a 40 percent collapse from the peak of the marketplace in 2000–2001 to where we ended last year. There was tremendous overcapacity all across the United States.

And it is not something you take lightly, closing a plant. You look at the workers behind me. When that market collapsed, and we had 100,000 unassigned vehicles sitting at our ports that we didn't have dealers to be able to accept because the inventories were so high, we didn't lay these people off. We kept these people working because we know that they are a huge asset for us.

So, we don't take closing a plant or NUMMI doesn't take closing a plant lightly. We believe in our workers. They have done a tremendous job in getting us through all this.

So, NUMMI is—unfortunately, we are going to stop ordering product at the end of March. And we will do what we can to try to help the workers through transition, and hopefully, I don't know if another assembly can go in there or they can redevelop the property and create jobs through the redevelopment and whatever goes in there.

Mr. MCNERNEY. I am thinking of your benefit as well as ours. I will leave you with this parting thought. You are having a public relations nightmare right now, and it may benefit you a slight amount to close a plant like that, but you are going to face a public backlash on the West Coast. Now, on the other hand, if you work with us to keep that open, it is going to be a real plus for your public relations issues. I just ask you to keep that in mind as you move forward.

Mr. LENTZ. Just understand as well, we are going to do whatever we can to help through that transition. We are not legally obligated, but we are going to throw money into it to help through this. I just wish that our partner of 25 years would step up and do the same.

Mr. MCNERNEY. That is all.

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. McNerney.

Let me just ask you a few questions to clarify the record a little bit, if I can. There has been a lot of testimony here and a lot of questions. Just make sure I am correct here.

The only independent analysis that you have had, when you spoke on the Today Show you said you have an independent analysis on your problems with the sudden acceleration, has been Exponent, correct?

Mr. LENTZ. Yes, to my knowledge.

Mr. STUPAK. And you were referring to that report of Exponent?

Mr. LENTZ. Yes. Now, NTSA has also done studies in the past, but I don't know how robust they are. So I don't want to—

Mr. STUPAK. But you don't have any knowledge of any independent studies they did?

Mr. LENTZ. No, not to my knowledge.

Mr. STUPAK. All right. And there has been no independent electronic throttle control system studies.

Mr. LENTZ. Not at Toyota. There may be industrywide. I don't know.

Mr. STUPAK. But after this situation.

Mr. LENTZ. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. STUPAK. With Dr. Gilbert here, he has come up with this, and apparently your—Exponent's engineer has been able to duplicate it. Is it fair to say then when they duplicated it, they got the same result as Dr. Gilbert that the fail-safe system did not receive the signal to enact. So, in other words, the fail-safe system, whether it is an override—however it happened, the diagnostic codes did not kick in to put in the fail-safe system to get that braking going.

Mr. LENTZ. Yes. I believe what he has done is designed a way to go around the override system. So whether it can happen or not—

Mr. STUPAK. Sure. We don't know the source of it, but it is a bookend, as they said, to start the research.

Mr. LENTZ. Yes.

Mr. STUPAK. And that could be a value to Toyota in trying to restore service?

Mr. LENTZ. Yes.

Mr. STUPAK. You mentioned the SWAT team you are going to have at the end of March.

Mr. LENTZ. Yes.

Mr. STUPAK. Within 24 hours they will have information and be on site. Let me ask you this. Mr. Dingell asked and a couple of questions have been about this event data recorder. The event data recorder, as you said, tells you what happens 5 seconds before an accident and 1 second after.

Specific requests have been made on the Auburn, New York, crash, which was a 2010 Camry. That ERB has been seized. Do you know where it is? Why isn't the information made available to NHTSA or anyone else? No one seems to know the result.

Mr. LENTZ. I don't know. If I can get information on that crash—

Mr. STUPAK. How about the South Lake, Texas, one. That was that 2008 Toyota Avalon Mr. Rush brought up. It happened on December 26th. The same thing. It says conducted a site visit on 1/12 where they pulled the black box out, if you will. Where are your results on that?

Mr. LENTZ. And they pulled the pedal off. I don't know. Because I know NHTSA was also down there with our engineers, but I don't know specifically what the result was.

Mr. STUPAK. Or how about Mr. Jeff Papinski. He was from Minnesota. He had a 2007 Lexus ES350 and had problems with it and requested repeatedly from Toyota to give him the information off the black box, and he has always been denied.

If we are going to have this SWAT team and we are going to be more transparent and bring forward this information, why not on these fatal crashes, especially the ones I mentioned, why not disclose what happened on that black box?

Mr. LENTZ. I think right now the issue is there is one tool in the entire United States, and I believe it is still in the prototype stages. So the final production tools we won't start seeing here until April.

Mr. STUPAK. But standards for the black box were developed in 2006 by NHTSA that everybody has to have starting in 2012 and 2013, correct?

Mr. LENTZ. Yes, it is in 2012.

Mr. STUPAK. So if we have standards in 2006, you are still trying to develop a prototype?

Mr. LENTZ. That is my understanding.

Mr. STUPAK. So information off this black box then, if I wanted to get the information, if there is no mechanism in the United States, it has to go to Japan to get the information?

Mr. LENTZ. Correct. Correct. It is a unique mechanism for our black box.

Mr. STUPAK. And this defect committee, the U.S. may have a representative on it but the decisions are still going to be made in Japan?

Mr. LENTZ. Well, the process of making a defect decision is there is a general manager of the quality group that has a committee with a number of different engineers and everyone else. That has always been in Japan with Japanese. That committee now is going to have people that will be seated on that from other parts of the regions around the world. The United States for certain. I don't know, I am assuming Europe will probably be there as well. So they will be part of—they will be tied in to all the information

available, into the decision process, and we will have the ability to appeal that if we don't believe in it.

Mr. STUPAK. You will have input, but the decision will still be made in Japan?

Mr. LENTZ. Well, the input will be made, but we will have the ability to appeal that decision that we do not have today.

Mr. STUPAK. Let me ask on the black box there, where is that data stored?

Mr. LENTZ. Pardon?

Mr. STUPAK. Where is that data stored? If I get a black box out of the South Lake, Texas, accident, where would that data be stored? Would that have to go to Japan to get downloaded?

Mr. LENTZ. No. I mean, if we have the scan tool, once these tools are available—

Mr. STUPAK. Right now, because you don't have the scan tools.

Mr. LENTZ. I don't know if Japan has tools or not. If we are in prototype stage, I am assuming that it is a global prototype stage. I don't know that for certain. But I do know in April we are slated to receive about 100 of these.

Mr. STUPAK. All right. That will be in April. OK. If you receive personally, you say you receive 20 to 25 complaints a week. Are any of them on unintended accelerations?

Mr. LENTZ. I have got to tell you, in the last 3 years, I have seen them on surges, but I don't recall any one that was on an unintended incidence.

Mr. STUPAK. Could you provide us an example of some of those surges that you personally handled?

Mr. LENTZ. Sure.

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Burgess, did you have any questions?

Mr. BURGESS. I think it has already been addressed, but I just would like for you, Mr. Lentz, or Toyota to provide the committee your analysis or Exponent's analysis of when they do the testing, the retesting on the Gilbert thing.

I would just echo about the black box. South Lake is right outside of my district. It was a very tragic accident right after Christmas where a car went through an intersection and ended upside down in a pond and all the occupants died. There is some question as to whether or not there might have been a medical emergency involved in that. But I think the black box in addition to the other physical evidence, the brake pads and that sort of thing, will be very instructive for your group and, of course, instructive for us as well.

So, as this information on these look-backs, if you go out and get the car from Tennessee and your engineers come up with a decision on this, I actually think it would be very useful that this committee would have that information as early as possible after you get that.

Mr. LENTZ. Surely.

Mr. BURGESS. Heaven help us if there is another uncommanded acceleration. But get that car. The first thing that has to happen is somebody has to look at that car and figure out what is going on.

Mr. LENTZ. I appreciate it.

Mr. STUPAK. We are about to wrap up. I see Mr. Engel is here. Did you have a question, Mr. Engel, of this witness? You are a member of the full committee.

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think a lot of the questions have already been asked. But when I was asked by the media yesterday what question was I going to ask, I said that I would ask what did you know and when did you know it and what do you still know that we don't know.

I have listened to the hearing, and, Mr. Lentz, all I can say is that I hope you can appreciate that we are very skeptical, because it certainly seems if you just look at the chain of events that there was an attempt to kind of sweep everything under the rug. And I am still not sure that the question has been reasonably answered in terms of, you know, you talk about these six vehicles that you tested. But why would not your first inclination be to test the vehicles that accelerated?

When I heard Mrs. Smith earlier on, on the first panel, and she talked about how it just went 100 miles an hour and she couldn't do anything to stop it, wouldn't it have just been logical to take that car and others like that and just rip it apart? I know Mr. Barton asked you it earlier, but I am not sure I am satisfied with your answer.

Mr. LENTZ. Again, I don't know the specifics, but it sounded as if she said that there was a technical person that was down there and did look at the car. So I can't tell you—if they didn't see anything, that is probably why they didn't tear it apart. If they would have seen a component failure, I am sure that component failure would have come off that car and we would have received it. Again, it may have happened. I don't know. I don't know the specifics on her accident.

Mr. ENGEL. But it wasn't only her car. There were others that gave similar stories, and for how long was Toyota saying it is mats, floor mats, or rugs or sticky pedals, when it just would seem clear by her story, I am sure there are others like her, that it wasn't that at all.

Mr. LENTZ. It may not be. There are so many different causes. They are very broad, they are very rare, and in some cases they are just very, very difficult to duplicate. That is the frustrating part about researching what happens on some of these instances, especially if there is something that is going on with the throttle, if there aren't error codes and it can't be duplicated.

That was one of the challenges with the sticky pedal in the beginning, was by the time the consumer got it to the dealership all the moisture had dried from the pedal and the pedal wouldn't stick, and you have got a consumer saying I am telling you, I know this thing has been sticking but by the time they get to the store it can't be replicated. And that took a while to understand exactly what was going on.

Mr. ENGEL. But in every case? Would that happen in every case? Surely once there were many different instances, there seemed to be a pattern, that you didn't have to be a rocket scientist to say, hey, wait a minute, maybe something is wrong. There is not only the acceleration, but we have heard about the steering and brakes and other things.



It just seems that if you look at everything, it certainly seems to me that there was an attempt to keep it under the rug and keep it under the table and let's not tell anybody anything and maybe it will go away. And, of course, with all the testimony, NHTSA is to blame as well. But I just don't think that Toyota handled it properly.

So let me just—go ahead.

Mr. LENTZ. Well, in the case of brakes, if you are talking about the Prius brake, we jumped on that very quickly and have taken care of that. And in the case of Corolla steering, it is being investigated right now.

So, yes, we have complaints on it. NHTSA has complaints. And we are digging into that right now to find out what is the issue and let's make sure the customers are happy with their products and safe with their products.

Mr. ENGEL. So let me ask you this last question. When I was asked yesterday what would I ask you, I said what did you know and when did you know it and what do you know that we don't know yet. What do you know that we don't know yet? What is going to come out in the days and weeks? I know Mr. Toyota is testifying in another committee tomorrow. What bombshells are going to come out that we don't yet know?

Mr. LENTZ. God, I hope there aren't any more. I have had enough bombshells for one year. Let's get back to the good old days of 2009, and I didn't think I would ever say that.

Right now, we have to fix the process so these things don't happen again. I don't know what is behind the curtain. No one knows in the auto industry as manufacturers what defects you could have down the road, what challenges you have. So it is important that we have built-in quality and built-in safety so we don't have these issues. And that is why our processes are changing, to make sure that we get back to where we once were.

This was a company for 50 years in the U.S. that whenever you said Toyota or you said Camry, it was quality, dependability, reliability and safety. And we have stubbed our toe and we have to get back to where that once was, and we are going to do that.

Mr. ENGEL. Well, I would hope so.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding the hearing.

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Gingrey.

Mr. GINGREY. Mr. Lentz, very quickly, I could ask you a couple of yes-no questions like have you enjoyed being here today and do you want to take any more questions? I guess the answers would be yes and no. But seriously, I did want to ask you, do you think of this as a software or hardware problem?

Mr. LENTZ. In the case of the ETC?

Mr. GINGREY. Yes.

Mr. LENTZ. Again, based on our analysis of what we have seen, based on going to accident sites and checking these cars out, I don't think it is either right now. But Exponent has not tested the software yet, so that is yet to come. So if there is a software issue, if there is an issue about how independently these two processes are working, because that is the key to make sure that this thing works, we will know that.

Mr. GINGREY. But it could be either and you are going to get to the bottom of that?

Mr. LENTZ. We have to get to the bottom of it. And it may be that the bottom of it is they find nothing and we have another independent group that goes in and researches again.

Mr. GINGREY. Mr. Lentz, thank you.

Mr. Chairman, that is all I have got, and I yield back.

Mr. STUPAK. That concludes all questions of this panel. Mr. Lentz, thank you. We invite you to stay for the next panel. We have Secretary LaHood. We have five votes coming up. I am going to try to get the Secretary's testimony in and we can then go vote and have a little recess. Thank you.

Mr. LENTZ. Thank you very much.

Mr. STUPAK. I am going to ask the media to move out of the way, please. Secretary LaHood is here. We would like to hear his testimony and get it done before we have to go vote.

Mr. Lentz, I see you are moving out. If you would keep on, we are trying to get the Secretary in. I know you are getting crushed there, but we are trying to move things along.

I would like to call our third witness for today, the Honorable Raymond H. LaHood, Secretary of the United States Department of Transportation.

Mr. LaHood, welcome. Thanks for being here.

It is the policy of this subcommittee to take all testimony under oath. Please be advised you have a right under the rules of the House to be advised by counsel during your testimony. Do you wish to be represented by counsel?

Secretary LAHOOD. No. I am ready to be sworn.

[Witness sworn.]

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. We look forward to your opening statement, and then after that we are probably going to have to run and do some votes.

#### **STATEMENT OF THE HON. RAYMOND H. LAHOOD, SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION**

Secretary LAHOOD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to be appear before you today to discuss the important issue of Toyota's recent safety recalls.

Ever since I was sworn in as the Secretary of Transportation 13 months ago, I have said that safety is the Department's number one priority. I would like to think that we have demonstrated that commitment time and time and time again.

When the terrible crash of the Washington Metro system claimed nine lives and injured dozens of others last summer, we quickly introduced legislation to give us Federal safety oversight of transit systems sometimes we don't currently have.

When Colgan Air Flight 3407 crashed in Buffalo, we learned right away what many of the problems were, and we did not wait a year for the NTSB to conclude its investigation before we acted. We began working with the aviation industry immediately to enhance airline safety and pilot training, holding 12 safety summits around the country. This spring the FAA will issue a new rule to

combat pilot fatigue, and it has already been begun to overhaul pilot certification qualifications.

One of the hallmarks of my time as Transportation Secretary has been our work on distracted driving. For all of you with cell phones and BlackBerries and other electronic devices, I am on a rampage about people talking and texting while driving a bus, a car, a plane or a train. It is a menace to society and we recently exercised our authority to ban truck drivers from texting.

The reason I say all of this, my number one priority has been and will be, as long as I am in this post, safety.

Now, for Toyota. The Toyota recall situation is very serious and we are treating it seriously. The three recalls involving Toyota are among the largest in automobile history, affecting more than 6 million people in this country.

I would like to say a word directly to consumers. If you notice that your gas pedal or your brake is not responding as it normally would, contact your Toyota dealer right away.

The recent recalls involve three issues. First, accelerator pedal entrapment by floor mats, which can lead to uncontrolled acceleration at very high speeds. It is important to take your floor mats out of the driver's side of your vehicle until your car has been repaired for this problem by a Toyota dealer.

Second, accelerator pedals sticking or returning slowly after being depressed. If the pedal is harder to depress or slower to return after releasing it, this could be the precursor to what is known as a sticky pedal. If your pedal has these symptoms, contact your Toyota dealer immediately. If your gas pedal becomes stuck for any reason, steadily apply the brake, put the car in neutral, bring it to a stop in a safe place and call your dealer.

Finally, with the Toyota Prius for model year 2010 and the Lexus HS250, if you experience a change in your car's braking performance, contact your Toyota dealer.

Now, I want everyone to know that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration has the most effective defect investigation programs in the world. Known as NHTSA, its job is to investigate complaints and to look for defects. It receives more than 30,000 complaints from consumers every year and reviews every one of them quickly and carefully.

Over just the past 3 years, NHTSA's defect and compliance investigations have resulted in 524 recalls involving 23.5 million cars. Of the 100 investigations NHTSA opens in an average year, there are currently 44 open defect investigations, five in which involve Toyota.

Every step of the way, NHTSA officials have pushed Toyota to take corrective action so that consumers could be safe. Unhappy with Toyota responsiveness to our safety concerns, the Acting Administrator of NHTSA, Ron Medford, and two associates flew to Japan in December of 2009 to clarify for Toyota management what the company's legal obligations are to find and remedy safety defects in vehicles sold here.

In January, our new Administrator of NHTSA, David Strickland, and Ron Medford, now our Deputy Administrator, told the President of Toyota North America in no uncertain terms that we expect

prompt action following the disclosure of the sticky pedal. Toyota publicly announced that recall 2 days later.

I have also talked personally to the President of Toyota. With potential fatal defects on the road, NHTSA has pressed hard to expedite these safety fixes. If NHTSA had opened a formal investigation and Toyota had resisted a recall, this would have consumed an enormous amount of time and resources, in effect extending the period in which owners of affected vehicles were at risk. By engaging Toyota directly, and persuading the company to take action, the agency avoided a lengthy investigation that would have delayed fixing for a year or more.

Last week I announced that we are investigating whether Toyota acted quickly enough in reporting these safety defects to NHTSA as well as whether they took all appropriate action to protect consumers. We have asked Toyota to turn over a wide range of documents which will show us when and how they learned about these safety problems. NHTSA will continue to make sure Toyota is doing all it has promised to make its vehicles safe. We will continue to investigate all possible causes of unintended acceleration.

While the recalls are important steps in that direction, we don't maintain that they answer every question about that issue. Some people believe that electromagnetic interference has a dangerous effect on these vehicles. Although we are not aware of any incidents proven to be the cause by such interference, NHTSA is doing a thorough review of that subject to ensure safety. If NHTSA finds a problem, we will make sure it is resolved.

Recently I spoke by phone with Mr. Toyoda. He assured me that Toyota takes U.S. safety concerns very seriously and that safety is the company's top priority. I intend to hold him to that.

Finally, I want to remind everyone there is a reason we investigate safety defects and there is a reason we push auto makers to do the right thing. I listened to the 911 tape of the Saylor family's harrowing last moments. Mark Saylor, a California highway patrolman, died last year along with his wife and his daughter and his brother-in-law when the accelerator got stuck and the Lexus they were driving crashed at more than 120 miles an hour. That is a horrible tragedy and one I hope that no other family has to endure.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I know that you all have to go vote, and I am certainly willing to stay and answer all the questions that any member wants. I want the committee to know, I was sworn in on January 23rd, 2009. I will take a back seat to nobody on safety. I have done a lot. We have done a lot. So I will try and answer every question as specifically as I can during my time as the Secretary. And for those that I don't know the answer to prior to my tenure, I will be happy to get all the information possible for the record.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. LaHood follows:]

**STATEMENT OF  
THE HONORABLE RAY LAHOOD  
SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION  
BEFORE THE  
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS  
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**

**HEARING ON  
RESPONSE BY TOYOTA AND NHTSA TO  
INCIDENTS OF SUDDEN UNINTENDED ACCELERATION  
February 23, 2010**

Chairman Stupak, Ranking Minority Member Walden, and Members of the Committee:

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the important issue of Toyota's recent safety recalls and the broader issue of sudden unintended acceleration.

Transportation safety is the Department's highest priority. We understand the level of concern about the safety of Toyota vehicles, particularly with regard to unintended acceleration. I would like to explain the recent recalls, the role that NHTSA played in ensuring the recalls occurred, and the actions NHTSA is taking to identify any additional safety defects that might cause unintended acceleration.

The recent Toyota recalls related to unintended acceleration involve two issues: first, accelerator pedal entrapment by floor mats, which can lead to uncontrolled acceleration at very high speeds; and second, accelerator pedals sticking or returning slowly after being depressed, which occurs at a variety of throttle positions but, to the best of our knowledge, is more likely to occur at low throttle positions more readily controlled by the vehicle's brakes.

Before I discuss the details of these two recalls and NHTSA's investigations, I want to clarify what owners of vehicles affected by these recalls should do. To avoid pedal entrapment, remove all floor mats from the driver's side of your vehicle until you receive the repair for this problem from a Toyota dealer. If you do not remove the mat, make sure that it is always securely anchored in place on the retaining hooks and that no other mats are ever stacked on top of it. If your vehicle is covered by the "sticky pedal" recall, pay special attention to your gas pedal. If the pedal is harder to depress or slower to return after releasing it, this could be a precursor to a sticky pedal. If your pedal shows those symptoms you should contact a Toyota dealer immediately. If your accelerator becomes stuck for any reason, steadily apply the brake, put the car in neutral, bring it to a stop in a safe place, and call your dealer.

### Pedal Entrapment

Of the two big recalls, the far more serious problem, in our view, is pedal entrapment by floor mats. We are aware of five deaths that have occurred due to this problem, including a tragedy near San Diego last August that claimed four lives. We have the greatest sympathy for the loved ones of those members of the Saylor and Lastrella families who died in that crash.

Pedal entrapment involves a situation in which the driver intends to accelerate quickly (such as when passing another car or entering a freeway) and depresses the accelerator pedal toward the floor of the vehicle. When pushed far enough the pedal becomes entrapped by the floor mat in full open throttle position. Once the pedal is entrapped, the vehicle will continue to accelerate well in excess of the driver's intent unless the driver can overcome that situation. Given the very high speeds involved and the firmness with which the mat is holding the pedal at full throttle, these are the most dangerous situations we are aware of that come under the broad heading of unintended acceleration. It is very important to note that, even on the recalled vehicles, entrapment by the mat can occur only if the floor mat is out of position because it is not secured, one floor mat is stacked on top of another floor mat, or a floor mat is used that is not intended for use on the vehicle and is inappropriate due to its shape or dimensions.

NHTSA first became aware of this phenomenon in Toyota's Lexus ES350 in 2007 and quickly opened an investigation in March of that year. NHTSA acted based on five complaints from vehicle owners. No related fatalities had been reported at the time the investigation began, but there had been three crashes allegedly related to pedal entrapment by the floor mat. At the time, the problem seemed most likely to occur in Lexus ES350 vehicles where a thick, all-weather floor mat offered as an option by Toyota was used. The shape of these floor mats and a raised portion forming a ridge made them particularly likely to entrap the pedal if not properly secured. So far as NHTSA knew at that time, the accelerator pedals themselves were functioning as designed and the problem centered on the way the pedal could be entrapped by these floor mats under certain conditions.

NHTSA escalated the investigation to an engineering analysis five months later, in August 2007. Shortly before that, a fatal crash involving a Camry occurred that was apparently caused by entrapment. In September 2007, Toyota announced a recall of the all-weather mats in Lexus and Camry vehicles. The remedy was to have the dealers remove the mats and provide a re-designed mat that was shaped in a way that addressed the entrapment risk even if the re-designed mat was improperly anchored.

At the time of the 2007 recall, NHTSA also issued a safety advisory, directed especially to owners of the recalled vehicles but also to all drivers, warning of the serious dangers of not properly anchoring mats or stacking mats on top of each other. At that time NHTSA believed that the recall and removal of the most problematic mats, the improved design of the replacement

mats, and education of the public and dealers about the proper use of mats would substantially eliminate the known risk related to pedal entrapment.

NHTSA continued to monitor the situation and became aware of a post-recall crash involving one of the recalled mats that the owner had not removed. Fortunately, that was not a fatal crash but did result in serious injury. In light of that crash and indications that consumer response to this recall was too low, NHTSA urged Toyota to re-notify vehicle owners, which Toyota did in January 2009.

Eight months later, when the San Diego fatal crash occurred on August 28, 2009, NHTSA immediately began to investigate the circumstances of the crash. NHTSA investigators and the San Diego County Sheriff's Department examined the wreckage of the vehicle and concluded that the likely cause was excessive speed due to entrapment of the accelerator pedal by the floor mat. The vehicle was a Toyota Lexus ES350 on loan from a Toyota dealer for the day. The floor mat in the vehicle was designed for a Toyota Lexus RX SUV and was much longer than the mat that would have been proper for the Lexus ES350. At the time NHTSA investigators viewed the wreckage, the accelerator pedal was still fused to the floor mat, apparently melted in that position by the heat of the fire that followed the crash. Combining that observation with the circumstances known to have occurred immediately prior to the crash, including extremely high speeds and the driver's inability to control the speed, NHTSA concluded that the excessive speed was caused by pedal entrapment. Supporting this conclusion was the fact that another customer of the dealership had used the same vehicle just three days earlier and complained of unintended, high-speed acceleration caused by the pedal having been trapped by the mat until he was able to stop the vehicle and free the pedal.

The San Diego tragedy made clear that the entrapment problem could occur in unexpected ways and that recalling the worst performing mats and educating drivers and dealers about not using unsecured, improper, or stacked mats was not going to adequately address the risk. Apparently not even all Toyota dealers were mindful of the need to ensure proper mats and mat anchorage to avoid entrapment.

As a consequence, NHTSA began to explore additional remedial options. The agency continued to review all relevant data to identify any reports that might be linked to similar entrapment in other Toyota vehicles. NHTSA became focused on the pedal design of a number of Toyota vehicles, not because of any known malfunction in their operation but because their shape tended to make entrapment more likely when floor mats are out of position or stacked. NHTSA prepared to open an investigation on the pedal design. At the same time, the agency informed Toyota that the company needed to address this risk promptly as a vehicle defect issue, and requested that Toyota conduct a recall. Toyota responded to NHTSA by announcing a recall to replace or re-shape the pedals in 3.8 million vehicles and sent its official notice of the recall to NHTSA on October 5, 2009.

NHTSA pressed the company to include as part of its recall the addition of a feature called brake override (which some call “smart pedal”) technology on models that have keyless ignition systems. With brake override, the vehicle control system gives priority to the signal from the brake pedal and returns the engine to idle when it detects the brake being applied while the accelerator is applied. NHTSA discovered in its investigation of pedal entrapment incidents that in some situations drivers of vehicles with keyless ignition systems did not know that, in Toyota vehicles, they could shut off their engines when in motion only by depressing the dashboard ignition button and holding it for three seconds. The owners were familiar with shutting off the vehicle when it was stopped, which requires holding the button for just one second or less. NHTSA thought it was especially important to ensure that in those vehicles with keyless ignition the driver had the benefit of brake override. Many other manufacturers use this technology and Toyota uses it in newly produced vehicles. The recall Toyota announced in October adhered to NHTSA’s request.

NHTSA continued to monitor incoming reports involving relevant incidents. In January, NHTSA told Toyota that its review of other Toyota vehicles indicated that they needed to be included in the pedal entrapment recall. Toyota responded by adding 1.1 million vehicles to the pedal entrapment recall on January 27, 2010.

Under the law, manufacturers have an obligation to notify NHTSA within five days of determining that a defect or noncompliance exists. When manufacturers voluntarily initiate recalls without waiting for NHTSA to order a recall, the process protects the public most quickly. NHTSA can order manufacturers to do recalls but only after initiating a formal investigation, completing its investigation, and following administrative procedures that include a public hearing and opportunities for the manufacturer to file detailed responses. Even after the NHTSA Administrator issues an order directing a recall, the manufacturer can avoid doing the recall until NHTSA proves its case in court. In such a case, the agency has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a vehicle defect exists and that it creates an unreasonable risk to safety. As a result, recalls occur most quickly when a manufacturer announces the recall without waiting for NHTSA to open and complete an investigation. That is what happened here—because of the pressure NHTSA applied.

On February 16, NHTSA sent Toyota a Timeliness Query, which is a detailed request for information about when Toyota learned about the defect addressed by this recall. The information Toyota will provide in response to this request will help NHTSA determine whether Toyota’s initiation of the recall met its obligation to notify NHTSA quickly. If NHTSA determines that Toyota did not meet that obligation, NHTSA may seek civil penalties from Toyota for that failure. Those penalties could be as high as \$16,375,000 for a related series of violations.



#### CTS Pedals Sticking

I want to turn now to the “sticky pedal” recall that was initiated in January of this year. NHTSA is not currently aware of any injuries or deaths definitively linked to this problem. Unlike the pedal entrapment recall, which concerns the shape of the pedal that makes it more susceptible to entrapment by an external object (the floor mat), this recall involves the internal working of the pedal assembly. Another distinguishing factor is that the pedal entrapment situations involve instances of full acceleration that are initially intended by the driver, while this problem, to the best of our knowledge, generally involves occurrences at lower power levels where the car continues to accelerate because the pedal does not return upward, or returns slowly, when the driver lessens pressure on the pedal.

The affected pedals are manufactured by CTS Corporation, which is based in Elkhart, Indiana. Some Toyota vehicle owners have complained of certain symptoms in vehicles equipped with those pedals. Those symptoms include a feeling that it is harder than normal to depress the pedal or that, when depressed, it is slower to return. In some circumstances, the situation can involve the pedal not returning at all from the position to which it was depressed. At this time, we understand that this problem is mechanical in nature and does not involve a flaw in the electronic signal being sent from the pedal sensor to the throttle.

In November 2009, NHTSA received several Toyota field reports concerning incidents in which pedals were slow to return or sticking in a number of different Toyota models from various model years. The reports did not indicate a root cause of the symptoms drivers were experiencing. NHTSA reviewed those reports as part of its screening for possible defect trends. Before NHTSA had decided whether or not to open an investigation, Toyota contacted the agency on January 16 about the specific problem it had identified with the CTS pedal. NHTSA told the company it needed a full explanation immediately. Toyota met with NHTSA on January 19 and demonstrated what it thought to be the mechanical problem with the CTS pedals. Based on the information presented by Toyota about the nature of the problem and Toyota’s experience with it, NHTSA told the company it expected very prompt action. Two days later, on January 21, Toyota announced the recall, covering some 2.3 million vehicles (many of which are also covered by the pedal entrapment recall and will receive both remedies). Toyota has had the supplier produce a new pedal with a different design that the company believes addresses the issue of excessive friction. The company has also devised an interim remedy to eliminate the safety risk by altering the pedal while new ones are being manufactured. Toyota informed NHTSA that it ceased production of new vehicles in the models affected by this recall so that it could begin to supply the new pedals being produced for the assembly line to dealers for installation in existing vehicles.

On February 16, NHTSA sent Toyota a Timeliness Query about this recall. NHTSA has also begun an investigation to determine whether these particular CTS pedals have been installed in

vehicles other than those recalled by Toyota, including those made by other manufacturers. NHTSA will soon receive relevant information from CTS and evaluate it.

#### Other Instances of Unintended or Excessive Acceleration

NHTSA receives more than 30,000 complaints from consumers every year concerning perceived safety problems with their vehicles. NHTSA reviews every complaint promptly and, if it appears to contain any evidence related to a safety defect trend, the reviewers begin to track that trend for possible investigation. Among those complaints in recent years have been many allegations of unintended or excessive acceleration on vehicles made by Toyota. Of course, during that same period NHTSA has received thousands of complaints containing such allegations concerning the vehicles made by most major vehicle manufacturers.

The agency has also received several petitions requesting that NHTSA investigate unintended acceleration in various Toyota vehicles. When a member of the public petitions NHTSA to investigate a possible defect, NHTSA examines all information submitted by the petitioner as well as all other information relevant to the particular problem cited by the petitioner. Even where NHTSA denies a defect petition, it does so only after conducting so thorough an examination of the issue that it has effectively done a preliminary investigation. Generally, NHTSA will visit the petitioners, interview them about their experiences, examine their vehicles and vehicle history, drive the vehicles, and search the NHTSA data bases for complaints similar to the experiences petitioners had. In some situations NHTSA will conduct more extensive testing of a vehicle of the same make and model as that of the petitioner.

The information NHTSA has received from consumers concerning unintended or excessive acceleration in vehicles can be divided into general categories that include: engine surging that lasts only a second or two; unintended acceleration from a stopped position or very low speed that results in quick movement over a short distance and sometimes results in crashing into an object; and events that begin at high speeds because the driver intended to accelerate quickly and continue for a sustained period of many seconds or minutes beyond what the driver intended. The possible causes of these events that NHTSA has been able to identify include mechanical problems with the accelerator; obstruction of the accelerator by another object; or human error (pressing the wrong pedal).

NHTSA has carefully reviewed all of the information provided by Toyota consumers in complaints filed with the agency to try to find causes for what they were experiencing. NHTSA also reviews Early Warning Reporting information submitted by the manufacturer and other sources of information, including insurance company submissions. For the high-speed events that last for many seconds or minutes, the only cause NHTSA has been able to establish thus far is entrapment of the pedal by a floor mat. The only exception to this has may have been a recent event in New Jersey that apparently did not involve floor mat entrapment but apparently did

involve a stuck CTS pedal. Fortunately, the driver was able to bring the vehicle under control and drive it to a dealership. As discussed, the pedal entrapment issue in the recalled vehicles will presumably be resolved by the recall announced in October. The problem experienced in New Jersey will presumably be addressed by the recall of the CTS pedals announced in January.

NHTSA does not contend that the two recalls will fully resolve all concerns about unintended acceleration in Toyota vehicles. However, with one exception, NHTSA has not been able to establish a vehicle-based cause for unintended acceleration events in Toyota vehicles not covered by those two recalls. The exception was a recall of the model year 2004 Sienna vans in 2009 due to a defective trim panel that could, if loosened during servicing, entrap the accelerator at full throttle. That recall also arose from a NHTSA investigation.

NHTSA initiated a Recall Query on February 16 to ascertain whether Toyota has been completely forthcoming with the agency concerning all possible defects in its vehicles that may be causing unintended acceleration. NHTSA will closely review the documents Toyota submits to determine whether the company has additional information not yet shared with the agency that may cast light on possible defects that cause the problem.

Some consumers and others believe that Toyota's electronic throttle control (ETC) systems, and perhaps such systems in other manufacturers' vehicles, are susceptible to electro-magnetic interference (EMI) that can theoretically cause unintended acceleration by resulting in incorrect signals to the engine. These types of electronic systems are commonly used by all major vehicle manufacturers. To date, we have not identified any particular crash or unsafe occurrence that can clearly be attributed to such a phenomenon. NHTSA opened an investigation on Toyota's ETC system in 2004, focused on short duration events, and could not find any safety defects in that system at the time. NHTSA looked at short duration events where no brake application was alleged in this investigation so as to screen out events that could have been caused by driver error, to ensure the agency could find a vehicle-based defect if it existed. In 2008, in wrapping up the floor mat investigation, NHTSA went on to look for additional possible causes of unintended acceleration in the Lexus ES350. That work included some limited electronic and magnetic testing but did not reveal a flaw in the ETC system. Since 1980, NHTSA has conducted 141 investigations on throttle control issues in vehicles made by various manufacturers, some of which involved electronic throttles and some the more traditional mechanical throttle systems.

However, to be absolutely sure that the agency is aware of all potential defects, NHTSA is conducting a review of the general subject of possible EMI effects on ETC systems. We have begun by talking to Toyota and other major manufacturers about the design of their systems and how, through failure modes and effects analysis and other standard techniques, they have taken the possible effects of EMI into account in designing those systems. This is a review of the technological issue, not a defect investigation. However, if any of this activity gives us any

reason to believe that a defect may exist in Toyota or other vehicles related to EMI effects on ETC systems, we will open a defect investigation. When we have completed these discussions we will decide whether to conduct any additional research projects that might shed further light on the possible role of EMI effects on various electronic components in vehicles that are safety-related.

#### Other Pending Toyota Investigations

NHTSA has a total of 44 pending defect investigations concerning various manufacturers and a wide range of issues. Of those, five concern Toyota. One of the Toyota investigations is the Recall Query on sudden acceleration discussed above. Two others have gained wide attention and are summarized here.

NHTSA opened an investigation on February 4, 2010, concerning a braking problem on the model year 2010 Prius. The problem involves a momentary loss of braking when the vehicle hits a pothole, bump, or other uneven surface. NHTSA had received more than 100 complaints about the problem, including four alleged crashes involving two injuries. Five days after NHTSA opened its investigation, on February 9, Toyota announced a recall designed to address this problem. NHTSA will closely monitor its implementation. The recall involves over 148,000 vehicles sold in this country, including the model year 2010 Prius and the 2010 Lexus HS250H. While awaiting an appointment to have their vehicles remedied, owners who experience any braking problems should immediately contact their dealers, and all drivers of these cars should allow extra stopping distance until the problem is fixed.

On February 18, NHTSA opened an investigation concerning approximately 487,000 model year 2009 and 2010 Toyota Corolla and Matrix vehicles. The issue concerns the steering becoming unresponsive or loose at highway speeds. NHTSA had received 168 complaints alleging eight crashes (none fatal) at the time this investigation was opened.

As a final note, I would like to make clear that NHTSA has a very aggressive enforcement program that searches constantly for safety defects and noncompliance with the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards. In just the last three years, NHTSA investigations have resulted in 524 recalls in which 23.5 million vehicles were recalled so that safety problems could be fixed. In addition, several million items of motor vehicle equipment (including imported tires, child seats, and motorcycle helmets) were recalled to correct safety problems.

In summary, NHTSA has acted to ensure Toyota recalls on the issues related to unintended acceleration on which we have had evidence indicating the presence of a vehicle defect, i.e., pedal entrapment and sticky accelerators. We stand ready to ensure prompt action on any additional defects that we have reason to believe are present.

Thank you and I look forward to answering your questions.

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. You are right, we do have votes. We have five votes. We are going to be in recess until 5:30. I would appreciate it if you would stay. We would look forward to your answering questions then. If you want to walk to the floor with us, you are more than welcome to do so.

[Recess.]

Mr. STUPAK. The committee will be back in order.

Mr. Secretary, thank you again for your patience. Thanks for being here. You can tell by all the interest in the committee members who are not even members of the subcommittee that have stayed throughout this hearing to ask questions. A lot of interest here on this Toyota matter and what has happened and Toyota's role. I know you have only been there for about a year.

One of the things that struck me—and let me just ask and say this politely—but it seems like all decisions on Toyota, especially dealing with safety issues, the decisions are made in Japan. You mentioned in your testimony you sent Mr. Strickland and others to Japan to talk to Toyota representatives, or I should say the head of Toyota, which just further emphasizes the point everything is made in Japan.

The problem is here in America. Why couldn't we have dealt here with it in the United States? Or is everything compartmentalized that strict with this organization or company that the decisions have to be made in Japan?

I find that a little odd, that is all. Do you care to respond to that?

Secretary LAHOOD. I plan to meet with Mr. Toyoda, who will be in the United States this week. He has agreed to meet with me. One of the things I am going to express to him is they have some very good people in North America, some very good people, but perhaps they need to look at their business model. And what I mean by that is that when their good, experienced, qualified professional people in North America make recommendations, they need to listen to them.

Mr. STUPAK. Did your investigation show—

Secretary LAHOOD. Our people met with the North American people, but we decided to go directly to Japan.

Mr. STUPAK. Why? Because they could not make a decision here in the United States?

Secretary LAHOOD. Because we felt that maybe the people in Japan were a little bit safety deaf. We wanted to give them an opportunity to hear directly from us that this—

When I talked to Mr. Toyoda, I said three things. The first thing I said is this is a very serious matter for your company and America. I want you to know that DOT is taking it seriously. We are not going to sleep until every one of your cars is safe for Americans to drive. And then I invited him to come to America.

Mr. STUPAK. I called you after those articles appeared, and we never had a chance to talk. But you have been proactive in trying to get in front of this.

One of the concerns that I have and has come out is that 70 percent of this sudden unintended acceleration, we still don't have an answer for. In fact, I think, according to all the documents from NHTSA and also from Toyota, their database, that only 16 percent of these sudden accelerations are really addressed with the floor

mat and the sticky accelerator, if you will. The electronics seems to have to have some part of it on this remaining 70 percent.

Secretary LAHOOD. As I said in my testimony, we are going to do a complete review of the electronics. We will meet with the folks from Southern Illinois University, take a look at the results of what they have had to look at. We will look at what the Toyota folks have done with the people that they have hired. We are going to get into this. We are going to get into the weeds on the electronics. We feel an obligation to do that, because we get 30,000 complaints a year, and we take every one seriously. We don't just set them off to the side. We look at every one. And when we see a few start to stack up, then we really get into it. We are going to get into the weeds on the electronics. I commit to you we are going to do that.

Mr. STUPAK. How about this event data recorder that records information 5 seconds before an accident, 1 after?

Secretary LAHOOD. We have a review of that going on right now.

Mr. STUPAK. But it says your NHTSA investigators have been at some of these accidents sites like the Southlake, Texas, one on January 12, 2010. They were there. The one that happened up in Auburn, New York, that one was also NHTSA folks were there. In fact, it says investigators from NHTSA took the black box on November 27. What did your investigators do with the black box if you don't have any way to read it?

Secretary LAHOOD. Our challenge is to investigate these, to look into them, and to render some judgment about it.

Mr. STUPAK. Would your investigators have taken the black box?

Secretary LAHOOD. You know, Mr. Chairman, I don't know the specifics on that incident, but I will check it out.

Mr. STUPAK. I got that from your outline that NHTSA provided us, all the actions you took.

Secretary LAHOOD. OK.

Mr. STUPAK. Do you have any knowledge of them taking that?

Secretary LAHOOD. I don't.

Mr. STUPAK. Dr. Gilbert, who testified earlier today, indicated that he was able to bypass the system and the diagnostic code would not come up. It was a bookend, as we call it, one of the things that could happen on the sudden acceleration. He said he notified NHTSA of the test results, what he found, and tried to contact NHTSA. All he got back was a form, an e-mail form saying thank you for contacting us. Can you assure us that NHTSA is going to follow up with Dr. Gilbert?

Secretary LAHOOD. You have my 100 percent commitment that we will get in the weeds on that. We will talk to anybody that wants to talk to us. We will look at studies that have been conducted already, whether it is SIU or studies that have been done through the Toyota program. We will figure this out. I know that all of you think this is a serious issue and so we think it is a serious issue.

Mr. STUPAK. Well, we know how serious you think it is because you had them stop building cars here in the United States, certain models. Are they still building those cars? Are they still on a pause? What is the status on Toyota?

Secretary LAHOOD. On what, again?

Mr. STUPAK. On building some of the cars, some of their models in the United States. They stopped after your intervention. Have they started reproducing those cars again?

Secretary LAHOOD. That I don't know. I will have to get back to you on that.

Mr. STUPAK. Does NHTSA need the responsibility—I should say, does NHTSA need to accept some of the responsibility? We heard from the Smiths today about how they felt that NHTSA just came out and tried to convince them that it was the floor mats. Is there some responsibility NHTSA shares in this whole situation?

Secretary LAHOOD. If you look at my testimony, Mr. Chairman, no one has talked more about safety in Washington, D.C., and around the country than Ray LaHood since January 23, 2009. We had 12 safety summits on regional jets. We had a day and a half distracted driving conference. We stepped up on a tarmac rule so that people don't have to sit on airlines more than 3 hours. We suspended air traffic controllers when there was a crash over the Hudson River between a helicopter and a small plane. And we also investigated when the pilots overflowed Minneapolis by 150 miles.

We are not sitting around on our hands. Safety is our number one priority. We take it seriously. We take every complaint seriously. We look at it. We open investigations when we think it needs to be done.

Mr. STUPAK. No one doubts your aggressive enforcement action. The problem we have up here, if we have all these complaints on sudden surges in this vehicle, Toyota vehicles, and we have got 70 percent unresolved, how do we resolve that 70 percent that is still unaccounted for, unexplained, and we have millions of these vehicles on the road?

Secretary LAHOOD. Well, we will continue our investigations which we have going on. There are currently investigations going on. There are recalls going on, many of them sparked by the Department of Transportation and NHTSA, initiated by us.

Mr. STUPAK. Which can't continue the investigation as NHTSA has, when in 2004 when you did your report, your ODI, as they call it, March 23, 2004, you closed it on July 22, 2004. During that period of time there were five fatal accidents involving surges, and basically the NHTSA investigators said it doesn't count because we are only looking for momentary surge. Those surges or that accelerator stayed on too long. So we just disregarded it. It almost looked at it with blinders on. When we do this investigation, get that 70 percent, we can't do that.

For the love of me, I was an investigator. You do an investigation, you get five fatal accidents come in and you can't explain, and people think the car went really fast and there might have been a surge in acceleration, and you don't take into consideration your report, that is just poor work.

Secretary LAHOOD. Well, that won't happen on my watch.

Mr. STUPAK. Very good.

Mr. Burgess.

Mr. BURGESS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary, welcome to our committee. My staffer is going to bring you something to look at.

While she's doing that, I have been trying to get an unredacted report of the NHTSA report on the Mark Saylor accident. I realize that the appropriate person to ask is the head of NHTSA, but we don't get to ask the head of NHTSA in this committee. I have got you. So I'm going to ask you. Can my office have made available to it an unredacted NHTSA accident report on the Mark Saylor accident?

Secretary LAHOOD. If it's legally possible for us to do it, absolutely.

Mr. BURGESS. You can see my problem when I try to read the report. Paragraph five is blacked out. Now perhaps that is something that is not pertinent to me in general circulation or open source. I'm willing to come down to your place and review it under armed guard, if necessary.

But it raises questions back home. I mean, I have people on the radio talking about why can no one see an unredacted report. Again, if it's something that relates to the accident that would be harmful to the family to have out in general circulation, I understand that. But I would certainly as a Member of Congress who does have some clearance to look at things, I think that should be made available.

Secretary LAHOOD. Let me just say, Mr. Burgess, what I will do is ask our general counsel to brief you on this, on what we can say and what we can't say, and we will try and do that very quickly here.

Mr. BURGESS. As you know, once the information is denied to you, the fantasy can become more extreme than the reality. It would be helpful to me to know what has been redacted from that.

On the issue of—and I appreciate that you have only been there for 1 year. I appreciate your comments about safety being a top priority.

She brought to you a graph showing uncommanded accelerations in the Camry vehicle. I believe this is a NHTSA-produced document. Clearly, without getting into great detail, this was a change about 2001 or 2002 where the number of incidents were very low and then suddenly it goes high and stays high. My understanding from Mr. Lentz's testimony is that coincided with the time that the electronic throttle control became marketed upon those automobiles.

I would just ask the question, should there have not been some curiosity at some point as to why this is happening now at a level previously unprecedented? What has changed in the manufacturing? The electronic throttle control is one thing. Were there other things that changed in the manufacturing? If safety is going to be job one, it can't take us that long to investigate these things, and it certainly can't take a very dramatic and tragic accident to spark the investigation.

So the only point I would make from that, again, a NHTSA-produced document. I realize that personnel does change from time to time. But we have to keep that—obviously, that has to be foremost in our minds.

Now from the NHTSA documents that we have, it looks like they have received 113 vehicle owner questionnaires alleging sudden and unintended acceleration related to the throttle. The Office of



Defect Investigations believes that only 14 of those questionnaires were relevant to the throttle control. So how does that office narrow that number down? How are cases included or excluded where only about 10 percent of the cases that were brought to NHTSA attention were actually thought to be an uncommanded acceleration?

Secretary LAHOOD. By looking at the documents, by interviewing people, by talking to people, and then by making a judgment about whether it's something that has validity or standing.

Mr. BURGESS. In light of some of the things that we've heard in our testimony today, should we go back and look at those other nine out of ten that were deemed not to be—not to represent true uncommanded accelerations? Perhaps they deserve a closer look or closer scrutiny.

Secretary LAHOOD. Well, I take your point on that. I go back to what I said to Chairman Stupak, that we are going to really get in the weeds on the electronics. I assume that we will take a look back at some of those.

Mr. BURGESS. I guess just very recently, within the last day or two, your Inspector General from the Department of Transportation announced an audit initiated on NHTSA's Office of Defect Investigations. The audit is going to build on earlier works concerning implementation of the TREAD Act. The specific understanding is going to focus on recent actions taken by the agency regarding Toyota recalls. Obviously, this is something you felt was necessary to do.

Secretary LAHOOD. Look, the Inspector General does his own thing. He's an independent operator. He doesn't take his cues from me. He decided to do this I think either at the request of Congress or because his people thought it was something to do. He doesn't consult with me on these things. He lets me know, but he doesn't consult to see if I agree with him or not.

Mr. BURGESS. Has he let you know the scope of the investigation, what it will include?

Secretary LAHOOD. He has.

Mr. BURGESS. Can you share that with us?

Secretary LAHOOD. I think he posted it on his Web site, which would be our Web site. I think it's up.

Mr. BURGESS. When that report becomes available——

Secretary LAHOOD. He will make it available. As soon as it's complete, he puts it up on his Web site.

Mr. BURGESS. Now everything that we have heard today on the issue surrounding the Toyota uncommanded acceleration gives people the impression there's a lot of problems with this product. If you actually list things down, the number of problems per vehicle mile—or percent of market share I guess is a more appropriate measurement—Toyota is not really high on that list, are they?

Secretary LAHOOD. In terms of?

Mr. BURGESS. The number of incidents or percentage of market share. I mean, a NHTSA document that is available actually ranks Toyota number 17. There are 16 other automobiles that have more problems per percent of market share.

Secretary LAHOOD. If you look at the 30,000 complaints we receive and you look at the investigations we do and then you look

at the recalls, the vast majority of them are not with Toyota. They are with other brands of automobiles.

Mr. BURGESS. But we are talking today about an increased level of scrutiny because of perhaps some of the uncommanded accelerations were missed in earlier investigations. I guess the only question is, are you going to go back and look at some of those other vehicle manufacturers that are higher on the list for these types of incidents?

Secretary LAHOOD. Yes.

Mr. BURGESS. Have you already initiated that?

Secretary LAHOOD. We are just—as I said, we are just starting our review and our look back.

Mr. BURGESS. Well, Mr. Chairman, when that data becomes available, again, we'd appreciate you sharing it.

Secretary LAHOOD. Thank you. We will.

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Burgess.

Chairman Waxman, please, for questions.

Mr. WAXMAN. Thank you very much.

Secretary LaHood, our review shows that you had 2,600 complaints concerning this sudden unintended acceleration but that NHTSA only looked at the electronic systems one time, and that was in 2004. Is that correct?

Secretary LAHOOD. Yes, sir.

Mr. WAXMAN. Do you think that the 2004 investigation was sufficient?

Secretary LAHOOD. I think that under our watch we are going to get into the weeds and we are going to have a complete review on the electronics.

Mr. WAXMAN. Looking back from here, there was only one review, and that was in 2004. Would you say that was sufficient? I know you are planning—

Secretary LAHOOD. No, no. The answer is no.

Mr. WAXMAN. We have looked at the record, and the 2004 investigation was not comprehensive or in depth. It was headed by an individual who in an e-mail to Toyota officials said that he was not very knowledgeable about electronic throttle systems. It excluded the vast majority of complaints involving sudden unintended acceleration, including the most dangerous type, high-speed events in which the brakes are unable to stop the vehicle.

It appears that NHTSA never independently evaluated Toyota's claim about the adequacy of its systems, and there's no evidence that NHTSA did its own testing of electronic throttle control systems. Your staff told us that you had no electrical engineer on staff to help you assess the problem, and they never hired an outside electrical engineer.

Now I know you weren't around then, so I don't blame you, but I am concerned that I haven't heard you express any disagreements with any decisions made at the agency before your time. Am I stating that incorrectly? Do you feel the agency has done what it should have done prior to your being there?

Secretary LAHOOD. What I have tried to do is be forward looking, Mr. Chairman. I have spent the last year talking about safety. I have traveled the country. I have been to 35 States and 80 cities. Everywhere I go I talk about safety, whether its car safety, air-

plane, train safety. The train crash in California was caused by a distracted train driver, and that is why we decided to take on that cause. We will continue to do that.

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Secretary, I applaud you for your efforts in what you have told us about how high a priority safety is, and I'm pleased that you're going to take that position and try to steer the department, the National Highway Traffic Safety agency, under your watch to do the kind of job that needs to be done. I think that part of it is leadership.

But I think there needs to be a fundamental reform. Some of that you can do administratively and some may require legislation. We will be here to help you. We want this agency, as you want, to do the job of protecting the safety of the American people.

I must say, as I look at the record, it's not a happy one, it's not a successful one, and it's not the one that you and I want from that agency. Let's both look forward and make the changes to assure the American people that that situation is going to be different in the future.

Secretary LAHOOD. Well, Mr. Chairman, I would say this. I don't know of another Member of Congress while I was serving or since I have left that has been more concerned about these issues than you have. We really appreciate your support on this. We may be coming to you and asking for some legislative remedies, and I know you will be there for us. That may be happening sooner rather than later. And if you have legislative remedies, we want to work with you on this.

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Rush is the Chair of the subcommittee with the legislative jurisdiction. We are going to work with him and with you to do what we need to do in terms of the law to give you the powers and give that agency the powers to do what needs to be done. I know you're determined to accomplish that goal. So I look forward to working with you on that.

Secretary LAHOOD. Thank you.

Mr. WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yield back.

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Waxman.

Mr. Dingell for questions, please.

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

I'd like to welcome my old friend Mr. LaHood back.

Mr. Secretary, welcome.

Secretary LAHOOD. Thank you, sir.

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Secretary, yes or no, to your knowledge has Toyota complied with the statutory and regulatory obligations, whether mandated under the TREAD Act or otherwise, in conducting its 2009 and 2010 recalls related to sudden unintended acceleration?

Secretary LAHOOD. I'd rather get back to you on the record, if I could, sir.

Mr. DINGELL. All right. If you will submit a proper response at a time later.

Mr. Secretary, if Toyota has not complied with the statutory regulatory obligations related to these recalls, will you please submit for the record a description of how and what punitive action the Department of Transportation has taken as a result of this non-compliance.

Secretary LAHOOD. Yes, sir.

Mr. DINGELL. Now, Mr. Secretary, since 2001, how many reports of sudden unintended acceleration has the Department of Transportation received from Toyota Motor Sales USA, Inc.? Would you please submit a list and a description of each and every one of these reports for the record?

Secretary LAHOOD. Yes, sir.

Mr. DINGELL. Do you know whether you have received all of these or not?

Secretary LAHOOD. I will submit that for the record.

Mr. DINGELL. All right. Mr. Secretary, again, yes or no, are the Secretary of Transportation and NHTSA administrator empowered under statute to visit foreign automakers in their home country?

Secretary LAHOOD. Yes.

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Secretary, yes or no, have the Secretary of Transportation and NHTSA administrators done so in the past?

Secretary LAHOOD. Yes.

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Secretary, would you describe such visits to the headquarters of foreign automakers as routine or commonplace?

Secretary LAHOOD. Commonplace.

Mr. DINGELL. Commonplace?

Secretary LAHOOD. I mean, we try and make visits. Our NHTSA folks try and do it on a regular basis, yes.

Mr. DINGELL. Is there anything extraordinary here about you having the administrator or the acting administrator go over there while this investigation is going on?

Secretary LAHOOD. Yes. That was a special trip. That was not a routine trip. That was a special trip.

Mr. DINGELL. Special trip. Why was this a special trip that you and the administrator made?

Secretary LAHOOD. We wanted to get their attention and tell them we are taking these safety issues seriously and they need to take them seriously. And immediately upon return of our NHTSA acting administrator, they really stepped up and I think took our word on this.

Mr. DINGELL. Why did you have to do this, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary LAHOOD. Well, I think they were a little safety deaf.

Mr. DINGELL. Were they complying?

Secretary LAHOOD. I think that they were a little safety deaf.

Mr. DINGELL. Pardon?

Secretary LAHOOD. I think they were safety deaf, and we wanted to create some hearing devices for them, so we took a big megaphone with us and we got their attention.

Mr. DINGELL. So you're telling me that you felt it necessary to do this because of the safety of the American driving public, is that right?

Secretary LAHOOD. That is correct.

Mr. DINGELL. Have you had to do that before?

Secretary LAHOOD. Not with Toyota.

Mr. DINGELL. With anybody else?

Secretary LAHOOD. Not that I know of.

Mr. DINGELL. So this is essentially unique.

Secretary LAHOOD. I will make sure I get that accurate for the record, but I'm not aware of it.

Mr. DINGELL. OK. Now, Mr. Secretary, are the reporting requirements for early warning of possible vehicle safety defects different in Japan than in the United States?

Secretary LAHOOD. I will get back to you on the record for that.

Mr. DINGELL. On the record. Very well.

Mr. Secretary, are the Japanese requirements in this regard more or less stringent than American requirements?

Secretary LAHOOD. I will let you know.

Mr. DINGELL. All right. I assume that will be for the record.

Secretary LAHOOD. On the record, yes, sir.

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Secretary, if the Japanese requirements are less stringent, is it your experience that this affects the manner in which Toyota evaluates potential defects in its vehicles and influences what information a company provides to U.S. regulators?

Secretary LAHOOD. I will put that on the record, sir.

Mr. DINGELL. Very well.

Now, Mr. Secretary, you—I don't know whether you heard the testimony of Mr. Lentz.

Secretary LAHOOD. I did.

Mr. DINGELL. I found myself concerned. He said the decisions on these questions had to be made in Tokyo, and he couldn't do these decisions. Was that the reason you had to go to Tokyo to talk to the Japanese or, rather, talk to Toyota about the safety questions?

Secretary LAHOOD. Yes, sir.

Mr. DINGELL. Because that was where the decisions were made.

Secretary LAHOOD. That is correct.

Mr. DINGELL. Now is this a problem to you that you don't deal with Toyota the way you have to deal with other automobile makers?

Secretary LAHOOD. I told Chairman Stupak earlier that I think their business model for making decisions needs some adjustment.

Mr. DINGELL. Well, but the adjustment has to be because of your problems in dealing with them. Instead of getting the decision made here in the United States, you have got to trot over there to Tokyo to have the decision made. That doesn't seem to me that we're enforcing—we're able to enforce the laws speedily and efficiently as is necessary for the safety of the American driving public. Is that right?

Secretary LAHOOD. I also told the chairman that I'm going to be meeting with Mr. Toyoda when he is here in America and I hope to talk with him about some of these issues.

Mr. DINGELL. OK. Now the Governors of four States sent a letter that I find most distressing. Because if this government is going to use ownership in automobiles to confer benefits or disadvantage on anybody, I want to know about it. Is there any truth in the assumptions that these Governors are making that in some way or another the politics or ownership of General Motors or Chrysler is in any way related to the actions that are now being taken by your Department against Toyota?

Secretary LAHOOD. I have talked to three of those four Governors, and I told them that that letter was not accurate. Our investigation of any car company is not based on who they are. The

idea that we would not take seriously complaints from people who drive Toyotas belies belief, and the idea that we would do it because our government owns 60 percent of GM is baloney, and I told three of the four Governors that.

Mr. DINGELL. You might tell the fourth.

Secretary LAHOOD. Well, I will.

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Secretary, you are familiar with event data recorders? I believe these are useful to NHTSA, are they not?

Secretary LAHOOD. Yes.

Mr. DINGELL. Have you looked at all the EDRs in the Toyota vehicles that have been recalled?

Secretary LAHOOD. We have not, but we, again, are going to relook at them.

Mr. DINGELL. Some of them do not carry these kind of recorders. Are you able to easily read the recorders of the Toyota vehicles, or do you have some difficulty?

Secretary LAHOOD. What I'd like to do is really look at the statistics on that and get back to you on the record for ones that we could read and ones we had difficulty with.

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman you have been gracious. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. It's good to have you.

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Rush for questions, please.

Mr. RUSH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, it's good to see you here. Your testimony so far has been excellent testimony and even to a certain extent inspiring, considering your hands on the problem and your hands-on approach and your dedication and commitment. I've known you as a Member of this House, and I know that you're very capable and forthright as an individual and you say what you mean and you mean what you say. I am also encouraged by the confirmation of Mr. David Strickland as the head of NHTSA.

That said, I do have some concerns and I have some questions that I want to ask you.

First of all, earlier today—I want to get this out of the way—I received an e-mail from one of my staff members who received an e-mail in turn from one of the executives at the Chicago Defender. You are aware of that newspaper, the Chicago Defender.

This person indicated that his sister-in-law had been killed on December 28 in a Toyota Avalon somewhere near Dallas, Texas. There were three individuals in the car. All four of them were killed. The car flipped over and rested in a pond. The police said that this wasn't a result of a braking issue. So it means that something was wrong electronically. So my question and my request is that you look into that. I will get you all the pertinent information that I have and—

Secretary LAHOOD. We will look at it. We will get the information from you, and we will look at it.

Mr. RUSH. That said, Toyota consumers have witnessed a significant decline in their resale values. That means that there is a possibility and a probability that Toyota consumers, the owners of these vehicles, will experience a sharp increase in their insurance premiums for owning these vehicles. Are you concerned about that?

Secretary LAHOOD. I haven't heard about that, no.

Mr. RUSH. If in fact that does become a reality, especially in this time of economic hardship, I think we ought to be proactive in trying to offset that in some kind of way.

Secretary LAHOOD. OK.

Mr. RUSH. The members of this committee raised several areas of concern in regard to NHTSA's response to certain unintended acceleration, and that was explained by resource constraints within the agency. As the chairman said, the subcommittee that I chair will begin to hear and begin to become very active on NHTSA reauthorization. NHTSA's budget for operations and research has been stagnant for the last 10 years. Are you aware of that?

Secretary LAHOOD. Yes.

Mr. RUSH. As cars become more reliant on computers to operate, NHTSA has not kept up and doesn't have sufficient expertise in electronics to judge the safety of new electronic automobile technology. On at least five occasions NHTSA Office of Defects Investigations cited resource constraints as a reason for the defect petition filed by an individual who experienced sudden unintended acceleration. The question is, does NHTSA have the resources it needs to meet the challenges of its mission?

Secretary LAHOOD. I hope that you all will be pleased to hear that in President Obama's budget for the Department of Transportation there will be 66 new positions at NHTSA. That is what the President is proposing. We have 125 engineers, and some of them are electrical engineers. The idea that we don't have the experts to do the work is not quite accurate. We do have electrical engineers. We have 125 engineers. And the President has requested in his budget request to all of you 66 new positions at NHTSA. So we are moving away from stagnation.

Mr. RUSH. Well, I believe in you as a Secretary and I believe in Mr. Strickland. So we will be working hand in hand with you to make sure—

Secretary LAHOOD. I look forward to that.

Mr. RUSH. —that we move NHTSA forward and we address these problems.

You have only been there a year, but I'm really mindful and something that's important to me is for departments and employees of these departments and the departments themselves having a regulatory role with these agencies or these manufacturers and these businesses and corporations that they have to oversee. I hope that you will be able to build a firewall that is clear, that there can be no regulatory roadblock between the agencies that you have to oversee.

Secretary LAHOOD. I look forward to working with you, sir.

Mr. RUSH. Thank you.

I yield back.

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Secretary, just one thing. Your staff told us you have no electrical engineers at NHTSA.

Secretary LAHOOD. I'm sorry?

Mr. STUPAK. You have no electrical engineers.

Secretary LAHOOD. We have electrical engineers.

Mr. STUPAK. At NHTSA.

Secretary LAHOOD. Yes, sir.

Mr. STUPAK. That is contrary to what they told this committee and committee staff during the investigation. They said they have engineers who have taken some classes, but——

Secretary LAHOOD. We have 125 engineers, and we have electrical engineers as a part of the 125. I'm sworn to tell the truth here, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. STUPAK. I know.

Secretary LAHOOD. I wouldn't be lying about engineers. If I'm going to lie, it's not going to be about engineers.

Mr. STUPAK. Are any of these electrical engineers in the Office of Defect Investigations?

Secretary LAHOOD. They work for NHTSA, and their responsibilities are to use their expertise in this area.

Mr. STUPAK. So ODI, Office of Defect Investigation, can tap other parts of NHTSA.

Secretary LAHOOD. That is correct. We use their expertise for this.

Mr. STUPAK. That is amazing the staff didn't know you had all that expertise a week ago.

Mr. MARKEY for questions.

Mr. MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.

Welcome back, Ray.

Secretary LAHOOD. Thank you, sir.

Mr. MARKEY. Thank you for your work at the Department of Transportation.

Secretary LAHOOD. Thank you.

Mr. MARKEY. The impression that I think we've all been left with here today is that Toyota was aggregating all this information in Tokyo, but they weren't sharing it with their dealers, their employees, the people that ran different countries. And so we are at an inflection point here where obviously we have to change this system. We have to give you more power, and we have to just make sure this does not occur in the future. So I'd just like to walk through a few things and get your response, because I think it will help us to flesh out the authorities you will need and the things that we have to put in place to make sure we don't see a recurrence.

So it turns out that Toyota recalled a Lexus in the U.K. in 2000 because of a floor mat problem that was identical to that involved in the more recent recalls here in the United States. It's my understanding that the Department of Transportation was never informed of that recall.

In 2003, the Department turned down a consumer protection petition filed by an individual from Braintree, Massachusetts, alleging sudden acceleration problems involving his '99 Lexus, saying that the Department had no reason to think there were excessive problems with the Lexus based on what it knew at the time. It wasn't getting the information from Toyota. So it was not in a situation to see the entire situation.

Do you think the Department might have reached a different conclusion had it known about the 2000 U.K. Lexus recall involving the floor mats and trapping accelerator pedals?



Secretary LAHOOD. Well, I don't mean to be venturing a guess, Mr. Markey. I would assume that we would have, but that is a guess.

Mr. MARKEY. The law doesn't require automakers to report on foreign safety problems that it might have had that do not result in an actual recall, but we have learned recently that one of Toyota's tactics when dealing with safety regulators is to use lobbyists to try to limit the scope of recalls or to prevent them from occurring at all. Do you think that requiring automakers to more broadly report safety problems that they have encountered in other countries could help you do your job?

Secretary LAHOOD. Yes.

Mr. MARKEY. During today's hearing, Toyota claimed to be just beginning to examine the possibility that there are problems with its vehicles' electronics, while an outside academic said he proved that real-world circumstances existed under which the software that is supposed to automatically turn cars off if the throttle electronics fail does not work. We have also learned that Toyota had evidently validated that result. Do you think it would be inaccurate to assert that Toyota has identified and proposed remedies for all of the sudden acceleration problems that have been documented for its vehicles?

Secretary LAHOOD. We are going to do a complete, comprehensive, down-in-the-weeds review of the electronics. We will take information that was presented to your committee today. We will look at all the data. We will look at all the information. We will not rest until we finally find out if electronics are a part of this problem.

Mr. MARKEY. Can I ask, do you think that you need expanded authority to enable you to more easily conduct mandatory recalls? Do you need more authority?

Secretary LAHOOD. No, sir, not really. We do these investigations. We meet with auto companies. If they are not willing to do the recall voluntarily, we have the authority to do it.

Mr. MARKEY. But you need the information.

Secretary LAHOOD. We have to have the information. If we have missed the target on the electronics, we will correct that. We're going to do that. We're going to have a complete review.

Mr. MARKEY. The early warning database that consists of reports provided by auto manufacturers to the Department—and these reports are generally kept secret unless the Department opens up an investigation—what do you think about the public in terms of them providing—being provided with more information regarding potential safety defects that automakers tell the Department about even before an investigation is opened or a recall is announced?

Secretary LAHOOD. We are for transparency. The more information we can give the public, the better.

Mr. MARKEY. Do you need authority to do that? Do we have to change any—

Secretary LAHOOD. I don't know for sure, Mr. Markey. I will get back to you on that.

Mr. MARKEY. OK. That would be helpful. Because we want to be as helpful to you as we can be. We think that you're clearly, in my opinion, a great Secretary of Transportation.

Secretary LAHOOD. Thank you.

Mr. MARKEY. So we want to work with you to accomplish the goals while you're in the agency.

Secretary LAHOOD. I appreciate that. Thank you.

Mr. STUPAK. Ms. DeGette for questions, please.

Ms. DEGETTE. I will add my welcome, Mr. Secretary, and associate myself with Mr. Markey's last remarks, maybe not his first—not all of his remarks.

I just have a couple of questions for you. The first one, I think I know the answer to this. The New York Times has reported that its officials were frustrated with Toyota's slow response while conducting its investigation into acceleration issues. From your previous testimony today I would assume that you agree with that assessment, that Toyota was often slow to respond to requests from your agency, as far as you know.

Secretary LAHOOD. Yes. We have had issues with them, and that is the reason Ron Medford, our then acting-NHTSA administrator, went to Japan. Ron came to me and said, look, I don't think they're listening to us. I need to go to Japan. I said, leave tonight.

Ms. DEGETTE. When was that?

Secretary LAHOOD. It was late last year.

Ms. DEGETTE. From your sense from talking to Ron and others in the agency, was this a pattern with Toyota even before—

Secretary LAHOOD. What I said earlier is Toyota has some very good people in North America, very professional people. They know what they're doing. But I'm not sure that they were able to really communicate that to the folks in Tokyo, and that is the reason Ron felt he had to go there. I'm not going to trash the people in North America at Toyota. They are good people. They are professional people. And I told Mr. Toyoda when I talked to him, I said, safety is number one. You need to take this seriously. And I encouraged him to really do that. I think they've gotten that message.

Ms. DEGETTE. I think it's pretty clear you gave them that message.

NHTSA conducted six investigations into Toyota safety problems since 2003, so this didn't just start last year. This was ongoing since 2003. So my question is, do you know why, since these frustrations were happening at the agency since 2003, that NHTSA didn't use its subpoena power once in all those years of investigation?

Secretary LAHOOD. Well, we have other authority other than subpoena power, and we've used it from time to time. We have other enforcement mechanisms.

As I said at the top in my testimony, I'm going to be forward looking here. I've been in this job a little over a year. If you want me to go back and account for what happened in '04, I will do that.

Ms. DEGETTE. No, I don't. But what I do want to ask you—so, number one, you don't know why they didn't do that before—

Secretary LAHOOD. I don't personally know.

Ms. DEGETTE. Number two, do you reserve the right to use the subpoena power going forward if you don't get adequate response?

Secretary LAHOOD. Absolutely. Totally.

Ms. DEGETTE. My second and last question is, following up on the questions Mr. Rush and also Mr. Stupak were asking about the

NHTSA budget, you said that there are 66 new positions in the administration's budget—

Secretary LAHOOD. Correct.

Ms. DEGETTE. —within NHTSA. But at the same time, NHTSA's fiscal year 2011 budget for the vehicle operations and research side of the agency is about even. So we are wondering where you're going to fund those extra positions and will they be able to work in this particular part of the agency.

Secretary LAHOOD. If the Congress approves our budget with additional staff, we will take those resources and put them where they are needed.

Ms. DEGETTE. So you think that you will be able to hire these 66 new positions within that flat budget.

Secretary LAHOOD. I think if we get 66 new positions and you provide the money for it, we will take those people and put them where they are needed. If they are needed on looking into electronics, we will do that. If they are needed in other areas, we will do that.

Ms. DEGETTE. So your view is that the 66 new people aren't necessarily looking into electronics. They are just—

Secretary LAHOOD. They are going to be a human resource that we are going to use where we need them, where the problems are.

Ms. DEGETTE. So let's say you do need them in electronics—because it seems like from past years, again, not speaking about the last year when you've been Secretary, but from past years this has been a deficiency in the agency. If you put them over there, where are you going to take it from in the agency's current enforcement?

Secretary LAHOOD. Well, I don't know the specifics on that. I'd be happy to get back to you. We will keep our fingers crossed that you provide us the additional 66.

Ms. DEGETTE. See, I will just tell you, Mr. Secretary, what we are concerned about, not just with NHTSA but a lot of the other consumer agencies, is over the last 8 to 10 years these agencies have been starved of resources. And we are concerned that if you take 66 new positions, which might be authorized but if there's no additional funding for the agency that we are going to stint on other places where we are already short on enforcement.

Secretary LAHOOD. I would assume if we get the authorization, we are going to get the money to pay for them. That would be our goal.

Ms. DEGETTE. And that would be in addition to your fiscal 2011 budget?

Secretary LAHOOD. Our 2011 would be the 66 additional people, plus the money to pay for them.

Ms. DEGETTE. OK. Because the request we know about is pretty much flat.

Secretary LAHOOD. Our goal will be to—

Ms. DEGETTE. Your staff has some advice here.

Secretary LAHOOD. Let me just see what it says here. It says, increase in salary count. Look, if you authorize 66, I will work with our friends on the Appropriations Committee to find the money.

Ms. DEGETTE. Thank you.

Mr. STUPAK. Mrs. Christensen senior for questions, please.

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you.

Welcome, Secretary LaHood. It's always good to have you here. Having worked with you for quite a few years and knowing your integrity, having witnessed your commitment and passion for safety, I have confidence that what needs to be done at NHTSA will get done.

Some of the questions about what authorities you need have already been asked, so let me just ask this one question.

After the Firestone Ford Explorer rollover problem I read that Congress introduced the Passive TREAD Act, which required NHTSA to create an early warning system to gather and analyze more information on auto safety to reduce defects sooner. In a 2004 report—and I realize this is before you came—but in that report from the Department of Transportation Inspector General it was stated that the cost estimates for the project were way above what had been anticipated and that the computer system that existed at that time did not have the advanced analytical capabilities that were envisioned by the law. So it didn't have the money, but they didn't have the capability of creating or having that early warning system to gather and analyze the information. Do you know if that problem has been corrected since the Inspector General report of 2004?

Secretary LAHOOD. It has been. And I can tell you this. When we got into this Toyota thing—I have been going over this and going over this. I think we have some outstanding people. They work very hard. We get 30,000 complaints a year. We look at what other organizations are saying and doing. We talk to car companies. And we take every one seriously. We don't set any aside. And when we really see a curve and see something that really catches us, we begin to look at that very carefully. And so I think we have a good system in place. Hopefully, we get a few more resources in terms of people. But I think the system works very well. If somebody has a complaint, we take it seriously, if it's an individual driver or a company or an organization. And our people look at every one.

Ms. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

I yield back my time.

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you.

Ms. Sutton for questions, please.

Ms. SUTTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and thank you, Mr. Secretary, for being here and for your work at the Department.

A couple of things. The black boxes that we have heard about, I'm just trying to get clarification on that. Does NHTSA have access to the data that was contained in black boxes that might have been—might be in Tokyo? As I understand it, Toyota has access to this information, but can we access it?

Secretary LAHOOD. I don't know the answer to that. So it's difficult for us. They only have one reader to read these devices, and it's very difficult to get the information.

Ms. SUTTON. So finding ways to get relevant information and enforcing safety concerns here is something that—

Secretary LAHOOD. It is. I do think all of this has been a big wake-up call for Toyota. I think you will find that when Mr. Toyoda comes on Capitol Hill tomorrow, when he makes some vis-

its to some folks—I mean, I think they get it now. They need to be more attuned and sensitive to these things.

Ms. SUTTON. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Also, just because we have the opportunity to make sure the record is clear here on certain things, I reviewed the report issued by NHTSA on the CARS program. I was happy to see that positive jobs impacts of at least 60,000 jobs.

But I also want to make sure that people understand, because I think there's been some effort to confuse the record, about the way—we have talked a lot about resources and what you need to do to accomplish the safety functions that fall within NHTSA responsibility. We want to make sure that you always have what you need. And if you need more than you have now, we want to make sure you have got it.

But, just to clarify, it's my understanding that at NHTSA—I mean, which also, of course, has responsibility over fuel economy standards, which is why Cash for Clunkers was also part of NHTSA's purview, that the people who deal with fuel economy and the people who deal with the safety functions under NHTSA are two different sets of people. Is that correct?

Secretary LAHOOD. It is correct. But I will say this, Congresswoman—and you know this—in the first 4 days of that program, which was your stepchild, or however you want to characterize it—it was your idea—250,000 cars were sold. It was a wildly popular program. And I'm not going to sit here and tell you we weren't overwhelmed. When you sell 250,000 cars and try to get the money out the door to dealers, it became a very serious issue for us. We were trying to incorporate a lot of resources, including our FAA friends out in Oklahoma City, who do a lot of good work but they also know how to process paper. We used their expertise. We hired people from the outside to come in. But I want people to know there never for one instance was safety ever compromised as a result of the CARS program, not for one second. I wouldn't let that happen.

Ms. SUTTON. Mr. Secretary, the other issue, of course, is that I wouldn't let that happen, either. The reality is that we put \$50 million in administrative costs into the legislation, so that we actually gave resources when we gave work—

Secretary LAHOOD. That is correct.

Ms. SUTTON [continuing]. To NHTSA. And that is an extraordinarily important point not to be lost because it's easily swept under the rug by those who might want to discredit what was clearly, as you point out, wildly popular.

Secretary LAHOOD. It was a lifeline to the automobile industry. No one could have ever sold 7 or 800,000 cars in less than 30 days. It was a lifeline to car salesmen, to car dealers, to the loan companies, to the credit unions that made the loans, to the local governments that got the sales tax. The spin-off on that was incredible. It was a lot more than \$3 billion.

Ms. SUTTON. Thank you. Thank you very much, and I appreciate that clarification.

Secretary LAHOOD. Thank you.

Mr. STUPAK. The gentlelady yields back?

Ms. SUTTON. I yield back.

Mr. STUPAK. Ms. Schakowsky for questions, please.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Hi, Ray. Thank you for being here and answering all our questions—

Secretary LAHOOD. Thank you.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY [continuing]. And being here at this late hour.

I have been meeting, as I think other members have, with some of the Toyota dealers today, who—this couldn't have happened at a worse time in many ways with the downturn in the economy, and they are very worried about their futures, and we have to be, too, because there's a lot of jobs involved in dealerships and the manufacture of cars. They said that the sale of Toyota is down like 50 percent right now, which is understandable.

One of the other things that they feel is that there has been disproportionate focus on this particular situation of Toyota, and they pointed out that there have been over the last year some 143 or something like that recalls, some related to safety of other automobile manufacturers. So what I wanted to ask you is how would you rate Toyota's performance in dealing with NHTSA safety issues compared to other automakers? Do we have a particular problem here?

Secretary LAHOOD. The vast majority of recalls are not on Toyotas. They are on other car manufactures.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. That is what they were saying.

Secretary LAHOOD. It is. People know what that is. We put it out there. We are not trying to hide that.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. They weren't blaming.

Secretary LAHOOD. The reason that people are focusing on this now is because of the horrific accident that occurred in San Diego where these people lost their lives, and that really highlighted the unfortunate circumstances by which that happened. And you all want to get to the bottom of it, and so do we.

I know there are people on this committee all day that have been talking about the electronics. We are going to get in the weeds on that. We feel an obligation to do that. If we've overlooked it, I guarantee it won't happen on my watch. We are going to look into it.

The idea that we are picking on Toyota is just not accurate. Look at the statistics. Over the last 3 years, 23 million recalls of automobiles as a result of our investigations. And the vast majority were not Toyota.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Right. I think they were actually mostly just worried about the publicity that had been around this.

Secretary LAHOOD. Look, Congresswoman, if you and I were in charge of publicity, there would be a lot different stories written about everything.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. This is true. Some of us have the same problems.

One of the things that Toyota is doing is installing in some of the recalled cars, not all of them, a software fix that makes sure that the brakes override the accelerator. This seems like a really good idea. Is there some way that this could be required as a standard safety feature?

Secretary LAHOOD. I heard Mr. Lentz say they were doing it in the majority of his models as he was sitting here today. And we have not heard that before. It's something I think we should look

into. If that is a way to override an electrical problem or a sticky pedal or a floor mat pedal that someone hasn't taken care of, any way that we can save lives and save injuries and correct something that is wrong, I think we should look at it.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. It seems to me that that would make a whole lot of sense now in this computer and electronic era to make sure—

Secretary LAHOOD. Yes.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. I have no other questions. Thank you.

Mr. STUPAK. That concludes questions by members of the subcommittee.

We still have members from the full committee here. Mr. Shimkus, if you have any questions.

Mr. SHIMKUS. No questions, just a statement if I may, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, Dr. Gilbert comes out of SIU Carbondale. I got to listen to most of his testimony in the office, and I got to spend some time with him this afternoon. So I want to place on the record we are very proud of him for the work he has done. And I know my good friend and now former colleague, Secretary LaHood, would appreciate the Illinois connection of that.

I just want to, on the record, praise a good friend and a mentor of mine. As you know, I have been a little combative in my 3 years, last 3 years especially, and I think some of that style I learned from the sitting Secretary. There's something to be said about telling it straight and forcefully. And that's always been Ray's style. On the record, I appreciate your friendship and support over the years, and I know you're working in the best interest of the country. So thank you for what you do.

Secretary LAHOOD. Thank you for those very good words, kind words, and we are going to look at his research. We are going to look at everything, his testimony today. But we want to look at the documents and see what he's done. Hopefully, it will be helpful to us.

Mr. SHIMKUS. Welcome to the committee.

Secretary LAHOOD. Thank you.

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Gonzalez, questions, please.

Mr. GONZALEZ. Thank you very much.

The first thing, Mr. Chairman, can I ask unanimous consent that we all agree with Mr. Shimkus' description of himself, that he is combative?

Mr. Secretary, I've said it before. I will say it again. We miss you. We are happy to have you, as great a job as you're doing. Too bad we don't have two of you.

A couple of things. One, I think you said there were 250,000 cars sold in the Cash for Clunkers. I think that may have been the first few days. There were 750,000 cars sold. I know I had some of my dealers complaining that the money wasn't being paid quickly enough. The alternative would be for the cars to remain on their lots. When I reminded of that, they were happy to wait a couple of days.

Let me start off with a couple of observations. First of all, in your testimony, written testimony—I'm going to read from it. NHTSA does not contend that the two recalls will fully resolve all concerns

about unintended acceleration in Toyota vehicles. However, with one exception, NHTSA has not been able to establish a vehicle base cause for unintended acceleration events in Toyota vehicles not covered by those two recalls. The exception was the recall of the model year 2004 Sienna vans in 2009 due to a defective trim panel.

Some consumers and others believe that Toyota's electronic throttle control, ETC, systems and perhaps such systems in other manufacturers' vehicles are susceptible to electromagnetic interference, EMI, that can theoretically cause unintended acceleration by resulting in incorrect signals to the engine. To be absolutely sure that the agency is aware of all potential defects, NHTSA is conducting a review of the general subject of possible EMI effects on ETC systems.

Now you have assured us that that is ongoing and you're going to be very aggressive about it, which we would all stand here and tell you how can we help you with it. The problem was, and we have had members make reference to it, was that members of NHTSA were here, and this is from a letter—actually, it's a body of a letter that has been forwarded to you, but it's dated February 22, so I doubt if you've even had a chance to look at it.

As the agency responsible for ensuring that the vehicles on the road are safe, it is essential that NHTSA have ample expertise to test and analyze the electronic systems and to evaluate the sufficiency of tests and the analysis of the automobile and automakers' performance.

It appears, however that, NHTSA lacks the expertise, hampering the ability of the Office of Defects Investigation, ODI, to examine possible electronic defects in vehicles. In the briefing on February 18, officials told the committee staff that the agency has no electrical engineers or software engineers on staff. Now that is not accurate, is that correct?

Secretary LAHOOD. We have two electrical engineers. We have 125 engineers. We have two electrical engineers, and we are about ready to hire another one.

And the third thing I would say, Mr. Gonzalez, is that when we need outside expertise, we use it. We do. We are not bashful about doing it. If we don't feel we have the expertise, we will go out and find it.

Mr. GONZALEZ. I think that is an important point. The reason for that we have been talking about maybe expanding your authority, and I don't think you're going to be bashful about coming here and saying, legislatively speaking, you need a fix. But we also want to be very receptive to the expanded resources that you may require, and there's not going to be anybody on either side of this aisle that's not going to give you whatever you need to get to the bottom of this.

It is good to see you here and receive the assurance that you're aggressively pursuing this. I will end with one question. Is Toyota cooperating with your Department?

Secretary LAHOOD. A hundred percent now.

Mr. GONZALEZ. Thank you very much. I yield back.

Mr. STUPAK. A hundred percent now. They weren't always cooperating with you?



Secretary LAHOOD. I don't know that we would have had to go to Japan. I don't know if I would have had to pick up the phone and talk to Mr. Toyoda.

Mr. STUPAK. Let me ask you this. You indicated that you could always—NHTSA can get outside experts if they need help in an area. Do you know the last time ODI, Office of Defect Investigations, ever hired outside experts to help them with a problem?

Secretary LAHOOD. I do not. But I will put that on the record for you. I can find out.

Mr. STUPAK. We would appreciate it.

Mr. BURGESS, questions?

Mr. BURGESS. Yes. Mr. Secretary, I'm sure you heard the testimony—the compelling testimony of the Smiths, who were here.

Secretary LAHOOD. Of course.

Mr. BURGESS. The uncommanded acceleration in her vehicle. They voiced a lot of frustration over getting anyone at Toyota to take them seriously. They also voiced some frustration in getting the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration to listen to them and take them seriously. I got the impression that they were still waiting for a response from NHTSA. I would appreciate it if you would look into that.

Secretary LAHOOD. We will be in touch with them.

Mr. BURGESS. I heard Mr. Lentz say that he didn't know what had happened to the vehicle, but he was going to make an effort to find it. I would just suggest that maybe NHTSA ought to take the same trajectory. I think you would be very interested to know if some of the things that Professor Gilbert brought up today actually can exist in a real-world situation, and if that car was the laboratory that created that, thank goodness no one died in the experiment, but let's get that data and find out if indeed that what Professor Gilbert produced in the laboratory was what Mrs. Smith encountered when she drove her car.

Secretary LAHOOD. We know where the car is. We have talked to the owner of the car. We hope to be able to explore that.

Mr. STUPAK. That concludes all the questions of the members.

Mr. Secretary, thank you. Thank you for your patience today. We look forward to follow-up questions that we will be sending you.

I want to thank all of our witnesses for coming.

The committee rules provide members have 10 days to submit additional questions for the record.

I ask unanimous consent that four documents—the Exponent letter dated February 23, 2010, be entered in the record; the report of Professor Michael Pecht be entered in the record; Mr. Neal Hanneman's report be entered in the record; and Dr. Gilbert's interim report be entered in the record. Without objection, so ordered.

[The information appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Burgess asked that Governor Perry's letter to the committee be entered in the record. Without objection, so be it.

[The information was unavailable at the time of printing.]

Mr. STUPAK. That concludes our hearing. The meeting of the subcommittee is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 6:55 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

[Material submitted for inclusion in the record follows:]

FEB. 23. 2010 1:03PM EXPONEN

NO. 792 P. 2/3

**Exponent**

Exponent  
149 Commonwealth Drive  
Menlo Park, CA 94025

telephone 650-346-9400  
facsimile 650-326-8072  
www.exponent.com

February 23, 2010

*Via FedEx and Facsimile*

Mr. Henry A. Waxman, Chairman  
Committee on Energy and Commerce  
Mr. Bart Stupak, Chairman  
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations  
2125 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, D.C. 20515-6115

Gentlemen:

We are concerned about the Committee's comment in a letter to Mr. James Leutz, dated February 22, 2010, that Exponent's report "appears to have serious flaws." The two individuals referenced, Professor Michael Pecht and Mr. Neil Hanneman, have not identified any flaws in our work, but rather identified other areas of investigation to be pursued, some of which were already underway.

When Toyota released Exponent's report they described it as an interim report. We specifically state, both in the Executive Summary and in the Conclusions of our report, that "This report summarizes some of the testing that has been performed to date. Exponent's testing and analysis is ongoing."

It is important to note that at this stage of our work we neither claim to have looked at all the issues, nor to have opined on the cause of the incidents of unintended acceleration that have been reported. We agree that further work needs to be performed before we reach such opinions and further work is underway.

We released our interim report at Toyota's request because Toyota understood that the Committee was interested in the status of our ongoing work. We have made our staff available to the Committee staff to answer questions, and would be pleased to continue to do so. Also, should the Committee or its staff wish to visit our offices or test facilities in order to assist them in the review of this matter, we would be pleased to host such a meeting.

On the other hand, if the Committee would prefer that we not release any further progress reports until our investigation is complete, we will respond accordingly.

FEB. 23. 2010 1:03PM EXPONEN

NO. 792 P. 3/3

Mr. Henry A. Waxman  
Mr. Bart Stupak  
February 23, 2010  
Page 2

It is counter-productive for us to release progress reports if we are to be criticized because they have not addressed all the issues.

Sincerely,



Paul R. Johnston, Ph.D.  
President and CEO

cc: The Honorable Joe Barton, Ranking Member  
Committee on Energy and Commerce

The Honorable Greg Walden, Ranking Member  
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations

Mr. James E. Lentz  
President and Chief Operating Officer  
Toyota Motor Sales

# **Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration**

February 5, 2010

Sean Kane  
Ellen Liberman  
Tony DiViesti  
Felix Click



Safety Research & Strategies, Inc.  
340 Anawan Street / Ste. 200  
Rehoboth, MA 02769  
Ph. 508-252-2333, Fax 508-252-3137  
[www.safetyresearch.net](http://www.safetyresearch.net)

## **Acknowledgements**

The report was written and its research conducted by Safety Research & Strategies, Inc. on behalf of consumers and the injured individuals, families and loved ones of the fatal victims of Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration.

This report is the sole property of Safety Research & Strategies and its contents reflect the work and the opinions of SRS. This report was not funded by attorneys, consumers, advocacy groups, or experts interested in this subject matter. It was not produced for litigation against Toyota Motor Company. We would nonetheless like to acknowledge five attorneys, who sponsored some of our research into Sudden Unintended Acceleration in Toyota vehicles: Donald Slavik of Habush, Habush & Rottier; Edgar F. “Hike” Heiskell III of Bailey & Glasser, LLP; John H. Gomez of the Gomez Law Firm; R. Graham Esdale Jr. of Beasley, Allen, Methvin, Portis & Miles PC; and Terrence McCartney of Rheingold, Valet, Rheingold, Shkolnik & McCartney LLP. We also acknowledge Randy and Alice Whitfield of Quality Control Systems Corp. for their insights and continued efforts in defect surveillance and government transparency.

We undertook this effort solely to help consumers who have suffered incalculable personal and economic losses and advance our public safety mission. It is our intention, in publishing this report, to provide a comprehensive accounting of the public record surrounding this complex problem. We hope it will encourage Toyota to take swift action and produce policy changes to prevent future tragedies.

This report was a collaboration among the entire SRS staff: Sean E. Kane; Ellen C. Liberman; Felix Click; Tony DiViesti; Melanie MacDonald; Lauri Stevenson; Ann Boudreau; Sharon Mitchell; Marilyn Charest; Ryan Gousie and Sarah Madsen.

## **Table of Contents**

<b>Executive Summary</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Introduction</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>Owners Complain</b>	<b>5</b>
The Data	5
Early Warning Reporting Data	12
<b>NHTSA Investigates</b>	<b>14</b>
Aborted Efforts to Look at the Early-Model Camry	17
The Lexus Investigations	17
The Tacoma Investigation	24
The Sienna Van Investigation: No Data, Bigger Problem	25
<b>A Case of Historical Bias? A Brief History of SUA</b>	<b>26</b>
<b>Possible Causes of SUA</b>	<b>30</b>
Pedal Entrapment and Pedal Misapplication	30
Electromagnetic Interference and Electronic Problems	31
Cracked Throttle Body Shafts	33
<b>Toyota Response: Illogical and Inconsistent</b>	<b>34</b>
The ETCS-i	34
Toyota's Notice of the Emerging SUA Problem and the Effort to Shut it Down	36
The Recalls	38
Do the Recalls Address Root Causes of SUA?	40
Sticky Pedals	41
<b>A Confused Public as Toyota Shifts the Blame</b>	<b>47</b>
<b>Conclusion</b>	<b>50</b>

## **Table of Appendices**

Appendix A: Unintended Acceleration Incidents Reported 1999-January 19, 2010 Involving Vehicles Outside of the Recall Populations

Appendix B: A Sampling of Incidents of Unintended Acceleration in Recalled Vehicles not Explained by Pedal and Mat Failures

Appendix C: Toyota Vehicles with ETCS-i

Appendix D: Consumer complaints to NHTSA 2007 – 2008 MY Lexus ES350 unintended acceleration incidents occurring Jan. 2009 – Jan. 2010

Appendix E: Consumer complaints to NHTSA of unintended acceleration in Lexus IS models

## Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration

### Executive Summary

This report examines the complexities and inconsistencies within the public record on Sudden Unintended Acceleration (SUA) incidents involving Toyota vehicles. It concludes that neither Toyota nor the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has identified all of the causes of SUA in Toyota and Lexus model vehicles, nor has the automaker implemented remedies that address the types of complaints consumers are reporting.

Since 1999, at least 2,262 Toyota and Lexus owners have reported to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, the media, the courts and to Safety Research & Strategies that their vehicles have accelerated suddenly and unexpectedly in a variety of scenarios. These incidents have resulted in 815 crashes, 341 injuries and, 19 deaths potentially related to sudden unintended acceleration.

Toyota's SUA problems span many years, makes and models. The scenarios in which they occur show different patterns of problems. Like many wide-spread problems, rarely is there a single root-cause. Toyota's recalls to date and continuing consumer complaints show this.

In 2003, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration launched the first of eight separate investigations into SUA, beginning in 2003, into this phenomenon in Lexus models and Toyota Camry, Tacoma and Sienna vehicles. The agency never determined a cause for these incidents in five of the investigations; three resulted in determinations that all-weather accessory floor mats or vehicle trim had interfered with the accelerator pedal.

Toyota initially blamed customers for improperly installing accessory floor mats and resisted taking widespread action. In 2005 and 2007, the automaker launched two small recall campaigns. The first corrected an accelerator that could stick in Lexus IS250 vehicles; the second replaced all-weather floor mats in a limited group of 2007 and 2008 Lexus and Camry vehicles. More recently, under growing public pressure, Toyota has initiated much larger recalls to redesign floor mats, shorten the accelerator pedal, and in some vehicles, install a brake override feature. The automaker has also launched a second recall for sticky accelerator pedals.

Toyota has been slow to accept its responsibility in creating this safety hazard. That floor mats could so easily entrap the accelerator pedal suggests design flaws that could encompass the mat, the floor arrangement on the driver's side, the pedal mechanism itself, the pedal placement or any combination of these factors.

An accelerator pedal that is slow to return to idle requires repair, but does not cause Sudden Unintended Acceleration.



The agency's investigations have been too brief and cursory to find other causes. Its decisions to open or close probes, based on shifting statistical bases, have contributed to a continuing safety issue. That may be the result of a lack of electronic expertise, the resources to fully investigate the electronic causes, or a bias against non-mechanical causes, rooted in the 25-year, and frequently controversial, history of SUA.

Nonetheless, there is ample evidence to suggest that neither Toyota nor NHTSA have identified all of the causes of SUA in Toyota vehicles or all of the vehicles plagued by this problem. Of the 2,262 complaints, about half are from drivers of vehicles that haven't been recalled. The complaint data also show that replacing a sticking pedal or the floor mat will not resolve the problem, because:

- Drivers experience SUA when their vehicle is in idle mode.
- Drivers experience SUA when their foot is on the brake.
- Drivers experience SUA when no all-weather accessory floor mats are present or are properly installed.
- Drivers report that the vehicle accelerates while at constant highway speed.

These scenarios don't square with the current theories. Absent a mechanical cause, the automaker and the regulators must look more closely at the vehicle control systems, including the electronic throttle control assembly and the associated sensors. Toyota has consistently argued that its electronic throttle control design and failsafe systems are infallible. Drivers' experiences clearly prove that this is not true. Random, intermittent electronic faults are hard to detect, but they do occur – the electrical contacts, electromagnetic interference, and the programming of the electronic controls are all possible points of breakdown or interruption in an electronic system.

Regardless of the causes of sudden unintended acceleration in Toyota and Lexus vehicles, the automaker's first step should be measures to protect the public. The implementation of a brake-to-idle feature across all model lines and years may be a significant step in that direction. With this feature, the signal to brake would take precedence – even if the throttle were fully open. The brake override allows drivers to regain control of a runaway vehicle.

Sudden Unintended Acceleration is a contentious topic in automotive circles. The debate was born in the 1980s, when angry Audi owners, claiming that their vehicles could suddenly accelerate, were crashing their vehicles with alarming frequency. Audi blamed drivers unfamiliar with its vehicles. Drivers could not be persuaded that they had made an error. Five recalls ensued. Whether you believe that Audi was unfairly maligned or that the regulators failed, the lessons of the past are not necessarily instructive to the problems of the present. The Bowden cable, the linchpin of mechanical throttle designs, is rapidly becoming an obsolete technology. Vehicles are now complicated interfaces where mechanicals systems are controlled by increasingly sophisticated electronics. Any examination of SUA must fully explore the interactions between the two, as well as simpler, easy-to-understand causes. This has not yet been done for the Toyota SUA incidents.

## Introduction

On August 28, 2009, California Highway Patrol Officer Mark Saylor, his wife, young daughter and brother-in-law died in a horrific crash, when the 2009 Lexus ES 350 Saylor had been driving, “failed to stop at the end of Highway 125.”<sup>1</sup> According to the report filed a month later by NHTSA investigators, Saylor’s Lexus, a loaner from Bob Baker Lexus of El Cajon, Calif., “entered the T-intersection and collided with a Ford Explorer. The Lexus continued on past the end of the T-intersection and struck an embankment, at which time it became airborne. The Lexus eventually came to rest in a dry riverbed where it burned for an extended period of time.”<sup>2</sup>

Mark Saylor, his wife Cleofe, their 13-year-old daughter, Mahala, and brother-in-law Chris Lastrella were not the first occupants to die in a crash caused by Sudden Unintended Acceleration (SUA) in a Toyota or Lexus vehicle. An estimated 19 occupants have died in Toyota vehicles in which the driver or occupants described a scenario in which their vehicle inexplicably accelerated without their input and could not be stopped. But the moments before the Saylor crash were captured in a frantic and publicly broadcast 911 call from Lastrella, describing panic in a runaway vehicle.

It was a watershed moment in a crisis that had been forming for at least six years, caused by Toyota’s neglect and failure to address the root causes, and by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s failure to identify any safety-related defect trends despite the steady stream of complaints. Since 2003, NHTSA’s Office of Defect Investigations (ODI) has opened eight separate investigations into allegations of Sudden Unintended Acceleration involving Camry, Lexus ES 350, Sienna and Tacoma vehicles – five of which included Lexus vehicles. Most have been very brief, cursory, and closed with no defect finding. The only cause the agency has ever found for Toyota SUA has been pedal interference caused by floor mats, or in the case of the Toyota Sienna, trim interference.

In the past, Toyota had successfully responded by denying that any problem existed – but if pushed, blamed consumers for installing accessory floor mats that could entrap the accelerator pedal and agreed to replace the mats, or post warnings. This remedy had satisfied NHTSA – until the Saylor crash – which put renewed pressure on Toyota and the agency, to, at the very least come up with a much more substantive remedy.

Many could not understand why a highly experienced California Highway Patrol officer couldn’t safely bring the vehicle under control and to a stop. After an inspection of the burned vehicle, NHTSA declared that the cause was an unsecured accessory all-weather floor mat entrapped the accelerator pedal. The inspection noted:

<sup>1</sup> REPORT: Vehicle and Crash Site Inspection of 2009 Lexus ES-350 ; DP09001; Bill Collins; NHTSA; September 30, 2009

<sup>2</sup> REPORT: Vehicle and Crash Site Inspection of 2009 Lexus ES-350 ; DP09001; Bill Collins; NHTSA; September 30, 2009

“The mat was not secured by either of the two retaining clips. The right clip was installed into the grommet of the carpeting but not installed into the mat. The left clip was found under the middle of mat but was not clipped to either the carpet or the rubber mat. Removal of the mat was difficult because the bottom edge of the accelerator pedal had melted to the upper right corner of the mat. Further inspection of the mat revealed that while it was a Lexus brand mat, it was not the correct application for the vehicle.”<sup>3</sup>

Was that really the cause? (The report is ambiguous – it does not say that the mat was found on top of the pedal, rather the pedal had burned on to the mat. The pedal mechanism was found to be in good shape, with the ability to easily spring back.) If the floor mat was to blame, Toyota is guilty of failing to acknowledge the very serious and real consequences of pedal entrapment for at least two years, since the agency pointed out in a 2007 investigation that drivers could not easily stop a runaway vehicle.<sup>4</sup>

If the floor mat did not confine the pedal, then Toyota and Lexus owners have real cause to worry that their vehicles have an unidentified defect constituting a severe safety hazard.

Over the last eight years, Toyota has ignored many consumers’ complaints, even as it quietly issued a number of Technical Service Bulletins to fix problems with its electronic throttles. The Electronic Throttle Control-intelligent (ETCS-i) throttles, first introduced in some models in 1998, were widely applied by the 2002 model year. Since 2005, Toyota has launched six recalls related to accelerator pedals – floor mat replacement was featured in four of these campaigns – although the October 2009 recall included other adjustments to the targeted vehicles. The most recent recalls, in January, were launched to replace sticking accelerator pedals on many late model Toyotas.<sup>5</sup>

Each of Toyota’s recalls have focused on mechanical root causes while the company has denied any electronic connection to unintended acceleration.

Like many large-scale defect-related tragedies, there is rarely a singular cause or event at the root of a problem; rather, a number of issues align. Firestone tire/Ford Explorer rollovers that dominated the news at the beginning of the decade were the result of design and manufacturing defects in the tires, combined with an application on a rollover-prone vehicle that was sensitive to tires. In addition, the tire’s long wear on the best-selling SUV ensured wide exposure.

There are many parallels between that crisis and Toyota’s problems today. It is becoming increasingly apparent that Toyota SUA incidents stem from multiple causes. Complaints have been found across many years, makes and models of Toyota vehicles, under a range of driving conditions. Consumers’ descriptions of SUA incidents do not all fit the current

<sup>3</sup> <sup>3</sup> REPORT: Vehicle and Crash Site Inspection of 2009 Lexus ES-350 ; DP09001; Bill Collins; NHTSA; September 30, 2009

<sup>4</sup> Closing Resume EA0710; National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; October 11, 2007

<sup>5</sup> Recall 10V017; Toyota Motor Company; January 21, 2010

recall descriptions. Many consumers report sudden full-throttle occurrences when parking at low speeds with the brake applied. Others describe on-highway events in which the vehicle continues to increase in speed without pedal application. In many cases floor mats are secured or simply absent. Further, Toyota dealer and field service representatives' inspections report no physical impairments, such as a "sticky pedal."

NHTSA's failure to respond effectively to these complaints may be affected by the agency's longstanding historical bias against non-mechanical or non-driver error causes of SUA. Although electronic problems within today's increasingly computer-saturated vehicles are well-known within the auto industry, the agency has given this possible cause short shrift. It may also underscore the weaknesses of the Early Warning Reporting (EWR) system, instituted in the wake of the Ford Explorer debacle. EWR data, (in addition to consumer reported complaints) submitted to NHTSA starting in 2003 showed some Toyota and Lexus models exhibiting SUA claim rates that should have drawn closer attention to the problems.

Unraveling the complex mix of the SUA problems will take time. In the meantime, it is imperative that Toyota communicate openly and honestly with its customers and that NHTSA work to support consumers throughout this process. Many Toyota owners remain confused as the company shifts its public position, applies remedies unevenly, and fails to provide a clear, tangible and logical explanation for vehicle problems.

Regardless of the causes of sudden unintended acceleration in Toyota and Lexus vehicles, it is apparent that the automaker's first step should be measures aimed at protecting the public. The implementation of a brake-to-idle feature across all model lines and years may be a significant step in that direction. This design, found in many other manufacturers' vehicles with electronic throttles, will bring the engine to idle if both the brake and the accelerator pedals are applied. A significant number of motorists who experienced frightening SUA events reported that no amount of braking would stop the vehicle once it took off. So far, Toyota has only been willing to add a brake-to-idle feature on some Camry, Avalon and Lexus ES 350, IS 350 and IS 250 models as an "extra measure of confidence." This is inadequate.

Complaints of SUA can be found for all manufacturers. While there may be other standout makes and models, this report is focused on Toyota, an automaker with an SUA complaint problem that appears to be much broader and widespread than in other manufacturers and models.

## **Owners Complain**

### **The Data**

Toyota and Lexus owners have been complaining about sudden unintended acceleration in their vehicles for years. An independent analysis by Safety Research & Strategies (SRS) of complaint data collected by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Toyota submissions to NHTSA investigations, incidents in litigation,

media accounts and accounts from individuals who have contacted SRS shows that since 1999, there have been 2,266 incidents, 819 crashes; 341 injuries and 26 potential deaths. The SRS analysis defined sudden unintended acceleration broadly as any incident in which the complainant reported an engine acceleration that was unintended – regardless of whether the car was in gear. This mirrors the consumer complaints in which drivers have likewise described incidents in which the vehicle surged while in idle mode or moving very slowly or travelling at a high rate of speed.

**Table 1. Toyota Unintended Acceleration Incidents Reported from 1999 to Jan. 19, 2010**

<b>Total Incidents</b>	<b>2262</b>
<b>Crashes</b>	<b>819</b>
<b>Injuries</b>	<b>341</b>
<b>Deaths</b>	<b>26</b>

**Table 2. Number of Injuries Resulting from Toyota Unintended Acceleration Incidents Reported 1999- Jan. 19, 2010, by Model**

4RUNNER	2
AVALON	13
CAMRY MODELS	131
COROLLA	16
ES MODELS	48
GS MODELS	2
HIGHLANDER MODELS	15
IS MODELS	5
LS MODELS	6
OTHER MODELS	10
PRIUS	13
RAV4	9
RX MODELS	12
SIENNA	20
TACOMA	31
TUNDRA	2
UNKNOWN CAMRY OR ES MODELS	6

**Table 3. Number of Potential Deaths Resulting from Toyota Unintended Acceleration Incidents Reported 1999-Jan. 19, 2010, by Model**

CAMRY MODELS	12
ES MODELS	5
HIGHLANDER MODELS	1
IS MODELS	1

**Figure 1**





Figure 2



[Note: In order to improve visibility for the graphs, we have combined vehicle models for which there are fewer than fifty reported incidents across all years with "Other Models" category.]

It is very important to look at *all* of the available data, particularly in light of Toyota's recent public announcements that it had determined that the problems were confined to unsecured floor mats and sticking accelerator pedals, and that the current recalls would resolve these complaints.

In the past, both Toyota and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration have taken pains to limit their probes to specific vehicles malfunctioning in a particular way. These limitations by no means describe the entire scope of the affected vehicles; nor do they encompass all of the scenarios under which drivers report that they experience an SUA event.

Drivers have reported vehicle surges and unintended acceleration under the following conditions:

- The vehicle was at idle
- The vehicle was in reverse at low speed
- The operator's foot was on the brake
- The vehicle was travelling at a constant highway speed

- The vehicle contained no all-weather accessory floor mats
- The accelerator pedal was not “sticking”

A number of reports allege the vehicle experienced multiple events.

For example, Kevin Haggerty, owner of a 2007 Avalon, experienced SUA multiple times; he did not have accessory floor mats, and the OE mats were secured in place.

Haggerty reported five SUA events. Several times, the vehicle accelerated without his foot on the gas pedal. The engine would return to idle after driving a few miles or after the Avalon shut down and restarted or was stopped and put into park. Haggerty’s vehicle was checked at the dealership, but they could find nothing wrong. According to his NHTSA complaint:

“Then on 12/28/09 I was driving to work on a major highway. The car began to accelerate without my foot on the gas pedal. As I pushed on the brake, the car continued to accelerate. At that time I was not able to stop my vehicle by pressing hard on the brake. The only way I was able to slow the car down was to put the car into neutral. I took the next exit, which was the exit for the Toyota dealership. I called the dealership and told the service manager to meet me outside because I was experiencing acceleration problems. I drove approximately 5 miles by alternating from neutral to drive and pressing very firmly on the brakes. As I pulled into the front of the dealership I put the car into neutral and exited the car. With the brakes smoking from the excessive braking and the car's rpm's racing the manager entered my car. He confirmed that the mats were properly in place and confirmed the rpm's were very high.”<sup>6</sup>

The Haggerty incident is particularly notable because Toyota technicians witnessed the vehicle engine racing at full-throttle, in neutral, and no mechanical causes of the incident were found. Subsequent interviews with Mr. Haggerty revealed that the Toyota dealer contacted Toyota’s regional representative in Caldwell, NJ who later inspected the vehicle. The details of this inspection were not provided to the owner. However, Toyota Motor Sales authorized replacement of the throttle body and accelerator pedal assemblies and sensors and paid for the \$1700 repairs and rental car costs. The owner was told by the Toyota dealer that the vehicle’s computer had stored no error codes and they were unsure whether the repairs would fix the vehicle.

The complaint data challenge Toyota’s assertions in a number of ways.

First, Toyota has insisted that there is no reason to believe that there could be an electronic cause of these sudden acceleration events. In news stories tied to the November 25 recall announcement, Mr. Irv Miller, Group Vice President of Toyota

---

<sup>6</sup> NHTSA ODI Number: 10300210; Complaint of Kevin Haggerty; National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; December 28, 2009



Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. reportedly stated, “We can come up with no indication whatsoever that there is a throttle or electronic control system malfunction.”<sup>7</sup>

A scientific analysis from Quality Control Systems Corp. (QCS), however, finds that the proportion of consumer complaints related to vehicle speed control in some Toyota Camry, Tacoma, and Lexus ES vehicles is substantially higher in those models with electronic throttle control systems (Toyota's "ETCS-i") than it is for the same models without electronic throttle control.<sup>8</sup> The report also finds the proportion of reported speed control failures among complaints in the non-recalled Toyota Camrys with electronic throttle control compared to the recalled Camrys with electronic throttle control particularly troubling.

The report, written by Randy and Alice Whitfield, tested Toyota's conclusion that there is “no indication” of a throttle or electronic control system malfunction in the recalled vehicles as an hypothesis using data taken from consumer complaints made to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. Whitfield stated: “On the basis of the consumer complaint data, we believe there is evidence both to question and to reject this hypothesis for the recalled vehicles in our study.”

The study was limited to the period beginning in 1999 until just before the well-known Santee, California crash in August 2009 so that the publicity surrounding the crash would not affect the study's results.

The report adds new information about the actual differences seen in complaint patterns for specific models with ETCS-i in their engines compared to the same models without ETCS-i. Even among vehicles that were not recalled, speed control-related complaints were reported at a higher rate for all three models with ETCS-i.

The report also shows differences in the reporting of speed control-related complaints for the recalled vehicles with ETCS-i compared to the non-recalled vehicles with ETCS-i. QCS found that the proportion of complaints related to speed control for the unrecalled Camrys with ETCS-i was 29 percent, compared with 25 percent for the recalled Camrys with ETCS-i.<sup>9</sup>

Second, in looking at the universe of consumer “speed control” complaints, it quickly becomes apparent that the recalls do not cover all affected vehicles. Further analysis of the total of 2,262 complaints examined by Safety Research & Strategies find that more than half – 1,122 – involve vehicles outside the current recalls. About a third (419) of these complaints involve 2002-2006 Camry (for models which could be confirmed).<sup>10</sup>

<sup>7</sup> Toyota Recall Fails to Address 'Root Cause' of Many Sudden Acceleration Cases, Safety Expert Says; ABC News; December 7, 2009.

<sup>8</sup> Electronic Throttle Control Systems in Toyota Consumer Complaints to NHTSA, Randy & Alice Whitfield, Quality Control Systems, Corp., February 3, 2010

<sup>9</sup> Electronic Throttle Control Systems in Toyota Consumer Complaints to NHTSA; Quality Control Systems Corporation; Feb. 3, 2010

<sup>10</sup> Appendix A: Unintended Acceleration Incidents Reported 1999-January 19, 2010 Involving Vehicles Outside of the Recall Populations

Could all of these incidents be caused by a sticking accelerator or an errant floor mat? Again, the complaints indicate that pedal interference or a sticking accelerator pedal do not explain many SUA incidents. (A sampling of these complaints to NHTSA of unintended acceleration in recalled vehicles not explained by pedal and mat failures can be found in **Appendix B**.)

Following is a common scenario reported to NHTSA by one owner of a 2009 Camry from Elkridge, Maryland:

"I was in a parking lot of a shopping complex and I was trying to look for a parking spot. There was a parking spot between two cars on the right side, I slowly turned right into the spot, the car was in the spot and the car was straight and my leg was on the brakes. Unexpectedly the car started accelerating on its own, then the car with great speed climbed up the curb and hit the hair salon shop. The shop had 2-3 feet high brick wall and main door and other things are made with glass and metal frames. The car smashed the wall and glass door completely and landed inside the shop. I had to press the brakes really hard and finally it stopped there was a tire burning smell, I saw there was big drag tire mark on the shop floor. I had received a recall letter from Toyota 1-2 months back and it indicated that the driver side floor mat can interfere with the gas pedal and it had suggested to remove the floor mat and keep it in the trunks until further notice. Then I had removed all the floor mats and were in the trunk at the time of accident."<sup>11</sup>

Similarly a Lexus owner from Freehold, New Jersey reported:

"I was driving my wife's Lexus 2008 IS 250 out of a parking lot when applying my foot on the brake the car accelerated. I now slammed my foot on the brakes and the car continued to accelerate. The only thing that stopped my car was the car in front of it with very little damage. If the car was not in front of me I was accelerating faster into on coming traffic. My floor mat is not on the floor as after the San Diego incident that was Toyota's reasoning. We were told roughly a month and half ago to take the mat out, which I did right away."<sup>12</sup>

Russell and Laura Scotti, of Bucks County, PA are confident that the three SUA incidents they experienced in their 2009 Camry hybrid since the summer were not related to floor mats. The first time it occurred, the vehicle accelerated onto I-95 in New Jersey and continued to accelerate. Laura Scotti tried braking the Camry but the incident didn't end until she heard an audible click and the acceleration stopped. At the time, the vehicle was equipped with after-market all-weather floor mats, but the mats, although unsecured by clips, had spikes underneath that kept them in place. The mat was not interfering.

<sup>11</sup> NHTSA ODI Number: 10299750; National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; December 21, 2009

<sup>12</sup> NHTSA ODI Number: 10291091; National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; October 31, 2009

The Scottis removed the accessory mats anyway and left the OE carpet mats clipped in place. One month later, the Camry experienced a second event. Again, as she accelerated onto the highway, the car kept going. This time, she applied both the brake and the emergency brake and was able to stop the Camry by pulling onto shoulder and turning off the key. The dealer claimed that the floor mat had caused the event, even though it was securely in place.

Scotti removed the carpet mats. Then, Scotti experienced a third SUA incident. This time, the Camry hit about 70 or 80 mile per hour before Scotti heard an audible “click” and the vehicle returned to idle. Scotti returned to the dealer, and three days later, a Toyota representative examined the car – and found nothing.

According to these reports, these drivers did not have floor mats in their vehicles during the SUA and/or they had not depressed the accelerator. Further, these complaint scenarios are repeated by hundreds of drivers – foot on brake, driving at a low speed (often in a parking lot), or a highway speed when the vehicle rapidly accelerates. Other drivers have also noted hearing an audible click sound before their vehicles return to normal.

#### **Early Warning Reporting Data**

In 2003, manufacturers began submitting early warning reports, as required by the Transportation Recall Enhancement Accountability and Documentation (TREAD) Act. This system, established in the wake of the Firestone tire / Ford Explorer tragedies, was supposed to alert the automakers and NHTSA to defect trends. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration collects manufacturer information related to death, injury, property damage, warranty claims, field reports and production numbers, each quarter as the basis for evaluating emerging problems. How well did it work in the case of sudden unintended acceleration claims involving Toyota/Lexus vehicles?

A review of the data by Quality Control Systems of EWR data compiled from NHTSA's Early Warning Reporting database through the first quarter of 2008 found that two of the top five injury claims included 2007 Lexus ES350 and Toyota Camry “Speed Control.” This ranking is notable because both vehicles were part of Toyota’s floor mat recall (Recall 07E082) that included 2007 and early 2008 model Camry and Lexus ES models. Dealers received notice of this recall in September 2007. By the end of the first quarter of 2008, a high ranking in the EWR injury claims appears to indicate that either the recall was not effective in solving the problem or that the recall was poorly implemented. Either way, these data provided evidence of a continuing problem.

According to QCS, the vehicle fleets on the list appear in rank order, based on the unusual distribution of injury claims associated with each fleet. The order of these fleets in the list is not based on simple counts of claims. (This technique is related to one described in the paper found at: *Injury Prevention*, April 2004, 10:88-92 by R. A. Whitfield and Alice K. Whitfield. This methodology has been criticized by NHTSA.)

This Period	Fleet - Component	Last Period	Times on List	Notes
1	LEXUS ES 350 4D 2007 - Speed Control	-	3	Possibly related recall 07060000
2	FORD TRUCK ENVI CREW 4D 4X2 2002 - Visibility	3	10	Possibly related recall 07010000 Possibly related "special service campaign" 07010000
3	JEEP LIBERTY 4D 4X4 2002 - Suspension	-	1	Possibly related recall 05060000
4	TOYOTA CAMRY 4D 2WD 2007 - Speed Control	-	1	Possibly related recall 07060000
5	FORD TRUCK F350 CREW C PU 4X4 2004 - Engine & Engine Cooling	-	1	Possibly related petition, but no recall 06030000

*Quality Control Systems, Corp., Rankings: Early Warning Reporting system through the first quarter of 2008.*<sup>13</sup>

In early September 2009, Quality Control Systems Corporation released another analysis of the publicly available EWR death and injury data covering 2003-2008. QCS identified their top 10 vehicles with troubling trends for injuries and deaths. Number five was the Lexus ES with speed control problems.<sup>14</sup>

Using five and a half year's worth of death and injury claims, QCS was able to show which vehicles are involved in unusual patterns of deaths and injuries. They correlated those data with consumer complaints (Vehicle Owner Questionnaires, VOQs) in the NHTSA databases. Finally, QCS associated injuries/deaths and consumer complaints with recalls that were launched to address related problems. For the first time since the QCS began mining the EWR deaths and injuries information, each of the vehicle and component combinations on their top 10 list appeared to be clearly linked to specific consumer complaints. These problems, in turn, appeared to be well-recognized issues supposedly addressed by earlier recalls – potentially indicating that the recalls were failing to address the problems.

<sup>13</sup> Vehicle Safety Information Resource Center, October 2009

<sup>14</sup> Government Data Mired in Secrecy; Randy and Alice Whitfield; press release; Quality Control Systems Corporation; September 4, 2009

Fleet	Potentially Related Consumer Complaints	Potentially Related Recalls
2002 Ford Explorer	Liftgate hinges and struts, shattered glazing	04V442000
2004 Chevrolet Venture	Sliding power door and handle	04V597000
2004 Ford F-350 SD	Engine stalls	05V270000
2003 Ford Explorer	Liftgate hinges and struts, shattered glazing	04V442000
2007 Lexus ES 350	Unintended accelerations	07E082000
1999 Ford Explorer	Tire-related, loss of control crashes	00T005000
2004 Ford F-250 SD	Engine stalls	05V270000
2004 Toyota Tundra	Loss of control due to ball joint separation	05V225000
2002 Jeep Liberty 4X4	Loss of control due to ball joint separation	03V460000
2000 Ford Expedition	Control switch fires	05V017000

### NHTSA Investigates

NHTSA has opened eight different investigations into SUA since 2003. Six were initiated by consumers' Defect Petitions. Only one – DP0400 involving SUA in 2002-2003 Lexus ES vehicles – was granted formal investigation status and rose to the Preliminary Evaluation stage. The other two investigations started as Preliminary Evaluations: PE07016 was initiated by five complaints and three crashes with injuries;<sup>15</sup> PE08025, involving 54,000 2004 Toyota Siennas, was opened based on a single complaint of unwanted acceleration, with no deaths or injuries.<sup>16</sup>

This is highly unusual – that the agency would examine a single manufacturer for unintended acceleration with such frequency, and that six separate consumers would initiate Defect Petitions on a single issue.

In eight investigations, why hasn't the Office of Defect Investigations ever discovered any electronic problems? We can not evaluate the entire record because we do not have access to it. Toyota has requested and obtained confidentiality for some critical pieces of the puzzle; most centrally, its throttle design and the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis documents, which show how engineers have envisioned system failures and their likely consequences. However, the public record does indicate several problems with past investigations: they have been opened and closed too quickly to get to the root of a complex problem; critical data have been excluded from the analysis; the agency lacks expertise in the area of electronic forensics and has ignored inconsistencies, accepting in whole Toyota's explanations – that electronic failure cannot occur unless its diagnostic system catches them; and the agency has an institutional bias against a non-mechanical or non-driver cause of sudden acceleration.

<sup>15</sup> PE07016; Opening Resume; National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; March 29, 2007

<sup>16</sup> PE08025; Opening Resume; National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; April 10, 2008

In myriad investigations NHTSA has conducted, only a tiny fraction of the crashes and injuries have been counted as part of working dataset. Three fatalities have been referenced, but only one has ever been officially considered by the agency in an SUA investigation. (Even though the August 2009 Saylor crash in Santee, California, which killed the driver and three occupants, has driven all the recent official activity by the agency and Toyota, it was not counted in the context of the open investigation at the time, according to the Closing Resume of DP09001.) In Engineering Analysis 07010,<sup>17</sup> ODI investigators describe a July 2007 fatality that was examined by NHTSA's Special Crash Investigations office, but had not been reported on a Vehicle Owner Questionnaire. "The operator reportedly traveled at speeds in excess of 100 mph for an estimated eight miles on an interstate in California before it struck two other vehicles. One of the struck vehicles and the subject vehicle caught fire. The occupant of the struck vehicle did not evacuate and died at the scene. The subject vehicle driver suffered a broken bone."<sup>18</sup>

All of the investigations were very short – in many cases open only a few months. The probes have been closed on two bases: what Toyota and the agency said were low incidence numbers – as measured by the way the problem was defined against Vehicle Owner Complaints (VOQs), warranty claims, complaints directly to the manufacturer (the usual data points), and the agency and service technician's inability to locate any electronic cause of the complaints. Table 3 contains a brief chronology of the investigations.

NHTSA's investigative methods have consisted of examining the complaint/warranty claims/crash data; interviewing complainants; vehicle inspections; some laboratory testing; test drives of complainants' vehicles; and examining Toyota documents and holding discussions with Toyota.

For example, on July 7, 2004, NHTSA ODI staff memorialized a meeting that took place with Toyota after the automaker prepared sample hardware and electronic throttle components which were reviewed by NHTSA.<sup>19</sup> Toyota made a presentation to NHTSA which covered an overview and history of Toyota's ETC systems, design strategy/ETC system operation, diagnostic capabilities and failure mode fail/safe operations. The group then left to examine two vehicles a short distance away. One vehicle was outfitted with an oscilloscope, to allow monitoring of various ETC system circuits, and a circuit interrupt device, to allow simulation of component or circuit failure. The vehicle also had a modified ECM that allowed Toyota to demonstrate ETC system response to a microprocessor failure. Toyota demonstrated various types of component failures and their resistant fail/safe operation for NHTSA assessment. These types of meeting never yielded any insight into how the electronic throttle system could be malfunctioning in a way that the diagnostic fault code system couldn't detect.

<sup>17</sup> Engineering Analysis 07010; Closing Resume; National Highway Traffic Safety Administration;; October 11, 2007

<sup>18</sup> Engineering Analysis 07010; Closing Resume; National Highway Traffic Safety Administration;; October 11, 2007

<sup>19</sup> Technical Meeting with Toyota; PE04021; Scott Yon; National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; July 7, 2004

NHTSA also did some independent testing at the agency's Vehicle Research and Test Center in Liberty, Ohio. The latter turned up a potentially important clue that the electronic throttle could be affected by magnetic interference: "Magnetic fields were introduced in proximity to the throttle body and accelerator pedal potentiometers and did result in an increase in engine revolutions per minute (RPM) of up to approximately 1,000 RPM, similar to a cold-idle engine RPM level. Mechanical interferences at the throttle body caused the engine to shut down."<sup>20</sup>

(That electromagnetic forces could interfere with the throttle system was something Toyota already knew. The MY 2003 Camry owner's manual warns that the installation of a mobile two-way radio system could affect electronic systems, including the fuel injection, electronic throttle control system, cruise control system, and other electronics."<sup>21</sup>)

**Table 3. NHTSA Investigations of Toyota SUA**

Investigation number	Opened	Vehicles	Upgraded	Closed	Reason
DP03003	7/17/03	1997-2000 Lexus LS; GS 400	No	9/23/03	No data to support further investigation
DP04003	2/4/10	2002-2003 Lexus ES	PE04021 on 3/3/04	7/22/04	No data to support defect trend; no cause found
DP05002	8/5/05	2002-2005 Camry, Solara; Lexus ES 350	No	1/5/06	No data to support defect trend; no cause found
DP06003	9/14/06	2002-2006 Camry; Solara	No	4/3/07	No data to support defect trend; no cause found
PE07016	3/29/07	2007 Lexus ES 350	EA07010 on 8/8/07	10/11/07	Floor mat recall
DP08001	1/31/08	2006-2007 Tacoma	No	8/28/08	No data to support defect trend; no cause found
PE08025	4/10/08	2004 Sienna	EA08014 on 8/8/08	1/26/09	Floor mat recall
DP09001	4/8/09	2007 ES 350; 2002-2003 Lexus ES300	No	10/29/10	Floor mat recall and other fixes

<sup>20</sup> EA07010; Final Report: 2007 Lexus ES-350 Unintended Acceleration; Michael Monk; Vehicle Research and Test Center; April 30, 2008

<sup>21</sup> MY 2003 Camry; Owner's Manual; Toyota 2003

### **Aborted Efforts to Look at Toyota's Most Troubled Vehicle: The Early-Model Camry**

Despite the Camry's prominent presence in the complaint data, it has only been the central subject of two investigations, initiated by defect petitions.

There is evidence that, early on, the agency intended to investigate the Camry, but this investigation was never actually opened. In July 2003, the Pasadena, Calif. owner of a 2002 Camry described an SUA incident that occurred in March 2003 while slowly backing down a long driveway with her foot on the brake. Her Camry suddenly rocketed backward and hit a palm tree. The crash then propelled the vehicle forward 130 feet, where it came to rest. The vehicle was considered a total loss and was never examined. The owner reported this incident to NHTSA, and in July, received an e-mail from the ODI staff asking for the specific details of her crash.<sup>22</sup>

"We are preparing an investigation regarding the nature of your reports so any and all information is greatly appreciated and is beneficial to our investigation," the investigator wrote in July 2003.<sup>23</sup>

Four months later, the owner wrote a letter to NHTSA asking what had happened.<sup>24</sup> Her initial contact had apparently left the agency, and she had received a voice message from another individual identifying himself as a NHTSA staffer. Although she left messages at the number provided, no one from NHTSA ever re-contacted her. The owner followed up with a letter to the agency describing her experience. The public documentation of this case did not contain NHTSA's reply to her.

(That investigation may have been shelved by a Defect Petition 03003 filed on May 27, 2003, by Massachusetts resident Peter Boddaert, owner of a 1999 Lexus LS400, who experienced multiple instances of SUA.<sup>25</sup> Later, the 2002-2003 Camry was added to PE04021 in March 2004)<sup>26</sup>

But, in 2005, another Camry owner filed a defect petition – describing almost the exact same scenario as the Pasadena owner – same model, model year and SUA experience. Jordan Ziprin, a retired labor lawyer, living in Phoenix, AZ asked the agency to investigate after his 2002 Camry suddenly accelerated as he backed down a driveway, causing him to lose control, cut a wide arc and crash into a utility box. Ziprin said that he didn't remember if he tried to apply the brake, but he was certain he didn't apply the accelerator, because the vehicle was already moving rearward under its own power.<sup>27</sup>

<sup>22</sup> Letter to Kathleen DeMeter from unidentified Camry owner, 10023329; November 19, 2003.

<sup>23</sup> Letter to Kathleen DeMeter from unidentified Camry owner, 10023329; November 19, 2003.

<sup>24</sup> Letter to Kathleen DeMeter from unidentified Camry owner, 10023329; November 19, 2003.

<sup>25</sup> DP03003; Defect Petition; Peter Boddaert; April 25, 2008

<sup>26</sup> PE04021; Opening Resume; National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; March 3, 2004

<sup>27</sup> DP05002 Denial of Defect Petition; Federal Register Notice; National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; December 23, 2005



The agency opened an investigation on August 5, 2005. It requested information from Toyota, performed mechanical and rudimentary computer inspections of two vehicles – Ziprin’s and another vehicle from Falls Church, VA and looked at the VOQ data.<sup>28</sup>

To bolster his argument, Ziprin mined the VOQs, looking for other similar complaints, and submitted to those he thought relevant. NHTSA investigators eventually winnowed those to 93 reports alleging throttle control problems where the brake was reportedly ineffective at controlling vehicle movement. In further examining these types of complaints, the agency found that inspections at the dealership, by Toyota or other service technicians, could find nothing wrong with the vehicles. ODI said that the complaint rate was unremarkable.<sup>29</sup>

Another 168 reports described incidents similar to Ziprin’s – where a vehicle equipped with an electronic throttle experienced an SUA at a low speed in tight quarters and crashed the vehicle. Again, ODI looked more closely at a subset of these complaints. And again, the agency indicated subsequent inspections found nothing wrong with the vehicles and the complaint rate was unremarkable.<sup>30</sup>

Toyota’s argument, in brief, was that its systems were built with multiple redundancies and that the electronic throttle control could not malfunction without its diagnostic system catching the error and employing one of four failsafe modes. It flatly rejected the very concept of unintended acceleration stating:

“With regard to allegations of unintended acceleration, *Toyota does not believe that uncontrollable acceleration can occur without the driver applying the accelerator pedal because of the several detection systems described above.* If an abnormal condition occurs, such as the ETC sending the signal to the throttle body to open the throttle without applying the accelerator pedal due to a failure of a component or a malfunction of the system, or if the throttle simply were to open on its own, the system goes into failsafe mode. In addition, the brake system and the ETC system are mechanically separated and work independently of each other. *Therefore, even if the ETC system fails, the brake system still works as designed and unintended acceleration cannot occur.* Furthermore, brake systems that fail mechanically leave evidence of their failure after the occurrence and do not return to normal operating conditions by themselves.”<sup>31</sup>

DP05002 was closed in December 2005 with no defect finding. Nine months later, another 2006 Camry owner, William Jeffers III, submitted a Defect Petition based on multiple, brief experiences of engine surging. According to the *Federal Register* notice

<sup>28</sup> DP05002 Denial of Defect Petition; Federal Register Notice; National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; December 23, 2005

<sup>29</sup> DP05002 Denial of Defect Petition; Federal Register Notice; National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; December 23, 2005

<sup>30</sup> DP05002 Denial of Defect Petition; Federal Register Notice; National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; December 23, 2005

<sup>31</sup> DP05002; Toyota Response; November 15, 2005

denying Jeffers' petition, DP06003, his Camry did exhibit diagnostic trouble codes related to the operation of the throttle actuator.<sup>32</sup> The *Federal Register* notice also indicated that "a service technician found two diagnostic trouble codes related to the operation of the throttle actuator stored in the engine control unit's memory. After a new replacement throttle actuator was installed, another, more severe surge event occurred. Again, the Toyota dealership technician discovered a throttle actuator operation trouble code stored in memory. An electrical connector for the newly installed throttle actuator was 'adjusted' and the ground circuits were checked. NHTSA test drove this vehicle and could find nothing wrong."<sup>33</sup>

Interestingly, ODI arranged with Toyota to have the suspect actuator sent to a facility owned by the component supplier, Aisan Industry Co., Ltd. Aisan analyzed it via a physical inspection, including X-ray, mechanical testing, electrical testing, environmental testing, and destructive tear down. The final investigation report, which was confidential, found no problem.<sup>34</sup> Two years later, an anonymous correspondent from Franklin, Kentucky, home to a division of Aisan Industry, accused the supplier of shipping throttle bodies with cracked shafts that alleged could cause the throttle to open.<sup>35</sup>

DP06003 closed after eight months. ODI investigators examined the vehicle and found no problems; the investigation's examination of complaints was limited to warranty claims only. Most of Toyota's responses were confidential. No other investigations have focused solely on Camrys.

### **The Lexus Investigations**

The agency devoted four investigations of varying intensity to Lexus vehicles: DP03003; DP04003, which was upgraded to PE04021; PE07016, which was upgraded to EA07010; and DP09001. (Camry vehicles were included in PE04021 and EA07010). In the numerous investigations of Lexus vehicles, no cause has ever been found, except floor mat interference.

DP03003, opened in July 2003, after a Defect Petition was filed on May 27, 2003, by Massachusetts resident Peter Boddaert, owner of a 1999 Lexus LS400, who experienced multiple instances of SUA.<sup>36</sup> In this first investigation, NHTSA "limited the complaint count to only those complaints related to Vehicle Speed Control-linkages in its ARTEMIS consumer complaint repository."<sup>37</sup> NHTSA concluded that the Lexus was not

<sup>32</sup> Denial of Petition; DP06003; Federal Register Notice; National Highway Traffic Safety Administration March 5, 2007

<sup>33</sup> Denial of Petition; DP06003; Federal Register Notice; National Highway Traffic Safety Administration March 5, 2007

<sup>34</sup> Denial of Petition; DP06003; Federal Register Notice; National Highway Traffic Safety Administration March 5, 2007

<sup>35</sup> Denial of Petition; DP06003; Federal Register Notice; National Highway Traffic Safety Administration March 5, 2007

<sup>36</sup> DP03003; Defect Petition Request; Peter Boddaert; April 25, 2003

<sup>37</sup> DP03003; Denial of Petition; Federal Register Notice; Vol. 68; Pg. 55076; National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; September 22, 2003

over-represented, compared to peer vehicles, Cadillacs and Lincolns. “Based on this analysis, there is no evidence that Lexus vehicles are experiencing vehicle speed control-related problems more frequently than their peers.”<sup>38</sup>

Seven months later, another Lexus owner, Carol J. Matthews filed another Defect Petition, complaining of multiple short-duration SUA events.<sup>39</sup> Matthews had identified 37 other incidents in NHTSA’s VOQ system that described instances similar to her experiences. The agency rapidly elevated the defect petition to a Preliminary Evaluation and included Camry vehicles in the expanded probe.<sup>40</sup>

PE04021 lasted four months, and was closed on the basis of insufficient data and an inability to find any cause for the complaints. This investigation appears to have been hampered by a decision to narrow its scope to exclude some of the most critical types of SUA events: long duration instances, and instances in which the brakes could not overcome the open throttle.

According to a deposition taken in *Alberto v. Toyota*, Christopher Santucci, a former NHTSA Office of Defects Investigations (ODI) investigator and now Toyota’s Assistant Manager of Technical & Regulatory Affairs, testified that Toyota and ODI had discussions about the scope of PE04021 early on.<sup>41</sup> Later, in March 2004, ODI investigator Scott Yon wrote a memo stating that the scope of the investigation would be narrowed to eliminate longer duration events where applying the brake pedal didn’t stop the vehicle.<sup>42</sup>

In its response to the agency’s inquiries in PE04021, Toyota quibbled about the definition of SUA and the term vehicle surge: “Toyota believes a vehicle surge to be something less than a wide open throttle event but above typical throttle adjustments such as when the air conditioning compressor is activated or power steering assist is required. Also, according to the complainants’ own words the vehicle tended to accelerate at the time of application of the brake pedal. Without physical evidence or electronic codes stored in the vehicle’s computers, we believe those incidents to be similar to incidents referenced in other SUA investigations...”<sup>43</sup> In other words, Toyota was also eliminating engine surges that occurred when the driver was applying the brake, or surges in which the vehicle accelerated to a high speed – the two types of incidents that Toyota and Lexus owners were complaining about.

The agency also did not include a fatality in the official data set. In its closing report, NHTSA mentioned one death (VOQ 10065859) in which a vehicle drove off the fourth floor of a parking garage killing the operator and the single passenger.<sup>44</sup>

<sup>38</sup> DP03003; Denial of Petition; Federal Register Notice; Vol. 68; Pg. 55076; September 22, 2003

<sup>39</sup> DP04003; Opening Resume; National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; February 17, 2004

<sup>40</sup> PE04021; Opening Resume; National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; March 3, 2004

<sup>41</sup> Deposition of Christopher Santucci; Pg. 283; *Alberto v. Toyota*; December 9, 2009

<sup>42</sup> Complaints Update; PE04021; Scott Yon; National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; March 23, 2004

<sup>43</sup> PE04021; Toyota Response; Chris Tnito; Toyota Motor Corporation; June 4, 2004

<sup>44</sup> PE04021; Closing Resume; National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; July 22, 2004

ODI terminated the investigation in July 2004. Its reasons were nearly identical to those in earlier closures — not enough data and a low warranty claims rate. Electronics could not be blamed, because the complainants' vehicles did not malfunction in the way that Toyota said it must:

“ODI failed to find any evidence in the interviews conducted (113 VOQ and 36 Toyota reports, 149 total), or in the information provided in Toyota's IR response, of instrument panel warning lamp illumination or ETC diagnostic codes detection. None of the complainants interviewed described conditions similar to failsafe mode operation. One report (10062931) was found where an ETC component replacement occurred in connection with a repair attempt related to the alleged defect, no others were found.”<sup>45</sup>

But the problems for Lexus owners did not recede. In 2007 and 2009, NHTSA would again investigate sudden acceleration in Lexus models.

The agency opened Preliminary Evaluation 07016 in late March 2007, based on five complaints, three crashes and seven injuries. It was specifically aimed at examining the role of the floor mat in Toyota SUA. The Opening Resume did not describe the SUA scenarios that prompted this investigation; it focused solely on the idea of unsecured all-weather floor mats.<sup>46</sup> However, in this investigation, the allegations were more serious. Drivers told ODI that they experienced unwanted acceleration after releasing the accelerator pedal and that subsequent and repeated braking did not stop the vehicle. In some cases, drivers traveled significant distances at high vehicle speeds (greater than 90 mph) before the vehicle stopped.<sup>47</sup>

These were exactly the scenarios that the agency tossed out of consideration in PE04021.

In this investigation, Toyota insisted that it had done everything that it could to warn drivers not to stack an accessory rubber floor mat on top of the original equipment carpet mat:

“The ES350 has an available rubber floor mat option that cannot be used in conjunction with another floor mat at the same time. This is because these floor mats, as with all Toyota, Lexus, and Scion vehicle floor mats, utilize retaining clips in order to prevent the floor mat from sliding forward and interfering with the operation of the foot pedals. The retaining clips are affixed to the vehicle carpet. When a floor mat is placed on top of the vehicle carpet, proper installation requires the retaining clips be used to prevent unwanted movement of the floor mat, as instructed in the owner's manual. If a floor mat is already installed on the

<sup>45</sup> PE04021; Closing Resume; National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; July 22, 2004

<sup>46</sup> PE07016; Opening Resume; National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; March 29, 2007

<sup>47</sup> PE07016; Closing Resume; National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; August 8, 2007

carpet, and another floor mat is placed on top of the installed floor mat, the top mat will not be secured by the retaining clips”<sup>48</sup>

Despite Toyota’s assertions, the agency bumped up the status to an Engineering Analysis in August. EA07010 was closed two months later, when Toyota initiated a limited floor mat recall campaign.<sup>49</sup> (See “Are Floor Mats the Cause of Sudden Unintended Acceleration in Toyotas?”)<sup>50</sup>

The agency’s most recent examination of SUA in Lexus vehicles was at the request of petitioner Jeffrey Pepski of Minnesota. In April 2009, Pepski asked the agency in a detailed and sophisticated defect petition to re-open its investigation into SUA in Lexus ES350s. He experienced an SUA event while driving at high speed, in which the vehicle accelerated to 80 mph. Pepski tried pumping and pulling up the accelerator with his foot – to no avail. Pepski’s Lexus was equipped with a standard carpet mat, not the all-weather variety said to trap accelerator pedals, and his efforts to pull up the pedal would have dislodged the floor mat.

In May, Toyota took the unusual step of trying to kill the defect petition investigation by responding directly, point by point. Three months later, Mark Saylor and his family died in the Santee crash. This event seemed to cement in NHTSA’s mind that floor mats – again – were the sole cause of Toyota SUA. In the Closing Resume, ODI cited 64 complaints alleging incidents of unwanted acceleration in MY 2007 Lexus vehicles, resulting in eight crashes and 15 injuries. Eighty percent involved incidents of floor mat interference, including all the crashes and injuries, it asserted. “ODI’s analysis found that the only defect trend related to vehicle speed control in the subject vehicles involved the potential for accelerator pedals to become trapped near the floor by out-of-position or inappropriate floor mat installations.”<sup>51</sup>

ODI also took pains to specifically disassemble Pepski’s arguments for further action. In the Petition Denial, ODI created a table of 10 consumer complaints that Pepski had submitted as evidence that other Lexus owners were experiencing SUA at high speeds for sustained periods:

“Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, six of the VOQs were related to floor mat interference (four of the five that petitioner singled out as unrelated to floor mats were related to floor mats).”<sup>52</sup>

This might be charitably characterized as a misreading of the record. Here are three examples:

<sup>48</sup> PE07016; Toyota Response; Christ Tinto ; Toyota Motor Sales ; Response 15; Pg 13; 2007; June 11, 2007

<sup>49</sup> EA07010; Closing Resume; National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; October, 11, 2007

<sup>50</sup> Are Floor Mats the Cause of Sudden Unintended Acceleration in Toyotas?, Safety Research & Strategies, Inc., October 30, 2009; [http://www.safetyresearch.net/Library/Toyota\\_Floormat.pdf](http://www.safetyresearch.net/Library/Toyota_Floormat.pdf)

<sup>51</sup> DP09001; Closing Resume; National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; October 29, 2009

<sup>52</sup> DP09001; Denial of Petition; National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; October 27, 2009

In its entirety, VOQ 10199857 says:

"I purchased 2007 Lexus ES 350 in December of 2006. Sometime in last month, when I was driving the vehicle on a highway, its brake stopped working all of a sudden, and started accelerating by itself. I looked at my foot wondering if my foot was on gas pedal, instead of brake pedal, but it was on brake pedal. I was in a total panic, but managed to drove the car away to the shoulder of the highway by putting the car in park mode. I thought I was dead at that moment. I am trying to sue the Lexus. I honestly believe that car will kill someone. Before starting a legal proceeding, my attorney sent a letter to Lexus headquarter, and was told that the vehicle had no problem, and that the cause was the floor mat. But, it was not. As I said earlier, I looked at my foot when the vehicle did not stop, and after I stopped the car, I carefully looked at both gas pedal and brake again. I am not blind. Have you seen any other complaints for similar problems? Please let me know. It will be really helpful for me to win the case. I am not trying to make money by suing Lexus, but trying to have Lexus recall all of its ES350 since it will kill someone. \*jb"<sup>53</sup>

In ODI's table it appears as: "Unsecured floor mat discovered and corrected during dealer inspection."<sup>54</sup>

In its entirety, VOQ 10203221 says:

"On two prior occasions the vehicle accelerated from speeds between 20-30 mph, to speeds up to 50-60 mph. On 9/11/07, the vehicle accelerated at speeds up to 80-90 mph. We are aware of the Lexus notification of floor mat interference, so we removed the mats after the first two times, but the last and most frightening, occurrence happened without the mat in the vehicle. The car had to be forced into park in order to slow it down to a halt. My wife was driving the vehicle at the time and she states she almost had several multiple car accidents while trying to stop the vehicle. I had the vehicle towed to the dealer and they said it's the floor mat, before even driving the car. We won't drive the car again until someone other than Lexus determines what the problem is. \*tr"<sup>55</sup>

In ODI's table, it appears as: "All-weather accessory floor mat improperly stacked on top of carpet mat."<sup>56</sup>

In its entirety, VOQ 10230929 says:

"Reported: 27-may-2008 (incidence Memorial Day weekend 25 may 2008)  
problem: runaway acceleration: evidence of malfunctioning cruise control car was nearing end of 200 mile trip. Cruise control had been engaged on and off for last hour. Driver stopped at entrance onto old-designed fast-moving highway rte4)

<sup>53</sup> VOQ 10199857; National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; July 3, 2007

<sup>54</sup> DP09001; Denial of Petition; National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; October 27, 2009

<sup>55</sup> VOQ 10203221; National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; September 11, 2007

<sup>56</sup> DP09001; Denial of Petition; National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; October 27, 2009

with old-fashioned short access and no breakdown lanes. Cruise control green light on, but system supposedly disengaged. Car began to exhibit strong engine noise and runaway acceleration. Driver shut off cruise control, passenger observed the light go off and then back on several times. Driver firmly stepped on brakes. The brakes smoked and smelled of burning. When car slowed down, driver pulled to small indentation at side and pressed ignition button for several seconds. Car stopped with jolt. Driver started car in park. Engine made same loud blow-out sound. Re-shut down car. Driver restarted car to move to exit about 50 yds ahead. Car began run-away acceleration again, driver repeated steps pushing hard on brakes (smell and smoke) and shutting car off by pressing ignition button. Off-duty police (chief of force) smelled brakes and said loud engine noise made car a hazard; tow driver would also testify to loud engine noise when car turned on again to be placed on his truck. Because spill of ice-coffee during incident, mats were inspected by both driver and passenger before car was towed. Both noted that mats were intact and in their proper place. Driver noted clips were in place. (the car was in compliance with Lexus recall of mats having been serviced two months prior to incident.) Improper mats are still Lexus stated cause; however, driver and passenger say this is not case. Cruise control malfunctioning seems likely cause of runaway-acceleration. While our dealer is responsive, national Lexus has been most neglectful; agent does not return calls; and this is almost three weeks after incident. \*tr see also 10228954 & 10229189 \*dsy”<sup>57</sup>

In ODI’s table, it appears as: “All-weather accessory floor mat improperly stacked on top of carpet mat.”<sup>58</sup>

In November, SRS submitted a Freedom of Information Request to NHTSA, requesting any additional documentation the agency might have to establish its conclusions that these were floor mat-related incidents. On January 28, NHTSA replied, referring SRS to the same information, now currently on its publicly available website:

“..we searched for and found no supplementary information regarding the ten complaints you cited on unwanted acceleration. If you want to view these ten complaints, go to the website identified above.”<sup>59</sup>

Toyota agreed to remedy the situation with a floor mat recall and NHTSA denied the petition in October 2009.

#### **The Tacoma Investigation:**

Like previous investigations, DP08001 opened and closed in seven months, with ODI concluding that no defect could be found and that there was no data to support the existence of a trend. The investigation was initiated in late January 2008 by William

<sup>57</sup> VOQ 10230929; National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; May 25, 2008

<sup>58</sup> DP09001; Denial of Petition; National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; October 27, 2009

<sup>59</sup> RE: Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Request, 5 U.S.C. 552; Stanley Feldman; National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; January 28, 2010

Kronholm, a retired journalist, who experienced two bouts of unintended acceleration within a two-hour time span.<sup>60</sup> Both occurred at low speed; one incident took place as the vehicle was at idle; one took place as the vehicle was in reverse.

ODI interviewed Kronholm and other complainants; reviewed the VOQ data; and examined Toyota's submissions (most are confidential).<sup>61</sup> Again, ODI removed any complaints that did not fit Kronholm's basic scenario. It concluded that most of the complaints "involved various explained aspects of the Tacoma's throttle control system that do not seem to present a significant safety risk under most circumstances, or did not involve a failure of the throttle control system. For the remaining quarter, although there may have been an issue with the throttle control system as one possible explanation, we have been unable to determine a throttle control related or any underlying cause that gave rise to the complaint. For those vehicles where the throttle control system did not perform as the owner believes it should have, the information suggesting a possible defect related to motor vehicle safety is quite limited."<sup>62</sup>

#### **The Sienna Van Investigation: Fewer Data, Bigger Problem**

The investigation into the 2004 Sienna vans was opened as a preliminary evaluation in April 2008 on the basis of a single complaint.<sup>63</sup> The outlines of this investigation are remarkable for two reasons. One, for a single complaint – with no injury or death – to launch a preliminary evaluation is rare. But, at the time, the Tacoma investigation was still ongoing. The agency had already shuttered four different investigations into Lexus and Camry vehicles with no defect finding, and had forced Toyota to launch a recall for All-Weather Accessory floor mats in a limited number of Lexus vehicles. Two, the agency acted and pressured Toyota into a recall on the basis of virtually no complaint or warranty data – after summarily rejecting petition after petition on the basis of insufficient data.

Within four months, the agency bumped up the investigation to an Engineering Analysis. This was based on a Toyota response in June about "an accelerator pedal interference incident that occurred during production dynamometer testing at the assembly plant for an early production MY 2004 Sienna minivan. The incident was caused by a missing retaining clip that allowed the center console trim panel to interfere with (trap) the accelerator pedal after it had been depressed. Toyota subsequently implemented a 100 percent inspection requirement for the retaining clip. In June 2003, Toyota changed the original design of the trim panel to eliminate the potential for pedal interference in the event the retaining clip is not present."<sup>64</sup>

<sup>60</sup> DP08001; Denial of Defect Petition; Federal Register; National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; September 3, 2008

<sup>61</sup> DP08001; Closing Resume; National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; August 28, 2008

<sup>62</sup> DP08001; Denial of Defect Petition; Federal Register Notice; Vol. 72; page 51551; National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; September 3, 2008

<sup>63</sup> EA08014; Closing Resume; National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; January 26, 2009

<sup>64</sup> EA08014; Closing Resume; National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; January 26, 2009



In its Closing Resume, the agency cited exactly four incidents of “interference by the trim panel (which) have occurred in service. In at least three of the incidents, the interference occurred after service was performed that required removal and reinstallation of the subject trim panel and retaining clip.”<sup>65</sup>

Toyota finally issued a limited recall for vehicles built between January 10, 2003 and June 11, 2003, when the original design floor carpet cover was used in production. The recall was conducted as a “safety improvement” campaign.<sup>66</sup>

### **A Case of Historical Bias? A Brief History of SUA**

Sudden unintended acceleration is a complex problem. There are multiple causes that can result in a vehicle accelerating without the driver’s intent: design defects which induce driver error – such as poor pedal placement, the lack of a shift interlock, floor mat interference, or mechanical or electromechanical defects and electronic defects. The latter – which is the most difficult to pinpoint – is nonetheless a likely possibility as vehicle systems rely more heavily on sophisticated computer-driven electronics. And yet, automakers and NHTSA behave as though it is perfectly rational to assume that electronics housed in the hostile automotive environment – including the fault detection system – will always function as intended; and that malfunctions will be easily reproduced in a laboratory setting.

Elsewhere, however, the case has been persuasively made that NHTSA and automakers have ignored the real possibility of intermittent and other faults in the electronic systems of today’s automobiles. The 2003 reference book, *Sudden Acceleration*, by Carl E. Nash, of the National Crash Analysis Center at George Washington University, and Clarence Ditlow, of the Center for Auto Safety, James Castelli and Michael Pecht, Professor and Director CALCE Electronic Products and Systems Center at the University of Maryland, argue that the auto manufacturers lag those in other industries whose products rely on electronic systems in understanding the myriad ways their microprocessors and electronics components can fail.<sup>67</sup> NHTSA, the authors conclude, has also failed miserably in its attempts to find a cause other than a floor mat or driver error, because the agency employs an arbitrarily narrow definition of SUA – that it must occur from a standstill – and has conducted its investigations on incorrect assumptions and illogical reasoning.<sup>68</sup>

Drivers have been complaining about sudden unintended acceleration events for a quarter of a century and continue to lodge these complaints with manufacturers and NHTSA. Yet, NHTSA has made virtually no substantive progress toward understanding how electronic systems housed in an environment subject to heat, vibration, sudden shocks, various levels of electromagnetic interference, moisture, and other corrosive conditions could fail; or how they could be detected; or what appropriate countermeasures must be

<sup>65</sup> EA08014; Closing Resume; National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; January 26, 2009

<sup>66</sup> Recall 09V023; Toyota Motor Corporation; January 14, 2009

<sup>67</sup> *Sudden Acceleration*; Carl E. Nash, Clarence Ditlow, James Castelli and Michael Pecht; 2003

<sup>68</sup> *Sudden Acceleration*; Carl E. Nash, Clarence Ditlow, James Castelli and Michael Pecht; 2003

instituted other than expecting drivers to somehow overcome an open throttle on a runaway vehicle.

In the 1980s, Audi became the poster child for unintended acceleration. More than 1,600 consumers alleged that their Audi 5000 vehicles had accelerated without driver input and crashed; 400 had been injured and six died in SUA crashes.<sup>69</sup> The company denied that there was anything wrong with the vehicle and blamed the problem on shorter than average drivers who did not have much experience driving an Audi, and had mistakenly depressed the gas pedal when they meant to step on the brake. The response was a public relations and marketing nightmare. Audi sales plunged, and the complaints continued.<sup>70</sup>

The Audi 5000 was the subject of an infamous *60 Minutes* story, in which the news program attempted to simulate SUA.<sup>71</sup> The broadcast drove Audi sales down further, and the network was heavily criticized for its one-sided story. As the history is often recounted today, NHTSA vindicated Audi and CBS never apologized for maligning the automaker.<sup>72</sup>

However, between 1982 and 1987, Audi launched five recalls to address the problem. The first three attempted to fix what Audi had characterized as the driver-error problem by tweaking the pedal positions.<sup>73 74 75</sup>

In 1987, Audi launched a fourth recall of 81,000 Audi 5000 vehicles from the 1986 and 1987 model years, for worn idle stabilizer units.<sup>76</sup> As Audi explained to its customers: “The idle stabilizer has the purpose of maintaining uniform engine idle speed by regulating air flow under different operating conditions, such as variations in engine temperature, and on/off cycling of the air conditioner or power assist pump. Excessive idle stabilizer wear causes engine idle fluctuations which increase with the usage of the car. If a worn unit is not replaced in a timely fashion, the engine idle could ultimately see-saw so severely that it may surprise a driver who is not acquainted with the vehicle’s condition and fails to apply the brake. Under these circumstances, there is a risk of a collision in a confined space with the possibility of injury.”<sup>77</sup>

The fifth and final recall for 250,000 1978 to 1987 vehicles added a brake-shift interlock – which requires drivers to depress the brake pedal before shifting out of the Park position.<sup>78</sup>

<sup>69</sup> Audi Sudden Acceleration; The Center for Auto Safety, May 1987

<sup>70</sup> Audi: Shifting the Blame; Thomas Wathen; The Multinational Monitor; Vol. 8; Issue 5; May 1987

<sup>71</sup> Out of Control; 60 Minutes; broadcast; CBS; November 23, 1986

<sup>72</sup> Manufacturing the Audi Scare; Peter Huber; Wall Street Journal; December 18, 1989

<sup>73</sup> Recall 82V-037: 1978-82 Audi 5000, April 14, 1982.

<sup>74</sup> Recall 83V-095; 1978-83 Audi 5000, September 1, 1983

<sup>75</sup> Recall 86V-103: 1985-6 Audi 5000S, July 28, 1986

<sup>76</sup> Recall 87V009: 1985 Audi 5000S; January 14, 1987

<sup>77</sup> Recall 87V009; 1985 Audi 5000S; January 14, 1987

<sup>78</sup> Recall 87V-008: 1978-86 Audi 5000, January 14, 1987

In 1989, NHTSA published “An Examination of Sudden Acceleration.”<sup>79</sup> This report was intended to end all debates on SUA. Its primary conclusion was that only the driver’s foot or the cruise control could move the throttle to the wide-open position. The study also noted that SUA could be caused by simple mechanical failures of the throttle cable or floor mat interference. Under these conditions, a significant decrease in the driver’s ability to stop the vehicle was also noted. However, the general thrust of the report was that NHTSA could not find any vehicle defects causing SUA. The condition, the agency concluded, was caused by driver error, although the agency noted that it could be induced by poor vehicle design (i.e., brake, accelerator pedal placement and offset). The study recommended the installation of automatic shift-locks, which require the driver to depress the brake pedal before the vehicle can be shifted out of Park to prevent the driver from depressing the accelerator instead of the brake.

Based on SRS interviews with Dr. Antony Anderson, an electrical engineering consultant in the UK who has examined numerous SUA crashes, he says that NHTSA’s report was based on nine underlying assumptions, but did not provide the basis for those assumptions. The agency defined sudden unintended acceleration as only instances where the vehicle lurches suddenly forward or in reverse from a standstill. This automatically discounted many other situations in which a vehicle’s throttle is wide open in direct contradiction to the driver’s demands, be at full speed, a slow speed or in a cruise control mode. Further, he says, the systems that NHTSA examined in the late 1980s bear no resemblance to fully electronic throttle systems of today.

The 1989 report and the significant numbers of reported SUA incidents did prompt manufacturers to adopt shift-interlocks in their vehicles in the late 1980s. The report also appeared to reflect a mindset at the agency that SUA had no cause short of mechanical interference or driver error. In 1999, the *Wall Street Journal*, which profiled one of ODI’s principal SUA investigators, and his probe into Ford Econoline vehicles, underscored the staff’s firm belief in pedal misapplication.<sup>80</sup>

In 2003, when the agency rejected Peter Boddaert’s petition to investigate SUA in 1997-2000 Lexus LS and GS 400 vehicles, NHTSA cited this report, among its reasons for denying the petition – even though the acceleration systems and the sudden acceleration events studied were completely different from the electronic throttles in the Lexus vehicles and from the circumstances of Boddaert’s incidents.

In closing PE04021, the agency hinted that pedal misapplication was the culprit:

“Complainants report the occurrence of a single incident that often occurs during close quarters vehicle maneuvering (e.g., parking or entering a garage) and thus often results in a crash. During interviews, many complainants are unsure of the details that led up to the incident, such as the position of their right foot and which pedal, if any, they may have actuated or attempted to actuate; a crash occurs and

<sup>79</sup> An Examination of Sudden Acceleration; John Pollard and E. Donald Sussman; National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; January; 1989

<sup>80</sup> A Simple Case of Sudden Acceleration; Anna Wild Matthews; Wall Street Journal; November 1, 1999

in the aftermath the operator believes it was caused by the vehicle. In some cases the complainant continues to own and operate the vehicle on a regular basis, often through long periods and distances, without further incident.”<sup>81</sup>

SRS interviewed three of the petitioners: Jordan Ziprin, Jeffrey Pepski and William Kronholm. All three indicated that the investigators seemed to come to the interview with a pre-conceived idea about the cause and tended to dismiss any counter-arguments that the driver who experienced the SUA event made.

For example, William Kronholm recalled that the NHTSA investigator asked him if it were possible that he had accidentally hit the gas and the brake at the same time. Kronholm, who experienced two surges in a short period of time when he was returning from a cross-country ski trip, said that he didn’t believe that is what happened, but he was willing to test the theory. Kronholm later donned the cross-country ski boots he had been wearing, and took his Tacoma to a safe place to try stepping on both pedals at once. He found out that this was possible – if he twisted his foot uncomfortably at a 90-degree angle. The experiment instantly showed Kronholm that this was not the cause of his SUA incident. He later reported the results of his experiment, but in the *Federal Register* Notice, Kronholm was angry to read: “He subsequently reported that it was possible for him to inadvertently hit both pedals while wearing the ski shoes.”<sup>82</sup> Kronholm said that his experiment proved the opposite – it was *not* possible to *inadvertently* hit the two pedals simultaneously.

He also said that the NHTSA investigator causally tossed out the idea that perhaps the similar consumer complaints were created by publicity around the problem. Kronholm said that he was surprised later to read the same theory being advanced by Toyota in its response to the agency:

Toyota disputed the assertion in the petition that the 32 complaints in the NHTSA database “in and of themselves justify opening an investigation. The Tacoma has been the subject of extensive media coverage related to the possibility of sudden acceleration. In addition, there has been a high level of internet activity on this subject as far back as early 2007 including reports by members of Tacoma user groups detailing conversations with ODI staff and providing ODI contact information. Such exposure tends to generate consumer interest and complaints.”<sup>83</sup>

Kronholm, a retired Associated Press editor, was angrier still to watch it become a part of the official record, because there was no evidence to support this assertion.

Jeffrey Pepski, the Lexus owner who filed the most recent petition, DP09001, said that when NHTSA investigators examined his Lexus with a Toyota representative, they could not reproduce the event. Pepski’s vehicle had been equipped with the original equipment

<sup>81</sup> PE04021; Closing Resume; National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; July 22, 2004

<sup>82</sup> DP08001; Denial of Petition; Federal Register Notice; Vol. 72; page 51551; National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; September 3, 2008

<sup>83</sup> DP08001; Toyota Response. Pg. 10-11; April 25, 2008

carpet mats – not the all-weather accessory mats that had been previously determined to be the cause of Toyota SUA. Nonetheless, he says that the agency attempted to persuade him that the floor mat was to blame. He informed them that he attempted to stop the vehicle by pulling up the accelerator pedal with his foot, as well as pushing down on it. He demonstrated how the carpet mat could not have depressed the accelerator if he was pulling up on it. They did not accept his argument.

The agency then tried to buttress its floor mat theory by tying the Pepski incident to Saylor crash in Santee, CA. The results of ODI's inspection of the Lexus in that case – and the conclusion that unsecured all-weather floor mats were to blame – were added to this petition file. Pepski's vehicle was only equipped with the original floor mats. It is unlikely that these two cases are related.

## **Possible Causes of SUA**

### **Pedal Entrapment and Pedal Misapplication**

Pedal entrapment by a floor mat and pedal misapplication most certainly can be causes of unintended acceleration. The role of poor automotive design that leads to floor mat interference, however, can not be discounted as a contributing factor – even though Toyota has blamed drivers.

The blame-the-driver tack was very clear in the agency's 2007 probe into SUA in Lexus vehicles. In one of its submissions to PE07017, Toyota said that it had “found vehicles in which more than one floor mat was installed in the driver footwell at the same time. In such instances, it is possible that the top floor mat could move forward and interfere with the accelerator pedal motion. If it were to cause the accelerator pedal to become stuck in a partially depressed position, then the vehicle could accelerate without the operator's input.”<sup>84</sup>

Within that same investigation, the agency, although it concluded that floor mats were the cause, presented ambiguous evidence. A separate post-crash vehicle inspection of a Lexus that had crashed after an SUA event at highway speed found: “All weather mats are installed at all four seating positions. The driver-side all weather mat was found to be installed by itself; it was not on top of another floor mat. The installed mat was found to be unsecured by the retention hooks; *the mat did not interfere with the accelerator pedal in the position it was originally inspected*. The mat was removed from the vehicle. The two retention hooks were found engaged in the flooring material after tile mat was removed. The hooks were intact and did not appear to be damaged from the collision.”<sup>85</sup>

But in its final report, the agency said that vehicle owners themselves had noticed instances of pedal entrapment:

<sup>84</sup> PE07016; Toyota Response; Christ Tinto ; Toyota Motor Sales ; Response 15; Pg 13; 2007; June 11, 2007

<sup>85</sup> PE07016; Consumer Interview and Vehicle Inspection; National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; August 3, 2007

“To comprehend the statistical significance of the probability for this event to occur, a survey was sent to a sample size of 1986 registered owners of a 2007 Lexus ES-350 requesting information regarding episodes of unintended acceleration. NHTSA received 600 responses for an overall response rate of 30.2 percent. Fifty-nine owners stated they experienced unintended acceleration. *Thirty-five of those responding also reported that their vehicles were equipped with rubber Lexus all-weather floor mats and several commented that the incident occurred when the accelerator had become trapped in a groove in the floor mat.* Interviews with owners revealed that many had unsecured rubber floor mats in place at the time of the unintended acceleration event, which included in some cases unsecured rubber floor mats placed over existing Lexus carpeted mats.”<sup>86</sup>

If the all-weather floor mat is to blame, and pedal entrapment occurs with any frequency, then this is a design problem. And in applying the most recent recall remedies, Toyota has acknowledged this by making significant floor arrangement changes, including shortening the pedal length to allow for more space between the pedal and the floor, removal of padding materials below the floor carpet, and re-designing the floor mats.

In addition, Toyota models lack a pivot point between the accelerator pedal and the stalk. This pivot, found on many other vehicles, may help prevent mat entrapment. Another potential design flaw relates to the retention clips used by Toyota. These clips were notably easy to release and lacked a robust design. At least one manufacturer of after-market all-weather floor mats included redesigned clips with their mats for Toyota and Lexus models.<sup>87</sup>

### **Electromagnetic interference and Electronic Problems**

There is widespread acknowledgement by automakers, electronics experts and suppliers that electronics regularly cause all kinds of headaches for manufacturers and consumers.

At a 2004 industry conference, Mercedes Benz’s vice president for electrical and electronics and chassis development, Steven Wolfsreid, “railed against the temptation to overload vehicles with electronic functions that are useless to the customer,” according to an *Automotive News* story.<sup>88</sup> The German automaker had removed 600 electronic functions from its vehicles because of quality concerns that were damaging its reputation and ticking off its customers. Electronics are challenging to integrate into a vehicle’s electrical architecture, he said in his 20-minute presentation, and what works well in isolation can be a disaster in combination with other electronic components.

Wolfsreid’s frustration is a natural outgrowth on the explosion of on-board vehicle electronics. According to a Siemens VDO Automotive report estimate in 2004,

<sup>86</sup> EA07010; Final Report: 2007 Lexus ES-350 Unintended Acceleration; Michael Monk; Vehicle Research and Test Center; April 30, 2008

<sup>87</sup> MacNeil Automotive Products, Limited

<sup>88</sup> Mercedes ditches Glitches with Electronics, Georg Auer; Automotive News; May 31, 2004

electronics was the fastest growing sector in the industry with the total value of such systems expected to reach \$3.8 billion in 2010. Nonetheless, accompanying the short-term growth spurt in vehicle electronics has been a corresponding rise in the number of warranty claims and defects. JD Powers data has shown that as the number of electronic functions a vehicle has rises, so do the number of defects. German electronics supplier Robert Bosch has reiterated that claim in a trade-publication article on the issue:

““There is a direct correlation between the number of electronic functions and the number of defects per vehicle,” claims Franz Fehrenbach, chairman of the board of management at Robert Bosch GmbH (Stuttgart, Germany). “If the value of electronics content per vehicle doubles in the next five to 10 years as predicted, it isn’t hard to imagine what that means for the number of defects if this trend line holds true.”<sup>89</sup>

The increase in microprocessor power, the complexity of software itself exponentially increased by the automotive industry’s strategy of creating separate ECUs (each with its own software for each new system) have all contributed to rising warranty costs, tied to vehicle electronics.

While several articles have documented the problems, there has been less written on the solutions. A Peugeot enthusiast website neatly captures the tech/consumer experience, when the electronic glitch is intermittent:

“Walk into any auto repair shop and ask the mechanics what intermittent electronic problems mean to them, and if and if they don’t get real graphic with their answer, then either they don’t do electrical repairs, or they have the patience of a saint. At the very least they will tell you that intermittent problems are headaches. A day at the shop might start something like this. The customer tells the service writer that the vehicle works one minute and not the next. The service writer states this on the repair order. The mechanic checks it out and the vehicle operates fine, so no problem found is written on the repair order. The customer gets the vehicle back and the same thing happens. Now the customer has a headache, he goes back to the service writer who also now has a headache. And it doesn’t take him to long to give the mechanic a headache. I’ll say right now that sometimes no matter how hard all involved work to resolve this problem, it can take some time and patience to find an intermittent problem.”<sup>90</sup>

Electronic throttle controls, in particular, are subject to numerous faults. A technical paper published in 1999 by a Siemens researcher on dependability issues enumerates the various faults ETCs can be subject to. For example: “The pedal sensor was considered to be safety-critical. Due to this, the sensors generally are built with redundancy, to be able to detect and to mask appearing faults. Note that common-mode failures like a

<sup>89</sup> Electronic Road Trip; Austin Weber; Assembly Magazine; September 1, 2005

<sup>90</sup> Car Care, Tips and Tricks; Peugeot’s Fan Club; <http://peugeot.mainspot.net/tips/intermit.shtml>

mechanical sensor break has the same effect as they have at Bowden cables, namely stuck at a random sensor value – e.g. at highest value!”<sup>91</sup>

Another possibility is electromagnetic interference. “An electromagnetic incompatibility occurs when a system or equipment interferes with another system or equipment. When this interaction is traced to the transfer of electromagnetic energy from the culprit to the victim, it is termed EMI.”<sup>92</sup> This is a well-known phenomenon in many fields that rely heavily on electronics reliability – such as aircraft and medical devices. The possibility of EMI is the reason passengers can not use personal electronic devices during a commercial airline flight. The electronic systems in vehicles are also susceptible to EMI:

“During the early years of ABS's, Mercedes-Benz automobiles equipped with ABS had severe braking problems along a certain stretch of the German autobahn. The brakes were affected by a near-by radio transmitter as drivers applied them on the curved section of highway. The near term solution was to erect a mesh screen along the roadway to attenuate the EMI. This enabled the brakes to function properly when drivers applied them.”<sup>93</sup>

Recently, NHTSA promised the public “fresh” look at the possibility of EMI, and said that it would meet with manufacturers, suppliers and independent experts to gain a fuller understanding of current ETC systems, the safety of their designs, and measures to address any possible EMI effects. NHTSA said that if necessary, it will do further research on the topic.<sup>94</sup>

#### **Cracked Throttle Body Shafts**

Are some Toyota vehicles experiencing unintended acceleration events because of a parts defect? Possibly. An accusation has been lodged by an anonymous correspondent in Franklin, KY, that Toyota has been aware of a problem with cracked shaft throttle bodies – although for how long, the writer did not say.<sup>95</sup> The accuser, who called himself “A Concerned Citizen,” also sent NHTSA’s Office of Defect Investigation a used throttle body assembly in which the shaft that controls the throttle blade, situated within the throttle body housing, had a crack on the engine side of the valve, along the long axis of the shaft.<sup>96</sup>

“There are potentially hundreds of Toyota and Nissan vehicles driving American highways with cracked shaft throttle bodies. Japanese management up to and

<sup>91</sup> Electronic Throttle Control – A Dependability Case Study; Hans Mauser; Journal of Universal Computer Science; October 28 1999

<sup>92</sup> Electronic Systems Failures and Anomalies Attributed to Electromagnetic Interference; R.D. Leach and M.B. Alexander; NASA Reference Publication 1374; July 1995

<sup>93</sup> Electronic Systems Failures and Anomalies Attributed to Electromagnetic Interference; R.D. Leach and M.B. Alexander; NASA Reference Publication 1374; July 1995

<sup>94</sup> Concern Over Electronic Interference Grows; Nick Wingfield; Wall Street Journal; February 4, 2010

<sup>95</sup> Anonymous letter; Concerned Citizen; Franklin, Kentucky; November 27, 2009

<sup>96</sup> NHTSA VOQ 10298108; December 18, 2009



including company president was aware of the cracked shaft problem and told everyone to be quiet about this problem.

The failure mode on DFMEA for broken throttle shaft is no throttle control and potential wide open acceleration. The Toyota floor mats caused American deaths. Will you sit on this information and possibly cause more American deaths? It bothers me that I did not tell anyone sooner.

I have another throttle body in same condition that can be sent to Automotive News."<sup>97</sup>

Franklin Kentucky is the home of Franklin Precision Industry (FPI), which manufactures throttle bodies for Toyota and Nissan. FPI is part of Aisan Industry Co. Ltd. which, a large automotive supplier based in Japan. Aisan's major shareholders are Toyota Motor Corporation (35 percent) and Toyota Industries Corporation (18 percent).

The cracked throttle shaft problem may be yet another potential contributing factor in some events.

### **Toyota Response: Illogical and Inconsistent**


#### **The ETCS-i**

Toyota first introduced Electronic Throttle Control System with Intelligence (ETCS-i) in some 1998 Toyota and Lexus models.<sup>98</sup> With ETCS-i, the throttle valve is opened and closed using a computer controlled throttle actuator instead of the traditional throttle valve cable. The early ETCS-i on some models consisted of a cable controlled accelerator position sensor, throttle control motor with magnetic clutch, throttle position sensor and ECM (Electronic Control Module).<sup>99</sup> According to Toyota, when the accelerator is pressed, the cable moves the accelerator position sensor which sends a signal to the ECM. The ECM then determines how much throttle opening is requested and duty cycles the throttle control motor to open the throttle plate. The throttle position sensor then verifies that the throttle plate is at the correct angle.

<sup>97</sup> Anonymous letter; Concerned Citizen; Franklin, Kentucky; November 27, 2009

<sup>98</sup> Appendix B, Toyota Vehicles with ETCS-i


<sup>99</sup> Training Video Abstract, 1998 Toyota Supra Electronic Throttle Control System; Toyota Motor Sales, Inc.



**Figure X: ETCSi with Cable Controlled Accelerator Position Sensor**  
(Source: Toyota Motor Sales, Inc.)

In this design Toyota included a mechanical fail-safe mode in the event of a failure in the ETCS-i. Should the ETCS-i malfunction; the magnetic clutch in the control motor will disengage allowing the accelerator cable to magnetically control the throttle.

In 2002 Toyota adopted an ETCS-i system that no longer included the mechanical failsafe.<sup>100</sup> This design was used on vehicles like the Camry. The accelerator throttle cable was replaced by an Accelerator Pedal Position Sensor (APPS).<sup>101</sup> The throttle is controlled by information sent by the APPS to the Throttle Position Sensor (TPS). Each of these sensors includes both main and sub-sensor circuits. Based on the voltage signals from these sensors, the ECM controls throttle operation and activates fail safe modes if needed.



**Figure 1: ETCSi without Accelerator Throttle Cable (Linkless)**  
(Source: Toyota Motor Sales, Inc.)

<sup>100</sup> 2002 Camry Engines, Toyota Motor Sales, Inc.

<sup>101</sup> "Camry Engines," Toyota Motor Sales, Inc.

Toyota says that it has built in a failsafe should there be a malfunction in any of these circuits. If one of the two APPS circuits fail, the ECM detects the problem and activates the first fail safe mode which provides an active throttle range from idle to 25 percent of maximum throttle opening. According to Toyota, should the ECM detect that both APPS circuits have failed, the current to the throttle motor is turned off and the force of the return spring causes the throttle valve to return and stay at the prescribed opening and the throttle is fixed at idle. Should either of the TPS circuits fail, the ECM activates a third fail safe mode by varying ignition timing, fuel injection and cylinder operation. At idle, only half of the cylinders are operational. When engine load increases, all cylinders become operational.

[Appendix C contains a list of Toyota, Lexus and Scion model vehicles by year that SRS was able to determine have ETCS-i based on a review of Toyota service-related documents.]

#### **Toyota's Notice of the Emerging SUA Problem and the Effort to Shut it Down**

Toyota received the first complaints about this new engine surging almost as soon as the 2002 Camrys hit the road. Between February and August 2002, the company got ten complaints from drivers reporting that the engine surged when the vehicle was stopped or the operator already had his foot on the brake.<sup>102</sup> Toyota immediately issued a Technical Service Bulletin to recalibrate the electronic control module for the 1MZ-FE Engine.<sup>103</sup> The bulletin informed service techs that the Camry engine might surge during light throttle input of speeds between 38 - 42 MPH with lock-up On, and noted that the ECM had been re-calibrated to correct the problem. This bulletin is important because it shows that Toyota was aware that engine "surging" (i.e., unintended acceleration) was caused by coding in the ECM – and implemented a fix.

Rather than recalling vehicles, the company chose to issue the fix through its dealers who would only have to repair vehicles for customers who complained. NHTSA was aware of this action. Manufacturers are required to send all technical service bulletins to the agency.<sup>104</sup> In addition, the agency received a copy of this TSB in Toyota's response to PE04021. (Nonetheless, NHTSA closed this investigation, in part, it said, because there were no service bulletins or campaigns that relate to the alleged defect.)

Toyota experienced an unwanted acceleration incident firsthand in April 2003, when a missing retaining clip allowed the center console trim panel to trap the accelerator pedal of a Sienna undergoing production Dynamometer testing.<sup>105</sup> According to Toyota's statements to NHTSA, the automaker reviewed its manufacturing processes and other data and concluded this was an isolated incident. Nonetheless, in June 2003, Toyota

<sup>102</sup> PE04-021; Owner Complaints spreadsheet; Toyota motor Corporation

<sup>103</sup> Technical Service Bulletin EG017-02; Toyota; August 30, 2002

<sup>104</sup> 49 CFR 579.5 (formerly 573.8) requires manufacturers to submit to NHTSA monthly, communications sent to more than one dealer or other party concerning any malfunction. Technical service bulletins (TSBs) are usually covered by that provision.

<sup>105</sup> PE08025; Toyota Response; Chris Tinto ; Reponse 12; Toyota Motor Corporation ; June 25, 2008

changed the design of the trim panel to eliminate the potential for pedal interference if the retaining clip is missing.<sup>106</sup>

In 2003, Toyota began to get more insight into this problem, in the form of defect petitions filed by consumers concerned enough about their own experiences to ask the government to investigate. But, whatever the automaker may have been doing internally to determine a root cause, publicly Toyota has employed several strategies to deflect the agency investigations.

One method was to limit the probe by defining the problem under its own terms. According to a deposition taken in *Alberto v. Toyota*, Christopher Santucci, a former NHTSA Office of Defects Investigations (ODI) investigator and now Toyota's Assistant Manager of Technical & Regulatory Affairs, testified that Toyota and ODI had discussions about the scope of PE04021 early on. Later, in March 2004, ODI investigator Scott Yon wrote a memo stating that the scope of the investigation would be narrowed to eliminate longer duration events where applying the brake pedal didn't stop the vehicle.<sup>107</sup>

In its response to the agency's inquiries in PE04-021, Toyota set its own terms for the words "vehicle surge": "Toyota believes a vehicle surge to be something less than a wide open throttle event but above typical throttle adjustments such as when the air conditioning compressor is activated or power steering assist is required. Also, according to the complainants' own words at the vehicle tended to accelerate at the time of application of the brake pedal. Without physical evidence or electronic codes stored in the vehicle's computers, we believe those incidents to be similar to incidents referenced in other SUA investigations..."<sup>108</sup> In other words, Toyota was also eliminating engine surges that occurred when the driver was applying the brake, or surges in which the vehicle accelerates to a high speed – two types of incidents that Toyota and Lexus owners were complaining about.

Another strategy was to blame media attention for artificially driving up the complaint rate. In its response to Defect Petition 08-001, Toyota told the agency: "The Tacoma has been the subject of extensive media coverage related to the possibility of sudden acceleration. In addition, there has been a high level of Internet activity on this subject as far back as early 2007, including reports by members of Tacoma user groups detailing conversations with ODI staff and providing ODI contact information. Such exposure tends to generate consumer interest and complaints. Thus, the petitioner's assertion that the Tacoma stands out from its peers based on a relatively high number of complaints in the NHTSA database is not a valid argument, since the other vehicles listed by the petitioner have simply not had the same media and Internet exposure."<sup>109</sup>

<sup>106</sup> PE08025; Toyota Response; Chris Tinto ; Reponse 12; Toyota Motor Corporation ; June 25, 2008

<sup>107</sup> Deposition of Christopher Santucci; *Alberto v. Toyota*; December 9, 2009

<sup>108</sup> Complaints Update; PE04021; Scott Yon; National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; March 23, 2004

<sup>109</sup> DP08001; Toyota Response; Chris Tinto; Toyota Motor Corporation; April 25, 2008

When all else failed, Toyota resorted to the least costly recall, with a limited population and an easy-to-install solution: new floor mats. For example, in late March 2007, when ODI opened a Preliminary Evaluation into accelerator pedal interference with accessory all-weather floor mats in 2007 Lexus ES350 vehicles, Toyota tried to apply the brakes to the investigation by issuing a notification to that it would be contacting Lexus customers about proper floor mat usage.<sup>110</sup>

When the investigation moved forward anyway, Toyota issued Recall 07E-082, to replace optional all-weather floor mats in 55,000 Lexus and Toyota and stopped the sale of the Toyota/Lexus All Weather Floor Mat designed for the 2007 and early 2008 model year Camry and ES 350 Lexus vehicles.<sup>111</sup>

Whatever the root cause or causes of unintended acceleration, Toyota has been aware, for at least two years, that drivers who found themselves in a runaway vehicle had no idea how to stop it. Naturally, the first reaction was to stand on the brakes, but repeated application of the vacuum brake system actually rendered it useless. The lack of a proper failsafe was spelled out unequivocally in the Closing Resume of Engineering Analysis 07-010:<sup>112</sup>

“Stopping the vehicle with unassisted braking while the throttle is fully open requires significant pedal force, which some operators did not, or were unable to, apply for the required duration. Continued driving in this condition results in overheated brakes, which further diminishes the braking effectiveness. Some operators attempted to turn the vehicle off by depressing the engine control button, however they were unaware the button had to be depressed for three seconds to stop the engine when the vehicle is in motion; this functionality was not explained adequately in the owner's manual.”<sup>113</sup>

(This is in direct contradiction to Toyota's statements in 2005 that the brakes would overcome any throttle malfunction.) Toyota, however, did not move to implement this solution until late November 2009, when it was showered with negative publicity. The automaker said that as part of the October recall campaign, it would install a brake-to-idle override on a subset of the total recall population: 2007-2010 Lexus ES 350; 2006-2010 Lexus IS 250; 2006 – 2010 Lexus IS 350; 2007-2010 Camry and 2007-2010 Avalon vehicles.

## The Recalls

Since 2005, Toyota has issued six recalls to address either floor mat interference or sticking accelerator pedals. Below are summaries of each recall:

<sup>110</sup> PE 07016; Toyota Response; Attachment 8; 2007 Lexus ES 350 All Weather Floor Mat; June 11, 2007

<sup>111</sup> Recall 07E-082; Toyota Motor Corporation; September 26, 2007

<sup>112</sup> Closing Resume; EA07-010; National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; October 11, 2007

<sup>113</sup> Closing Resume; EA07-010; National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; October 11, 2007

**Recall 05V565**

On December 16, 2005 Toyota recalled 3,567 Lexus IS250 vehicles for accelerator pedals which could become stuck in the partially depressed position due to inadequate clearance between the accelerator pedal linkage and a plastic pad embedded in the vehicle's carpet.<sup>114</sup> The pedals were manufactured by Denso.

**Recall 07E082**

On October 2007, Toyota recalled 55,000 accessory All-Weather floor mats in some 2007 and 2008 Lexus ES 350 and Camry vehicles, equipped with part numbers PT908-33070, PT908-33071, PT908-32070.<sup>115</sup> "Toyota concluded that the mats do not contain a safety-related defect; however, Toyota agrees that an unsecured All Weather Floor Mat, especially one that is stacked on top of another floor mat, can migrate toward the accelerator pedal, potentially preventing it from returning to idle."

**Recall 09V023**

On January 14, 2009 Toyota recalled 26,501 2004 Siennas for a missing retainer clip.<sup>116</sup> Toyota did not concede that this was a defect, but called the actions a "safety improvement campaign" that is not being conducted under the Safety Act. Toyota's recall instructs dealers to replace the original floor carpet cover with the newer design floor carpet (and retention clip) at no charge to the owner. The repair will reduce the potential for trim panel interference with the accelerator pedal travel should the retaining clips become missing because of improper service or other reasons.

**Recall 09V388**

On October 5, 2009, Toyota recalled 3.8 million to address potential accelerator pedal entrapment by incompatible or unsecured floor mats.<sup>117</sup> The affected vehicles are 2007-2010 Camry, Tundra and Lexus ES 350 vehicles; 2005-2010 Avalon; 2004-2009 Prius; 2005-2010 Tacoma; 2006-2010 Lexus IS 250. More than a month later, Toyota announces plans to reconfigure the accelerator pedal on 3.8 million vehicles going back to the 2004 model year. Other fixes include modifying the floor area around the pedal and in *some* models, installing a brake-to-idle override that allows the driver to quickly stop a vehicle in an unintended acceleration incident and newly-designed replacement driver- and front-passenger side all-weather mats.

**Recall 10V017**

<sup>114</sup> Recall 05V565; Toyota Motor Corporation; December 16, 2005

<sup>115</sup> Recall 09V388; Toyota Motor Corporation; October 5, 2009

<sup>116</sup> Recall 09V032; Toyota Motor Corporation; January 14, 2009

<sup>117</sup> Recall 09V388; Toyota Motor Corporation; October 5, 2009

On January 22, 2010 Toyota announced Recall 10V017 for sticky accelerator pedals, separate and apart from the floor mat recall.<sup>118</sup> The affected vehicles are: 2009-2010 RAV4; 2009-2010 Corolla; 2009-2010 Matrix; 2005-2010 Avalon; 2007-2010 Camry; 2010 Highlander; 2007-2010 Tundra; 2008-2010 Sequoia.

#### **Recall 10V023**

On January 27, 2010 Toyota expanded 09V388 to include more models and model years. Under this campaign, the vehicles would be eligible for re-designed floor mats and modified pedals or pedal replacement.<sup>119</sup> These vehicles would not be outfitted with a brake –to-idle feature. The affected vehicles are 2008-2010 Highlander; 2009-2010 Corolla; 2009-2010 Venza; 2009-2010 Matrix; 2009-2010 Pontiac Vibe

#### **Do the Recalls Address the Root Causes of SUA?**

Will any of these campaigns stem the flow of complaints? The evidence, so far, indicates that the answer is: no.

First, Toyota has already tried both remedies: a small pedal recall in 2005 and a floor mat recall in 2007. The latter, all-weather floor mats in a limited number of 2007 and 2008 Lexus vehicles, has not been successful in abating the complaints. According to complaint data, throughout 2009, NHTSA received 14 complaints of SUA from owners of 2007 and 2008 Lexus ES350 vehicles.<sup>120</sup> One of those complaints was from Jeffrey Pepski.

On January 26, 2008, a 2008 Lexus ES350 was in an SUA-related crash in Connecticut. (This incident was not reported to NHTSA, but to Toyota.)

Gary Masi, a Lexus customer in Cos Cob, Connecticut, was driving the vehicle on loan from Lexus of Greenwich, on I-95, when he attempted to brake the vehicle to exit the highway. When Masi realized he could not stop the vehicle, he called the dealership for help, and shifted the vehicle into park. It did not prevent him from crashing into the back of a tractor trailer. An accident report filed by the Connecticut State Police noted that the floor mats were unsecured.<sup>121</sup> Despite the recall, Toyota's claims representative notified Masi in April 2008 that he was at fault for the crash, and they intended to seek compensation for damages to the vehicle from him.<sup>122</sup>

<sup>118</sup> Recall 10V017; Toyota Motor Corporation; January 22, 2010

<sup>119</sup> Recall 10V023; Toyota Motor Corporation; January 17, 2010

<sup>120</sup> Appendix D – Consumer complaint to NHTSA 2007 – 2008 MY Lexus ES350 unintended acceleration incidents occurring Jan. 2009 – Jan. 2010; SRS; Jan. 2010

<sup>121</sup> Connecticut Uniform Police Accident Report; Case number 0800042395; Connecticut State Police; January 27, 2008

<sup>122</sup> Toyota Letter to Masi; Cambridge Integrated Services, Inc.; Patricia Dragon; April 8, 2008

### Sticky Pedals

Toyota's second line of defense has been an accelerator pedal recall.

In early December 2005, Toyota learned of two early model Lexus IS250 with accelerator pedals "out of tolerance" – meaning the pedal could become stuck. One instance occurred during a dealer pre-delivery inspection and a second was reported by Toyota Canada during transportation at the port facility. The automaker had received no complaints in the U.S. or Canada.<sup>123</sup>

"Toyota investigated the cause of the problem, and found that the accelerator pedal linkage and the floor carpet design were out of tolerance; creating insufficient clearance between the accelerator pedal and the vehicle carpet," the automaker wrote to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.<sup>124</sup>

By December 16, Toyota sent a Notice of Defect and Noncompliance to NHTSA and four days later, a notice was sent overnight to dealers instructing them to replace the acceleration pedal assembly with a revised one, and to modify the carpet.

The recall population was limited to 3,567 All-Wheel Drive models built between August 30 and December 2, 2005. According to Toyota's first quarterly recall report in March 2006, all but 325 vehicles had been inspected and repaired.

But this was not the first, nor the last time the agency would hear about sudden unintended acceleration in Lexus IS models. Since 2002 to the present, more than 20 Lexus IS owners complained of SUA events.<sup>125</sup> The agency had fielded complaints from Lexus IS300 owners before the recall to modify the small subset of IS250 vehicles, who told stories like these:

"Since I have owned the vehicle, I have had two incidents, which both occurred randomly with no prior engine problems or indications of issues with the car, in which as I was accelerating, the gas pedal would continue to press down and pin itself to the floor. Both times, the gas pedal was literally stuck to the floor and not able to be loosened. The first time it occurred, I pulled the emergency brake and jammed on my brake pedal until the gas pedal popped back up after about a minute pinned to the ground. The second time, I luckily had someone with me who instructed me to put the car in neutral and quickly turn off the engine one click so that I could brake and steer myself to safety. Thank God no one was injured in these incidents, but both occurrences could have been horrible accidents."<sup>126</sup>

<sup>123</sup> Recall 05V565; Defect Information Report; Chris Tinto; Toyota Motor Corporation; December 16, 2005

<sup>124</sup> Recall 05V565; Defect Information Report; Chris Tinto; Toyota Motor Corporation; December 16, 2005

<sup>125</sup> Appendix E – Consumer complaints to NHTSA of unintended acceleration in Lexus IS models; SRS; Jan. 2010

<sup>126</sup> NHTSA VOQ 10119774; National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; March 1, 2005



More recently, the blame has been laid at the feet of the supplier CTS, an Elkhart IN company.

On January 21, 2010 Toyota issued a recall for “sticky pedals” in approximately 2.3 million vehicles.<sup>127</sup> According to Toyota, no Lexus or Scion vehicles were affected by the pedal problem; nor are Toyota Prius, Tacoma, Sienna, Venza, Solara, Yaris, 4Runner, FJ Cruiser, Land Cruiser, Highlander hybrids and certain Camry models, including Camry hybrids. Camry, RAV4, Corolla and Highlander vehicles with Vehicle Identification Numbers (VIN) that begin with “J” are not affected by the accelerator pedal recall.<sup>128</sup>

Toyota’s recall cited a faulty friction device as the cause of unintended acceleration, suggesting that an increase in friction results in a pedal that “is slow to return to the idle position or, in rare cases, the pedal sticks, leaving the throttle partially open.”<sup>129</sup> Toyota also warned that a worn pedal mechanism “may become harder to depress, slower to return or, in the worst case, stuck in a partially depressed position.”<sup>130</sup>

Beginning in March 2007 the company began receiving field technical information reports that some accelerator pedals were exhibiting “rough operation” and “slow to return to the idle position,” according to its submissions to the agency. Environmental testing of the pedal assemblies in the Tundra (allegedly the only model affected at the time) revealed that the material used to make the friction levers in the pedals (PA46), would absorb moisture and swell with humidity. In February of 2008, the material was changed to PPS, and Toyota concluded that “while accelerator pedal feeling could change under certain conditions, Toyota considered it to be a drivability issue unrelated to safety.”<sup>131</sup>

In December 2008, Toyota received reports from the European market of sticky accelerators on vehicles with pedals made of the new material. Toyota conducted additional testing and discovered that the accelerator pedal could stick in a partially depressed position should condensation occur on the accelerator pedal. Toyota described the way that the “friction lever interacts with the sliding surface of the accelerator pedal inside the pedal sensor assembly, [such that] the sliding surface of the lever may become smooth during vehicle operation.” Under such circumstances, friction may increase, resulting in an accelerator pedal becoming harder to depress. When condensation occurred, it was likely the result of heater operation after the engine was started, and in cold temperatures.<sup>132</sup>

<sup>127</sup> NHTSA Recall 10V017; January 21, 2010; Toyota Accelerator Pedal Recall

<sup>128</sup> Toyota Announces Comprehensive Plan to Fix Accelerator Pedals on Recalled Vehicles and Ensure Customer Safety; February 1, 2010. (<http://pressroom.toyota.com/pr/tms/toyota/toyota-announces-comprehensive-153311.aspx>)

<sup>129</sup> Toyota Press Release: Toyota Answers Customer Questions About The Solution For Sticking Accelerator Pedals; 2010

<sup>130</sup> Toyota Press Release: Toyota Files Voluntary Safety Recall on Select Toyota Division Vehicles for Sticking Accelerator Pedal; January 21, 2010; SUA0398


<sup>131</sup> NHTSA Recall 10V017; January 21, 2010; Toyota Accelerator Pedal Recall

<sup>132</sup> NHTSA Recall 10V017; January 21, 2010; Toyota Accelerator Pedal Recall

In response to its internal probe, Toyota then lengthened the arm of the friction lever and again changed its material to prevent the smoothing of the lever on all vehicles produced in Europe starting in mid-August 2009.<sup>133</sup>

But, in October of 2009, the company received new reports, this time in the U.S. and Canadian markets, of sticking accelerator pedals using the same material friction lever as in the European models.<sup>134</sup>

In January, Toyota announced that it had developed a remedy “that involves reinforcing the pedal assembly in a manner that eliminates the excess friction that has caused the pedals to stick in rare instances.”<sup>135</sup> The subsequent recall included vehicles with friction levers made of both PPS, and PA46, the material first associated with rough operation or slow to return symptoms.<sup>136</sup>



***Toyota sticky pedal remedy: A steel reinforcement bar eliminates the excess friction that can cause the pedal to stick (Source: Toyota Motor Sales)***

In January, CTS, the pedal assembly manufacturer, expressed “deep concern that there is widespread confusion and incorrect information” regarding the recent Toyota recall, and

<sup>133</sup> NHTSA Recall 10V017; January 21, 2010; Toyota Accelerator Pedal Recall

<sup>134</sup> NHTSA Recall 10V017; January 21, 2010; Toyota Accelerator Pedal Recall

<sup>135</sup> Toyota Announces Comprehensive Plan to Fix Accelerator Pedals on Recalled Vehicles and Ensure Customer Safety; February 1, 2010. (<http://pressroom.toyota.com/pr/tms/toyota/toyota-announces-comprehensive-153311.aspx>)

<sup>136</sup> NHTSA Recall 10V017; January 21, 2010; Toyota Accelerator Pedal Recall

asserted that the rare “slow return” pedal incidents should not be linked to any sudden unintended acceleration incidents.<sup>137</sup> In a press release, it raised several points in its defense: that unintended acceleration incidents have been occurring in Toyota vehicles at least as far back as 1999, long before CTS supplied accelerator pedals to Toyota. Further, the complaints encompassed vehicle models and model years built with pedals from other suppliers. For example, CTS has never manufactured accelerators for Lexus vehicles and “has no accelerator pedals in Toyota vehicles prior to model year 2005.”<sup>138</sup>

CTS also reminded the public that Toyota regarded this recall apart from previous recalls intended to remedy sudden unintended acceleration.<sup>139</sup>

In a February interview with the *Today Show*, Toyota President Jim Lentz told viewers that floor mat entrapment was an issue separate from sticky pedals. The company learned about the sticky pedal problem in late October 2009 of last year, although he also said that Toyota had been investigating the issue for a long time. (According to the recall documents, Toyota first began to receive complaints in March 2007 – two-and-a-half years earlier.) In the interview Lentz was adamant that Toyota has a fix that will solve the problem of a sticky pedal – but did not link “sticky pedals” to unintended acceleration.<sup>140</sup>

Toyota and CTS agree that sticky accelerator pedals are extremely rare. CTS said that Toyota reported less than a dozen cases of the sticky pedal to the company. But, CTS declared: “in no instance did the accelerator actually become stuck in a partially depressed condition.”<sup>141</sup>

Toyota’s sticky pedal recall doesn’t appear to relate to complaints of SUA. Both the supplier and Toyota’s statements about the results of this defect fail to connect the sudden unintended acceleration reported by consumers. Nor can Toyota explain SUA events in Lexus models that are not fitted with the CTS supplied pedals or vehicles outside of the recalls. Many complaints of SUA fall outside of the scope of the recall, the supplier claims that the failure has not caused any crashes nor does the failure lend itself to the types of complaints commonly reported.

Part of Toyota’s remedy for recall 09V388 is the addition of a safety feature for some models including the 2007-2010 Camry, 2005-2010 Avalon, 2007-2010 Lexus ES350 and the 2006-2010 Lexus IS250 and IS350. The feature, known as a brake override system, is designed to cut engine power in the case of simultaneous application of both the accelerator and brake pedals.<sup>142</sup> Toyota states in a November 15, 2009 letter to NHTSA that:

“Although not part of the remedy for addressing the defect identified in Toyota’s

<sup>137</sup> CTS Press Release: CTS Comments on Accelerator Pedals; January 29, 2010

<sup>138</sup> CTS Press Release: CTS Comments on Accelerator Pedals; January 29, 2010

<sup>139</sup> CTS Press Release: CTS Comments on Accelerator Pedals; January 29, 2010

<sup>140</sup> MSNBC Today Show Interview; February 1, 2010

<sup>141</sup> CTS Press Release: CTS Comments on Toyota’s January 21 Safety Voluntary Recall; January 27, 2010

<sup>142</sup> Recall 09V388, TMS December 1, 2009 letter to All Toyota Dealers (Special Service Campaign 9L)

Part 573 report, Toyota intends to add a supplemental function to the software for owners of ES, Camry, Avalon, and IS models that will ensure that the brake overrides the accelerator in the event that both pedals are being applied at the same time. This software supplement will reduce the consequences of pedal entrapment, should it occur. It is Toyota's intent to introduce similar software in all new models in the future, as the development work is completed."<sup>143</sup>

In a Toyota Motor Sales USA Inc., memo to its dealers regarding recall 09V388 (aka., 90L), the company states:

"As an additional measure independent of the vehicle-based recall remedy, you should also install a newly designed override system on non-hybrid Camry vehicles to provide an extra measure of confidence. This system will cut engine power in case of simultaneous application of both accelerator and brake pedals at certain speeds and driving conditions. *The Camry Hybrid already contains a fuel supply cut feature for Hybrid motor protection that achieves a similar result as the override system newly designed for the non-hybrid models.*"<sup>144</sup>

The system Toyota intends to install is also referred to as a Brake-to-Idle feature or "Smart Pedal." This safety feature is designed into vehicles whereby braking by the driver overrides any other input to the throttle, regardless of source. This should allow the driver to control the vehicle quickly in event of an unintended acceleration event, regardless of the root cause.

Based on a news reports BMW is said to have made this feature standard on their vehicles beginning in the 2005 Model Year and Volkswagen in 2001.<sup>145</sup> Technical documents show that Audi began installing the feature in 2000.<sup>146</sup> According to a Chrysler spokesman quoted in the *Washington Post*, the company began using the system in 2003: "If the brake and the accelerator are in an argument, the brake wins."<sup>147</sup>

While the brake-to-idle feature has been around for some time, there is a dearth of documentation on the design and its origins. There is also very little, if any, information in manufacturers' technical materials or in Owner's Manuals of vehicles that do have the brake-to-idle feature installed.

The brake-to-idle feature is noted in a 1998 "Audi Self Study Programme Book." which covers the 2.7-liter V6 Bi-Turbo Engine which was available in the Audi A6 and A4. The guide states:

"Safety function: For safety reasons, the throttle valve is closed as far as a defined angular position when both the accelerator pedal and the brake pedal are

<sup>143</sup> Recall 09V388, TMNA November 25, 2009 Letter to NHTSA

<sup>144</sup> Toyota Motor Sales USA Inc. Memo RE: Toyota Safety Recall 90L, February 2, 2010

<sup>145</sup> October 7, 2009 NY Times Article: 'Smart Gas Pedals May Solve Floor Mat Problem'

<sup>146</sup> November 25, 2008 Audi Technical Service Bulletin 01 08 16

<sup>147</sup> January 29, 2010 Washington Post, 'Toyota Did Not Install Brake Overrides Systems Despite Complaints'

depressed. If the brake is pressed first followed by the accelerator pedal, the driver input (torque request) is executed.”<sup>148</sup>

An Audi Technical Service Bulletin<sup>149</sup> issued in 2008 that covers the 2000-2008 Audi A6 Quattro Sedans states:

“With the introduction of Electronic Power Control (EPC) (no accelerator cable) to fuel injection systems, an engine RPM control feature has been incorporated into the engine electronic control system software.

Application of both brake and accelerator pedals at the same time (brake pedal with left foot and accelerator pedal with right foot) results in the following:

- Brake pedal function (normal at all times) overrides any throttle application.
- Diagnostic Trouble Codes (DTCs) will not be stored.

If brake pedal is applied while accelerator pedal is depressed, after approximately two seconds, engine RPMs will return to idle speed of 1400 RPMs.”

Patents covering the brake-to-idle feature go back as far as 1965. General Motors patent 3,207,276 titled, ‘Accelerator Cancelling Pedal’ states the following:

“The present invention relates to a vehicle safety device whereby the effect of accelerator pedal operation on the vehicle throttle is cancelled in the event the vehicle operator simultaneously depresses both the accelerator pedal and the brake pedal with one foot.”

General Motors has at least two other Patents that disclose this safety feature.

Regarding Toyota’s knowledge of this feature, US Patent 4,779,597 titled, ‘Fail-Safe System for Vehicle Engine’ and issued to Hitachi, Ltd.<sup>150</sup> discloses a system to prevent a vehicle runaway or engine stall due to a stuck throttle while the engine is in operation. Of interest in this patent is a reference to a Toyota Japanese patent application. This document, JP-B-58-2583, filed in 1975 and published in 1983 discloses the following:

“Toyota discloses the following, ‘a fail-safe system comprising mechanical separation means such as an appropriate clutch between the actuator and the throttle valve, whereby the throttle valve is separated from the actuator by the clutch in the event that the throttle valve has stuck and throttle valve is returned to the full-open position by the force of spring. This prior art system provides satisfactory fail-safe means to the extent that once the throttle valve has stuck, the engine becomes to be idling condition and thus the car is prevented from running away.’”

<sup>148</sup> 1998 Audi 2.7L Bi-Turbo Self Study Programme 198

<sup>149</sup> November 25, 2008 Audi Technical Service Bulletin 01 08 16

<sup>150</sup> US Patent 4,779,957

### **A Confused Public as Toyota Shifts the Blame**

Understandably, Toyota owners today find themselves confused by the current stream of contradictory recalls; public pronouncements from the Department of Transportation and Toyota; and news stories that suggest that there are causes beyond pedal entrapment or a stuck accelerator pedal.

The inconsistencies have been abetted by NHTSA, which has not looked deeply enough beyond driver error or mechanical interference, to state – with unshakeable certainty – that the root cause has been found. Their investigatory conclusions may be the result of an historical bias; they are certainly the result of insufficient resources.

NHTSA has conceded this in the Closing Resumes of more than one probe. In denying the 2006 defect petition of Camry owner William Jeffers III, the agency conceded:

“This in no way implies that we doubt the Petitioner’s reported experiences with his vehicle. Rather, the agency simply lacks evidence of a safety related defect in his vehicle or a trend of such defects in the subject vehicles. In view of the foregoing, it is unlikely that NHTSA would issue an order for the notification and remedy of a safety-related defect as alleged by the Petitioner in the subject vehicles at the conclusion of the requested investigation. Therefore, in view of the need to allocate and prioritize NHTSA’s limited resources to best accomplish the agency’s safety mission, the petition is denied.”<sup>151</sup>

The agency’s rejection of William Kronholm’s Tacoma petition struck a similar note:

“ODI reviewed the petition, assessed VOQs, interviewed persons who filed VOQs, tested the vehicle, and reviewed Toyota’s response to an agency Information Request. The complaints fell into three groups. A majority of the complaints may have involved the Tacoma’s throttle control system. Some complaints did not involve a failure of the throttle control system. For the remaining reports, although there may have been an issue with the throttle control system as one possible explanation, we have been unable to determine a cause related to throttle control or any underlying cause that gave rise to the complaint. For those vehicles where the throttle control system did not perform as the owner believes it should have, the information suggesting a possible defect related to motor vehicle safety is quite limited.

Additional investigation is unlikely to result in a finding that a defect related to motor vehicle safety exists or a NHTSA order for the notification and remedy of a safety-related defect as requested by the petitioner. Therefore, in view of the need

<sup>151</sup> DP06001; Denial of Defect Petition; Federal Register Notice; National Highway Traffic Safety Administration March 5, 2007

to allocate and prioritize NHTSA's limited resources to best accomplish the agency's safety mission, the petition is denied.”<sup>152</sup>

But Toyota has created its own problem.

The automaker has ignored customers' real-world experiences and refused – at least publicly – to consider that it has not accounted for all of the ways its electronic throttle systems or the sensors that work in concert with it could malfunction. This insistence on design infallibility has forced the company into the very uncomfortable posture it finds itself today. Toyota has shifted the blame from drivers to its floor mats to its suppliers. It has never conceded that the blame lies in its own designs – be they a floor arrangement that allows a mat to wander freely or an electronic system that can be overcome by random, intermittent faults, and more fundamentally adequate failsafe designs. It is no wonder that the public is confused.

For six years, Toyota consistently denied that vehicle-initiated sudden unintended acceleration can even occur:

“With regard to allegations of unintended acceleration, *Toyota does not believe that uncontrollable acceleration can occur without the driver applying the accelerator pedal because of the several detection systems described above.* If an abnormal condition occurs, such as the ETC sending the signal to the throttle body to open the throttle without applying the accelerator pedal due to a failure of a component or a malfunction of the system, or if the throttle simply were to open on its own, the system goes into failsafe mode.”<sup>153</sup>

The automaker has argued that the electronic throttle control system can not be implicated in any malfunction, unless it is detected by a diagnostic fault code:

“In case the ECU itself experiences a malfunction and an abnormal throttle control signal is sent to the throttle motor, the above detection system will still work as designed because of built in redundancy. The ECU has two CPUs and these two CPUs are comparing each signal received every 100 milliseconds in order to measure its own functionality. In the event of a multipoint failure (one of the CPUs or any sensor or sensors) the system will go into failsafe mode and illuminate the engine warning lamp because of the built in redundancies in the ETC system.”<sup>154</sup>

Further, Toyota has not budged from the assertion that the brake system can overcome an open throttle:

<sup>152</sup> DP08001; ; Denial of Defect Petition; Federal Register Notice; Vol. 72; page 51551; National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; September 3, 2008

<sup>153</sup> DP05002; Toyota Response; Chris Tinto; Toyota Motor Company; November 15, 2005

<sup>154</sup> PE04021; Toyota Response; Chris Tinto; Toyota Motor Company; June 19, 2004

“Toyota believes that if the throttle had opened as was alleged by the complainant, and the consumer was applying the brake pedal as stated, the vehicle brakes would have restrained vehicle motion.”<sup>155</sup>

“In addition, the brake system and the ETC system are mechanically separated and work independently of each other. *Therefore, even if the ETC system fails, the brake system still works as designed and unintended acceleration cannot occur.* Furthermore, brake systems that fail mechanically leave evidence of their failure after the occurrence and do not return to normal operating conditions by themselves.”<sup>156</sup>

*“As with any vehicle in production today, the ES350 service brakes are more than adequate in stopping a vehicle with a stuck throttle pedal. Customers would be aware that something is operating in an unusual manner, can apply the brakes and shut off the vehicle, as instructed in their owner’s manual.”*<sup>157</sup>

Simply, Toyota’s entire argument is: our system cannot fail. And, if the system can not fail, then the fault lies elsewhere. In 2007, when the agency opened its third Lexus investigation, Toyota blamed customers for stacking all-weather mats on top of the original carpet mats causing pedal entrapment. In its first all-weather floor mat recall 07E082, even as the company filed a defect notice in September 2007, it insisted that there was no defect:

“Toyota has carefully evaluated the agency’s concerns in the defect investigation EA07-010 and has concluded that the subject vehicles do not contain a safety related defect. With respect to the All Weather Floor Mats that are associated with the field incidents reported in EA07-010, Toyota concluded that the mats do not contain a safety-related defect; however, Toyota agrees that an unsecured All Weather Floor Mat, especially one that is stacked on top of another floor mat, can migrate toward the accelerator pedal, potentially preventing it from returning to idle.”<sup>158</sup>

Five days after NHTSA closed the last Toyota SUA investigation, DP09001, Toyota issued a press release announcing what it perceived as the regulator’s latest vindication:

“The question of unintended acceleration involving Toyota and Lexus vehicles has been repeatedly and thoroughly investigated by NHTSA, without any finding of defect other than the risk from an unsecured or incompatible driver’s floor mat,” said Bob Daly, TMS senior vice president.<sup>159</sup>

<sup>155</sup> PE04021; Toyota Response; Chris Tinto; Toyota Motor Corporation; June 19, 2004

<sup>156</sup> DP05002; Toyota Response; Chris Tinto; Toyota Motor Corporation; November 15, 2005

<sup>157</sup> PE07016; Toyota Response; Christ Tinto ; Toyota Motor Corporation ; Response 15; Pg 13; 2007; June 11, 2007

<sup>158</sup> Recall 07E082; Defect Information Report; Toyota Motor Corporation;

<sup>159</sup> Toyota Begins Interim Notification to Owners Regarding Future Voluntary Safety Recall Related to Floor Mats Letter Confirms No Defect Exists in Vehicles with Properly; Press release; Toyota Motor Company; November 2, 2009



“..no defect exists in vehicles in which the driver’s floor mat is compatible with the vehicle and properly secured.”<sup>160</sup>

In a letter to its customers, Toyota referred to NHTSA’s “extensive technical review” of the issue, including interviews with consumers who had complained of unwanted acceleration, NHTSA concluded that “...the only defect trend related to vehicle speed control in the subject vehicles involved the potential for accelerator pedals to become trapped near the floor by out-of-position or inappropriate floor mat installations.”<sup>161</sup>

When consumers who had taken all floor mats out of their vehicle stepped forward to recount their SUA crashes and near-miss experiences, Toyota shifted the focus to sticking accelerator pedals – even though the accelerator is not implicated in any number of SUA incidents in which the driver’s foot was on the brake. In January, the president of Toyota’s US sales unit confidently declared:

“We know what the problem is. We have the fix. And we’re going to take great care of our customers.”<sup>162</sup>

Sudden Unintended Acceleration in the age of advanced vehicle electronics is a complex and multi-source problem. If Toyota knows what the problems are, it has not shared them with the public. The fixes – except for the brake to idle feature to be implemented in a select number of vehicles – will not prevent continued complaints of unintended acceleration. And it is long past the time to “take great care” of their customers.

## Conclusion

After examining the lengthy and complex public history of SUA in Toyota vehicles, Safety Research & Strategies has concluded:

- SUA is occurring among a wider range of Toyota models and model years than has been investigated or remedied.
- Neither Toyota nor the NHTSA has identified all of the causes of SUA in Toyota and Lexus vehicles. Both have adopted the simplest, mechanical explanation for these incidents.
- Pedal entrapment may be a cause of SUA. The data show that floor mat interference cannot be the only cause.

<sup>160</sup> Toyota Begins Interim Notification to Owners Regarding Future Voluntary Safety Recall Related to Floor Mats Letter Confirms No Defect Exists in Vehicles with Properly; Press release; Toyota Motor Company; November 2, 2009

<sup>161</sup> Toyota Begins Interim Notification to Owners Regarding Future Voluntary Safety Recall Related to Floor Mats Letter Confirms No Defect Exists in Vehicles with Properly; Press release; Toyota Motor Company; November 2, 2009

<sup>162</sup> Toyota Owners Barrage Dealers With Calls as Pedal Fixes Shipped; Mike Ramsey; Business Week; February 1, 2010

- Sticking accelerator pedals do not appear to cause the SUA events as reported by drivers.
- NHTSA has not yet conducted a thorough investigation of all possible causes. It has been hampered by decisions to limit data and exclude data which didn't fit its hypotheses. The agency may lack expertise and resources. It has been unduly influenced by its past experiences investigating SUA in mechanical throttle systems. Toyota's electronic system is significantly different and more complex than the older, mechanical systems.
- Toyota has not accepted its responsibility in manufacturing and selling vehicles which have design flaws that can contribute to SUA. It has insisted that its system cannot fail and has blamed drivers and suppliers.
- Toyota's past recalls have been ineffective. Drivers of recalled vehicles, who have applied the remedy, still experience SUA.
- Toyota has not addressed SUA problems in some of the models and model years with the worst complaint records, many of which are not eligible for any of the current remedies.
- In view of the automaker's and the government's inability to isolate all of the causes of SUA, Toyota should immediately implement a brake-to-idle override on all affected models and model years to ensure public safety.



**Safety Research & Strategies, Inc.**

340 Anawan Street / Suite 200  
 Rehoboth, MA 02769  
 Ph. 508-252-2333, Fax 508-252-3137  
[www.safetyresearch.net](http://www.safetyresearch.net)

**Addendum to Safety Research & Strategies February 5, 2010 report:  
*Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration***

**Exclusion of Early Camry Deaths Hamper Later Investigations**

NHTSA's decision not to include any but one of the fatal crashes in its official complaints, crash, injury, and death counts in their eight Toyota SUA investigations was a critical decision with serious consequences. By not counting deaths, the SUA investigations appeared to have less urgency and intensity. The impact of omitting the most serious incidents for consideration and further review – particularly in the first two years of NHTSA investigations – has reverberated through the subsequent probes and may have affected the recall remedies and the scope of those recalls.

In the span of six months, from September 2003 to March 2004, there were eight deaths that were alleged to have resulted from sudden unintended acceleration events in 2002-2004 Camry models. All eight deaths were reported to NHTSA via Vehicle Owner's Questionnaires or Early Warning Reporting data in an eight-month-period, beginning April 9, 2004, to the close of 2004. ODI only considered including one of these suspected deaths in any of the investigations. There is no evidence in the public files that ODI further investigated any of these deaths. These fatal incidents – save one noted, but not counted in PE04021 – are not mentioned in any of ODI's Closing Resumes or *Federal Register* notices, which describe, in greater detail, the agency's investigatory steps.

The details of most, as described in the EWR data or ODI narratives, are scant, but each ODI-reported incident alleges an important fact: The vehicle raced out of control without driver input. One of these incidents, described in a Vehicle Owner's Questionnaire contained a compelling detail in an Evansville, Indiana crash:

"When coming out of a parking lot, accelerator stuck, causing the vehicle to accelerate out of control. Vehicle grazed another vehicle, went across a street, grazed a building, and drove straight into another building. Driver was conscious when paramedic arrived... The police report stated the crash was due to a mechanical defect... EMTs at the scene stated both feet were 'jammed' on the brake."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> ODI#10065362; April 9, 2004

Handwritten notes on the form state: Stuck Throttle. Engine surges. Toyota Rep. to inspect 5/5/04.<sup>2</sup>

During the six-month period in which these fatal crashes occurred, one investigation into SUA in Lexus LS and GS vehicles (DP03003) was opened and closed.<sup>3</sup> *An investigation specifically into Camry unintended acceleration had been considered but not opened,*<sup>4</sup> and based on another consumer petition,<sup>5</sup> a second investigation focusing on Lexus and Camrys (PE04021) was open – and still in the phase of discussing the parameters of the types of SUA incidents that would be examined.<sup>6</sup> According to a deposition taken in *Alberto v. Toyota*, Christopher Santucci, a former NHTSA Office of Defects Investigations (ODI) investigator and now Toyota's Assistant Manager of Technical & Regulatory Affairs, testified that Toyota and ODI had discussions about the scope of PE04021 early on,<sup>7</sup> prior to March 23<sup>rd</sup>, when ODI investigator Scott Yon wrote a memo, tossing out instances where the operator was applying the brakes and longer duration events.<sup>8</sup> *These are the scenarios that appear to cover some of these fatal incidents.*

Based on the dates they were reported, NHTSA was informed of at least six – and possibly seven – of these fatal crashes that were alleged to have been caused by unintended acceleration or related to speed control. More troubling is that these reports were received just after the agency made the decision to narrow the scope of the investigation, *but not before they closed it.*<sup>9 10</sup>

Only one of these fatal incidents – in which a driver launched his Camry off a Las Vegas parking garage deck as he was slowly pulling into a space – is ever mentioned in the course of PE04-021 by the agency or Toyota.

These fatal incidents were not considered in the course of the agency's next investigation (DP05002), which was based on another consumer's petition from July 2005 alleging his 2005 Toyota Camry experienced multiple unintended acceleration events, including one that resulted in a crash. This petitioner also took pains to identify similar reported Camry incidents that NHTSA received.

There is no evidence that NHTSA did anything to investigate these fatalities further or to seriously consider them in their investigations.

<sup>2</sup> ODI#10065362; April 9, 2004

<sup>3</sup> DP03003; Closing Resume; September 22, 2003

<sup>4</sup> Letter to NHTSA Kathleen DeMeter from unidentified Camry owner, ODI # 10023329; November 19, 2003.

<sup>5</sup> DP04-003

<sup>6</sup> PE04-021; Opening Resume; National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; March 5, 2004

<sup>7</sup> Deposition of Christopher Santucci; Pg. 283; *Alberto v. Toyota*; December 9, 2009

<sup>8</sup> Complaints Update; PE04021; Scott Yon; National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; March 23, 2004

<sup>9</sup> PE04021; Closing Resume; National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; July 22, 2004

<sup>10</sup> Table 1: Fatal Incidents Reported to NHTSA 2003-2004; Safety Research & Strategies

In DP05002, Toyota mentions a May 2004 inspection of a vehicle that experienced an SUA event.<sup>11</sup> The timing suggests it is the Evansville, Indiana crash in which the driver was pulled from the vehicle with both feet on the pedal. *The fact that this is a fatal incident is never mentioned, and again, it is not counted in the investigation.*

When did Toyota receive notice of these fatalities? It is clear that the automaker had direct knowledge of the Evansville, Indiana crash. Toyota is also likely to have had early direct knowledge about one that occurred on March 14, 2004 because the complainant stated they contacted the company:

“My mother and friend started out for church, the friend had come to pick her up when the 2004 Toyota Camry with less than 3000 miles on it was having difficulty shifting into reverse, then when she shifted into drive the car accelerated uncontrollably EST speed on 80 - 92 mile a hour in less than 250 ft when the car hit a mobile home. They hit so hard it moved double wide almost a foot. Killing my mother the passenger and injury to her friend the driver. No air bag deployed and when Toyota was contacted they refused to speak to us. Attorneys have said that Toyota is so big, not cost affective....so I watch and in two years there are many many more now....how many more have to die before something is done.”<sup>12</sup>

It is also likely that Toyota was informed of the March 15 crash that occurred in Delray Beach, FL. According to interviews with the family of the driver, Leonard Rubin, the leased vehicle was returned to the dealer after the crash; Mr. Rubin refused to drive it again. Mr. Rubin’s son-in-law, Marvin Cohen, reported the incident to NHTSA, and received a return phone call from an agency representative. As he recalls it, the agency said that the evidence in this crash was inconclusive. (Mr. Rubin was never charged in the crash.)<sup>13</sup>

In this context, Toyota’s language on June 4, in responding to PE04021, is interesting, to say the least:

“Long duration incidents involving uncontrollable acceleration when brake pedal application had no affect are not within the scope of this investigation...” “In reviewing 8013543 and 10045944, Toyota believes that if the throttle had opened, as was alleged by the complainant, and *the consumer was applying the brake pedal as stated the vehicle brakes would have restrained vehicle motion.* For this reason, we believe that these complaints are unrelated to the failure of the electronic throttle control system, and again consider them as similar to complaints referenced in other SA investigations and, per your memo, outside the scope of this investigation.”<sup>14</sup>

<sup>11</sup> DP05002; Attachment Response 3 Inspection data; Toyota Motor Corporation;

<sup>12</sup> ODI# 10171110;

<sup>13</sup> Interview with Marvin Cohen; February 16, 2010

<sup>14</sup> PE04021; Toyota Response; Chris Tinto; Toyota Motor Corporation; June 4, 2004

ODI# 8013543 states: At a stop with brakes applied vehicle suddenly surged forward. Engine raced and rpm's went up to 6000. Consumer shifted to neutral to stop vehicle. Vehicle has Not been examined by dealer.\*ak<sup>15</sup>

ODI# 10045944 states: While pulling into a parking space, at 2-4 mph, with my foot on the brake, the car suddenly accelerated at full speed, jumping the curb and hitting a tree with full force. Because of previous concerns with throttle problems noted with the dealership at 1000 and 5000 mile check, I immediately called the Lexus dealership. After a conference call with Lexus roadside assistance and the dealership, my car. Was flat bedded to the dealership. The frontal crash rendered the vehicle undrivable. Radiator damage with leakage of fluid covered a portion of the parking lot. The Lexus dealership said they was no problem with the car. I could have been killed or somebody else live could have been in danger... On the night of the accident I learned by reviewing complaints from the Office of Defect Investigations on the NHTSA web site that the problems have been known by the corporate office of Lexus from as early as January, 2002 in regards to all of the above problems. I also found out there have been two recalls on this vehicle that I was not informed about. I will be requesting an investigation with the Lexus east regional office and discussing this with the Rockville Lexus office. I believe that this car is unsafe to drive.”<sup>16</sup>

Why are they talking about these complaints, but not fatalities, in which there was clear evidence that the driver was trying to brake the vehicle before the crash?

These deaths and injuries indicate that Toyota had ample notice of a growing problem – in the form of eight deaths in six months – all of which were reported to NHTSA, and in the public domain, by the end of 2004. It also shows that Toyota knew that in a real-world uncontrolled acceleration event, the brakes were not overcoming a fully open throttle as reported by owners – with the most serious consequences – and yet the company continued to insist that the brakes would always work.

It is always easier to examine these issues in hindsight; however, these deaths occurred so closely together, with similar circumstances and in the same vehicle model. How could this not have gotten Toyota's and the agency's attention at the same time they were investigating unintended acceleration in these vehicles? The decision, early on, to exclude these deaths in 2002-2004 Camrys from the count, grows ever more significant with each subsequent defect petition and each investigation closing that with no finding.

---

<sup>15</sup> ODI# 8013543

<sup>16</sup> ODI# 10045944

Table 1. September 2003-March 2004 Toyota Camry Fatal Incidents Alleging Unintended Acceleration

Date of Incident	ODI Number	Model	MY	Injury	Deaths	Incident Location	Date Received by NHTSA	Incident Description
2003/09/04	10072605	CAMRY	2002	1	1	Williamston, MA	2004/05/14	Maria Cudia was entering I-93 at exit 39 at 5:30 in the morning when her car suddenly shot across three lanes of travel and was hit, broad side, by another vehicle traveling in the high speed (314) lane. Traffic at the time of the accident was light. It is believed that the Camry experienced an un-commanded acceleration causing Mrs. Cudia to lose control resulting in the accident and her death. The Camry has been stored since the accident and no changes have been made to its post accident condition. Vehicle is available for inspection testing by NHTSA. *AK
2004/01/22	10065859	CAMRY	2002	0	2	Las Vegas, NV	2004/04/09	Witnesses saw my parents vehicle (a 2002 Toyota Camry) coming to a stop and then suddenly accelerate. *ak According to news reports, George and Maureen Tago drove off the fourth floor of a parking deck, while slowly backing into a parking space. At which, the friend had come to pick her up when the 2004 Toyota Camry was in the parking space. The car was backing into the space and the driver was backing into the space. The car accelerated uncontrollably east speed on 80 - 92 mile a hour in less than 250 ft when the car hit a mobile home. They hit so hard it moved double wide almost a foot. Killing my mother the passenger and injury to her friend the driver. No air bag deployed and when Toyota was contacted they refused to speak to us. Attorneys have said that Toyota is so big, not cost effective...so I watch and in two years there are many many more now...how many more have to die before something is done. See also 10074472. *day *min; *difficultly shifting from park to reverse, then upon shifting into drive the car accelerated uncontrollably, would not stop, collided with a mobile home, air bags did not deploy, resulting in the death of one passenger and injury of driver. *in fatal victim: Ethyl Marlene Foster
2004/03/14	10171110	CAMRY	2004	2	1	Phoenix OR	2004/03/29	While in a parking lot and backing out of a parking space vehicle accelerated, hitting a pedestrian. *ak Leonard Rubin incident. Doreen Valdez fatal victim
2004/03/15	10094578	CAMRY	2003	1	1	Delray, FL	2004/12/15	When coming out of a parking lot accelerator stuck, causing the vehicle to accelerate out of control. Vehicle was in a parking lot and the driver was backing out of the space. The car accelerated uncontrollably and the driver was conscious when paramedics arrived. They found the driver with both feet still on the brake pedal. Driver was transported to the hospital, and later died due to fatal injuries from the crash. The insurance company preserved the vehicle as evidence. The police report stated the crash was due to a mechanical defect. *AK. *nm Juanita Grossman crash
2004/03/16	10065562	CAMRY	2003	0	1	Evansville, IN	2004/04/29	According to a news account, 83-year-old man collapses and dies of a heart attack <i>after</i> crash. This report is found in Toyota's EWR 2004 second quarter report to NHTSA in which the company coded this incident as "speed control" related. Matthew Rarus crash
2004/03/16	EWR	CAMRY	2003	0	1	South Attleboro, MA	2004/08/00 (approximate)	A Toyota Camry, 2002 driven by a 68 year old lady was parked, and then crashed into a storefront after going forward. Backed into traffic 40 feet away, struck vehicles, and went forward again killing pedestrian as well. Case under investigation. Recent accident. Previous reports of sudden acceleration. All Camrys should be recalled before more loss of life. Possible power train/automatic transmission problems."
2004/05/14	10073168	CAMRY	2002	1	1	Honolulu, HI	2004/05/26	

February 17, 2010 Addendum to  
Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration  
Safety Research & Strategies



**Safety Research & Strategies, Inc.**  
 340 Anawan Street / Suite 200  
 Rehoboth, MA 02769  
 Ph. 508-252-2333, Fax 508-252-3137  
[www.safetyresearch.net](http://www.safetyresearch.net)

**Appendix A: Unintended Acceleration Incidents Reported 1999-January 19, 2010  
 Involving Vehicles Outside of the Recall Populations**

The attached appendix is comprised of incidents of unintended acceleration occurring in vehicles outside of the scope of the six Toyota floor mat and accelerator pedal recalls. Sources for these incidents include:

- Consumer complaints to NHTSA
- Toyota-submitted claims from several NHTSA investigations into SUA
- Incidents reported by media organizations
- Consumer contacts made to Safety Research & Strategies, Inc., and other organizations who are reporting incidents that they have received.

We have reviewed all of the complaints in the database and, using the details provided in the incident descriptions, coded every field possible. We focused particularly on date of incident, vehicle make, model, and model year, whether or not an incident resulted in a crash, and injury and death counts. In cases where NHTSA had already coded those fields, we relied on their coding unless the incident descriptions provided clear contradictions.

Every effort has been made to identify duplicate records and combine them; however, often the reports do not provide enough detail to link incidents to other reports; there are likely some duplicates among our records – if there are, they are few.

In order to limit these incidents to only those occurring in non-recalled vehicles, we reviewed the vehicle make, model, model year, and, when necessary, VIN, in order to determine the recall status of the vehicles involved in the incidents. When model year was not known for vehicles that were included in one or more recalls, we excluded the associated records. This resulted in 1,122 incidents of unintended acceleration involving vehicles outside of the recalls.



<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA CRD No: 2009040 Date of Incident: 1/09/04 Vehicle: 2002 TOYOTA CAMRY Location of Incident: POMPANO BEACH, FL NHTSA Summary: CONSUMER STATED WHILE PULLING INTO A PARKING SPACE AND WITHOUT ANY INDICATION VEHICLE ACCELERATED, JUMPING OVER PARKING SPACE AND KNOCKING DOWN A TREE. DEALER AND MANUFACTURER HAD BEEN CONTACTED. PLEASE PROVIDE FURTHER INFORMATION. *CB Additional Summary:</p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA CRD No: 1011900 Date of Incident: 101/01/01 Vehicle: 2002 TOYOTA AVALON Location of Incident: ITHACA, NY NHTSA Summary: 2002 TOYOTA AVALON EXPERIENCED SHIMMY ACCELERATION AFTER OUTSIDE CONTROLS WERE ENGAGED. *PENDING REQUEST FOR THE IDENTIFICATION OF SHIMMY ACCELERATION CAUSED THE VEHICLE TO IMPACT LOW TREES BRANCHES WHICH REACHED THE FRONT OF THE VEHICLE. THE SECOND INCIDENT RESULTED IN NO DAMAGE. *PMB Additional Summary:</p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA CRD No: 1017120 Date of Incident: 101/01/01 Vehicle: 2002 TOYOTA CAMRY Location of Incident: SAN JUAN CAMPUBIANO, CA NHTSA Summary: LIFE INSURANCE THE 2002-2002 TOYOTA CAMRY, ROLAND, AND LENA'S AUTOMOBILES REQUEST NHTSA DO A FULL INVESTIGATION ON THEIR VEHICLE RE SHIMMY ACCELERATION. *TS WHILE FINDING THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED SUDDENLY AND RESULTED IN AN ACCIDENT. *PMB Additional Summary:</p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA CRD No: 1010011 Date of Incident: 101/01/01 Vehicle: 2002 TOYOTA CAMRY Location of Incident: HUNTINGTON, NY NHTSA Summary: 2002 TOYOTA CAMRY LURCHED FORWARD ON OCCASIONS CAUSING DAMAGE TO THE VEHICLE. THE BRAKE LIGHTS DID NOT FLUKE BECAUSE. *CB WHILE PARKING. ON TWO SEPARATE OCCASIONS, THE VEHICLE LURCHED FORWARD WHILE THE CONSUMER WAS PULLING INTO A PARKING SPACE. EACH TIME THE CONSUMER'S FOOT WAS ON THE BRAKE PEDAL PREPARING TO STOP. DURING THE SECOND OCCURRENCE THE CONSUMER'S HEAD AND NECK WERE SHAKEN FROM HEAD-ON COLLISION TO VERY HIGH SPEED. AT OR CLOSE TO THE MAXIMUM RPM. THE VEHICLE HIT A TREE. *PMB Additional Summary:</p> <p><i>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</i> <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i></p>	<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA CRD No: 1004005 Date of Incident: 100/01/01 Vehicle: 2001 LEXUS ES300 Location of Incident: GAITHER, MO NHTSA Summary: PETITION FOR DEFECT INVESTIGATION INTO MODEL YEAR 2002 THROUGH 2006 TOYOTA CAMRY AND VEHICLES FOR DEFECTS RELATING TO VEHICLE SHIMMY. *TS THE CONSUMER EXPERIENCED SHIMMY ACCELERATION IN HIS VEHICLE. *CB Additional Summary:</p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA CRD No: 1002004 Date of Incident: 100/01/01 Vehicle: 2001 LEXUS ES300 Location of Incident: FOUNTAIN INN, SC NHTSA Summary: CONSUMER IS REQUESTING INFORMATION REGARDING THE STATUS OF THE REVIEW OF THE 2001 LEXUS ES300 ACCELERATION DELAY PROBLEM. THE CONSUMER EXPERIENCED AN ACCELERATION DELAY WHILE DRIVING THE VEHICLE. WHEN THE CONSUMER RELEASED THE VEHICLE DOWN LINE WHEN APPROACHING A RAMPWAY OR RAMP, THEN ACCELERATED TO GET INTO TRAFFIC. THERE WAS AN 1.1 SECOND DELAY BEFORE THE VEHICLE WOULD ACCELERATE. *TS Additional Summary:</p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA CRD No: 1004700 Date of Incident: 100/01/01 Vehicle: 2001 LEXUS ES300 Location of Incident: SOWELL, NJ NHTSA Summary: THE CONSUMER'S 2001 LEXUS ES300 HESITATED INTERMITTENTLY WHILE ACCELERATING TO ENTER A HIGHWAY. *PMB THE VEHICLE WAS TAKEN TO THE DEALER TWICE AND THEY SAID THAT THE VEHICLE HAD TO LEARN THE CONSUMER'S DRIVING HABITS AND WOULD BE BETTER. THEY ALSO SAID THE VEHICLE WOULD BE SOMETHING INTO THE COMPUTER BOARD. THE VEHICLE HESITATED AGAIN WHILE THE CONSUMER WAS MAKING A LEFT TURN FROM A VERY LOW SPEED. AFTER A FEW SECONDS THE VEHICLE FINALLY ACCELERATED BECAUSE THE VEHICLE WAS HIT BY AN ONCOMING TRUCK. *PMB Additional Summary:</p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA CRD No: 1004003 Date of Incident: 100/01/01 Vehicle: 2001 LEXUS ES300 Location of Incident: NASHVILLE, TN NHTSA Summary: WHILE DRIVING AT A LOW RATE OF SPEED AND WOUNDING INTO A PARKING SPACE WITH FOOT DEPRESSED ON THE BRAKE PEDAL VEHICLE CONTINUED TO MOVE, CAUSING UNWANTED ACCELERATION AND EXTENDED STOPPING DISTANCE. CONSUMER HAS CONTACTED THE DEALER. DEALER SAID THAT A BRAKE LIGHT WAS ON AND THAT THE COMPUTER CIRCUIT HAD BRAKE EXPENSE AND FRONT WHEEL SPENDING, BUT WOULDN'T WRITE IT ON THE REPAIR TICKET FOR LEGAL REASONS. *CB *PMB Additional Summary:</p> <p><i>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</i> <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i></p>
<p>REQUESTS BATTERY MULTIPLE MALFUNCTIONS OF THE BATTERY ELECTRONICS, BROKEN BATTERY AND LITIGATE ALIGNMENT PROBLEMS. *PMB UPDATED ON-USE. *CB Additional Summary:</p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA CRD No: 1000001 Date of Incident: 100/01/01 Vehicle: 2002 TOYOTA AVALON Location of Incident: BOSTON BEACH, RI NHTSA Summary: NAB 9-1-01. PFA HAS BEEN PENDING FOR INQUIRY HOW MANY 2002 TOYOTA HAVE HAD A PROBLEM OF ACCELERATION WHILE THE BRAKE IS BEING APPLIED, TO HAVE NO RECORDS. *CB Additional Summary:</p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA CRD No: 1007001 Date of Incident: 100/01/01 Vehicle: 2002 TOYOTA AVALON Location of Incident: OCLANDSIDE, CA NHTSA Summary: PROBLEMS WITH CONSUMER GETTING LOCKED IN VEHICLE AS WELL AS BRAKE PROBLEMS. *TS THE PROBLEM HAD BEEN PRESENT SINCE THE VEHICLE WAS PURCHASED. THE STEERING WHEEL WOULD NOT TURN, NEITHER WOULD THE KEY TURN THE IGNITION. THE BRAKE PEDAL REMAINED UNRESPONSIVE. ON ANOTHER OCCASION THE CONSUMER TRIED TO SLOW DOWN TO MAKE A TURN AND THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED UNCONTROLLABLY. THE ONLY WAY THE VEHICLE WOULD STOP, WAS TO TURN THE KEY AND THE SHUT THE MOTOR OFF. THE VEHICLE LOST POWER WHEN PULLING OUT OF A PARKING SPACE. THE IGNITION PROBLEM WAS INTERMITTENT AND THE BRAKE PROBLEM WAS INTERMITTENT. *CB *CB Additional Summary:</p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA CRD No: 1000006 Date of Incident: 100/01/01 Vehicle: 2002 TOYOTA CAMRY Location of Incident: ANN ARBOR, MI NHTSA Summary: BOTH BRAKE PEDAL AND ACCELERATION PEDAL ARE SHIMMED TOO CLOSE TOGETHER. PETITION TO PROVIDE ANY FURTHER INFORMATION. *CB Additional Summary:</p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA CRD No: 1000120 Date of Incident: 100/01/01 Vehicle: 2002 TOYOTA AVALON Location of Incident: CYPRESS, TX NHTSA Summary: LOCATION: PARKING LOT, PARKING, THREE LOST TRACTION AND ACCELERATION STUCK ON FLOOR. BRAKE WHEEL NOT FUNCTION. THE VEHICLE PROCEEDED FORWARD GLANCING OFF THE BACK OF A FULL SIZE PICKUP AND DEPLETED INTO A SUBURBAN. *CB Additional Summary:</p> <p><i>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</i> <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i></p>	<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA CRD No: 2007110 Date of Incident: 2007/01/01 Vehicle: 2000 TOYOTA CAMRY Location of Incident: OMAHA, NE NHTSA Summary: DURING A VERY HEAVY RAIN, I WAS DRIVING THE VEHICLE UP A MODERATELY STEEP HILL AT ABOUT 15 MPH WITH A CONSTANT PRESSURE TO THE ACCELERATOR. THE VEHICLE SUDDENLY BEGAN LOOSING POWER AND SLIGHTLY DECELERATED. I COULD NOT GET THE FOOT OFF THE PEDAL. THE ENGINE THEN SHUT OFF AND A BARGE PITCHED. CONSTANT WINDS CAME FROM THE FRONT OF THE HILL. THE ENGINE SHUT OFF. THE WINDS CAME AND THE VEHICLE BECAME IN NORMAL ACCELERATION. IMMEDIATELY AFTER THAT, I HEARD A BATTING NOISE FROM THE UNDERCARRIAGE. AROUND THE FRONT LOWER REAR AREA. IT SOUNDED LIKE METAL BANGING ON METAL. IT STOPPED AFTER A FEW SECONDS. I HADN'T IN THE EVENING. MY WIFE HAD DRIVEN THE VEHICLE IN THE SAME HEAVY RAIN AND NOTED THE SAME PROBLEMS WHILE DRIVING. THEN I RECALLED AT APPROXIMATELY 10 MPH IN A LEVEL ROADWAY. THE VEHICLE WAS CRACKED BY THE DEALER ON 1/14, BUT THEY WERE UNABLE TO REPRODUCE THE ENGINE PROBLEM. NOR SAW ANY LOOSE COMPONENTS ON THE UNDERCARRIAGE. *CB Additional Summary:</p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA CRD No: 1007110 Date of Incident: 1007/01/01 Vehicle: 2000 TOYOTA CAMRY Location of Incident: CONCORD, OH NHTSA Summary: DURING A VERY HEAVY RAIN, I WAS DRIVING THE VEHICLE UP A MODERATELY STEEP HILL AT ABOUT 15 MPH WITH A CONSTANT PRESSURE TO THE ACCELERATOR. THE VEHICLE SUDDENLY BEGAN LOOSING POWER AND SLIGHTLY DECELERATED. I COULD NOT GET THE FOOT OFF THE PEDAL. THE ENGINE THEN SHUT OFF AND A BARGE PITCHED. CONSTANT WINDS CAME FROM THE FRONT OF THE HILL. THE ENGINE SHUT OFF. THE WINDS CAME AND THE VEHICLE BECAME IN NORMAL ACCELERATION. IMMEDIATELY AFTER THAT, I HEARD A BATTING NOISE FROM THE UNDERCARRIAGE. AROUND THE FRONT LOWER REAR AREA. IT SOUNDED LIKE METAL BANGING ON METAL. IT STOPPED AFTER A FEW SECONDS. I HADN'T IN THE EVENING. MY WIFE HAD DRIVEN THE VEHICLE IN THE SAME HEAVY RAIN AND NOTED THE SAME PROBLEMS WHILE DRIVING. THEN I RECALLED AT APPROXIMATELY 10 MPH IN A LEVEL ROADWAY. THE VEHICLE WAS CRACKED BY THE DEALER ON 1/14, BUT THEY WERE UNABLE TO REPRODUCE THE ENGINE PROBLEM. NOR SAW ANY LOOSE COMPONENTS ON THE UNDERCARRIAGE. *CB Additional Summary:</p> <p><i>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</i> <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i></p>

<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 872347  <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 2005011  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2005 LEXUS GRAM  <b>Vehicle:</b> CUPERTINO, CA  <b>NHTSA Summary:</b>          WAS DRIVING VEHICLE &amp; STARTED TO PRESS DOWN ON BRAKES AND VEHICLE          SUDDENLY ACCELERATED WITHOUT WARNING. TOOK VEHICLE TO USE BRAKES &amp;          MECHANIC COULD NOT LOCATE CAUSE OF ACCELERATION AND TIME PROBLEMS, NOT          DELAYED AFTER IT HAPPENED PRIOR TO TAKING TO DEALERSHIP AND HAPPENED 4          DIFFERENT TIMES SINCE THEN &amp; PROBLEM WAS GETTING WORSE. MECHANIC DID NOT          KNOW CAUSE OF ACCELERATION *AK  <b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 875251  <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 2005008  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2005 LEXUS RX300  <b>Vehicle:</b> PRASADNUT, CA  <b>NHTSA Summary:</b>          WHEN CHANGING LANES STEERING WHEEL WENT INTO OPPOSITE DIRECTION,          RESULTING IN A COLLISION. DEALER HAS INSPECTED VEHICLE, AND HAD NOT BEEN          ABLE TO CORRELATE OR CORRECT PROBLEM. MANUFACTURER HAS BEEN NOTIFIED.          THE VEHICLE WAS STUCKING. SPEAKER FAILED. CONSUMER HEARD A RATTLING NOISE IN          RIGHT FRONT DASH AREA. DEALER REFLECTED THE GLOW COMPARTMENT. *AK *WC  <b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 875257  <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 2005002  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2005 TOYOTA CAMRY  <b>Vehicle:</b> BOWSER, CA  <b>NHTSA Summary:</b>          THREE WEEKS AFTER PURCHASING THE VEHICLE, CONSUMER COMPLAINED THAT THE          ENGINE WAS RUNNING ROUGH AND BRUTAL. AT THAT TIME THE DEALER WAS          UNABLE TO INSPECT THE VEHICLE, DUE TO THE CONSUMER WAS INVOLVED IN AN          ACCIDENT WHERE SHE WAS INABLE TO GET THE VEHICLE. A WEEK AFTER THE          ACCIDENT CONSUMER RECEIVED NOTIFICATION WHICH ADVISED OF A DEFECTIVE          CRUISE CONTROL. THE VEHICLE LANGUAGE CUP. CONSUMER RECEIVED THE DEFECT CAUSED          THE ACCIDENT (ATTORNEY FOR CLIENT) NLM  <b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 881367  <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 2005030  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2005 LEXUS LX500  <b>Vehicle:</b> HENNINGTON STATION, NY  <b>NHTSA Summary:</b>          WHILE DRIVING VEHICLE WOULD UPBRATE WHEN ACCELERATING. VEHICLE BEEN TO          DEALER ON THREE OCCASIONS, AND PROBLEM RE-COCCURED. FEEL FREE TO PROVIDE          ANY FURTHER INFORMATION *AK  <b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	<p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 870012  <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 2000122  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2000 TOYOTA XENIO  <b>Vehicle:</b> LONG BEACH, NY  <b>NHTSA Summary:</b>          WHILE APPLYING BRAKES VEHICLE ACCELERATED SUDDENLY AND UNEXPECTEDLY. V.          DRIVER'S VEHICLE TO PARK TO STOP IT. DEALER WAS INSPECTING VEHICLE *AC  <b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 870012  <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 2000122  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2001 TOYOTA TACOMA  <b>Vehicle:</b> RACEMOUNT, CA  <b>NHTSA Summary:</b>          CONSUMER WAS TRAVELING IN RAINY CONDITIONS AT 10 MPH AND WITHOUT          ACCELERATION FRONT BLIND ACHORD ROAD INTO ANOTHER VEHICLE. NO INJURIES.          TOYOTA HAS INSPECTED VEHICLE BUT DID NOT FIND ANYTHING. EVERYTHING MEET          REQUIREMENTS, BUT NOTHING ELSE COULD BE DONE FOR CONSUMER *AK. **TD  <b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 877195  <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 2005119  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2005 LEXUS RX300  <b>Vehicle:</b> LAKE CHARLES, LA  <b>NHTSA Summary:</b>          VEHICLE EXPERIENCED SUDDEN ACCELERATION IN REVERSE AND MET A POLE. GEAR          SHIFT RE-APPLIED IN REVERSE AND COULD NOT SHIFT INTO DRIVE. THE ENGINE          TORQUED UP AND ACCELERATED FORWARD, CAUSING VEHICLE TO CRASH INTO A BRICK          WALL. CONSUMER SUSTAINED WOUNDS DUE TO THE ACCIDENT. *AC  <b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 873644  <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 2000128  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2000 TOYOTA TUNDRA  <b>Vehicle:</b> PHOENIX PARK, IL  <b>NHTSA Summary:</b>          ACCELERATOR WENT DOWN TO THE FLOOR AS IF THE CRUISE CONTROL TOOK OVER.          AWARDED NOT DISPLAY ON IMPACT *AK  <b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 875387  <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 2005122  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2005122  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2005 LEXUS LX500  <b>NHTSA Summary:</b>          JUST HITTING THE OPPOSING VEHICLE'S LEFT FRONT WHEEL, WILL DOING DAMAGE TO IT          AND TO MY CAR.  <b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Vehicle:</b> 2005 TOYOTA CUVARLA  <b>Location of Incident:</b> PRINCETON HEIGHTS, IL  <b>NHTSA Summary:</b>          WHILE TRAVELING ON HIGHWAY AT 45 MPH APPLIED ACCELERATOR PEDAL TO PARK          AND ACCELERATOR PEDAL REMAINED STUCK TO THE FLOOR AND WOULD NOT RETURN.          CAUSING VEHICLE TO EXCEED A YAK OFF. CONSUMER WAS ABLE TO SHUT OFF          VEHICLE AND GO ON OVER THE BRIDGE OF ROAD. DEALER WAS NOT CONTACTED AT THIS          TIME. PLEASE FEEL FREE TO PROVIDE ANY FURTHER DETAILS ON THIS MATTER. *AK  <b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 875290  <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 2005030  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2005 LEXUS LX500  <b>Vehicle:</b> GAITHERSBURG, MD  <b>NHTSA Summary:</b>          DEALER SAYS THAT THE VEHICLE STUCKING IS THE NORM FOR CAMRY AND IS NOT A          DRIVE TRAIN PROBLEM AND NOT WORRYING *AK  <b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 748462  <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 2005011  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2005 LEXUS LX500  <b>Vehicle:</b> KADAMBA, VA  <b>NHTSA Summary:</b>          STUCKING ACCELERATOR. *AK  <b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 880752  <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 2005011  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2005 TOYOTA CAMRY  <b>Vehicle:</b> GAITHERSBURG, MD  <b>NHTSA Summary:</b>          WHILE DRIVING ABOUT 15 MPH ENGINE SUDDENLY ACCELERATED WITHOUT A PRIOR          WARNING. CONSUMER HAD TO TURN OFF ENGINE AND PUT FUEL IN NEUTRAL.          VEHICLE THEN TOOK OFF. AVOIDING A CRASH INTO A STOP. DEALER SAYS THAT          THE VEHICLE CAME WAS THE PROBLEM. *AK  <b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 871239  <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 2005021  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2005 LEXUS RX300  <b>Vehicle:</b> CHILMARK, CO  <b>NHTSA Summary:</b>          PUSHED IN BRAKES AS VEHICLE COMING TO A STOP IN PARKING LOT. SUDDENLY          WITH NO REASON ACCELERATED OFFER AROUND THE PERIMETER ON THE BRAKES. JUMPING          THE CONCRETE STOP. ENGINE OVER PARKING LOT AND SIGN AND CHANGING TO A STOP  <b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	<p><b>Vehicle:</b> 2005 LEXUS LX500  <b>Location of Incident:</b> LAKE CHARLES, LA  <b>NHTSA Summary:</b>          VEHICLE EXPERIENCED SUDDEN ACCELERATION IN REVERSE AND MET A POLE. GEAR          SHIFT RE-APPLIED IN REVERSE AND COULD NOT SHIFT INTO DRIVE. THE ENGINE          TORQUED UP AND ACCELERATED FORWARD, CAUSING VEHICLE TO CRASH INTO A BRICK          WALL. CONSUMER SUSTAINED WOUNDS DUE TO THE ACCIDENT. *AC  <b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 881372  <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 2005030  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2005 LEXUS LX500  <b>Vehicle:</b> LAKE CHARLES, LA  <b>NHTSA Summary:</b>          WHILE BACKING INTO GARAGE THE VEHICLE SUDDENLY ACCELERATED BACKWARD          STRIKING SEVERAL APPLICES STORED IN THE GARAGE. THE VEHICLE SUFFERED          EXTENSIVE DAMAGE TO THE REAR END AND LEFT REAR QUARTER PANEL. THE DRIVER          SUFFERED INJURY AND AVOIDER BACK INJURY BUT REQUIRED NO MEDICAL          ATTENTION. THIS PROBLEM OCCURRED ONCE BEFORE WHILE BACKING INTO GARAGE BUT          WITHOUT INCIDENT. NLM  <b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 880671  <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 2005034  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2005 TOYOTA CAMRY  <b>Vehicle:</b> BALTIMORE, MD  <b>NHTSA Summary:</b>          WHILE TRAVELING AND WITHOUT ANY INDICATION VEHICLE WOULD IDLE BRUSH          CAUSING CONSUMER TO DEPRESS BRAKE PEDAL AND VEHICLE WOULD STILL TRAVEL.          RESULTING IN CONSUMER'S VEHICLE TO COLLIDE INTO A LIGHTHOUSE. CONSUMER          STATED SHE HIT ANOTHER VEHICLE IN FRONT OF HER. DEALERSHIP WAS UNABLE TO          REPAIR THE PROBLEM OR BOTH OCCASIONS *AC  <b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 880440  <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 2005041  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2005 TOYOTA XENIO  <b>Vehicle:</b> FORT COLLINS, CO  <b>NHTSA Summary:</b>          WHILE TRAVELING FROM A COMPLETE STOP THERE WAS A HESITATION IN ENGINE.          THE HESITATION ALMOST RESULTED IN REVERSAL. VEHICLE CRASHED. DEALERSHIP HAS          EXAMINED VEHICLE, BUT COULD NOT DETERMINE THE PROBLEM. REQUESTED          CONSUMER INFORMATION WAS NORMAL. PLEASE PROVIDE ANY ADDITIONAL          INFORMATION / DOCUMENTATION. *AK  <b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 775241  <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 2005042  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2005 TOYOTA RAV4  <b>Vehicle:</b> WINDHAM, MN  <b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p>

Safety Research & Strategies  
 Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A

Safety Research & Strategies  
 Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A

THE 2001 TOYOTA RAV4 HAS A SIGNIFICANT VIBRATION PROBLEM UPON ACCELERATION RESULTING IN, MY OPINION, AN EXTREMELY INSAFELY VEHICLE AT RANDOM TIMES THERE IS VIRTUALLY NO POWER PROVIDED BY THE ENGINE FOR APPROX. 1-4 SECONDS WHEN THE ACCELERATOR IS DEPRESSSED. THIS RESULTS IN A VERY DANGEROUS SITUATION AS IT MAY CAUSE THE DRIVER TO LAG, ADJUSTING WHEN A FRIEND CLAIMS THEY HAVE NO IDEA WHAT CAUSES IT, NOR DOES TOYOTA. I HAVE HAD ONLY THREE REPORTS BY OTHER TRAFFIC WHEN I EXCEPTED THE VEHICLE TO SMOOTHLY ACCELERATE OUT OF HAZARD WAY WHEN IT DID NOT "AK"

**Toyota ID No:**  
**NHTSA CRD No:** 200702  
**Date of Incident:** 2006/05/01  
**Vehicle:** 2006 TOYOTA HENNA  
**Location of Incident:** CHARLOTTEVILLE, VA  
**NHTSA Summary:** THERE WAS A SUDDEN DECREASE IN ACCELERATION WHILE IN CRUISE CONTROL, AND AN INSTANTAL NOISE "AK"  
**Additional Summary:**

**Toyota ID No:**  
**NHTSA CRD No:** 488046  
**Date of Incident:** 2006/04/08  
**Vehicle:** 2006 TOYOTA CAMRY  
**Location of Incident:** FLYMOBILE, IL  
**NHTSA Summary:** WHILE LIFTING AT APPROXIMATELY 14 MPH AND TURNING A CORNER VEHICLE ACCELERATED EVIDENTLY. CONSUMER LOST CONTROL OF VEHICLE AND VEHICLE ROLLED THREE TIMES. DEALERSHIP HAS NOT GIVEN A REASON FOR THE INCIDENT IN THIS VEHICLE "AK" CONSUMER STATES VEHICLE CUP UP TO ACTIVEN "D" AND IN MPH WITHIN 2 MINUTES. CONSUMER WAS INJURED IN ACCIDENT "AK"  
**Additional Summary:**

**Toyota ID No:**  
**NHTSA CRD No:** 480018  
**Date of Incident:** 2005/01/11  
**Vehicle:** 2006 TOYOTA CAMRY  
**Location of Incident:** WOODSTOCK, CA  
**NHTSA Summary:** VEHICLE ACCELERATED SUDDENLY AND UNEXPECTEDLY, RESULTING IN A COLLISION/VEHICLE FLIPPED OVER. MANUFACTURER HAS ADVISED THAT THE CAR CONSUMER WAS IN VEHICLE. CONSUMER STATED AFTERWARDS WHEN TURNED SHARPLY TO THE LEFT AT THE TIME THE ACCELERATOR "AK"  
**Additional Summary:**

**Toyota ID No:**  
**NHTSA CRD No:** 489042  
**Date of Incident:** 2006/04/04  
**Vehicle:** 2006 TOYOTA CAMRY  
**Location of Incident:** APEL, NC  
**NHTSA Summary:**

*Safety Research & Strategies  
Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A*

9

WHILE TRAVELING BETWEEN 45 AND 60 MPH A VIBRATION OCCURRED IN VEHICLE UNDER NORMAL OPERATION. DEALERSHIP COULD NOT DUPLICATE PROBLEM AND COULD NOT ASSESS CONSUMER. LATER THE WHEEL OF FRONT LEFT. ACCELERATOR STUCK WHILE VEHICLE WAS IN OPERATION. DEALERSHIP AGARD STATED THEY COULD NOT FIND ANYTHING. VEHICLE WAS VIBRATING "AK" CONSUMER NOTICED WHEN CRUISE WAS NOT WORKING PROPERLY. SHORTLY AFTER PURCHASE, IT WOULD CUT IN AND OUT AND EVEN VEHICLE DEALER ADJUSTED TENSORS OF RUMBLE STRUTS. WHEN CRUISE WAS GOOD CONTACT AND ADJUSTED CABLE OF THE CRUISE CONTROL, A COUPLE MONTHS LATER, NOW CONSUMER EXPERIENCING PROBLEMS WITH THE ACCELERATOR STOPPED WITHOUT THE CRUISE CONTROL TURNED ON, CRUISE IS STILL EXPERIENCING PROBLEMS WHILE ON. FOUR ARE A RUNNING HIGHWAY AT STOP, AND ACCELERATOR IS STUCK, WHILE APPLYING BRAKES WHEN THEY ARE HEATED UP. THEY GET HEATED AND CAUSE VEHICLE TO VIBRATE. "AK"  
**Additional Summary:**

**Toyota ID No:**  
**NHTSA CRD No:** 302218  
**Date of Incident:** 2006/06/18  
**Vehicle:** 2001 TOYOTA EC90  
**Location of Incident:** HUNTERVILLE, NC  
**NHTSA Summary:** BRAKE PEDAL AND THE ACCELERATOR PEDAL ARE TOO CLOSE AND CAUSE HERRATIC OPERATION WHEN APPLYING EITHER PEDAL. DEALER/MANUFACTURER WERE NOTIFIED. FEEL FREE TO PROVIDE ANY FURTHER DETAILS ON THIS MATTER "AK"  
**Additional Summary:**

**Toyota ID No:**  
**NHTSA CRD No:** 201661  
**Date of Incident:** 2006/06/22  
**Vehicle:** 2001 TOYOTA COROLLA  
**Location of Incident:** SEVIER, MD  
**NHTSA Summary:** WHILE BACKING OUT OF A PARKING SPACE CONSUMER NOTICED A NOISE, DEPRESSSED BRAKES AND NOISE GOT LOUDER. THEN VEHICLE ACCELERATED. CAUSING VEHICLE TO RUN INTO WALL "AK" CONSUMER STATES THAT THE ACCELERATOR THROU PLAGE WHILE HE WAS PUTTING INTO DRIVE FROM PARK. EVEN THOUGH BRAKE WAS PRESSSED VEHICLE CONTINUED TO MOVE. ABRARD DEPLOYED CAUSING THE ENGINEER TO BE DEAD. CONSUMER WAS SLIGHTLY BROOSED AND INJURED DUE TO DEPLOYMENT OF THE AIRBAG. "AK"  
**Additional Summary:**

**Toyota ID No:**  
**NHTSA CRD No:** 497610  
**Date of Incident:** 2007/07/10  
**Vehicle:** 2006 TOYOTA CAMRY  
**Location of Incident:** FORT WORTH, TX  
**NHTSA Summary:** CONSUMER WERE WASHING AND PULLED INTO A PARKING LOT, AND VEHICLE ACCELERATED INTO A CEMENT BARBER WORKING INTO A LUMP POST. SHE WAS TRAVELING AT APPROXIMATELY 30 TO 35 MPH, AND BOTH FRONTAL AIR BAGS FIRED TO DEPLOY. NO DETERMINATION HAS BEEN MADE AS TO WHY THE AIR BAGS FIRED TO  
**Additional Summary:**

*Safety Research & Strategies  
Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A*

10

FUNCTION. DRIVER EXPERIENCED VIBRATION, AND WAS ASKING FURTHER MEDICAL HELP FOR NECK PAIN "AK" "AK"  
**Additional Summary:**

**Toyota ID No:**  
**NHTSA CRD No:** 200711  
**Date of Incident:** 2006/07/13  
**Vehicle:** 2006 TOYOTA COROLLA  
**Location of Incident:** FREDERICK, CA  
**NHTSA Summary:** DRIVER WAS TRYING TO PARK THE CAR, THIS THE CAR WAS TRAVELLING AT VERY LOW SPEED. CAR WENT INTO A POCKET AFTER THE DRIVER APPLIED THE BRAKE. CAR WENT OVER THE CEMENT TIRE STOPPER, UP A SMALL HILL, HIT A WALL AND STOPPED. THIS CANNOT POSSIBLY HAVE BEEN CAUSED BY THE DRIVER HITTING THE ACCELERATOR PEDAL. THIS IS A SERIOUS SAFETY PROBLEM. WE WILL CONTACT THE DEALER AND THE MANUFACTURER ON JULY 14, 2006 "AK"  
**Additional Summary:**

**Toyota ID No:**  
**NHTSA CRD No:** 200711  
**Date of Incident:** 2006/08/01  
**Vehicle:** 2006 TOYOTA RAV4  
**Location of Incident:** PLACANT HILL, CA  
**NHTSA Summary:** ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, WITH THE CAR IN PARK AND THE ENGINE RUNNING, VEHICLE WOULD MAKE A HIGH CLANGING NOISE AND WOULD SPEED FORWARD WITH UNCONTROLLABLE ACCELERATION. VEHICLE RECEIVED BODY DAMAGE. DRIVER UNABLE TO LOCATE PROBLEM "AK"  
**Additional Summary:**

**Toyota ID No:**  
**NHTSA CRD No:** 489142  
**Date of Incident:** 2006/08/24  
**Vehicle:** 2006 TOYOTA RAV4  
**Location of Incident:** SPENDINGVILLE, CA  
**NHTSA Summary:** WHILE COMING TO COMPLETE STOP BY PRESSING AIR BRAKES, VEHICLE SUDDENLY ACCELERATED AND HIT A STOPPER. ALL. DEALER HAS BEEN CONTACTED PLEASE PROVIDE FURTHER DETAILS. CONSUMER HAS VAIN PHOTOGRAPH OF VEHICLE WALL AND CRASH, INCLUDING THE MARKS "AK"  
**Additional Summary:**

**Toyota ID No:**  
**NHTSA CRD No:** 751206  
**Date of Incident:** 2006/08/07  
**Vehicle:** 2006 TOYOTA RAV4  
**Location of Incident:** ELK GROVE VILLAGE, IL  
**NHTSA Summary:** VEHICLE EXPERIENCED INTERMITTENT RESISTANCE UPON ACCELERATION FROM STOP OR LOW SPEED. DRIVER HAD BEEN OCCURRED MORE MONTHS AFTER VEHICLE PURCHASE DATE, WITH INCREASED FREQUENCY DURING LAST 60-90 DAYS. RESISTANCE OCCURS  
**Additional Summary:**

*Safety Research & Strategies  
Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A*

11

NOTH WITH AIR CONDITIONING ON, OFF, AND WITH A SPEED AUTOMATIC TRANSMISSION OVERDRIVE ON AND OFF. 5.5 OCCURRED PER WEEK, ARE CURRENTLY EXPERIENCING MOST FREQUENT WHEN VEHICLE IS MAKING LEFT TURN BOTH RIGHT AND LEFT, AND LASTS 1-4 SECONDS EVEN IF ACCELERATOR IS NEARLY FULLY DEPRESSSED. RESISTANCE HAS ALSO OCCURRED WHEN MOVING FORWARD, AFTER FROM STOP OR FROM LOW SPEED (2-30 MPH) STOP AND GO TRAFFIC. DEALER HAS BEEN NOTIFIED AND COULD NOT REPLICATE PROBLEM. ON OTHER 4 SECTIONS, HOWEVER, VEHICLE WAS DRIVEN FOR ONLY A SHORT TIME BY DEALER'S SERVICE TECHNICIAN. DEALER INDICATES NO REPAIR CAN BE DONE AT THIS TIME. OF THIS DEALER REFUSE TO TOYOTA TRAIL AT THE CRUISE CONTROL OF OTHER 2001 RAV4 CONSIDER WHO HAVE REPORTED A SIMILAR PROBLEM TO THEIR DEALER AND HAVE NOT HAD THE PROBLEM RESOLVED. WHILE THIS PROBLEM IS INTERMITTENT, THIS IS A SOME WAY, WOULD TRUCK IT HAPPENED EVERY TIME BECAUSE THERE IS NO WAY TO PREVENT THE EVENT AND COMPENSATE FOR IT "AK"  
**Additional Summary:**

**Toyota ID No:**  
**NHTSA CRD No:** 1006038  
**Date of Incident:** 2006/09/17  
**Vehicle:** 2001 TOYOTA RAV4  
**Location of Incident:** MINNEAPOLIS, MN  
**NHTSA Summary:** BRAKES WERE APPLIED VEHICLE SUDDENLY ACCELERATED "AK" "AK"  
**Additional Summary:**

**Toyota ID No:**  
**NHTSA CRD No:** 496676  
**Date of Incident:** 2006/08/22  
**Vehicle:** 2006 LEXUS ES300  
**Location of Incident:** HUNTERDON, NY  
**NHTSA Summary:** VEHICLE EXPERIENCING PROBLEM WITH VIBRATION AND HESITATION WHEN APPLYING ACCELERATOR PEDAL. VEHICLE AT DEALER SHOP WAITING ON A COMPUTER REPAIR ALERT ON NATIONAL BACK ORDER. FEEL FREE TO PROVIDE ANY FURTHER INFORMATION CONCERNING THIS MATTER "AK"  
**Additional Summary:**

**Toyota ID No:**  
**NHTSA CRD No:** 1006032619  
**Date of Incident:** 2001/08/09  
**Vehicle:** 2006 TOYOTA LEXUS CAMRY, CAMRY SOLARA, ES300  
**Location of Incident:** FORT WORTH, TX  
**NHTSA Summary:**

\*\*\* FRONT LOG 05/27/2001 08:29:59 AM ESNAKT  
CUT OFF ENGINE 4 SECONDS WHEN THE ACCELERATOR AND ACCELERATOR AT LOW SPEEDS AND WHEN CLING DOWN HILL. CUT OFF TO KNOW IF ANY KNOWN CONSUMER HAVE BEEN REPORTED. CUT OFF VEHICLE HAS NOT BEEN NOTIFIED BY THE  
**Additional Summary:**

*Safety Research & Strategies  
Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A*

12



[illegible]





[illegible]



<p><b>Location of Incident:</b> Natick, MA <b>NHTSA ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CR# No:</b> <b>Date of Incident:</b> <b>Vehicle:</b> <b>Location of Incident:</b> <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> <b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CR# No:</b> <b>Date of Incident:</b> <b>Vehicle:</b> <b>Location of Incident:</b> <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> <b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CR# No:</b> <b>Date of Incident:</b> <b>Vehicle:</b> <b>Location of Incident:</b> <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> <b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CR# No:</b> <b>Date of Incident:</b> <b>Vehicle:</b> <b>Location of Incident:</b> <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> <b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CR# No:</b> <b>Date of Incident:</b> <b>Vehicle:</b> <b>Location of Incident:</b> <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> <b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CR# No:</b> <b>Date of Incident:</b> <b>Vehicle:</b> <b>Location of Incident:</b> <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> <b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CR# No:</b> <b>Date of Incident:</b> <b>Vehicle:</b> <b>Location of Incident:</b> <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> <b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CR# No:</b> <b>Date of Incident:</b> <b>Vehicle:</b> <b>Location of Incident:</b> <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> <b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CR# No:</b> <b>Date of Incident:</b> <b>Vehicle:</b> <b>Location of Incident:</b> <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> <b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CR# No:</b> <b>Date of Incident:</b> <b>Vehicle:</b> <b>Location of Incident:</b> <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> <b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b> <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i></p>	<p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b> <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i></p>
<p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b> <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i></p>	<p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b> <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i></p>





[illegible]

[illegible]















<p>1-800 CONTACT REPORT WITH MANY INTERIOR AND EXTERIOR PHOTO</p> <p>*** NOTES 070601 06:40:00 AM NY1 CASE DISPUTED TO MAJORS OFFICE</p> <p>*** NOTES 070601 06:43:00 AM NY1 CLOD TEST AT 06:43:00. CUST TEL HE CAN ALSO BE REACHED AT 708 328 94-59-6276.</p> <p>*** NOTES 070601 06:24:00 AM NY1 CUST STS HE RECEIVED A LETTER FROM CAMBRIDGE TRANSPORTATION SERVICES STATING THAT IN 04/24/01 HE WAS TOLD THEY KNOW WHETHER HE WILL BE GETTING REPRESENTATION IN INSPECTING THE VEHICLE INVOLVED IN THE ACCIDENT. ADV CUST THAT TOYOTA CTR CONTACTED INSPECTOR BY NAME PLACE BECAUSE HE SAYS THAT VEH ACCIDENTED ON ITS OWN W/O HIM HITTING THE GAS PEDAL.</p> <p>*** NOTES 070601 06:56:07 AM NY1 CALLED CAMBRIDGE TRANS SERVICES AND LEFT VMAIL FOR PATRICIA WICKOBER AT 800-442-5276 REQ A CTR FOR CLARIFICATION ON LETTER SENT TO CUSTOMER.</p> <p>*** NOTES 070601 12:14:00 PM NY1 CASE ASSIGNED TO PFS M MARIANNE.</p> <p>*** NOTES 071101 07:50:00 AM NY1 BOTH EMAIL AND LEFT VMAIL FOR MARIANNE REQ AN INSPECTION DATE ASAP.</p> <p>*** NOTES 071101 09:00:01 AM NY1 BOTH INQUEST FROM LEGAL DEPT. JOHN RODRIGUEZ. HE REQUESTS A COPY OF THE PFS FOR WHEN COMPLETED. LEFT V M AND FOR PFS M MARIANNE TO ADVISE WHEN THE VEHICLE WILL BE INSPECTED. ADV THAT A COPY OF THE REPORT IS BEING BY EMAIL.</p> <p>*** CASE CLOSE 080601 08:30:00 AM NY1 PFS M MARIANNE, UNEXPECTED VEHICLE ON 7/1/2005.</p> <p>*** NOTE 081001 0</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 2001A 0001 No:</p> <p><b>Model:</b> 0900092</p> <p><b>Year of Inclusion:</b> 2000/00</p> <p><b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY</p> <p><b>Location of Inclusion:</b> PORT LANDERDALE, FL</p> <p><b>Vehicle Summary:</b> WHILE TRAVELING THE VEHICLE SLOWLY FORWARDED, SUDDENLY ACCELERATED AND CRASHED INTO A FENCE. "AK"</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 01000001</p> <p><b>Model:</b> 0000000</p> <p><b>Year of Inclusion:</b> 2000/00</p> <p><b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 LEXUS RX300</p> <p><b>Location of Inclusion:</b> WALNUT, CA</p> <p><b>Vehicle Summary:</b> I AM LEAVING A 2001 LEXUS RX300 PRD WITH ABOUT 20,000 MILES ON IT. WHEN I TRY TO APPLY THE THROTTLE AFTER A LONG STOP, THERE IS A SUDDEN JERK, USUALLY FOLLOWED BY A SUDDEN SURGE IN POWER. AT TIMES THERE IS AN ADDITIONAL JERK, USUALLY WHILE THE TRANSMISSION IS SHIFTING WHAT GEAR IT SHOULD BE IN. THIS IS ESPECIALLY NOTICEABLE WHILE MAKING A TURN AT AN INTERSECTION, AND ESPECIALLY DANGEROUS IF THERE ARE PEDESTRIANS OR OTHER INTERACTION. I HAVE HAD IT TO THE LEAST DEALER 6-8000 LENSES AND THEY</p>	<p>REPROGRAMMED THE TRANSMISSION, WHICH PROVIDED A TEMPORARY AND PARTIAL FIX. AFTER A FEW WEEKS, APPARENTLY THE TRANSMISSION REPROGRAMMED ITSELF AND THE PROBLEM RETURNED. FROM THE CAR TO A SECOND DEALER AND HE SAID THAT THEY HAD MANY VMAIR COMPLAINTS ABOUT THAT PROBLEM, BUT THERE WAS NO FIX. I CALLED LEXUS CUSTOMER SERVICE AND THEY SAID THE SAME. THIS PROBLEM BEGAN SHORTLY AFTER I GOT THE CAR IN APRIL 2001 AND STILL EXISTS. IF THEY NEED A PUSH "AK"</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10000000</p> <p><b>Model:</b> 2001 TOYOTA HIGHLANDER</p> <p><b>Year of Inclusion:</b> 2000/00</p> <p><b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY</p> <p><b>Location of Inclusion:</b> WATSONVILLE, CA</p> <p><b>Vehicle Summary:</b> CONSUMER FEELS THAT THE LOCATION OF THE BRAKE GAS PEDAL ARE TOO CLOSE. THIS RESULTS IN ACCIDENTAL ACCELERATION WHILE REVERSING "AK"</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10000000</p> <p><b>Model:</b> 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY</p> <p><b>Year of Inclusion:</b> 2000/00</p> <p><b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY</p> <p><b>Location of Inclusion:</b> WATSONVILLE, CA</p> <p><b>Vehicle Summary:</b> 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY IS EQUIPPED WITH ELECTRONIC COMPUTER CONTROLLED THROTTLE. ELECTRONIC COMPUTER CONTROLLED TRANSMISSION, AND CRUISE CONTROL. AT VARIOUS TIMES THE CAR WILL EITHER HESITATE FOR 1-2 SECONDS WHEN ACCELERATING IN DANGER OR ALTERNATIVELY UNDER LIGHT THROTTLE IT WILL SHUT DOWN SEVERAL GEAR, THE ENGINE KNOCKING AND ACCELERATE. IN CRUISE CONTROL IT SOMETIMES SHUTS DOWN AND ACCELERATES ITSELF OVER THE REDLINE "AK"</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10000000</p> <p><b>Model:</b> 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY</p> <p><b>Year of Inclusion:</b> 2000/00</p> <p><b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY</p> <p><b>Location of Inclusion:</b> WATSONVILLE, CA</p> <p><b>Vehicle Summary:</b> WHILE TRAVELING ON THE HIGHWAY AND WITHOUT VEHICLE WARNING, THE VEHICLE SUDDENLY ACCELERATED. "AK" THE CONSUMER WAS ABLE TO REACT THE FORWARD LIGHTS WHEN THE SUN WAS EXTREMELY BRIGHT. "TS" "B"</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10000000</p> <p><b>Model:</b> 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY</p> <p><b>Year of Inclusion:</b> 2000/00</p> <p><b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY</p> <p><b>Location of Inclusion:</b> WATSONVILLE, CA</p> <p><b>Vehicle Summary:</b> WHILE TRAVELING ON THE HIGHWAY AND WITHOUT VEHICLE WARNING, THE VEHICLE SUDDENLY ACCELERATED. "AK" THE CONSUMER WAS ABLE TO REACT THE FORWARD LIGHTS WHEN THE SUN WAS EXTREMELY BRIGHT. "TS" "B"</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Vehicle Summary:</b> THREE TIMES CONSUMER WENT TO TOYOTA TO TELL THEM THAT SOMETHING WAS WRONG WITH HIS BRAKES. THE FIRST TIME, HIS 1997 CAMRY WAS BEING SERVICED AND 2001 CAMRY ROLLED AHEAD. THE BRAKES DID NOT WORK. THE SECOND TIME, HE WAS IN CONSUMER'S TOWN. DURING THE BRAKE TEST, HE FELT A SUDDEN JERK IN THE FRONT WHEN STOPPED FOR A LIGHT. 1997 CAMRY NEVER DID THAT. ALSO NO OTHER CAR I HAD NOT THAT THEY THROTTLED AND NO OTHER CAR I HAD NOT THAT THEY THROTTLED. CONSUMER TOLD THEM DO NOT TELL ME ANYTHING WAS WRONG WITH BRAKES, DO NOT WANT TO BRING IT. HE DROVE THE CAR AND HAD NOTHING AT ALL WRONG. STOP ON ONLY 1/2 MILE, WOULD PARKED AT MACY'S MALL AT CROSS COUNTY. I AM BACKING UP SLOWLY OUT OF MY SPACE, AND AS I GO, CONSUMER'S VEHICLE ROLLED AHEAD. HE WAS DRIVING AND HIT TWO PARKED CARS PARKING. ALL THE VEHICLES HAD DAMAGE. CONSUMER WILL NOT BE DRIVING THAT CAR AGAIN. COULD HAVE KILLED SOMEONE "AK"</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10000000</p> <p><b>Model:</b> 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY</p> <p><b>Year of Inclusion:</b> 2000/00</p> <p><b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY</p> <p><b>Location of Inclusion:</b> MCQUEEN, CA</p> <p><b>Vehicle Summary:</b> REAR PEDAL. I HAVE A 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY RE. ATTENDED WHEN I BLOW DOWN ALMOST TO A STOP AND THIS RE-ACCELERATE MY CAR ROLLS FORWARD RATHER THAN ACCELERATING IMMEDIATELY "AK"</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10000000</p> <p><b>Model:</b> 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY</p> <p><b>Year of Inclusion:</b> 2000/00</p> <p><b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 LEXUS RX300</p> <p><b>Location of Inclusion:</b> MCQUEEN, CA</p> <p><b>Vehicle Summary:</b> WHILE PARKING, CONSUMER DEPRESSING THE BRAKE PEDAL AND VEHICLE LURCHED FORWARD, HITTING A BUILDING. THE FRONT OF THE VEHICLE WAS DAMAGED. VEHICLE WAS TAKEN TO THE DEALER, WHO COULD NOT DETERMINE THE CAUSE OF THE PROBLEM. "AK"</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 01000001</p> <p><b>Model:</b> 0000000</p> <p><b>Year of Inclusion:</b> 2000/00</p> <p><b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY</p> <p><b>Location of Inclusion:</b> BAK, DEPT. CA</p> <p><b>Vehicle Summary:</b> A REAR VIEW MIRROR DROPPED DOWN, WHEN A SECTION RESPONDED TO AN ARTICLE REGARDING UNEXPECTED ACCELERATION FROM BLIND GEAR THROTTLES AND THE REAR VIEW MIRROR DROPPED DOWN. THE REAR VIEW MIRROR DROPPED DOWN. WHILE PARKING IN A PARKING LOT, PARKING SPACE THE CONSUMER'S VEHICLE ACCELERATED SUDDENLY AS HE WAS DRIVING. HE WAS IN A PARKING LOT. THE SUDDEN ACCELERATION PROBLEM HAPPENED AGAIN WHILE THE CONSUMER WAS PARKING. THAT WAS NOT ACCIDENTALLY COVERED. "AK" "AK"</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	<p><b>Vehicle Summary:</b> REPROGRAMMED THE TRANSMISSION, WHICH PROVIDED A TEMPORARY AND PARTIAL FIX. AFTER A FEW WEEKS, APPARENTLY THE TRANSMISSION REPROGRAMMED ITSELF AND THE PROBLEM RETURNED. FROM THE CAR TO A SECOND DEALER AND HE SAID THAT THEY HAD MANY VMAIR COMPLAINTS ABOUT THAT PROBLEM, BUT THERE WAS NO FIX. I CALLED LEXUS CUSTOMER SERVICE AND THEY SAID THE SAME. THIS PROBLEM BEGAN SHORTLY AFTER I GOT THE CAR IN APRIL 2001 AND STILL EXISTS. IF THEY NEED A PUSH "AK"</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10000000</p> <p><b>Model:</b> 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY</p> <p><b>Year of Inclusion:</b> 2000/00</p> <p><b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY</p> <p><b>Location of Inclusion:</b> WATSONVILLE, CA</p> <p><b>Vehicle Summary:</b> CONSUMER FEELS THAT THE LOCATION OF THE BRAKE GAS PEDAL ARE TOO CLOSE. THIS RESULTS IN ACCIDENTAL ACCELERATION WHILE REVERSING "AK"</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10000000</p> <p><b>Model:</b> 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY</p> <p><b>Year of Inclusion:</b> 2000/00</p> <p><b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY</p> <p><b>Location of Inclusion:</b> WATSONVILLE, CA</p> <p><b>Vehicle Summary:</b> 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY IS EQUIPPED WITH ELECTRONIC COMPUTER CONTROLLED THROTTLE. ELECTRONIC COMPUTER CONTROLLED TRANSMISSION, AND CRUISE CONTROL. AT VARIOUS TIMES THE CAR WILL EITHER HESITATE FOR 1-2 SECONDS WHEN ACCELERATING IN DANGER OR ALTERNATIVELY UNDER LIGHT THROTTLE IT WILL SHUT DOWN SEVERAL GEAR, THE ENGINE KNOCKING AND ACCELERATE. IN CRUISE CONTROL IT SOMETIMES SHUTS DOWN AND ACCELERATES ITSELF OVER THE REDLINE "AK"</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10000000</p> <p><b>Model:</b> 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY</p> <p><b>Year of Inclusion:</b> 2000/00</p> <p><b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY</p> <p><b>Location of Inclusion:</b> WATSONVILLE, CA</p> <p><b>Vehicle Summary:</b> WHILE TRAVELING ON THE HIGHWAY AND WITHOUT VEHICLE WARNING, THE VEHICLE SUDDENLY ACCELERATED. "AK" THE CONSUMER WAS ABLE TO REACT THE FORWARD LIGHTS WHEN THE SUN WAS EXTREMELY BRIGHT. "TS" "B"</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10000000</p> <p><b>Model:</b> 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY</p> <p><b>Year of Inclusion:</b> 2000/00</p> <p><b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY</p> <p><b>Location of Inclusion:</b> WATSONVILLE, CA</p> <p><b>Vehicle Summary:</b> WHILE TRAVELING ON THE HIGHWAY AND WITHOUT VEHICLE WARNING, THE VEHICLE SUDDENLY ACCELERATED. "AK" THE CONSUMER WAS ABLE TO REACT THE FORWARD LIGHTS WHEN THE SUN WAS EXTREMELY BRIGHT. "TS" "B"</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>



[illegible]

[illegible]





[illegible]



<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA ODI No: 10984478 Date of Incident: 20080106 Vehicle: 2003 TOYOTA CAMRY Location of Incident: MASSACHUSETTS NHTSA Summary: WHILE IN A PARKING LOT AND BACKING OUT OF A PARKING SPACE VEHICLE ACCELERATED HITTING A PEDESTRIAN. *AK Additional Summary:</p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA ODI No: 10106912 Date of Incident: 20080118 Vehicle: 2008 TOYOTA CAMRY Location of Incident: OCEAN, NH NHTSA Summary: 1999S A 2008 CAMRY SE WITH THE 4.4 LITER V6 EVER SINCE WE PURCHASED THIS CAR WE HAVE PUT IT WITH A DOUBLED DRIVE SHAFT IN THE VEHICLE. MANY TIMES WE HAVE HEARD VIBRATION IN OTHER CARS WHILE PULLING INTO THE FLOW OF TRAFFIC. HEAVY TAKING IT TO THE DEALER AND SPEAKING WITH THE MANAGER AS WELL AS MET WITH THE REGIONAL TOYOTA REP. THEY BOTH ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE IS AN ISSUE BUT OFFERED NO RESOLUTION. *NM Additional Summary:</p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA ODI No: 10962873 Date of Incident: 20080131 Vehicle: 2003 LEXUS ES300 Location of Incident: PHILADELPHIA, PA NHTSA Summary: WHILE DRIVING AT 11 MPH VEHICLE EXPERIENCED UNWANTED SUDDEN ACCELERATION WHEN THROTTLE COVERS CONSUMER IMMEDIATELY DECREASED THE BRAKE PEDAL AND PUT VEHICLE IN NEUTRAL TO STOP THE ACCELERATION. *AK Additional Summary:</p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA ODI No: 10104704 Date of Incident: 20080131 Vehicle: 2004 TOYOTA CAMRY Location of Incident: BRACKLEY, NY NHTSA Summary: THIS VEHICLE TENDS TO HESITATE AND NOT ACCELERATE WHILE PRESSING DOWN ON THE ACCELERATOR PEDAL WHILE ON THE ROAD. OWNER WILL CONTACT MANUFACTURER. *N Additional Summary:</p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA ODI No: 10174117 Safety Research &amp; Strategies Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</p>	<p><b>Date of Incident:</b> Vehicle: 20080114 2003 TOYOTA CAMRY Location of Incident: POWDER BROOK, IL NHTSA Summary: 2003 CAMRY ACCELERATED OUT OF CONTROL CAUSING CONSUMER TO CRASH INTO A WALL. CUST. THE CONSUMER WANTED TO KNOW IF ANY ACTION WILL BE TAKEN REGARDING THEIR COMPLAINT. *N Additional Summary:</p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA ODI No: 10053375 Date of Incident: 20070120 Vehicle: 2002 TOYOTA CAMRY Location of Incident: VIRADIA, CA NHTSA Summary: IN NOVEMBER 2007 VEHICLE EXPERIENCED SUDDEN ACCELERATION TWO MONTHS LATER, ONCE AGAIN WHILE DRIVING. VEHICLE EXPERIENCED SUDDEN ACCELERATION. DEALER INDICATED BOTH TIMES THAT NOTHING WAS WRONG WITH THE VEHICLE. *AK Additional Summary:</p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA ODI No: 10084899 Date of Incident: 20080122 Vehicle: 2002 TOYOTA CAMRY Location of Incident: CARMARCA, CA NHTSA Summary: NEIGHBORHOOD OF MY PARENTS VEHICLE (A 2002 TOYOTA CAMRY) COMING TO A STOP AND THEN SUDDENLY ACCELERATE. *AK Additional Summary:</p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA ODI No: 10080870 Date of Incident: 20080122 Vehicle: 2003 TOYOTA COROLLA Location of Incident: TEANECK, NJ NHTSA Summary: AT 2003 TOYOTA COROLLA EXPERIENCED A SUDDEN ACCELERATION PROBLEM TWICE. THE LOCAL TOYOTA DEALER AND TOYOTA TRIP TECHNICAL SPECIALIST REFUSED TO RELIEVE THE CAR WOULD HAVE ACCELERATED BY THEMSELVES. I HAD PRESSED THE ACCELERATOR, SO WHAT? THEY SAID IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE CAR TO HAVE PULSED BY ITSELF. ACCELERATE. THEY WERE UNABLE TO PREVENT ANY PROBLEMS. THIS IS A VERY DANGEROUS SITUATION. I WAS LUCKY NOBODY WAS HIT OR KILLED. Additional Summary:</p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA ODI No: 10120808 Date of Incident: 20080123 Vehicle: 2002 TOYOTA CAMRY Location of Incident: DAYTON, TN NHTSA Summary: Safety Research &amp; Strategies Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</p>	505	106
<p>IT. THE CONSUMER'S VEHICLE ACCELERATED SUDDENLY AND RESULTED IN AN ACCIDENT ON JAN 18, 04 WHICH TOTALLED THE VEHICLE. THE FIRST TIME THE GAS PEDAL BECAME STUCK WAS NOT. ON THAT DATE THE PROBLEM WAS REPORTED AND THE CONSUMER WAS CHARGED FOR THE REPAIRS. THIS PROBLEM IS UNDER INVESTIGATION WITH NHTSA. *NM Additional Summary:</p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA ODI No: 10056600 Date of Incident: 20080128 Vehicle: 2003 TOYOTA CAMRY Location of Incident: WILKESVILLE, IL NHTSA Summary: WHILE DRIVING CONSUMER APPLIED THE BRAKES AND VEHICLE'S SUDDENLY ACCELERATED. CONSUMER WAS UNABLE TO MAINTAIN CONTROL OF THE VEHICLE AND IT HIT ANOTHER VEHICLE HEAD-ON. UPON IMPACT BOTH VEHICLES DID NOT DEPART. CONSUMER HAD VEHICLE TOWED TO REPAIR SHOP, BUT MECHANIC WAS NOT ABLE TO REPLICATE THE PROBLEM. *AK Additional Summary:</p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA ODI No: 10208044 Date of Incident: 20080128 Vehicle: 2004 TOYOTA CAMRY Location of Incident: BEA CREEK, NJ NHTSA Summary: 123000 P.M. PULLING HEAD-ON, AT A LOW RATE OF SPEED, ALMOST A CRAWL, INTO A PARKING SPACE IN FRONT OF A BUSINESS AND THE CAR "BUMPED" OR SURGED FORWARD. MY FOOT WAS OFF THE BRAKE AND THE ACCELERATOR WHEN THIS OCCURRED. THE CAR HIT THE BUILDING. 8:10 P.M. I WAS PULLING HEAD-ON INTO A PARKING SPACE IN A PARKING LOT, AT A LOW RATE OF SPEED, WHEN THE CAR "BUMPED" OR SURGED FORWARD. THE CAR HIT A TREE IN FRONT OF ME. *N Additional Summary:</p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA ODI No: 10064550 Date of Incident: 20080129 Vehicle: 2003 TOYOTA CAMRY Location of Incident: ROBINSON PARK, CA NHTSA Summary: VEHICLE SUDDENLY ACCELERATED AND BRAKE DID NOT RESPOND WHEN PRESSED. (CUST) *N *CB Additional Summary:</p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA ODI No: 10077339 Date of Incident: 20080131 Vehicle: 2002 TOYOTA TACOMA Location of Incident: GILBERT, CA NHTSA Summary: Safety Research &amp; Strategies Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</p>	<p>AS SOON AS THE CONSUMER STARTED THE VEHICLE THE RPM RANGED EXTREMELY HIGH AND THE VEHICLE LUNGED FORWARD. THE VEHICLE WAS TAKEN TO THE DEALER WHO REPAIRED THE THROTTLE ACTUATOR CONTROL. WITHIN THREE DAYS IN AS MANY DAYS THE MANUFACTURER WILL BE INFORMED OF THE PROBLEM. *NM Additional Summary:</p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA ODI No: 2008012855 Date of Incident: 20080209 Vehicle: 2002 TOYOTA LEXUS ES300 Location of Incident: ROCKY HILL, MD NHTSA Summary: *** PHONE LOG 01/12/2008 08:46:59 AM ACAPPELLA REFER TO CASE#2008112021. CUST. STS. SHE'S CURRENTLY DRIVING AN OLDSMOBILE. CUST. STS. SHE'S RESPONSIBLE FOR PETITION THAT INITIATED THE NHTSA CAMPAIGN FOR THE ES300. CUST. STS. SHE WROTE A LETTER TO CONSUMERS AND INFORMED HER THAT MORE INFORMATION TO THE ACCIDENT AND CUST. RECEIVED AN ORAMATICALLY INCORRECT RESPONSE FROM CUN THAT WAS INSULTING AND DID NOT ADDRESS HER INQUIRY. CUST. STS. SHE HAD DOCUMENTATION TO PROVE IT WHEN CUST. OF RENTAL VEHICLES CHARGED FOR THE ACCIDENT. *** NOTER BY TOWNSHIP BE THAT AN ACAPPELLA CUST. STS. SHE DID NOT ADDRESS CONCERNS W/ CUST. AND ONLY MENTIONED VEH. INSPECTION. CUST. STS. SHE HAD INTERVIEWED ADDITIONAL VEH. CHARGES, TOWING FEES, LOSS OF WAGES, AND AN INSURANCE REDUCIBLE. CUST. STS. SHE IS ENTITLED TO REPAIR FOR THESE COSTS AND WILL FILE DOCUMENTATION TO PROVE IT. CUST. STS. SHE ALSO BELIEVES SHE SHOULD BE COMPENSATED BY LEXUS FOR PUTTING DAMAGE AND WOULD LIKE HER VEH. TO BE REPAIRED. *** NOTER 01/12/2008 08:46:59 AM ACAPPELLA CUST. STS. SHE TOLD HER TO CALL US 228-BUT HER EXPERIENCED AN EPISODE OF SUBSIDING IN THE VEH. CUST. STS. SHE HAD BEEN CONTACTED BY LOCAL JOURNALIST AND TELL LEXUS SHOULD RECONSIDER HER CONCERNS AND TAKE ACTION. CUST. WILL FILE DOCUMENTATION AND REQUEST REPAIRS. RECALL TO THE THREE CONCERNS. *** CAMRY 01/12/2008 08:27:21 PM APPL. ACTION TYPE: CUSTOMER *** COMMENT 01/10/2008 10:16:06 AM APPL. ACTION TYPE: CUSTOMER Additional Summary:</p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA ODI No: 2008021801 Date of Incident: 20080220 Vehicle: 2002 TOYOTA LEXUS CAMRY, CAMRY SOLARA, ES300 Location of Incident: PITTSBURGH, PA NHTSA Summary: *** PHONE LOG 02/18/2008 01:40:47 PM AMERICAN CUST. STS. SHE TOLD HER TO CALL US 1/28/08 FOR THE RECOMMENDATION. CUST. STS. THAT WHEN SHE GOES TO PRESS THE VEH. WILL STOP IMMEDIATELY. CUST. ALSO FEELS THAT SOMETHING WAS ACCIDENTALYING THE VEH. WILL TAKE OFF. CUST. FEELS THAT THIS IS VERY DANGEROUS AND WANTS TO KNOW WHAT TO DO ABOUT CUST. WANTS TO TAKE TO BACK TO DEAL. *** CAR CLONE 02/19/2008 10:06:47 PM AMERICAN ADV. CUST. TO TAKE TO DEAL FOR INSPECTION &amp; ASSESS. ANY WELL DOCUMENT CONCERNS &amp; TO CALL BACK IF NECESSARY. CUST. SATIS. 30 FIVE OTHER ASSIST REQ. Additional Summary:</p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA ODI No: 20080101556 Date of Incident: 20080201 Safety Research &amp; Strategies Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</p>	107	108



<p>THERE HAVE BEEN A NUMBER OF INCIDENTS OF POSSIBLE UNEXPECTED ACCELERATION OF MY 2001 CAMRY, WHERE CAR SEEMS TO SURGE FORWARD WITHOUT ME DOING ANYTHING *AK</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA ID# No:</b> 15043005 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2004/11/1 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> DOWNSIDE GROVE, IL</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b> THE CONSUMER EXPERIENCED SUDDEN ACCELERATION FOR ALMOST A MILE WHEN INTO A PARKING SPACE. THE VEHICLE HIT A CONCRETE WALL. THE PARKER ALSO OCCURRED WHILE TURNING RIGHT ONTO A MAIN STREET. *AK. THE AGE USE OCCURRED ON ANOTHER OCCASION BUT THERE WAS NO COLLISION AS THE CONSUMER ATTEMPTED TO ACCELERATE TO MOVE IN FRONT ANOTHER VEHICLE AT A RED LIGHT. THE VEHICLE ATTEMPTED TO ACCELERATE BY ITSELF. THE CONSUMER IMMEDIATELY RELEASED TO STOP THE VEHICLE. *AK *OB</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA ID# No:</b> 10074174 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2004/01/1 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 TOYOTA PRIUS <b>Location of Incident:</b> SAN JOSE, CA</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b> THE 2001 TOYOTA PRIUS HAS A VACUITY ACCELERATOR PEDAL AND SHOULD BE COVERED UNDER THE 5-YEAR HYBRID SYSTEM WARRANTY. NOT ONLY ARE THERE SAFETY ISSUES WITH THIS PROBLEM (E.G. RUTING LOSS OF ACCELERATION THAT COULD CAUSE ACCIDENTS, INTERACT COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE ACCELERATOR AND THE HYBRID SYSTEM, ETC.) BUT THERE IS A LACK ON TOYOTA'S PART TO ADMIT THAT THE ACCELERATOR IS A CRITICAL COMPONENT OF THE HYBRID SYSTEM WHEN THE ACCELERATOR DOES IT CAUSES THE "VACUITY" HYBRID SYSTEM LIGHT TO APPEAR ON THE DASHBOARD AND CAN MAKE THE CAR DANGEROUSLY UNRESPONSIVE (ESPECIALLY ON THE FREEWAY). THE HYBRID SYSTEM IS SUPPLYING INFORMATION FROM THE ACCELERATOR, AND WITHOUT SUFFICIENT IT, ITTERS THE CAR DRIVING. ON THE ELECTRIC ENGINE, ON BOTH ENGINES FAIL TO OPERATE. EVAN THOUGH TWO TOYOTA DEALERS HAVE BEEN TOYOTA OF A MEET AND THAT A INDEPENDENT ELECTRIC ENGINEER ANALYZED THE PART AND CONCLUDED THAT THE ACCELERATOR HAD AN ISSUE OF CARBURETOR. HE CONCLUDED THAT THE PRIUS OWNER WOULD BE DEFECTIVE TO THE SAME MAGAZINE PROBLEM SEVERAL TIMES DURING THE LIFETIME OF THE CAR. I HAVE INFORMATIONAL EVIDENCE FROM OTHER PRIUS OWNERS WHO ARE EXPERIENCING THE SAME PROBLEMS AND WOULD BE HAPPY TO SHARE THIS INFORMATION WITH YOUR INVESTIGATION TEAM. IN MY OPINION, THESE PROBLEMS ARE SERIOUS ENOUGH TO MERIT CONSIDERATION FOR EITHER A RECALL OR A LENSION OF TOYOTA'S "POWER WINDOW" WARRANTY POLICY. I APPRECIATE ANY</p> <p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b> <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i> 113</p>	<p>ANNOUNCE YOU CAN PROVIDE ME IN THIS MATTER AND HOPE THAT TOGETHER WE CAN PREVENT NEEDLESS DEATHS FROM THIS UNSAFE ACCELERATION. *AK</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA ID# No:</b> 10001779 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2004/01/1 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 TOYOTA ANALOG <b>Location of Incident:</b> DEERFIELD, IL</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b> 2001 TOYOTA ANALOG SURGE FORWARD WITH THE ACCELERATOR STUCK IN THE DEPRIVED POSITION RESULTING IN A COLLISION WITH THREE PARKED CARS IN A DEPT. MALL PARKING LOT. THANKS TO A SNOWBANK AND THE IMPACT OF HITTING THE THREE CARS THE VEHICLE CAME TO A STOP WITHOUT DAMAGING THE PRIUS OR ANYONE ELSE. THE AIR BAGS ALAID NOT DEPLOY *AK *OB</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA ID# No:</b> 10040804 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2004/01/1 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 LEXUS GS400 <b>Location of Incident:</b> SACRAMENTO, CA</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b> UNEXPECTED ACCELERATION. ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, PRIMARILY WHILE STOPPED AT A RED LIGHT, MY VEHICLE WOULD Lunge FORWARD. I LOCK IT TO THE GEAR OR AND WAS TOLD THEY HAD NO RECORD OF A PROBLEM OF THIS NATURE FOR THIS VEHICLE. THEY COULD NOT FIND ANYTHING WRONG. I SAW A ARTICLE ON THE INTERNET THAT THE NHTSA WAS INVESTIGATING SIMILAR PROBLEMS WITH OTHER TOYOTA PRODUCTS. *AK</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA ID# No:</b> 10002158 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2004/01/1 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY SOLARA <b>Location of Incident:</b> HOUSTON, TX</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b> I'M VERY CONCERNED ABOUT MY 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY SOLARA VIN#3C220220242 SINCE I NOTICED ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS IT HAD BEEN THE MOST RECENT ONE OF SOMETHING THAT CAUSE SUDDEN ACCELERATION EVEN WHEN IT WAS IN SOMETHING DIFFERENT IN THE SPEEDOMETER. THANK YOU. RESPECTFULLY, LESTER GARCIA. *OB</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA ID# No:</b> 10000817 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2004/01/1 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 LEXUS ES300 <b>Location of Incident:</b> PHOENIX, ARIZONA, AZ</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b> ON A PARKING LOT, VEHICLE'S SUDDENLY ACCELERATED FORWARD. WHEN THIS OCCURRED, VEHICLE RUMBLER THE CABINET WHEEL BLOCK, AND WENT</p> <p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b> <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i> 114</p>
<p>THROUGH A COMPLEX BEFORE STOPPING. CONSUMER HAD TO APPLY EXCESSIVE FORCE TO THE BRAKE PEDAL TO STOP VEHICLE. *AK. VEHICLE WAS INSPECTED BY THE DEALER, AND FOUND NOTHING WRONG WITH THE VEHICLE. *LA</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA ID# No:</b> 10061141 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2004/01/1 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2000 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> PARKERSBURG, WV</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b> AT 14 MILES PER HOUR IN A PARKING LOT, MY 2000 TOYOTA CAMRY 2004 HONKED FORWARD AT A RED LIGHT. I AND MY 4 YEAR OLD SON WERE IN THE VEHICLE. MY SON: SPANDED HIS AND CRUSHED TO CHEST AND ANKLE. *AK</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA ID# No:</b> 10077974 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2004/01/1 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 LEXUS ES300 <b>Location of Incident:</b> FORT LAUDERDALE, FL</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b> WHEN THE CONSUMER LIFTED FOOT OF THE BRAKE PEDAL, VEHICLE SUDDENLY ACCELERATED, AND HIT A WOMAN WHO WAS STANDING IN THE FRONT OF THE CONSUMER'S VEHICLE. THE WOMAN FRACTURED HER ANKLE AND ARM. *AK</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA ID# No:</b> 10061708 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2004/01/1 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 TOYOTA HIGHLANDER <b>Location of Incident:</b> WATERTOWN, WI</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b> SUDDEN ACCELERATION WHILE BRAKE WAS DEPRIVED. VEHICLE WENT AT A TWO FOOT LAMBDA AND THEN A GRAY LINE. VEHICLE WAS STOPPED BY PLACING FOOT PARK. THIS ALL HAPPEND WHEN BRAKE WAS DEPRIVED FULLY.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA ID# No:</b> 10042009 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2004/01/1 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> EVING, IL</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b> NEW TOYOTA CAMRY 4-DOOR HIGHLANDER 2004. ON FEBRUARY 15TH KEY WOULD NOT TURN (TWO, 10-15 MINUTES TO REACT IT). LATER WHILE DRIVING, THE CAR THE STEERING WHEEL TURNING THE CAR TO THE RIGHT. THE CAR ACCELERATED AND SURGED FORWARD REPRESENTING THE BRAKE SAME AS (OFF ROAD). *THOUGH THE CAR BROKE A METAL PLATE AND DAMAGED A BRICK WALL AND HILL WENT INTO A MAJOR STREET. THE AIR BAGS DID NOT DEPLOY. *CAR IS SEVERELY DAMAGED.</p> <p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b> <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i> 115</p>	<p>WHEEL, THEN FRONT END, GAS TANK, FRONT AXLE. *DEATH OF A WOMAN AND BOTH KNEE ALONG WITH BLOODSTAIN BOTH TISSUE INJURIES INCLUDING BACK PAIN. *OB</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA ID# No:</b> 10060415 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2004/01/1 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 LEXUS GS400 <b>Location of Incident:</b> NORTONVILLE, KY</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b> WILEY MARRASIA PENDING FROM A STOP THE VEHICLE SUDDENLY ACCELERATED. THE CONSUMER APPLIED THE BRAKE BUT THE VEHICLE HAD EXTENDED STOPPING DISTANCE. THE DEALER REPAIR WORKER BUT DID NOT RESOLVE THE PROBLEM. PLEASE PROVIDE MORE INFORMATION. *NM</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA ID# No:</b> 10000016 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2004/01/1 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 LEXUS ES300 <b>Location of Incident:</b> DARIEN, IL</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b> ON THREE SEPARATE OCCASIONS WITHIN FOUR THREE MONTHS OF INCIDENT DATE, WHEN TAPPING ACCELERATOR VS THE DISORDERLY OPERATION OF A SECOND, AND THIS RELAXING, CARB THROTTLE REMAINED COMPLETELY OPEN (MAYBE IN REMAINS) EVEN WITH FOOT OFF OF THE ACCELERATOR PEDAL. CARB THROTTLE SYSTEM EQUIPPED WITH "THROTTLE" OR A WIRELESS COMPUTER CONTROLLED THROTTLE. ON FOUR TWO OCCASIONS, VEHICLE'S THROTTLE HAD TO BE SHUT OFF BY MANIPULATING FROM THROTTLE WHEEL DROPPING IN THE MIDDLE OF THE STREET. ON TWO OCCASIONS, BUT TO PLACING TO AVOID OBSTACLES (OFF-ON) HAVING TIME TO SHUT FOUR OFF CAR SPEEDS, EGGS AND YETTED OFF INTO LAKE. CAR TOTALLED. *OB</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA ID# No:</b> 10001111 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2004/01/1 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> WESTFALL, IL</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b> WHILE PARKING IN A PARKING SPACE THE DRIVER PRESSED THE BRAKE PEDAL AND THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED. THE VEHICLE CRASHED INTO A STORE WINDOW. VEHICLE WAS DAMAGED IN THE REAR. *AK *OB. THE CONSUMER CONTACTED THE MANUFACTURER WHO REPLIED BY SAYING THAT THE INCIDENT WAS NOT THE RESULT OF ANY TYPE OF MANUFACTURER DESIGN OR DEFECT. THE MANUFACTURER WANTS TO CLOSE THE CASE. *NM</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA ID# No:</b> 100002100629 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2004/01/1</p> <p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b> <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i> 116</p>



<p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Taxista ID No:</b> 20601012131  <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b>  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2007/07/04  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2007 TOYOTA LEXUS CAMRY, CAMRY SOLARA, ES300  <b>Location of Incident:</b> 1711 LENOVA, AZ</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>  <b>** PERSON LOCUS 02/2004 02:57:59 PM AHEAD ON</b>          CUSTOMER IS HEARING CONCERN WITH VAN ENGINE NOISE. CUSTOMER WAS HEARING NOISE WHEN BRAKING, WHEN GETTING TOO CLOSE TO VEH, WHEN REMOVING FOOT FROM ACCELERATOR TO BRAKE, VAN BEING FORWARD. CUSTOMER HAS NOTICED THIS WHEN DRIVING ON THE FREEWAY. CUSTOMER SHE HEARD ABOUT CONCERN ON THE NEWS.  <b>** NOTER 02/2004 02:57:59 PM AHEAD ON</b>          NCR ADV CUSTOMER THAT TOYO IS JUST STARTING INVESTIGATION ALONG WITH NHTSA. NCR ADV CUSTOMER OF THE OPEN IS THAT THE VAN HAD SOME VAN NOISE. CUSTOMER IS HEARING CONCERN WITH VEH. ADV THERE IS NO INC. AT THIS TIME. TOO EARLY TO COMMENT ON CONCERN AND WHAT IS GOING TO BE DONE.</p> <p><b>** CASE CLOSE 02/2004 02:12:40 PM FILED 02/01</b>          MR. FRAZER SAID SHE WOULD COME IN ON THE MORNING OF THE 14TH. BOTH THE CUSTOMER AND HER HUSBY FOREMAN WILL GO FOR A TEST DRIVE, REGARDING THE DRIVING WITH EXPLANATION ON REMOVING FOOT FROM THE ACCELERATOR AND MOVING IT TO THE BRAKE PEDAL.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Taxista ID No:</b> 20601010425  <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b>  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2006/03/00  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2002 TOYOTA LEXUS CAMRY, CAMRY SOLARA, ES300  <b>Location of Incident:</b> SACRAMENTO, CA</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>  <b>** PERSON LOCUS 02/2004 09:42:02 AM CDM479</b>          CUSTOMER WHILE DRIVING WHEN HE APPROACHED A SLOWED DOWN VEH BEHIND. CUSTOMER FEELS ACCELERATION WAS NOT TUNED. CUSTOMER WAS SLOWING DOWN. THE TYPIC OFF A. ALMOST THE VEH IN FRONT. CUSTOMER CALLED DSA WHO ADV TO BRUSH THE OFF FOR INSPECTION.</p> <p><b>** CASE CLOSE 02/2004 05:42:10 AM CDM479</b>          NCR ADV CUSTOMER THAT THE VEH IN FRONT. CUSTOMER CALLED DSA WHO ADV TO TAKE TO DSA FOR INSPECTION. CUSTOMER ADV. NCR OFFERED CAR. CUSTOMER DISCONTINUED.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Taxista ID No:</b> 20601010955  <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b>  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2006/03/00  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2002 TOYOTA LEXUS CAMRY, CAMRY SOLARA, ES300  <b>Location of Incident:</b> FERRY DELL, MD  <b>NHTSA Summary:</b>  <b>** PERSON LOCUS 02/2004 01:27:00 PM PDMERLAK</b>          CUSTOMER LOCUS 02/2004 01:27:00 PM PDMERLAK</p>	<p><b>** PERSON LOCUS 02/2004 02:57:59 PM AHEAD ON</b>          CUSTOMER IS HEARING CONCERN WITH VAN ENGINE NOISE. CUSTOMER WAS HEARING NOISE WHEN BRAKING, WHEN GETTING TOO CLOSE TO VEH, WHEN REMOVING FOOT FROM ACCELERATOR TO BRAKE, VAN BEING FORWARD. CUSTOMER HAS NOTICED THIS WHEN DRIVING ON THE FREEWAY. CUSTOMER SHE HEARD ABOUT CONCERN ON THE NEWS.  <b>** NOTER 02/2004 02:57:59 PM AHEAD ON</b>          NCR ADV CUSTOMER THAT TOYO IS JUST STARTING INVESTIGATION ALONG WITH NHTSA. NCR ADV CUSTOMER OF THE OPEN IS THAT THE VAN HAD SOME VAN NOISE. CUSTOMER IS HEARING CONCERN WITH VEH. ADV THERE IS NO INC. AT THIS TIME. TOO EARLY TO COMMENT ON CONCERN AND WHAT IS GOING TO BE DONE.</p> <p><b>** CASE CLOSE 02/2004 02:12:40 PM FILED 02/01</b>          MR. FRAZER SAID SHE WOULD COME IN ON THE MORNING OF THE 14TH. BOTH THE CUSTOMER AND HER HUSBY FOREMAN WILL GO FOR A TEST DRIVE, REGARDING THE DRIVING WITH EXPLANATION ON REMOVING FOOT FROM THE ACCELERATOR AND MOVING IT TO THE BRAKE PEDAL.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Taxista ID No:</b> 20601010425  <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b>  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2006/03/00  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2002 TOYOTA LEXUS CAMRY, CAMRY SOLARA, ES300  <b>Location of Incident:</b> SACRAMENTO, CA</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>  <b>** PERSON LOCUS 02/2004 09:42:02 AM CDM479</b>          CUSTOMER WHILE DRIVING WHEN HE APPROACHED A SLOWED DOWN VEH BEHIND. CUSTOMER FEELS ACCELERATION WAS NOT TUNED. CUSTOMER WAS SLOWING DOWN. THE TYPIC OFF A. ALMOST THE VEH IN FRONT. CUSTOMER CALLED DSA WHO ADV TO BRUSH THE OFF FOR INSPECTION.</p> <p><b>** CASE CLOSE 02/2004 05:42:10 AM CDM479</b>          NCR ADV CUSTOMER THAT THE VEH IN FRONT. CUSTOMER CALLED DSA WHO ADV TO TAKE TO DSA FOR INSPECTION. CUSTOMER ADV. NCR OFFERED CAR. CUSTOMER DISCONTINUED.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Taxista ID No:</b> 20601010955  <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b>  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2006/03/00  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2002 TOYOTA LEXUS CAMRY, CAMRY SOLARA, ES300  <b>Location of Incident:</b> FERRY DELL, MD  <b>NHTSA Summary:</b>  <b>** PERSON LOCUS 02/2004 01:27:00 PM PDMERLAK</b>          CUSTOMER LOCUS 02/2004 01:27:00 PM PDMERLAK</p>
<p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b>  <b>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</b></p> <p><b>Location of Incident:</b> MORGENTHAU, NJ  <b>NHTSA Summary:</b>          MY CAR SUDDENLY ACCELERATED WHEN I PRESSED THE BRAKES GOING DOWN AN HILL IN A HILL.  <b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Taxista ID No:</b> 100610101  <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b>  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2006/03/00  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2002 TOYOTA CAMRY SOLARA  <b>Location of Incident:</b> LOMBARD, IL</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>          WHILE PULLING INTO A PARKING LOT, VEHICLE SUDDENLY ACCELERATED, AND IT LANDED ON THE ROAD OR ANOTHER VEHICLE. THERE WERE NO INJURIES. A CUSTOMER ALSO STATED THAT APPLYING THE BRAKES DIDN'T HELP STOP THE VEHICLE.          *A.  <b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Taxista ID No:</b> 100610101  <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b>  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2006/03/00  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2002 TOYOTA CAMRY  <b>Location of Incident:</b> CLARK, IL</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>          WHEN APPLYING THE BRAKE PEDAL, IT WOULD PROCEED TO THE FLOOR AND CONTINUED TO ACCELERATE. *A. THE VEHICLE ROLLED FORWARD AND CRASHED INTO A BUILDING. *A. THE CUSTOMER STATED THE BRAKES WERE SET. *B.  <b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Taxista ID No:</b> 100610101  <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b>  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2006/03/00  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2002 TOYOTA CAMRY  <b>Location of Incident:</b> CLARK, IL</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>          WHEN APPLYING THE BRAKE PEDAL, IT WOULD PROCEED TO THE FLOOR AND CONTINUED TO ACCELERATE. *A. THE VEHICLE ROLLED FORWARD AND CRASHED INTO A BUILDING. *A. THE CUSTOMER STATED THE BRAKES WERE SET. *B.  <b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Taxista ID No:</b> 100610101  <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b>  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2006/03/00  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2002 TOYOTA CAMRY  <b>Location of Incident:</b> CLARK, IL</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>          WHEN APPLYING THE BRAKE PEDAL, IT WOULD PROCEED TO THE FLOOR AND CONTINUED TO ACCELERATE. *A. THE VEHICLE ROLLED FORWARD AND CRASHED INTO A BUILDING. *A. THE CUSTOMER STATED THE BRAKES WERE SET. *B.  <b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	<p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b>  <b>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</b></p> <p><b>Location of Incident:</b> MORGENTHAU, NJ  <b>NHTSA Summary:</b>          MY CAR SUDDENLY ACCELERATED WHEN I PRESSED THE BRAKES GOING DOWN AN HILL IN A HILL.  <b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Taxista ID No:</b> 100610101  <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b>  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2006/03/00  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2002 TOYOTA CAMRY SOLARA  <b>Location of Incident:</b> LOMBARD, IL</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>          WHILE PULLING INTO A PARKING LOT, VEHICLE SUDDENLY ACCELERATED, AND IT LANDED ON THE ROAD OR ANOTHER VEHICLE. THERE WERE NO INJURIES. A CUSTOMER ALSO STATED THAT APPLYING THE BRAKES DIDN'T HELP STOP THE VEHICLE.          *A.  <b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Taxista ID No:</b> 100610101  <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b>  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2006/03/00  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2002 TOYOTA CAMRY  <b>Location of Incident:</b> CLARK, IL</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>          WHEN APPLYING THE BRAKE PEDAL, IT WOULD PROCEED TO THE FLOOR AND CONTINUED TO ACCELERATE. *A. THE VEHICLE ROLLED FORWARD AND CRASHED INTO A BUILDING. *A. THE CUSTOMER STATED THE BRAKES WERE SET. *B.  <b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Taxista ID No:</b> 100610101  <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b>  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2006/03/00  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2002 TOYOTA CAMRY  <b>Location of Incident:</b> CLARK, IL</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>          WHEN APPLYING THE BRAKE PEDAL, IT WOULD PROCEED TO THE FLOOR AND CONTINUED TO ACCELERATE. *A. THE VEHICLE ROLLED FORWARD AND CRASHED INTO A BUILDING. *A. THE CUSTOMER STATED THE BRAKES WERE SET. *B.  <b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Taxista ID No:</b> 100610101  <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b>  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2006/03/00  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2002 TOYOTA CAMRY  <b>Location of Incident:</b> CLARK, IL</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>          WHEN APPLYING THE BRAKE PEDAL, IT WOULD PROCEED TO THE FLOOR AND CONTINUED TO ACCELERATE. *A. THE VEHICLE ROLLED FORWARD AND CRASHED INTO A BUILDING. *A. THE CUSTOMER STATED THE BRAKES WERE SET. *B.  <b>Additional Summary:</b></p>

<p><b>Location of Incident:</b> TORONTO, ON</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p> <p>WHILE WAITING AT AN INTERSECTION VEHICLE SUDDENLY ACCELERATED. DRIVER'S FOOT WAS PLACED ON THE BRAKE AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT. DRIVER TRAINED FOR THE VEHICLE AND WAS ABLE TO RESTART AND DRIVE IT TO THE DEALER FOR INSPECTION. MECHANIC WAS NOT ABLE TO DUPLICATE OR RESOLVE THE PROBLEM.</p> <p><b>*AK</b></p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 15042502  <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 20040914  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20040914  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2003 TOYOTA CAMRY  <b>Location of Incident:</b> WHEELING, IL</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p> <p>WHILE APPLYING THE BRAKES AT A TOLL, BOTH BRAKE PEDAL WENT TO THE FLOOR AND VEHICLE SUDDENLY ACCELERATED. AS A RESULT, CONSUMER'S VEHICLE REAR-ENDED ANOTHER VEHICLE. FORD IMPACT BOTH AIR BAGS DID NOT DEPLOY. DRIVER AND PASSENGER RECLINED HEAD AND BACK INWARD, AND WERE TRANSPORTED BY AMBULANCE TO THE HOSPITAL. VEHICLE WAS TOTALLED.</p> <p><b>*AK</b></p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10461751  <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 20040914  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20040914  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2003 LEXUS ES300  <b>Location of Incident:</b> COLUMBUS, GA</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p> <p>WHILE ENTERING A PARKING LOT VEHICLE ACCELERATED ON ITS OWN. CONSUMER TAPPED THE BRAKE, AND SPEED INCREASED EVEN MORE. AS A RESULT, DRIVER LOST CONTROL OF VEHICLE AND HIT A WALL. *AK. SEE LONG HISTORY ONLY.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10461751  <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 20040914  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20040914  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2003 LEXUS ES300  <b>Location of Incident:</b> ALBUQUERQUE, NM</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p> <p>THE VEHICLE LUNGED UPON PARKING. AS A RESULT THE CONSUMER LOST CONTROL AND HIT A WALL. THE FRONT END REPAIRS COST \$2,379.00. *AK. DRUGGON.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10461751  <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 20040914  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20040914  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2003 LEXUS ES300  <b>Location of Incident:</b> NEW ROCHELLE, NY</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p>	<p><b>WHILE WAITING IN HEAVY TRAFFIC AT AN INTERSECTION AND WITHOUT WARNING, VEHICLE SUDDENLY ACCELERATED. THIS CAUSED THE DRIVER TO REAR END THE VEHICLE IN FRONT. OPEN IMPACT, BUT AIR BAGS DID NOT DEPLOY. THE VEHICLE WAS TOWED TO THE DEALER. THE INSURANCE COMPANY RETAINED THE VEHICLE. *AK. THE DEALER ADMITTED THAT THERE WAS SOMETHING WRONG WITH THE VEHICLE. THE CONSUMER CONTACTED THE MANUFACTURER AND WAS TOLD THAT NOTHING COULD BE DONE. *NM</b></p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10461751  <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 20040914  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20040914  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2003 TOYOTA CAMRY  <b>Location of Incident:</b> MANASSAS, VA</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p> <p>ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS THE BRAKE PEDAL HAS GONE TO THE FLOOR WHEN I ATTEMPTED TO STOP OR SLOW THE CAR. DRIVING OR ACCELERATING THE CAR IS NOT SMOOTH AND THERE ARE SUDDEN ACCELERATIONS OR JERKS OF THE CAR. THE CAR WAS TESTED BY THE DEALER SERVICE MANAGER AND BY THE SALESMAN BOTH AGREED THAT THE CAR HAD NO PROBLEM. HOWEVER, THEY STATED THAT ALL 2003 CAMRYS BEHAVED IN SIMILAR FASHION AND THAT THERE WAS NO "FIX" FOR THIS PROBLEM. THE TOYOTA MANUFACTURER STATED THAT THEY HAD RECEIVED SIMILAR COMPLAINTS WHICH THEY WERE INVESTIGATING BUT THEY DID NOT KNOW WHAT CAUSED THIS PROBLEM OR THEY COULD NOT PROVIDE ANY SUGGESTIONS FOR ITS REPAIR. *AK.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10461751  <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 20040914  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20040914  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2003 TOYOTA CAMRY  <b>Location of Incident:</b> ROCKVILLE, MD</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p> <p>2003 TOYOTA CAMRY SKEWED FORWARD UNEXPECTEDLY. BRAKES ARE BEING APPLIED, BUT THE VEHICLE ACCELERATES. AND JERKS IN. HAPPENED INSTANTLY. I HAD REPORTED THIS BEFORE OVER LAST 3 WEEKS. LAST TIME, JUST IN FRONT OF A SCHOOL. CAME ALMOST TOOK THE CAR TO THE DEALER TO MAKE REPAIRS AND WAS INFORMED NOTHING COULD BE DONE. WENT HOME WITH CAR DESPITE MORE THAN 100 MILES WITH DEALER. ONLY VERY HEAVY CONCERN ABOUT CAR SAFETY. *AK.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10461751  <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 20040914  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20040914  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2003 TOYOTA CAMRY  <b>Location of Incident:</b> CLEVELAND, OH</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p> <p>2003 TOYOTA CAMRY VS. R. ENGINE SKEW. UNEXPECTED ACCELERATION. I HAVE BEEN OPERATING THIS VEHICLE FOR TWO YEARS WITHOUT INCIDENT. HOWEVER, IN THE LAST TWO MONTHS I HAVE EXPERIENCED TWO SUDDEN WHEEL LOCKS PROBLEM. THE FIRST EPISODE TOOK PLACE 1 MONTHS AGO AS I WAS IN REVERSE AND BACKING OUT OF A DRIVEWAY. I WAS ABLE TO STOP BY APPLYING THE BRAKE. THE SECOND INCIDENT TOOK PLACE AS I WAS BEGINNING TO ACCELERATE FROM A STOP LIGHT. THE VEHICLE</p>
<p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b></p> <p><i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i></p>	<p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b></p> <p><i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i></p>
<p><b>ABOVE AS WE WERE BLUING DOWN AS I APPLIED THE BRAKES TO SLOW DOWN THE ENGINE BEGAN TO RACE. I WAS ABLE TO STOP THE CAR WITH THE BRAKES BUT THIS LEAVE THE CAR IN FRONT OF ME. THERE WAS NO DAMAGE TO EITHER VEHICLE OR ANY INJURIES. I TOOK THE CAR TO MY DEALER THIS MORNING AND REPORTED THE PROBLEM. THE DEALER SAID THEY WOULD TRY TO REPAIR THE CAR AND TOLD ME TO REPORT THE PROBLEM. I DID HAVE A PASSENGER IN CAR DURING THE MOST RECENT EPISODE WHO CAN ATTEST TO THE PROBLEM. *AK</b></p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10461751  <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 20040914  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20040914  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2004 TOYOTA COROLLA  <b>Location of Incident:</b> NORTH EAST, MD</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p> <p>INTERMITTENTLY WHILE DRIVING AT LOW SPEED VEHICLE SUDDENLY ACCELERATED.</p> <p><b>*AK</b></p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10461751  <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 20040914  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20040914  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2004 TOYOTA CAMRY  <b>Location of Incident:</b> RANGOLF, CA</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p> <p>MY MOTHER AND FRIEND STARTED OUT FOR WORK. THE FRIEND HAD COME TO PICK HER UP WHEN THE 2004 TOYOTA CAMRY WITH LESS THAN 3000 MILES ON IT WAS RAVING PERFECTLY SHUTTING INTO REVERSE. THEN WHEN SHE SHIFTED INTO DRIVE THE CAR ACCELERATED UNCONTROLLABLY UP HILLS ON W. 4 MILES A HOUR IN LESS THAN 100 FT WHEN THE CAR HIT A MOBILE HOME. THEY GOT SO HARD IT MOVED DOUBLE THE ALMOST A FOOT. KILLING MY MOTHER. THE PASSENGER AND DRIVER TO BE FRIEND THE DRIVER, NO AIR BAG DEPLOYED AND WHEN TOYOTA WAS CONTACTED THEY REFUSED TO SPEAK TO US. ATTORNEYS HAVE SAID THAT TOYOTA IS NO ONE NOT COULD AFFECTIVE. SO I WALKED AND IN TWO YEARS THERE ARE MANY MANY AGREE NOW. HOW MANY MORE HAVE TO DIE BEFORE SOMETHING IS DONE. SEE ALSO 10078473. *AK. *NM. DIFFICULTY TO GET OUT FROM PARK IT BECAUSE. THEY FROG AND TWO TWO DRIVE THE CAR ACCELERATED UNCONTROLLABLY, WOULD NOT STOP COLLIDED WITH A MOBILE HOME. AIR BAGS DID NOT DEPLOY, RESULTING IN THE DEATH OF ONE PASSENGER AND INJURY OF DRIVER. *A.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10461751  <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 20040914  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20040914  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2004 LEXUS ES300  <b>Location of Incident:</b> WHITEFISH, CA</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p> <p>THERE IS A DANGEROUS AND UNSPENTACABLE TENDENCY FOR THE VEHICLE INSTANTANEOUSLY IN COMBINATION TO ACCELERATE SUDDENLY AND UNEXPECTEDLY. THIS IS AN INTERMITTENT PROBLEM WHICH MAKES IT ESPECIALLY UNDESIRABLE. IT IS MOST NOTICABLE AT SPEEDS OF 40-60 MPH WHEN FIRST ALLOWED, FOLLOWED BY ACCELERATION. IT APPEARS TO BE EXAGGERATED BY UNUSUAL</p>	<p>TRANSMISSION. INSTANTLY FOR PROPER GEAR-DRIVING SPEED COMBINATIONS. THE SUDDEN ACCELERATION CAUSES A RAPID AND JERKY THROTTLE RESPONSE TO MED ACCELERATION. FROM WHAT I HAVE TAKEN THE CAR TO THE DEALER ON AT LEAST TWO OCCASIONS FOR THIS REASON. THE FIRST TIME THE DEALER REPROGRAMMED THE TRANSMISSION. THE SECOND TIME THE TECHNICIAN TESTED THE VEHICLE AND NOTE "NO PROBLEM FOUND". AT CURRENT MILEAGE OF 32,000 THE PROBLEM SEEMS TO BE WORSENING. THIS IS A DANGEROUS CONDITION THAT IS LEFT UNWARRANTED. I WOULD BE THE CAUSE OF AN ACCIDENT, SERIOUS INJURY OR MUCH WORSE. *NM</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10461751  <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 20040914  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20040914  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2003 TOYOTA CAMRY  <b>Location of Incident:</b> INDIANAPOLIS, IN</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p> <p>WHEN COMING OUT OF A PARKING LOT ACCELERATION BECAME THE VEHICLE TO ACCELERATE OUT OF CONTROL. VEHICLE GRABBED ANOTHER VEHICLE, WENT ACROSS A STREET, GRABBED A BUILDING, AND DROVE STRAIGHT INTO ANOTHER BUILDING. DRIVER WAS CONSCIOUS WITH DAMAGED ARMS. THEY PUNED THE DRIVER WITH BOTH FEET STILL ON THE BRAKE PEDAL. DRIVER WAS TRANSPORTED TO THE HOSPITAL AND LATER DIED DUE TO FATAL INJURIES FROM THE CRASH. THE INSURANCE COMPANY PRESERVED THE VEHICLE AS EVIDENCE. THE POLICE REPORT STATED THE CRASH WAS DUE TO A MECHANICAL DEFECT. *AK. *NM</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10461751  <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 20040914  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20040914  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2004 LEXUS LS400  <b>Location of Incident:</b> CARY, CHAS, IL</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p> <p>WHILE CONSUMER WAS PARKING IN A PARKING SPACE VEHICLE SUDDENLY ACCELERATED. *AK. *NM</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10461751  <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 20040914  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20040914  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2003 TOYOTA CAMRY  <b>Location of Incident:</b> RICHMOND, VA</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p> <p>WHILE A LIGHT A LIGHT TURN AT A STOP, THE VEHICLE RESTARTED, THROTTLE ACCELERATED ON ITS OWN. THIS CAUSED THE VEHICLE TO HIT THE CURB. *AK. THE PROBLEM WAS WITH THE APPARENT BRAKES. *AC. *NM</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10461751  <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 20040914  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20040914  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2003 TOYOTA CAMRY</p>
<p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b></p> <p><i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i></p>	<p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b></p> <p><i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i></p>



<p><b>Location of Incident:</b> BRIDGTON, ME <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> WHILE DRIVING I FELT THE VEHICLE SUDDENLY ACCELERATED. THE CONSUMER WAS ABLE TO MAINTAIN CONTROL OF THE VEHICLE BY APPLYING THE BRAKES TO SLOW THE VEHICLE DOWN. THIS HAPPENED MORE THAN ONCE. THE DRIVER WILL CONTACT THE DEALER IN THE NEAR FUTURE. *AK: THE VEHICLE WOULD CONTINUE IN MOTION WHEN THE CONSUMER FOOT WAS NOT ON THE ACCELERATOR. WHEN AN OPENING FROM SPEEDER ABOVE 28 MPH, THE VEHICLE WOULD NOT ALLOW BELOW 28-33 MPH WITHOUT APPLYING THE BRAKES. AS THE TACHOMETER SHOWED 0-90 TO 100 MPH, IT WOULD AUTOMATICALLY MAKE A SLIGHT SURGE TO 106-120 MPH, THEN SETTLE TO 1000 RPM'S AND WOULD CONTINUE UNTIL THE BRAKES WERE APPLIED. *AC *AD <b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10964756 <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 10964756 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 10/01/10 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2008 LEXUS RX350 <b>Location of Incident:</b> HERMAN OAKS, CA <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> WHEN PULLING INTO A PARKING LOT DRIVER DEPRESSSED THE BRAKE PEDAL AND VEHICLE SUDDENLY ACCELERATED. VEHICLE WENT OVER THE CURB AND HIT A LIGHT POLE. FRONT LEFT SIDE OF THE VEHICLE WAS DAMAGED. UPON IMPACT, FRONT AIR BAGS DID NOT DEPLOY. DRIVER SUSTAINED MINOR BRUISES. *AK *LA <b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10963242 <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 10963242 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2008/01/19 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2008 TOYOTA 4RUNNER <b>Location of Incident:</b> TALLAHASSEE, FL <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> REGARDLESS MY 2008 TOYOTA 4RUNNER, LIMITED 4-WHEEL DRIVE WITH A V-6 ENGINE AND 5-SPEED AUTOMATIC TRANSMISSION. SINCE I'VE OWNED THE VEHICLE (10/2007) AS 2008 THE ENGINE HAS PERIODICALLY ACCELERATED SUDDENLY BY ITSELF WHILE AT A STOP, SUCH AS AT A STOP LIGHT WITH THE A/C ON AND THE TRANSMISSION IN DRIVE. SOMETIMES THIS RESULTS IN AN ABNORMAL ACCELERATION BECAUSE TO BEING HIT BY ANOTHER CAR IN THE REAR. IF I DON'T HAVE MY FOOT FIRMLY ON THE BRAKE OR IF THERE IS ANOTHER VEHICLE RIGHT BEHIND THE VEHICLE, THEN PERHAPS IT IS NOT ONLY A MECHANICAL SAFETY PROBLEM, BUT HAS TO BE DOING DAMAGE TO THE TRANSMISSION. I THINK IT'S FOR REPAIR AND AS I PERFECTLY GUESS THE DEALER SAID THEY FOUND NO PROBLEM. ALL THEY WERE WAS CONFIRM ITS ISSUE, THEY DID NOT FIX IT. IN MY OPINION, THERE IS A SAFETY PROBLEM AND COULD BECOME TO A SAFETY ISSUE. I'VE NOTICED OTHER COMPLAINTS HAVE BEEN MADE TO NHTSA ON THE SAME PROBLEM. I BELIEVE THIS PROBLEM COULD BE INVESTIGATED BEFORE MORE INJURIES ARE INCURRED BY SOMEONE *AK <b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10961541 <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 10961541 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2008/01/19 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2008 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> PARIS, KY <b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b> <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i></p>		<p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b> WHILE DRIVING AT LOW SPEEDS OR PARKING IN A PARKING SPACE THE VEHICLE SUDDENLY ACCELERATED. THE DEALER INSPECTED THE VEHICLE AND DETERMINED BUT COULD NOT REPLICATE OR CORRECT THE PROBLEM. *AK: NEW VQX 106280. *DSY ON 08/01/10. *GIVEN WHEN PARKING THE VEHICLE ROLLED FORWARD AND HIT A POST (NO DAMAGE REPORTED). THE CONSUMER HAD TO REPLACE THE TIRES AT 25000 MILES BECAUSE THEY PUNCTURED NOT MOVE WHILE ON ICE OR SNOW. *DSM <b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 109607907 <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 109607907 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2003 TOYOTA LEXUS CAMRY, CAMRY SOLARA, ES300 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 1-18-2008, NY <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> *** PROBLEM OCCURRED 2008 11 17 41 AM CINCINNATI STX WAS MAKING A RIGHT HAND TURN &amp; VEH IN ROAD. STX VEH TO BEAT THE MOVING &amp; RED. ADV CYCLES NOT FINE ANY MORE. STX DEAR COULD NOT REPLICATE COND. STX WROTE TO SERVICE ADVISOR, ROBBIE CLEVELAND AND STX WERE WILL NOT REPAIR THE VEH. STX READ IN THE PAPER WAS COMMON GOOD. *** CAME CLOSE 10/2008 11/19/08 AM CINCINNATI NCH APPRO. &amp; ADV DEAR WILL HAVE TO BE ABLE TO REPLICATE COND TO MAKE A RPH. AUTOMAT. STX WERE WILL NOT REPAIR THE VEH. ADV NHTSA LENDING INTO READING CONSIDER. <b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10960734 <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 10960734 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2008/01/09 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2008 LEXUS RX300 <b>Location of Incident:</b> ARLINGTON, VA <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> WHILE PULLING INTO A PARKING SPOT IN A PARKING GARAGE, MY CAR ACCELERATED SUDDENLY, CLAMORING TO THE CONCRETE WALL. BOTH CAR BAGS WERE DEPLOYED, HITTING CAR WITH DAMAGE AND LEAVING MY PARK AREA WITH SOME BUMP IN BUMP AND SCUFFING. DRIVER'S FINGER HIT L-ARM AND FINGER CUT. *AK <b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10957845 <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 10957845 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2007/01/20 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2007 TOYOTA AVALON <b>Location of Incident:</b> TEBICHAIR, CA <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> WHILE STOPPING ON THE BRAKE FRONTAL VEHICLE SUDDENLY ACCELERATED. THIS CAUSED THE VEHICLE TO COLLIDE WITH A HOUSE. VEHICLE WAS TOWED TO THE DEALER FOR INSPECTION NUMEROUS TIMES, BUT MECHANIC WAS NOT ABLE TO REPLICATE THE PROBLEM. *AK <b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b> <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i></p>	
<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10961866 <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 10961866 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2008/01/12 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2008 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> FRYERSVILLE, MO <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> PUSHING ACCIDENT WHEN PULLING INTO PARKING SPACE <b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10964570 <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 10964570 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2008/01/24 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2008 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> UNDEVELOPED <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> WHILE PARKING, PARKING ON A HILL, THE VEHICLE SUDDENLY ACCELERATED HITTING A PARKED CAR. *PH *ME <b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10961743 <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 10961743 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2008/01/24 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2008 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> GREENSBORO, NC <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> CONSUMER WAS PARKING THE VEHICLE WHEN IT SUDDENLY ACCELERATED. CONSUMER APPLIED THE BRAKES, BUT THE VEHICLE JUST KEPT GOING, CAUSING PROPERTY DAMAGE. VEHICLE WAS TOWED TO THE DEALER. OWNER BROVE THE VEHICLE HOME AFTER THE HOURS WERE DONE. AGAIN, THE VEHICLE BEGON TO ACCELERATE UNEXPECTEDLY. *AK <b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10961547 <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 10961547 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2008/01/16 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2008 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> CATONSVILLE, MD <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> WHILE DRIVING IN HIGH VEHICLE ACCELERATED TO HIGH SPEED. THIS CAUSED EXTENDED TRIPPING DISTANCE. DEALERSHIP WAS NOTIFIED, BUT DID NOT RESOLVE THE PROBLEM. *AK <b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10975804 <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 10975804 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 10/01/10 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2008 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> MARIETTA, TN <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> VEHICLE ACCIDENTED WHILE IN PARKING. AS A RESULT, THE VEHICLE CRASHED INTO A TREE AND BURST. *AK: NEW VQX 10975804. *DSY *DSM <b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b> <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i></p>		<p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10960347 <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 10960347 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2008/01/27 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2008 TOYOTA HIGHLANDER <b>Location of Incident:</b> SAN DIEGO, CA <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> (UNEXPECTED) ACCELERATION PROBLEM IN A BRAND NEW TOYOTA HIGHLANDER (CACHED AS ACCEPTED. IT HAD THE SAME PROBLEM TWICE BEFORE) <b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10961288 <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 10961288 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2008/01/20 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2008 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> MANNING, SD <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> WHILE APPLYING THE BRAKE PEDAL, WENT TO THE FLOOR AND VEHICLE SUDDENLY ACCELERATED. THIS CAUSED THE DRIVER TO LOSE CONTROL OF THE VEHICLE AND HIT ANOTHER VEHICLE. UPON IMPACT, BOTH AIR BAGS DID NOT DEPLOY. CONSUMER WAS ABLE TO DRIVE THE VEHICLE TO THE DEALER FOR INSPECTION. HOWEVER, MECHANIC WAS UNABLE TO REPLICATE THE PROBLEM. *AK *DSM <b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10971426 <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 10971426 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2008/01/20 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2008 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> CHARLOTTE, NC <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> UPON APPLYING THE BRAKES CONSUMER SOMETIMES DEPRESSSED THE ACCELERATOR AT THE SAME TIME. THIS CAUSED THE VEHICLE TO BURGE FORWARD. BOTH THE MOST ACTIVE, AND THE DEALER WERE NOTIFIED. *AK <b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10960421068 <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 10960421068 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2008/01/08 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2003 TOYOTA LEXUS CAMRY, CAMRY SOLARA, ES300 <b>Location of Incident:</b> CHICAGO, IL <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> CUTT IT IN AN HILL WITH THE FORWARD A/C AND WHEN MY FOOT BE FOOT ON THE BRAKE THE ENGINE BURSTED BY ITSELF AND FRONT END OF VEH HIT A BACK WALL. CUTT WROTE TO KNOW WHY VEH ACCELERATED BY ITSELF. *** CAME CLOSE 04/2008 12/18/08 PM PROBLEM NCH OFFERED BUT CUTT REFUSED AS THE SAFETY TO WAIT UP TO 30 DAYS FOR INSPECTION. CUTT VERY UNHAPPY AND FOR ME WILL CONTACT THE LAWYER. <b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b> <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i></p>	

[illegible]



<p>THE GRAB CYCLE AND ITS UNDERCARRIAGE SPRING THE CYCLE WOULD COME BACK ONTO RANIER ROAD, THE ABRIDGE DID NOT OPEN. FORTUNATELY, NO ONE WAS INJURED. THE CAR WAS DAMAGED. *AK</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA CDB No: 45082270 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20040124 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2002 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> TAMPA, FL</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b> THE CONSUMER HAD AN ACCIDENT WHEN THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED ON THE OPEN STREET. 3 VEHICLES HEAD ON AND THE AIR BAGS DID NOT DEPLOY. THE VEHICLE WAS TOWED TO THE DEALER AND THEY TOLD HER THAT THERE WERE NO DEFECTS WITH THE AIR BAGS OR VEHICLE ACCELERATOR. TOYOTA HAS ACCEPTED A CLAIM IN WILL PROCEED WITH THE CONSUMER FOR ALL DAMAGES. HOWEVER, THE CONSUMER SHOWS CONCERN THAT THERE IS NO RECALL. *LA 06/01/04 00061342 *BY</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA CDB No: 45080911 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20040113 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 LEXUS ES300 <b>Location of Incident:</b> SILVER SPRING, MD</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b> WHEN DRIVING A SPEED AND THE ACCELERATOR IS PRESSED HARD TO PASS OR TO ENTER A HIGHWAY, THE ENGINE KICKS BUT THE CAR DOES NOT ACCELERATE. THE DEALER TELLS ME THAT IF I BURN THE CAR IS DAMAGED. I HAVE A 2001 LEXUS ES300 BUT HAVE DRIVEN THE OTHER AND THEY ACT THE SAME WAY. WHEN YOU STEP ON THE GAS AND THE CAR DOES NOT GO, IT LEAVES YOU IN A VERY PROCAUSE SITUATION. *AK</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA CDB No: 10073942 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20040118 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2002 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> LAS VEGAS, NV</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b> WHILE DRIVING IN TRAFFIC, AND THE BRAKE PEDAL APPLIED, THE VEHICLE ACCIDENTLY ACCELERATED. THIS CAUSED THE DRIVER TO LEAN THE SEAT BACK TO TAKE IN ORDER TO GET THE VEHICLE. THE MECHANIC INFORMED THE DRIVER THAT THE PROBLEM COULD NOT BE DEPLETED. PLEASE FILL IN ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. *B</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA CDB No: 10073900 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20040118 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2002 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> FREDERICK, MD</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b> WHEN VEHICLE IS ENGAGED IN REVERSE IF ACCELERATES. *AK</p> <p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b> <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i></p>		141
<p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA CDB No: 10233482 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20040110 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 TOYOTA CELICA <b>Location of Incident:</b> HOUSTON, TX</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b> I WAS DRIVING WEST BOUND ON I-40 NEAR DOWNTOWN HOUSTON, TX WHEN I WENT TO PASS A TRUCK AND PRESSED THE GAS PEDAL. WHEN I RELEASED THE GAS PEDAL, THE CAR KEPT ACCELERATING AND THE ENGINE WENT TO THE REDLINE. I KNEW THE BRAKES WERE WORKING A LITTLE BUT THE ENGINE WAS STILL ACCELERATING TO THE REDLINE. FORTUNATELY THE FREEWAY WAS QUITE CLEAR AS I JUST KEPT GOING FAIRLY AND RATHER TO "C" AN "O" AND I'M ALSO A MICHIGAN AND RODE THAT WAY MY FIRST NEW CAR I EVER BOUGHT. I WAS WORRIED ABOUT THE ENGINE BLOWING UP MORE THAN I WAS ABOUT GETTING HOMELESS SINCE THE FREEWAY WAS PRACTICALLY EMPTY. I DID GET UP FAST I STOPPED THOUGH BEFORE I DECIDED TO PUT THE AUTOMATIC TRANSMISSION INTO NEUTRAL AND THEN THE KEY TO RESET THE ENGINE OFF. I COASTED FOR A LITTLE WHILE TO REDUCE SPEED AND THEN STARTED THE ENGINE WHILE STILL COASTING. EVERYTHING WAS BACK TO NORMAL AND I PUT THE TRANSMISSION BACK INTO DRIVE AND WENT ABOUT MY WAY. I HAD JUST HAD MY FLOPSCATS THROTTLES YAMMER IN THEY WERE NOT IN THE VEHICLE AT THE TIME SINCE THEY WERE OUTING. THERE WERE NO FLOPSCATS IN THE VEHICLE. I HAVE NEVER REPORTED THIS PROBLEM BECAUSE I JUST THOUGHT IT WAS A PEAK INCIDENT BUT NOW AS IN HEARING MORE REPORTS ON SIMILAR INCIDENTS I THOUGHT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL FOR OTHER PEOPLE TO KNOW OF THIS INCIDENT AS WELL. *B</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA CDB No: 1001710 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20040120 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2002 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> PLACERVILLE, CA</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b> WHILE DRIVING 35 MPH VEHICLE ACCELERATED UNCONTROLLABLY. CONSUMER APPLIED THE BRAKE PEDAL AND VEHICLE CONTINUED TO ACCELERATE. CONSUMER WAS UNABLE TO MAINTAIN CONTROL OF THE VEHICLE AND HIT A LADY, WROTE A LETTER TO THE DEALER, AND WAS TRANSFERRED TO THE SERVICE DEPARTMENT. VEHICLE WAS TOWED TO THE DEALER FOR INSPECTION, AND MECHANIC COULD NOT REPLICATE THE PROBLEM. CONSUMER WAS INVOLVED IN FIVE DIFFERENT ACCIDENTS DUE TO SUDEN ACCELERATION. *AK</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA CDB No: 10073935 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20040121 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 LEXUS LB600 <b>Location of Incident:</b> MINNETONKA, MN</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b> THREE EVENTS OCCURRED WHERE MY 2001 LEXUS LB600 ACCELERATED ON ITS OWN IN BEGGINING TO START MOVING IN REVERSE AND STOP FROM THE BRAKE. THE FIRST INCIDENT OCCURRED IN CANNON FALLS, MN. WE HAD COME TO A STOP AT A STOP LIGHT. *AK</p> <p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b> <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i></p>		142
<p>AND WHEN THE TRAFFIC STARTED MOVING I LIFTED MY FEE FROM THE BRAKE AND ONE CAR LEAPED FORWARD. I IMMEDIATELY SLAMMED ON THE BRAKE AGAIN SINCE MY CAR WAS STILL ON THE BRAKE. IT TOOK ME A FEW SECONDS AND THEN I GOT IT. I BARRELY STOPPED IT BEFORE HITTING THE CAR IN FRONT OF ME. IT HAPPENED AGAIN THE SAME DAY SEVERAL WEEKS LATER BUT NOT AS VIOLENT. THE THIRD TIME IT HAPPENED AS I WAS BRINGING MY CAR INTO LANE TO DIAGNOSIS THE PROBLEM. WHEN I MADE IT TO LANE I LEFT FORWARD AND CAME TO A STOP. I WAS ON THE FREEDOM WHEEL TO GET MORE LEVERAGE ON THE BRAKE. IT LOCKED UP AND WEAT SEEMED TO BE IN DANGER OF GOING INTO A POY WITH ME. I WAS PRESSING AS HARD AS I COULD ON THE BRAKE. FINALLY I HAD THE PRESENCE OF MIND TO SHIFT INTO NEUTRAL. AGAIN I BARRELY WAS ABLE TO STOP IT BEFORE HITTING THE CAR IN FRONT OF ME. THIS IS A JOKE. I DANGER OF A CONDITION AND I HAVE TOLD MYSELF I WILL NOT DRIVE THE CAR AGAIN UNTIL IT IS FIXED. I LEARNED FROM THIS AND NO CAR CLAIMS TRICE NOTHING IS WRONG. IF NOTHING CAN BE FOUND WITH THE DIAGNOSTICS. I AM WILLING TO LET NHTSA HAVE THE CAR FOR TESTING IF I CAN GET REPLACEMENT TRANSPORTATION DURING THE TESTING. NORM VAL ROSE. *AK</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA CDB No: 10073906 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20040123 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2004 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> NORWOOD, MA</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b> VEHICLE IS A NEW 2004 TOYOTA CAMRY LE WITH 100 MILES ON IT WHEN THE INCIDENT OCCURRED. I STARTED THE VEHICLE AND SHUT FROM PARK TO REVERSE. INTENTLY TAKING MY FOOT OFF THE BRAKE. THE VEHICLE RAPIDLY ACCELERATED AND TRAVELLED ABOUT TWO CAR LENGTHS BEFORE I WAS ABLE TO STOP IT. *AK</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA CDB No: 10074312 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20040124 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2002 TOYOTA TUNDRA <b>Location of Incident:</b> SAN ANTONIO, TX</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b> CONSUMER APPLIED THE BRAKES AND VEHICLE WOULD SUDENLY ACCELERATED ON IT'S OWN. CONSUMER PLACED FOOT OFF ON THE BRAKE PEDAL AND VEHICLE WOULD NOT STOP. CONSUMER WAS ABLE TO MAINTAIN CONTROL OF THE VEHICLE AND DROVE IT TO THE DEALER FOR INSPECTION. HOWEVER, MECHANIC COULD NOT REPLICATE THE PROBLEM. *AK</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA CDB No: 10073911 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20040122 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2004 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> DUBLIN, NC</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b> WHILE DRIVING VEHICLE EXPERIENCED SUDEN ACCELERATION. CONSUMER WAS APPROXIMATING A STOP WHEN THE VEHICLE SUDENLY TURNED FORWARD INTO AN</p> <p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b> <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i></p>		143
<p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA CDB No: 10073931 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20040120 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 LEXUS ES330 <b>Location of Incident:</b> TUCSON, AZ</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA CDB No: 10073931 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20040120 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 LEXUS ES330 <b>Location of Incident:</b> TUCSON, AZ</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p>		144

<p>RE SUPPLEMENT TO CONSUMER COMPLAINT FROM DALLAS TEXAS FOR TRANSMISSION/THROTTLE PROBLEMS. *RP AUTOMATIC TRANSMISSION HESITATES, REVTS, SHUTS DOWN/STALLS, HANGS UP, BEHAVES ABNORMLY ETC. THE THROTTLE DELAYS AT THE FIRST APPLICATION OF GAS AND THE RATE OF ACCELERATION RIGORS UP AND DOWN UNUSUALLY. DEALER COULD NOT FIND A PROBLEM. *JT</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 1075622  <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 20040603  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2004/06/03  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2003 TOYOTA CAMRY  <b>Location of Incident:</b> COLUMBIA, IL</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>  VEHICLE ACCELERATED UPON PARKING NEAR A STOP WITH FOOT OFF ACCELERATOR AND IN BRAKE PEDAL. PLEASE PROVIDE ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. *TM</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 1044541  <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 20040608  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2004/06/08  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2003 TOYOTA ARISENER  <b>Location of Incident:</b> BURLINGAME, CA</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>  THE CONSUMER EXPERIENCED SUDDEN ACCELERATION ON 3 SEPARATE OCCASIONS. *RL... *AK</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10080317  <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 20040608  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2004/06/08  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2004 TOYOTA CAMRY  <b>Location of Incident:</b> WEST NEWTON, PA</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>  WHILE DRIVING SLOWLY, RPSH ACCELERATED AT A HIGH RATE. DEALERSHIP WAS NOTIFIED, BUT DID NOT RESOLVE THE PROBLEM. *AK</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10076211  <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 20040614  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2004/06/14  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2003 TOYOTA CAMRY  <b>Location of Incident:</b> BOWLING GREEN, IL</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>  WHILE PULLING OUT OF A PARKING SPACE VEHICLE SUDDENLY ACCELERATED. CONSUMER WAS UNABLE TO MAINTAIN CONTROL OF THE VEHICLE. CONSUMER PLACED BOTH FEET ON THE BRAKE, BUT VEHICLE CONTINUED TO ACCELERATE. IT JUMPED A CURB AND COLLIDED WITH A GLASS WINDOW IN A STORE. CONSUMER, BOTH FRONTAL AIR BAGS DID NOT DEPLOY, HOWEVER, THERE WERE NO INJURIES. *AK</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10079237  <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 20040611  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2004/06/11  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2003 TOYOTA CAMRY SOLARA  <b>Location of Incident:</b> SPRINGFIELD, VA</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>  WHILE PULLING OUT OF A PARKING LOT, THE VEHICLE SUDDENLY ACCELERATED UNCONTROLLABLY WITHOUT WARNING. THE DRIVER WAS NOT ABLE TO MAINTAIN CONTROL OF THE VEHICLE. THE DRIVER PLACED BOTH FEET ON THE BRAKE PEDAL, BUT THE VEHICLE CONTINUED TO ACCELERATE INTO AN OTHER VEHICLE. BOTH FRONTAL AIR BAGS FAILED TO DEPLOY. THE DRIVER SUSTAINED INJURY AND SEVERE DAMAGE AND WAS TRANSPORTED BY AMBULANCE TO THE HOSPITAL. THE VEHICLE WAS TOWED TO THE DEALER. PLEASE FILL IN ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. *LA</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10082261  <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 20040614  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2004/06/14  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2002 LEXUS RX300  <b>Location of Incident:</b> NORTHON, MA</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>  WHEN BACKING OUT OF A PARKING SPACE THE CAR WENT INTO A HIGH ACCELERATION. I REAR ENDED TWO CARS THAT WERE DIRECTLY BEHIND ME. IF THERE WAS ANYONE WOLUNTEERING I WOULD HAVE HELD THEM. I BELIEVE THERE IS A THROTTLE CONTROL PROBLEM. *LA</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10193427  <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 20040616  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2004/06/16  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2004 TOYOTA HIGHLANDER  <b>Location of Incident:</b> WILTON, CA</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>  1 MONTH AFTER PURCHASING THE TOYOTA THE HIGHLANDER ON ACCELERATION BECAME FLAT. THE COMPUTER PROGRAM FLASHED NUMBER ON THEM. THE DEALERSHIP CLAIMED THEY HAD DONE ALL THEY COULD. ENTERING HOPKINS ON TURNING CLIMBED THE CAR STALLS UNTIL THE THROTTLE CHANGES, AND THEN LOOKS OFF. IT KILLED THE BODY AND MADE DRIVING THE TOYOTA HIGHLANDER VERY DIFFICULT. *LS</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10101443  <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 20040620  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2004/06/20  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2004 TOYOTA CAMRY  <b>Location of Incident:</b> ALVIN, TX</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>  WHILE APPLYING THE ACCELERATOR PEDAL, THE VEHICLE HESITATED TO ACCELERATE. AFTER APPLYING THE ACCELERATOR PEDAL ANOTHER 4 TIMES THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED UNCONTROLLABLY. THE CONSUMER WAS ABLE TO MAINTAIN CONTROL.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	<p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b>  <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i> 145</p> <hr/> <p>OF THE VEHICLE AND MOVE IT TO THE DEALER FOR INSPECTION. THE MECHANIC WAS NOT ABLE TO DUPLICATE THE PROBLEM. *BR</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10046292  <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 20040621  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2004/06/21  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2004 TOYOTA AYASUN  <b>Location of Incident:</b> VAGH MEYS, CA</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>  INTERMITTENTLY AT A STOP VEHICLE SHAKED. CONSUMER HAD TO PRESS HARD ON THE BRAKE PEDAL AND PUSH VEHICLE INTO PARK TO STOP. *AK. THE CONSUMER FEARED THE DEALER WAS UNABLE TO DUPLICATE THE PROBLEM. *AB</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10082354  <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 20040625  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2004/06/25  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2004 TOYOTA CAMRY  <b>Location of Incident:</b> GREELEY, CO</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b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p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10080399  <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 20040625  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2004/06/25  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2003 TOYOTA CAMRY  <b>Location of Incident:</b> LANSHAM, MD</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>  THE CONSUMER STATED THE VEHICLE BOKED FORWARD EVEN WHEN THE BEE FOOT WAS ON THE BRAKE. THE BRAKE PEDAL WENT ALL THE WAY TO THE FLOOR WHEN APPLIED. PROVIDE FURTHER DETAILS. *AB</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10080547  <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 20040626  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2004/06/26  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2003 TOYOTA MATRIX  <b>Location of Incident:</b> CARLETON, VT</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p>	<p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b>  <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i> 146</p> <hr/> <p>WHILE DRIVING THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED WITHOUT WARNING. AS A RESULT THE CONSUMER HAD TO HODGE A VEHICLE AND DROVE INTO A CORN FIELD. THE CAUSE WAS NOT BEEN DETERMINED. PLEASE PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. *TM</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10003750  <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 10003750  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2004/07/02  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2003 LEXUS RX300  <b>Location of Incident:</b> PETERBORO, PA</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>  PEOPLE WHO HAD OWNED ACCELERATION IN 2000 LEXUS RX300. WITHIN THREE MONTHS OF THE CONSUMER TAKING DELIVERY OF THE VEHICLE THE CONSUMER EXPERIENCED THREE INCIDENTS OF SUDDEN ACCELERATION. THE VEHICLE WAS TAKEN TO THE DEALER BUT THEY WERE UNABLE TO DUPLICATE THE PROBLEM. THE CONSUMER PLACED THE VEHICLE IN FOR A 100 KS 100 AND HADNOT RAG ANY PROBLEMS. *TM</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10044011  <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 20040702  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2004/07/02  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2004 LEXUS ES300  <b>Location of Incident:</b> MCINTIRE, PA</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>  WHEN APPLYING THE ACCELERATOR PEDAL VEHICLE HESITATED THEN BURGED FORWARD. CONSUMER WAS CONCERNED THAT HE WILL BE REAR ENDED. *AK</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10082304  <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 10080702  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2004/07/02  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 LEXUS RX300  <b>Location of Incident:</b> THE WOODLANDS, TX</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>  TWO (2) INCIDENTS OF SUDDEN ACCELERATION BY THE VEHICLE. -THE DEALER WAS NOT AWARE OF ANY INSULAR DEFECT. I WAS NOT AWARE THAT NHTSA WAS CONDUCTING AN INVESTIGATION INTO SIMILAR OCCURRING WITH OTHER TOYOTA LEXUS VEHICLES. *AK</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10274598  <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 20040702  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2004/07/02  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2003 TOYOTA CAMRY  <b>Location of Incident:</b> KANSAS CITY, MO</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>  UNINTENTIONAL ACCELERATION OF 2003 TOYOTA CAMRY LEAD TO SEVERE WITH FEASIBILITY CONTROL. (THIS CAR WAS MANUFACTURED IN THE US AND PURCHASED IN POLSKA, CA IN 2004) ONE. WITHIN THE FIRST TWO YEARS THE CAR EXPERIENCED TWO CASES OF UNINTENTIONAL ACCELERATION. USUALLY, FEELS WERE LOW AS THE CAR WAS</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	<p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b>  <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i> 147</p>	<p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b>  <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i> 148</p>
--	--	---	---	--	--

[illegible]

LEFT THE CAR. WHEN I PARK MY CAR IN THE DRIVEWAY IT IS ONLY A COUPLE OF INCHES FROM THE GATE AND FROM THE GATE IT IS ABOUT 24 FEET TO THE POOL. SO THERE WAS NO WAY TO AVOID THIS ACCIDENT. WHEN I GOT INTO THE CAR, THE FIRST THING I FOUND NOTHING WRONG WITH THE DRIVE/ELECTRONIC THROTTLE CONTROLS. I FOUND THIS TO BE A COINCIDENCE BECAUSE I'VE BEEN DRIVING FOR YEARS AND NEVER HAD THIS HAPPEN TO ME BEFORE. I KNOW VERY WELL THAT IT IS NOT A DRIVER ERROR. IT IS A MANUFACTURE DEFECT. I KNOW I'VE BEEN HAVING INTERSTIONS AND THEY ARE NOT RECALLING THE CAR. BUT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT THIS REALLY HAPPENED. SINCE I'VE BEEN DRIVING THE CAR TO MY FIRST KNOWLEDGE, I DON'T THINK THAT THE SAME THING HAPPENED TO MY 40 BRANDS FRIENDS WIFE LAST YEAR. HER CAR TOOK OFF ON HER, AND WENT THROUGH HER GARAGE. THIS IS VERY DANGEROUS AND I DON'T FEEL SAFE DRIVING MY CAR. I FEEL THAT LEXUS IS REALLY IN A POSITION WHERE THEY DON'T HAVE TO DO ANYTHING BECAUSE THE MEDIA CAME. THERE WAS NOTHING WRONG WITH THE CAR CAUSING THE UNEXPECTED ACCELERATION. BOTH THE DEALER AND MANUFACTURER DID NOT WANT TO TAKE ANY RESPONSIBILITY WHAT SO EVER FOR THIS INCIDENT. THEY WERE VERY DEFEAT WHEN I PURCHASED THE CAR BUT WHEN THE ISSUE OF ANY PROBLEM WITH THE VEHICLE. \*AK

**Additional Summary:**

**Toyota ID No:**  
**NISSA CRD No:** 1007304  
**Date of Incident:** 2004/09/09  
**Vehicle:** 2004 TOYOTA CAMRY  
**Location of Incident:** PARAJ, KY  
**NISSA Summary:**

WHILE PARKING THE VEHICLE SUDDENLY ACCELERATED. WHEN THE VEHICLE WAS FULLY PARKED AND THE CONSUMER'S FOOT WAS OFF THE ACCELERATOR AND OFF THE BRAKE THE VEHICLE PULSED OVER PARKING BRAKE AND HIT A POST. THE DRIVER HAD NO CONTROL ON THE VEHICLE. DEALERSHIP WAS NOTIFIED. \*AK. THE VEHICLE REQUIRED FRONT END DAMAGE. \*NM

**Additional Summary:**

**Toyota ID No:**  
**NISSA CRD No:** 1006970  
**Date of Incident:** 2004/08/09  
**Vehicle:** 2004 TOYOTA CAMRY  
**Location of Incident:** WELCH, CT  
**NISSA Summary:**

WHILE APPLYING THE ACCELERATOR PEDAL, VEHICLE ACCELERATED UNCONTROLLABLY. CONSUMER WAS NOT ABLE TO MAINTAIN CONTROL OF THE VEHICLE AND CALLED WITHIN MINUTES. DRIVER REPORTED MINOR INJURY AND WAS TRANSPORTED TO THE HOSPITAL BY AN AMBULANCE. THE VEHICLE WAS TOWED TO THE DEALER FOR INSPECTION. \*AK

**Additional Summary:**

**Toyota ID No:**  
**NISSA CRD No:** 1006764  
**Date of Incident:** 2004/09/09  
**Vehicle:** 2004 TOYOTA CAMRY  
**Location of Incident:** SAVAGE, MD

**Safety Research & Strategies**  
*Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A*

153

**NISSA Summary:**  
DRIVER'S DOOR HANDLE STUCK WHILE DRIVER TRIED TO OPEN THE DOOR. VEHICLE WAS TAKEN TO THE DEALER FOR INSPECTION, AND MECHANIC COULD NOT REPLICATE THE PROBLEM. ALSO, WHILE APPLYING THE ACCELERATOR PEDAL, VEHICLE REACCELERATED AND STALLED. CONSUMER REPORTED THE VEHICLE AND DROVE IT TO THE DEALER FOR INSPECTION, BUT MECHANIC COULD NOT REPLICATE THE PROBLEM. \*AK

**Additional Summary:**

**Toyota ID No:**  
**NISSA CRD No:** 1006720  
**Date of Incident:** 2004/08/09  
**Vehicle:** 2004 TOYOTA CAMRY  
**Location of Incident:** JACKSON, MI  
**NISSA Summary:**

WHILE BACKING OUT OF A PARKING SPACE ACCELERATOR STUCK, CAUSING CONSUMER'S VEHICLE TO STRIKE ANOTHER VEHICLE. THE MANUFACTURER FOUND NO DEFECTS YAK

**Additional Summary:**

**Toyota ID No:**  
**NISSA CRD No:** 1006440  
**Date of Incident:** 2004/03/10  
**Vehicle:** 2004 TOYOTA HIGHLANDER  
**Location of Incident:** BRANDON, FL  
**NISSA Summary:**

MY 2004 TOYOTA HIGHLANDER MAKES A TERRIBLE HUMMING/ROARING SOUND ON ACCELERATION THAT RESONATES WITHIN THE VEHICLE AND STAYS FOR THE ENTIRE. THE PROBLEM TYPICALLY OCCURS DURING ROLLOVER FROM 0 MPH. IT IS TERRIBLY FRIGHTENING THAT A BRAND NEW CAR MAKES SUCH A NOISY SOUND. IT IS ALSO SUBJECT A LOT OF NOISE DURING ROAD RANGING. THE VEHICLE DOES NOT RESPOND AS IT SHOULD TO THE ACCELERATOR AND THAT TOO SPECIFICALLY WHILE DRIVING WITHIN THE CITY. ON CONTACTING THE DEALER AND TOYOTA'S NATIONAL CUSTOMER SERVICE TEAM, SAID IT IS DESIGNED TO BE THAT AND THE HESITATION OF A DEFECT OF THE COMPUTER CONTROLLED AUTOMATIC TRANSMISSION. CLEARLY, THERE IS NO FIX FOR THIS. AS THE RESULT OF THIS, I HAVE BEEN IN THE HOSPITAL AND MY VEHICLE FROM TOYOTA'S SERVICE. I WOULD ALSO WANT TO KNOW THAT MY PERSONAL AND RELATIVE DOES NOT GO TO A TOYOTA DEALER. I AM DISGUSTED IN GETTING RED OF THE VEHICLE. \*AK

**Additional Summary:**

**Toyota ID No:**  
**NISSA CRD No:** 1006440  
**Date of Incident:** 2004/03/10  
**Vehicle:** 2004 TOYOTA HIGHLANDER  
**Location of Incident:** CROSBY, MI  
**NISSA Summary:**

CAR WAS AT UNEXPECTEDLY HIGH LANE WHEN ACCELERATING. \*AK

**Additional Summary:**

**Toyota ID No:**  
**NISSA CRD No:** 1006421  
**Date of Incident:** 2004/03/10  
**Vehicle:** 2004 TOYOTA CAMRY  
**Location of Incident:** CROSBY, MI  
**NISSA Summary:**

CAR WAS AT UNEXPECTEDLY HIGH LANE WHEN ACCELERATING. \*AK

**Additional Summary:**

VEHICLE OFF, ALLOWING IT TO ROLL DOWN. THEN, THE TOW TRUCK WAS CALLED BY THE POLICE OFFICER. WHEN THE TOW TRUCK, ARRIVED ON THE SCENE CONSUMER'S WIFE WAS ABLE TO RESTART THE VEHICLE, AND VEHICLE DEPARTED THE SCENE. THOUGH IT ROLLED DOWN, THE VEHICLE WAS TURNED OFF, AND TOWED TO A LEXUS DEALER. \*AK

**Additional Summary:**

**Toyota ID No:**  
**NISSA CRD No:** 1006199  
**Date of Incident:** 2004/03/10  
**Vehicle:** 2004 TOYOTA CAMRY  
**Location of Incident:** USUAL, CA  
**NISSA Summary:**

THE DRIVER WAS TELLING SOME OF THE DRIVEWAY AND VEHICLE SUDDENLY ACCELERATED. CONSUMER APPLIED BOTH FEET ON THE BRAKE PEDAL IN ORDER TO STOP AND VEHICLE CONTINUED TO ACCELERATE INTO THE GARAGE WALL. CONSUMER WAS NOT INJURED. CONSUMER HAD THE VEHICLE TOWED TO THE DEALER FOR INSPECTION, AND MECHANIC STATED THAT THE PROBLEM COULD NOT BE REPLICATED. CONSUMER INFORMED THE MECHANIC THIS PROBLEM OCCURRED MORE THAN ONCE, AND HAD NOT BEEN RECOVERED. MECHANIC INFORMED CONSUMER THAT A REPRESENTATIVE WOULD COME DOWN TO INSPECT THIS VEHICLE. \*AK

**Additional Summary:**

**Toyota ID No:**  
**NISSA CRD No:** 1011398  
**Date of Incident:** 2004/03/10  
**Vehicle:** 2004 TOYOTA CAMRY  
**Location of Incident:** WESTBURY, NY  
**NISSA Summary:**

CONSUMER IS EXPERIENCING A PROBLEM WITH SUDDEN ACCELERATION. OWNER WAS DRIVING OVER THE ROAD AT APPROXIMATELY 45 MPH WHEN THE CONSUMER APPLIED THE BRAKES, THE VEHICLE BEGAN TO ACCELERATE WITHOUT WARNING. THE OWNER HAD TO TURN OFF THE ENGINE, IN ORDER TO STOP THE VEHICLE. FINANCIAL DETAILS. \*NM

**Additional Summary:**

**Toyota ID No:**  
**NISSA CRD No:** 1006823  
**Date of Incident:** 2004/03/10  
**Vehicle:** 2004 TOYOTA HIGHLANDER  
**Location of Incident:** MILL VALLEY, CA  
**NISSA Summary:**

MY 2004 TOYOTA HIGHLANDER ACCELERATED AT A HIGH RATE OF SPEED WHILE THE BRAKE WAS FULLY APPLIED AS IT TURNED INTO A PARKING SPOT. LUCKYLY, IT HAPPENED WHEN I WAS ALONE BEHIND THE WHEEL, AND ONLY ACCELERATED INTO A BRICK WALL, NOT ANOTHER CAR OR PERSON. \*AK

**Additional Summary:**

**Toyota ID No:**  
**NISSA CRD No:** 1006210  
**Date of Incident:** 2004/03/10  
**Vehicle:** 2004 TOYOTA CAMRY  
**Location of Incident:** JACKSON, MI  
**NISSA Summary:**

WHILE DRIVING ON THE ROAD AT APPROXIMATELY 45 MPH WHEN THE CONSUMER APPLIED THE BRAKES, THE VEHICLE BEGAN TO ACCELERATE WITHOUT WARNING. THE OWNER HAD TO TURN OFF THE ENGINE, IN ORDER TO STOP THE VEHICLE. FINANCIAL DETAILS. \*NM

**Additional Summary:**

**Date of Incident:** 2004/03/10  
**Vehicle:** 2004 TOYOTA CAMRY  
**Location of Incident:** WYTHAM, NJ  
**NISSA Summary:**

WHILE PARKING THE VEHICLE SUDDENLY ACCELERATED. WHEN THE VEHICLE WAS FULLY PARKED AND THE CONSUMER'S FOOT WAS OFF THE ACCELERATOR AND OFF THE BRAKE THE VEHICLE PULSED OVER PARKING BRAKE AND HIT A POST. THE DRIVER HAD NO CONTROL ON THE VEHICLE. DEALERSHIP WAS NOTIFIED. \*AK. THE VEHICLE REQUIRED FRONT END DAMAGE. \*NM

**Additional Summary:**

**Toyota ID No:**  
**NISSA CRD No:** 1021114  
**Date of Incident:** 2004/03/10  
**Vehicle:** 2004 TOYOTA CAMRY SOLARA  
**Location of Incident:** ORANGE, CA  
**NISSA Summary:**

WHILE PARKING THE VEHICLE SUDDENLY ACCELERATED. WHEN THE VEHICLE WAS FULLY PARKED AND THE CONSUMER'S FOOT WAS OFF THE ACCELERATOR AND OFF THE BRAKE THE VEHICLE PULSED OVER PARKING BRAKE AND HIT A POST. THE DRIVER HAD NO CONTROL ON THE VEHICLE. DEALERSHIP WAS NOTIFIED. \*AK. THE VEHICLE REQUIRED FRONT END DAMAGE. \*NM

**Additional Summary:**

**Toyota ID No:**  
**NISSA CRD No:** 1006902  
**Date of Incident:** 2004/03/10  
**Vehicle:** 2004 TOYOTA CAMRY  
**Location of Incident:** CHESTER, NJ  
**NISSA Summary:**

CONSUMER'S SON WAS DRIVING VEHICLE ON A HIGHWAY AT 100 MPH WHEN HE SUDDENLY THE ACCELERATOR STUCK. VEHICLE ROLLED OVER THE HILL, AND WHEN IT REACHED THE TOP OF THE HILL, THE MOTOR WAS STILL RACING. CONSUMER'S SON MANAGED TO GET THE VEHICLE ON THE SIDE OF THE ROAD, AND CUT THE VEHICLE OFF. IT WAS WITNESSED BY POLICE OFFICER WHO WAS AT THE TOP OF THE HILL. THEN POLICE OFFICER ASKED CONSUMER'S SON TO RESTART THE VEHICLE, AND THE MOTOR IMMEDIATELY BEGAN TO RACE. RED LINES AGAIN. HE WAS THEN ASKED TO TURN THE

**Safety Research & Strategies**  
*Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A*

155

**Date of Incident:** 2004/03/10  
**Vehicle:** 2004 TOYOTA CAMRY  
**Location of Incident:** WYTHAM, NJ  
**NISSA Summary:**

WHILE PARKING THE VEHICLE SUDDENLY ACCELERATED. WHEN THE VEHICLE WAS FULLY PARKED AND THE CONSUMER'S FOOT WAS OFF THE ACCELERATOR AND OFF THE BRAKE THE VEHICLE PULSED OVER PARKING BRAKE AND HIT A POST. THE DRIVER HAD NO CONTROL ON THE VEHICLE. DEALERSHIP WAS NOTIFIED. \*AK. THE VEHICLE REQUIRED FRONT END DAMAGE. \*NM

**Additional Summary:**

**Toyota ID No:**  
**NISSA CRD No:** 1021114  
**Date of Incident:** 2004/03/10  
**Vehicle:** 2004 TOYOTA CAMRY SOLARA  
**Location of Incident:** ORANGE, CA  
**NISSA Summary:**

WHILE PARKING THE VEHICLE SUDDENLY ACCELERATED. WHEN THE VEHICLE WAS FULLY PARKED AND THE CONSUMER'S FOOT WAS OFF THE ACCELERATOR AND OFF THE BRAKE THE VEHICLE PULSED OVER PARKING BRAKE AND HIT A POST. THE DRIVER HAD NO CONTROL ON THE VEHICLE. DEALERSHIP WAS NOTIFIED. \*AK. THE VEHICLE REQUIRED FRONT END DAMAGE. \*NM

**Additional Summary:**

**Toyota ID No:**  
**NISSA CRD No:** 1006902  
**Date of Incident:** 2004/03/10  
**Vehicle:** 2004 TOYOTA CAMRY  
**Location of Incident:** CHESTER, NJ  
**NISSA Summary:**

CONSUMER'S SON WAS DRIVING VEHICLE ON A HIGHWAY AT 100 MPH WHEN HE SUDDENLY THE ACCELERATOR STUCK. VEHICLE ROLLED OVER THE HILL, AND WHEN IT REACHED THE TOP OF THE HILL, THE MOTOR WAS STILL RACING. CONSUMER'S SON MANAGED TO GET THE VEHICLE ON THE SIDE OF THE ROAD, AND CUT THE VEHICLE OFF. IT WAS WITNESSED BY POLICE OFFICER WHO WAS AT THE TOP OF THE HILL. THEN POLICE OFFICER ASKED CONSUMER'S SON TO RESTART THE VEHICLE, AND THE MOTOR IMMEDIATELY BEGAN TO RACE. RED LINES AGAIN. HE WAS THEN ASKED TO TURN THE

**Safety Research & Strategies**  
*Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A*

156

<p><b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 TOYOTA COROLLA <b>Location of Incident:</b> IRVING, NY <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> WHILE DRIVING DOWN AN INCLINE, THE VEHICLE SUDDENLY ACCELERATED. *DB THE VEHICLE WAS TAKEN TO THE DEALER BUT THEY WERE UNABLE DETERMINE THE CAUSE. *NM <b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10186940 <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 200401952 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 LEXUS SC430 <b>Location of Incident:</b> PALM BEACH GARDENS, FL <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> VEHICLE BE BEING WHEN CRUISE CONTROL WAS ENGAGED AT 40 MPH. IT SURGED UP TO 80 MPH. IT FELT LIKE IT WAS GOING DOWN HILL. DRIVER COULD NOT DISENGAGE THE PROBLEM. ALSO, TRANSMISSION HESITATED AT 0-30 MPH. IT ALSO JERKED. *AC. *LEADS HAD ADMITTED THE PROBLEM, BUT HAS STATED THAT VEHICLE DRIVE AS DESIGNED. HESITATION PROBLEM EXPERIENCED BY MANY LEXUS LEXUS CAR VEHICLE HESITATION, THIS WILL LEAD TO MORE WIND ACCELERATING A LOW SPEEDS. LEXUS HAS ADMITTED THE PROBLEM, BUT HESITATED VEHICLE DRIVE AS DESIGNED. *AK <b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10091244 <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 200401960 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> CHARLOTTEVILLE, VA <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> THE ACCELERATOR ON THE VEHICLE BECAME STUCK. WAS PEDAL LEFT THE FOOT AND THE PEDAL WAS NOT RESPONDING. THE CONSUMER THEN TRIED TO PUMP ON THE ACCELERATOR HOPEING TO LOOSEN IT. DURING THE VEHICLE BEGAN TO ACCELERATE AND THE CONSUMER SAID TO THEM THE KEY OF ABOVE THE VEHICLE WOULD STOP. THE CONSUMER CRASHED INTO AN EARTH BANK. PROVIDE FURTHER DETAILS. *DB <b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10091244 <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 200401960 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> LOMITA, CA <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> WHILE DRIVING THE VEHICLE WAS ACCELERATED AND CRASHED INTO A WALL. UPON IMPACT, AIR BAGS DID NOT DEPLOY. NO INJURIES REPORTED. *AK <b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10091246 <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 200401969 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 LEXUS LX570 <b>Location of Incident:</b> DENNIS, MA <b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b> <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i></p>	<p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b> LEXUS WAS NEARLY NEW, ONLY 400 MILES. NO ABNORMAL BEHAVIOR UP TO THAT POINT. WHILE DRIVING INTO PARK, AS PART OF THE PROCESS OF PARKING, AND WITH NO PRESSURE ON ACCELERATOR, CAR SUDDENLY JERKED FORWARD, REMOVING CONSOLE FROM BETWEEN SEATBELT LIGHT PADS. THIS RESULTED IN DAMAGE TO THE FRONT REARVIEW, FRAMES, RIGHT QUARTER PANEL, RIGHT HEADLIGHT ASSEMBLY, CAUSING OVER 8000 IN REPAIR COSTS. (1) ABOVE PROBLEMS WERE REPAIRED BY A DEALER-APPROVED AUTO BODY SHOP. *AK <b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10091246 <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 200401969 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> WHITTIER, CA <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> HESITATION ON ACCELERATION. *AK <b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10114443 <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 200401975 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> ATLANTA, GA <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> CONSUMER COMPLAINED ABOUT AN ACCELERATION PROBLEM. WHILE DRIVING AT APPROXIMATELY 70 MPH, DRIVER WOULD STEP ON THE ACCELERATOR AND THE VEHICLE WOULD BEGIN TO HESITATE. THEN, THE SPEED WOULD CONTINUE TO INCREASE EVEN WHEN THE ACCELERATOR PEDAL WAS PUSHED DOWN TO THE FLOOR. THIS HAPPENED WITHOUT WARNING. OWNER CONTACTED THE MANUFACTURER AND THE DEALER. THE DEALER HAS HAD THE VEHICLE FOR A MONTH. HOWEVER, THEY WERE UNABLE TO REPLICATE THE PROBLEM. *AK <b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10124092 <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 200401987 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY SOLARA <b>Location of Incident:</b> FORT MEYER, FL <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> THE HESITATION MECHANISM IN THE VEHICLE DELAYS WHEN GOING AROUND THE CORNER. WHEN PUMPING ON THE ACCELERATOR TRANSMISSION HESITATED. THE VEHICLE BEGINS TO THE SPEEDER TO THE SPEEDER. THE SPEEDER STARTS TO BE A TIGHT. HE ALMOST STATED IT WAS THE WAY THE VEHICLE WAS SUITABLE TO WORK. COMPUTER WAD REPROGRAMMED. ONCE IT WAS A LITTLE BETTER, BUT DID NOT SOLVE THE PROBLEM. THE SERVICE DEPARTMENT STATED THERE WAS NO OTHER SOLUTION FOR THIS. THE VEHICLE BEGINS TO THE VEHICLE WAS PROGRAMMED. IT HAPPENED AGAIN WHEN THE VEHICLE CRASHED AND THE ACCELERATOR WAS PUSHED AFTERWARDS. *AK <b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b> <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i></p>
<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10091246 <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 200401969 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> IRVING, NY <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> DURING TRIP WITH MY FRIENDS ON THE GAS PEDAL CAR RAPIDLY ACCELERATED. *DB THE CONSUMER STATED HE HIT A BUILDING AND THE AIR BAGS DID NOT DEPLOY. *DB <b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10170519 <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 200401991 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2004 TOYOTA CAMRY SOLARA <b>Location of Incident:</b> LAGOS, IL <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> VEHICLE LAG AT LOW SPEED AND FROM STOP IS INCONSISTANT AND HAS BEEN THE CAUSE FOR SEVERAL CLOSE CALLS WHEN PULLING INTO TRAFFIC. MANUFACTURER WAS INFORMED. DEALER INVESTIGATED. IT CANNOT BE NORMAL AND NOTHING ON BE DONE. THAT LAG IS "ACCEPTABLE." SOME INFO INTO HAVE BEEN SEVERAL SECONDS BEFORE ACTUAL THROTTLE RESPONSE. DRIVER HAS TO USE HARDER ACCELERATION TO COMPENSATE WHEN THIS HAPPENS. THIS IS A HAPPY THING THAT TOYOTA IS AWARE OF BUT FELT NEED TO ADMIT IT IS A PROBLEM. DRIVER IS VERY CONCERNED THAT THIS ISSUE WILL BE CAUSE OF AN ACCIDENT. *NM <b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10091246 <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 200401969 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> CAMPBELL, CA <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> WHEN DRIVING 20 MPH FROM ACCELERATED TO 30 MPH, THE CARBON THE CONSUMER TOOK OFF THE SIDE OF THE ROAD. CAUSING DAMAGE TO THE VEHICLE. DEALERSHIP WAS NOTIFIED, BUT DID NOT RESOLVE THE PROBLEM. *AK <b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10091246 <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 200401969 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> BARTLETT, IL <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> THE ACCELERATOR BECAME STUCK WHILE THE CONSUMER WAS DRIVING. THE CONSUMER WENT OVER A CURB AND FLATTENED HER TIRE. THIS IS THE SECOND INCIDENT. *DB <b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10091246 <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 200401969 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> 05100 GROVE, IL <b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b> <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i></p>	<p><b>Location of Incident:</b> 10091246 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> IRVING, NY <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> WHILE DRIVING OUT OF DRIVEWAY, WITH FOOT ON BRAKE PEDAL, I NOTICED THE 2001 CAMRY FROM PARK INTO REVERSE. THE CAR IMMEDIATELY ACCELERATED BACKWARD AT 40MPH OUT OF DRIVEWAY, CROSSING THE ROAD, AND CRASHED INTO A TRUCK. 3 PEOPLE IN CAR, NO INJURIES. 50,000. ESTIMATED BODY DAMAGE IS ABOUT \$8000, BUT UNDERSTANDING DAMAGE HAS YET TO BE DETERMINED. REASON FOR SUDDEN ACCELERATION IS UNKNOWN. *AK <b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10091246 <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 200401969 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> LA POUILLE, TN <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> WHEN THE GEAR WAS PLACED IN REVERSE, THE VEHICLE SUDDENLY ACCELERATED AND HIT A CONCRETE WALL. PLEASE PROVIDE FURTHER INFORMATION. *DB GAS PEDAL STUCK AND BRAKES WOULD NOT HOLD THE CAR FROM MOVING. CONSUMER WAS INJURED AS A RESULT OF ACCIDENT. THE CONSUMER SPRAINED HIS LEG AS A RESULT OF PUTTING SO MUCH FORCE ON THE BRAKE TRYING TO STOP THE VEHICLE. *TC <b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10091246 <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 200401969 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> FORT MEYER, FL <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> WHEN APPLYING THE ACCELERATOR PEDAL, VEHICLE HESITATED THEN JERKED FORWARD. CONSUMER WAS CONCERNED THAT THE VEHICLE WILL BE RECALIBRATED. *AK <b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10091246 <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 200401969 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> PEPPER HARBOR, NJ <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> VEHICLE SUDDENLY EXPERIENCED A SURGE IN ACCELERATION. *DB THE CONSUMER NOTICED THE PROBLEM HAPPENED WHEN THE GAS PEDAL WAS APPLIED. ROAD. *DB <b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10114443 <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 200401975 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> 05100 GROVE, IL <b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b> <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i></p>



<p>VEHICLE STOPPED AT AN INTERSECTION, THE ENGINE BECAME VIBRANTLY AND UNCONTROLLABLY WITHOUT ANY INPUT FROM ME, DUE TO THE HIGH REVOLUTIONS OF THE ENGINE THE BRAKE WERE UNABLE TO PREVENT THE CAR FROM MOVING FORWARD EVEN THOUGH THE BRAKE PEDAL WAS FULLY DEPRESSED. THE ONLY WAY TO PREVENT THE CAR FROM MOVING THE CAR IN FRONT OF ME WAS TO SHUT OFF THE ENGINE. TWO RESEQUENT ATTEMPTS TO RESTART THE ENGINE RESULTED IN A REPEAT OF THE OVER REVVING SITUATION. ONLY AFTER THE THIRD ATTEMPT DID THE ENGINE BEHAVE NORMAL OPERATION. A PASSENGER IN THE CAR AT THE TIME REPORTED THAT THE ACCELERATOR WAS NOT ENGAGED AT ANY TIME DURING THE INCIDENT, THE CAR WAS IMMEDIATELY DRIVEN TO THE DEALER WHO INSPECTED IT AND FOUND NO FAULT WITH THE ECU SYSTEM AND NO STORAGE CODES THAT WOULD VERIFY MY COMPLAINT. THE CAR WAS SUBSEQUENTLY RETURNED TO US AND WAS DRIVEN WITHOUT INCIDENT FOR THE NEXT MONTHS. MONTHS BEFORE THE PROBLEM ONCE AGAIN PRESENTED ITSELF AS WE WERE PULLING INTO A PARKING SPACE WHILE MY FOOT WAS ON THE BRAKE PEDAL THE ENGINE ONCE AGAIN BEGAN TO OVER REVV WITHOUT ANY INPUT FROM ME. AGAIN, THE PASSENGER IN THE CAR WHO HAD WITHNESSED THE FIRST INCIDENT IMMEDIATELY LOOKED TO SEE IF THE ACCELERATOR WAS ACCIDENTALLY BEING DEPRESSED. IT WAS NOT AGAIN, THE ONLY MEANS OF PREVENTING MY CAR FROM STRIDDING THE VEHICLE IN FRONT OF ME WAS TO SHUT OFF THE ENGINE. "NM"</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA GDS No:</b> 10084395 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20090928 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2008 TOYOTA CAMRY SOLARA <b>Location of Incident:</b> BOSTON, CA <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> <b>Additional Summary:</b> WHEN APPLYING THE ACCELERATOR PEDAL VEHICLE RESISTED "AK"</p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA GDS No:</b> 1014404 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20090925 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2008 LEXUS LX400 <b>Location of Incident:</b> SOUTH WOODBURY, NY <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> <b>Additional Summary:</b> AT THE CALLER SAID WHEN DRIVING IN THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED TO A FASTER SPEED VERY QUICKLY. THERE WAS AN ACCIDENT, THE CALLER RESISTED PRESSING THE PEDAL BECAUSE HE WAS AFRAID THE CALLER SAID THE VEHICLE WAS ACCELERATING WITHOUT WARNING FOR ABOUT A YEAR. THE CALLER CALLED THE ASSISTANT ABOUT THE DAY OF THE ACCIDENT AND TOLD THEM ABOUT THE PROBLEM. THE DEALER SAID THEY WOULD GET BACK TO HIM. HE WAS TOLD NOTHING WAS WRONG WITH THE CAR A FEW WEEKS BEFORE THE ACCIDENT. DEALER WAS CONTACTED AFTER THE ACCIDENT AND THEY SAID THEY WOULD SET UP AN APPOINTMENT TO FIND THE CAUSE OF THE PROBLEM. ON SEPTEMBER 2, 2009 AT 8:00 AM MANUFACTURER SAID THEY WOULD CALL IN TWO DAYS. THIS WAS BEFORE THE ACCIDENT. AFTER THE ACCIDENT THEY SAID THEY WOULD CALL AND LOOK AT THE VEHICLE. THE CALLER SAID SHE CALLED MANUFACTURER AGAIN ON SEPTEMBER 7, 2009 AT 9:00 AM TO TELL THEM OF THE ACCIDENT. THEY SAID SOMEBODY WOULD CALL BACK. ON SEPTEMBER 22, 2009 MANUFACTURER SAID IT WOULD TAKE SIX TO EIGHT WEEKS TO LOOK AT THE VEHICLE. THE CALLER TOLD THEM THAT THEY WERE GOING TO STEAL AND THE MANUFACTURER SAID THEY WILL NOT COME TO LOOK AT THE VEHICLE. "AK"</p> <p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategy</b> <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i></p>	
<p>SAFETY RESEARCH &amp; STRATEGY</p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA GDS No:</b> 10093796 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20091001 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2008 LEXUS ES300 <b>Location of Incident:</b> LAKE MARY, FL <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> <b>Additional Summary:</b> I HAD TO NOW WAIT MY CAR FOR SERVICE TWICE TO LEXUS OF ORLANDO ABOUT INSPECTING OPERATION OF THE VEHICLE AND VEHICLE REGISTRATION WHEN THE ACCELERATOR IS PRESSSED. THIS IS AN INTERMITTENT AND SOMETIMES IN THE MIDDLE, AS I DO NOT KNOW WHEN IT WILL OCCUR. WHEN IT DOES OCCUR THE THROTTLE FLARE, THE ENGINE FLARE AND IF THE PASSENGER IS CONFUSED ABOUT THE DRIVER'S INTERVIEW, AND THERE IS NO WARNING INDICATION WHEN THE ACCELERATOR IS PRESSSED. THIS FLARE CAN BE A DANGEROUS SITUATION FOR THE DRIVER. A DRIVER EXPLORED TO ACCIDENT AND INJURY. ON MY FIRST VISIT I WAS TOLD THE VEHICLE COMPUTER WOULD BE RESET, AS THE VEHICLE LEARNED THE DRIVER STYLE IN THE COMPUTER.</p> <p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategy</b> <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i></p>	
<p>SAFETY RESEARCH &amp; STRATEGY</p> <p>FIRST IN OR SO MEALS, AND I MIGHT HAVE DRIVEN THE VEHICLE GAINMELY. THIS IS CALLED RIGHT FOR NOTHING TO FIX THE PROBLEM. LESS THAN A WEEK LATER, I WANTED TO RECALL A CASE AFTER MY CAR BECAME WHILE DRIVING AN INTERSECTION. I PROMPTLY RETURNED THE VEHICLE TO THE DEALER FOR SERVICE. DURING COMPLETION OF THE SERVICE, WHEN I WERE IN THE CAR WITH THE TECHNICIAN, LEXUS SERVICE NOW HAD THEIR PROBLEM ARE INHERENT TO THE MODEL, AND THEY CAN'T FIX THEM IN ADDITION, I AM WORRY THAT MY OWN OWNERS FREQUENTLY COMPLAINS OF REGISTRATION AND RETURN IN 2008, 2009, AND 2004 MODELS. AND MANY COMPLAINTS OVER 100 OF THE SAME NATURE HAVE BEEN FILED WITH THE NHTSA. THIS STATEMENT IS TO MAKE NOTICE THAT I AM NOT SATISFIED, AND THE PROBLEM HAS NOT BEEN FIXED "AK"</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA GDS No:</b> 10094090 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20091006 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2008 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> PLAINFIELD, IL <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> <b>Additional Summary:</b> WHEN APPLYING THE ACCELERATOR PEDAL THE VEHICLE RESISTED THEN BURSTED FORWARD. PLEASE PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION "B"</p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA GDS No:</b> 10097242 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20091008 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2008 LEXUS ES300 <b>Location of Incident:</b> TALLMADGE, OH <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> <b>Additional Summary:</b> THE CONSUMER STATED AT ANY TIME THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED WITHOUT WARNING NO INCIDENT REPORTED. PLEASE PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. "B"</p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA GDS No:</b> 10100812 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20091006 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2008 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> HOUSTON, TX <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> <b>Additional Summary:</b> MY 2008 TOYOTA BEHOLDERS EXHIBITS A NONPERSISTENT BEHAVIOR AT THE START OF RAPID ACCELERATION THAT THE DRIVER IS A POTENTIAL SAFETY HAZARD. WHEN THE VEHICLE IS MOVING AT A SLOW SPEED AND THE ACCELERATOR IS DEEPRESSED TO PRESS A RAPID ACCELERATION (PASSING A SLOWLY MOVING VEHICLE OR MERGING INTO TRAFFIC), A NONPERSISTENT BEHAVIOR OF THE ACCELERATOR INPUT CAN PLACE THE VEHICLE IN DANGEROUS SITUATIONS WHERE THE VEHICLE CANNOT GET OUT OF THE WAY OF OTHER TRAFFIC. I BELIEVE THIS BEHAVIOR COULD RESULT IN A TRAFFIC ACCIDENT AND POTENTIAL INJURY TO PEOPLE. "B"</p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA GDS No:</b> 10096345 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20091004 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2008 SCION XBN <b>Location of Incident:</b> BIRMINGHAM, AL <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> <b>Additional Summary:</b> TOOK FOOT OFF GAS TO SLOW DOWN WHEN APPROACHING CURVE. FAILED TO SLOW DOWN WHEN ENTERING CURVE AND VEHICLE FAILED TO SLOW. FULLY ENGAGED</p> <p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategy</b> <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i></p>	
<p>SAFETY RESEARCH &amp; STRATEGY</p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA GDS No:</b> 10093796 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20091001 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2008 LEXUS ES300 <b>Location of Incident:</b> LAKE MARY, FL <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> <b>Additional Summary:</b> I HAD TO NOW WAIT MY CAR FOR SERVICE TWICE TO LEXUS OF ORLANDO ABOUT INSPECTING OPERATION OF THE VEHICLE AND VEHICLE REGISTRATION WHEN THE ACCELERATOR IS PRESSSED. THIS IS AN INTERMITTENT AND SOMETIMES IN THE MIDDLE, AS I DO NOT KNOW WHEN IT WILL OCCUR. WHEN IT DOES OCCUR THE THROTTLE FLARE, THE ENGINE FLARE AND IF THE PASSENGER IS CONFUSED ABOUT THE DRIVER'S INTERVIEW, AND THERE IS NO WARNING INDICATION WHEN THE ACCELERATOR IS PRESSSED. THIS FLARE CAN BE A DANGEROUS SITUATION FOR THE DRIVER. A DRIVER EXPLORED TO ACCIDENT AND INJURY. ON MY FIRST VISIT I WAS TOLD THE VEHICLE COMPUTER WOULD BE RESET, AS THE VEHICLE LEARNED THE DRIVER STYLE IN THE COMPUTER.</p> <p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategy</b> <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i></p>	

BRAKE AND VEHICLE FAILED TO STOP AND START ACCELERATING. THIS RESULTED IN THE VEHICLE CRASHING INTO AN EMBANKMENT WHICH CAUSED MAJOR DAMAGE TO THE VEHICLE. THIS IS A BRAND NEW CAR TO PURCHASED 09/04/04. \*AK

**Additional Summary:**

**Toyota ID No:** NHTSA ODI No: 1009782  
**Date of Incident:** 2001/05  
**Vehicle:** 2002 TOYOTA CAMRY  
**Location of Incident:** CONCORD, CA  
**NHTSA Summary:** CONSUMER STATED WITH 6. WHILE DRIVING INTO A PARKING SPACE SHE SUDDENLY FEARED HERSELF AND CHILD IN THE FRONT. SHE PULLED INTO A PARKING SPACE, APPLIED BRAKE, AND THEN SUDDENLY THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED AND CRASHED INTO THE STORE FRONT. CONSUMER WAS SURE THAT SHE DID NOT PUT FOOT ON THE ACCELERATOR PEDAL OR THE BRAKE PEDAL. CONSUMER WENT ON LINE AND FOUND THAT DOT WAS INVESTIGATING THE SAME TYPE OF PROBLEM. \*AK

**Additional Summary:**

**Toyota ID No:** NHTSA ODI No: 1010164  
**Date of Incident:** 2001/11  
**Vehicle:** 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY  
**Location of Incident:** CLARENDON HILL, IL  
**NHTSA Summary:** OWNER OF 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY EXPERIENCED SUDDEN ACCELERATION SUDDEN NHTSA INSTALLED INVESTIGATION. \*HE THE VEHICLE SUDDENLY BEGAN FORWARD AND ROLLED INTO A CONCRETE WALL AND OCCURRED ON TWO MORE OCCASIONS. \*SC REC ONE DRIVERS. \*NOT DUPLICATE OF 1009786. \*AK

**Additional Summary:**

**Toyota ID No:** NHTSA ODI No: 1011172  
**Date of Incident:** 2001/11  
**Vehicle:** 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY  
**Location of Incident:** PETERSBURG, VA  
**NHTSA Summary:** CONSUMER PRESSED GAS PEDAL AND VEHICLE DID NOT ACCELERATE, THREE SECONDS LATER VEHICLE LUNGED FORWARD. \*TS THE VEHICLE WAS TAKEN TO THE DEALER. THE DEALER WAS ABLE TO REPRODUCE THE PROBLEM BUT WAS UNABLE TO DETERMINE THE CAUSE. ABOUT 2 MONTHS LATER THE VEHICLE WAS REPAIRED. \*NM UPDATED \*TS

**Additional Summary:**

**Toyota ID No:** NHTSA ODI No: 1010128  
**Date of Incident:** 2001/11  
**Vehicle:** 2001 LEXUS RX300  
**Location of Incident:** GLENCOE, IL  
**NHTSA Summary:**

*Safety Research & Strategies  
Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A*

165

LEXUS IMMEDIATELY STOPPED ON ACCELERATOR. CAR BECAME AND RAN TO PUMP ACCELERATOR TO GO FORWARD. \*BF THIS PROBLEM OCCURRED MANY TIMES. THE CONSUMER ALSO HAD AN ACCIDENT WHILE ATTEMPTING TO MAKE A LEFT TURN. THE CONSUMER APPLIED THE ACCELERATOR PEDAL, THE VEHICLE HESITATED AND THE CONSUMER PRESSED THE ACCELERATOR TO GO FORWARD. THE DEALER COULD NOT FIND A PROBLEM. \*BF

**Additional Summary:**

**Toyota ID No:** NHTSA ODI No: 1009577  
**Date of Incident:** 2001/11  
**Vehicle:** 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY  
**Location of Incident:** PALM CITY, FL  
**NHTSA Summary:** THE VEHICLE INCREASED IN RPM WITHOUT TOUCHING THE ACCELERATOR PEDAL. WHEN APPROXIMATING A TRAFFIC LIGHT THE RPM WILL INCREASE FROM 1500 RPM. THE CONSUMER TOOK THE VEHICLE BACK TO THE DEALER. ALSO CONTACTED THE MANUFACTURER. IT WAS REPORTED TO THE CONSUMER THAT THIS WAS THE CURRENT DESIGN OF THE VEHICLE. \*AK THERE WAS POTENTIAL FOR AN ACCIDENT TO OCCUR IN STOP AND GO TRAFFIC. THE CONSUMER WAS AWARE OF TWO OTHER OWNERS OF THIS SAME MAKE AND MODEL WHO HAVE EXPERIENCED THE SAME PROBLEM. \*AC

**Additional Summary:**

**Toyota ID No:** NHTSA ODI No: 1010111  
**Date of Incident:** 2001/11  
**Vehicle:** 2001 LEXUS LS400  
**Location of Incident:** BIRMINGHAM, AL  
**NHTSA Summary:** AFTER STARTING THE VEHICLE, IT SUDDENLY ACCELERATED AT A HIGH SPEED. THE CONSUMER CALLED THE VEHICLE TO HIT THREE PARKED VEHICLES AND ONE VEHICLE IN MOTION. THE CONSUMER RECEIVED MINOR INJURIES TO HER FACE DUE TO AIR BAG DEPLOYMENT. THE OTHER DRIVER AND PASSENGER OF THE OTHER VEHICLE APPEARED TO SHOW NO INJURY. \*BF

**Additional Summary:**

**Toyota ID No:** NHTSA ODI No: 1010276  
**Date of Incident:** 2001/11  
**Vehicle:** 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY  
**Location of Incident:** LYNNHURST, NJ  
**NHTSA Summary:** CONSUMER WAS DRIVING ABOUT 40 MPH AND THE ACCELERATOR PEDAL BECAME STUCK. DRIVER HAD TO TURN OFF THE IGNITION IN ORDER TO GET THE VEHICLE TO STOP. \*AC

**Additional Summary:**

**Toyota ID No:** NHTSA ODI No: 1001648  
**Date of Incident:** 2001/10  
**Vehicle:** 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY  
**Location of Incident:** BIRMINGHAM, AL

*Safety Research & Strategies  
Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A*

166

**Location of Incident:** LOUISVILLE, KY

**NHTSA Summary:** THE CONSUMER EXPERIENCED SUDDEN ACCELERATION. THE BRAKES FAILED TO WORK CAUSING AN ACCIDENT. \*NM THE CONSUMER'S VEHICLE COLLIDED WITH ANOTHER VEHICLE AT A STOP SIGN. \*SC THE AIR BAG DID NOT DEPLOY. \*BF

**Additional Summary:**

**Toyota ID No:** NHTSA ODI No: 1010582  
**Date of Incident:** 2001/11  
**Vehicle:** 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY  
**Location of Incident:** NEW LONDON, CT  
**NHTSA Summary:** WHILE MAKING A LEFT TURN INTO A PARKING SPACE, THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED WITHOUT WARNING. AS A RESULT THE VEHICLE COLLIDED INTO A PARKED VEHICLE. THE CAR HAD TRY TO BE DECREASED. PLEASE PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. \*BL WHILE EXITING A HIGHWAY AT 60 MPH, I REMOVED FOOT FROM ACCELERATOR TO CHANGE INTO NEXT VEHICLE. SUDDENLY ACCELERATED TO 90 MPH. WAS ABLE TO CONTROL VEHICLE BY APPLYING BRAKES. ALSO, DEALER REPAIRED FRONT BUMPER. \*AK

**Additional Summary:**

**Toyota ID No:** NHTSA ODI No: 1010910  
**Date of Incident:** 2001/11  
**Vehicle:** 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY  
**Location of Incident:** JEFFERSON, VA  
**NHTSA Summary:** WHILE BACKING OUT OF A DRIVEWAY AND SHIFTING FROM REVERSE INTO DRIVE, VEHICLE SUDDENLY ACCELERATED OUT-OF-CONTROL INTO ADJACENT NEIGHBOR'S YARD. IMMEDIATE AND CONTINUOUS APPLICATION OF BRAKES DID NOTHING -- DRIVER COULD NOT TO REY AND NARROWLY AVOIDED STRIKING A HOUSE. INSTEAD, I WAS FORCED TO STRIKE A ROW OF TREES TO STOP AN UNWARY VEHICLE. FRONTAL AIR BAGS FAILED TO DEPLOY ON EITHER SIDE. MAY IT NOT BEEN FOR THE TREES, I WOULD BE STRUCK A TWO-DOOR PICKUP TRUCK, PARKED NEXT TO PICKUP, AND THE ORIGINAL PICKUP TRUCK WOULD HAVE BEEN HIT. MY 10-YEAR-OLD SON AND I WILL BE PERMANENTLY SCARED FOREVER BY THIS INCIDENT. PLEASE FORCE TOYOTA TO RECALL ALL HERE. PLEASE SEND MY PRAYERS FOR A DEATH. PLEASE!!!! \*AK

**Additional Summary:**

**Toyota ID No:** NHTSA ODI No: 1010644  
**Date of Incident:** 2001/11  
**Vehicle:** 2001 LEXUS ES330  
**Location of Incident:** MCKENNA, VA  
**NHTSA Summary:** I PURCHASED A NEW LEXUS ES330 AND IT HAS 3 PROBLEMS: 1) BUMPY RIDE AT LOW AND HIGH SPEED, 2) ACCELERATION LAG AFTER CLIPPING, 3) HIGH ECU WHEN COASTING DOWNHILL. \*AK

**Additional Summary:**

*Safety Research & Strategies  
Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A*

167

**Toyota ID No:** NHTSA ODI No: 1011038

**NHTSA ODI No:** 1011038  
**Date of Incident:** 2001/11  
**Vehicle:** 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY SOLARA  
**Location of Incident:** BIRMINGHAM, AL  
**NHTSA Summary:** WHEN MAKING TURNS (AND SOMETIMES JUST WHEN) ACCELERATOR PEDAL GOES AND ALL LIKE IT HESITATE WHEN THE THROTTLE IS DECREASED AND THEN LUNGES FORWARD INSTEAD OF SLOWLY CAUSING THE DRIVER TO LOSE CONTROL. \*BF

**Additional Summary:**

**Toyota ID No:** NHTSA ODI No: 1011218  
**Date of Incident:** 2001/11  
**Vehicle:** 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY  
**Location of Incident:** FAIRFAXVILLE, VA  
**NHTSA Summary:** CONSUMER'S VEHICLE EXPERIENCED THE VERY SAME PROBLEM AS MENTIONED IN RECALL 0101009 CONCERNING SPEED CONTROL CABLE/ACCELERATOR STICKING. \*AK

**Additional Summary:**

**Toyota ID No:** NHTSA ODI No: 1011212  
**Date of Incident:** 2001/11  
**Vehicle:** 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY  
**Location of Incident:** RED BANK, NJ  
**NHTSA Summary:** WHEN DRIVING INTERMITTENTLY THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED. THIS CONDITION HAS OCCURRED 4 TIMES WITHIN TWO MONTHS. VEHICLE RUSHED TO THE DEALER ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS. DEALER WAS UNABLE TO LOCATE THE CAUSE OR DUPLICATE THE PROBLEM. \*AK THIS PROBLEM ALSO OCCURRED WHEN THE VEHICLE WAS IN REVERSE. \*BF

**Additional Summary:**

**Toyota ID No:** NHTSA ODI No: 1011217  
**Date of Incident:** 2001/11  
**Vehicle:** 2001 LEXUS ES330  
**Location of Incident:** CAPE CORAL, FL  
**NHTSA Summary:** WHEN RETURNING TO A HIGH SPEED (40-50 MPH) AND THEN ACCELERATING, THE VEHICLE LAGS AND THEN LUNGES TO OVERCOMPENSATE. IT DOES THIS VIRTUALLY EVERY TIME, MAKING IT UNSAFE IN HEAVY TRAFFIC. \*BF

**Additional Summary:**

**Toyota ID No:** NHTSA ODI No: 1010160  
**Date of Incident:** 2001/11  
**Vehicle:** 2001 LEXUS ES330  
**Location of Incident:** MESA, AZ  
**NHTSA Summary:**

*Safety Research & Strategies  
Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A*

168

<p>VEHICLE EXPERIENCED REBIRTH WHEN DRIVING TO THE INTERSECTION, AND VEHICLE WILL NOT GO FORWARD WITH ANY POWER. CONSUMER DEMAND THE ACCELERATOR, BUT THE VEHICLE WILL NOT MOVE WITH ANY FORCE. CONSUMER TOOK THE VEHICLE TO THE DEALER, BUT RECEIVED NO ASSISTANCE. *AK</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10002010  <b>NHTSA GM No:</b> 20041204  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20041204  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2004 TOYOTA CAMRY  <b>Location of Incident:</b> AUSTIN, TX</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>  I WAS STUPID TO TRAFFIC ON HIGH IN AUSTIN DUE TO AN ACCIDENT AHEAD. I HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO MOVE TO ON EXIST LANE AND AFTER MOVING TO THAT LANE, NOTICED A VEHICLE COMING TOWARD ME AT HIGH SPEED. MY WAY WAS CLEAR TO ACCELERATE AND I DID SO, PRESSING THE ACCELERATOR HARDLY IN THE WAY DOWN. NOTHING HAPPENED AND I PRESSED THE ACCELERATOR THE HIGHER AND TO THE FLOOR. AFTER A SHORT TIME, THE ENGINE BEGINS TO ACCELERATE. THERE WAS A LATER, ON ONE "I" TOOK THE CAR TO THE DEALER AND EXPLAINED WHAT HAD HAPPENED. AFTER EXAMINING THE CAR, THE DEALER CALLED TO ASK US ON THAT THEY HAD CHECKED THE CAR OVER AND EVERYTHING WAS FINE. HE FURTHER INSISTED THAT THE 2004 CAMRY WAS EQUIPPED WITH A "WIDE-OPEN-THROTTLE" ACCELERATOR. NO ONE WORKS THERE, SO DAMAGE WAS DONE, BUT I AM CONCERNED THAT THIS CAR WILL NOT RESPOND QUICKLY IN A DANGEROUS SITUATION. FOR GOD KNOWS THAT THERE AN ISOLATED SITUATION. WE HAD GIVEN A DEMONSTRATOR, A CYLINDER CAMBI, ABOUT TEN MONTHS BEFORE WE PURCHASED OURS. MY WIFE WAS DRIVING AND PREPARED HARD ON THE ACCELERATOR TO GET IT TO MOVE IN AN EMERGENCY LANE AND IT ALSO DID NOT RESPOND. AT THAT TIME, I DID NOT REALIZE ANY IMPORTANCE TO THE CAR NOT RESPONDING, THINKING MY WIFE WASN'T ATTEMPTING TO ACCELERATE AS QUICKLY AS SHE DESIRED. *AK</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10005466  <b>NHTSA GM No:</b> 20041207  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20041207  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2004 TOYOTA CAMRY  <b>Location of Incident:</b> FAIRFAX PARK, OH</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>  WHILE PULLING INTO A PARKING SPACE THE CONSUMER HEARD A LOUD NOISE COMING FROM HIS VEHICLE. THE VEHICLE BEGINS TO ACCELERATE. HE HEARS A LOUD NOISE, A BRICK WALL, NO NOISES WERE REPORTED. THE VEHICLE WAS TAKEN TO THE DEALER AND THE PROBLEM IS STILL UNDETERMINED. *H</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10005583  <b>NHTSA GM No:</b> 20041209  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20041209  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2004 TOYOTA CAMRY  <b>Location of Incident:</b> FLORENCE, KY</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p>	<p>THE THROTTLE STICK WAS OFF ON THE CAR WHEN PUT IN DRIVE, FROM A PARKED POSITION. THIS CAUSED THE CAR TO GO COMPLETELY OUT OF CONTROL, KICKING SEVERAL OBJECTS COMING TO REST IN THE MIDDLE OF A ROAD. *NM</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10003307  <b>NHTSA GM No:</b> 20041210  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20041210  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2004 LEXUS RX300  <b>Location of Incident:</b> WEST SPRING, MD</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>  VEHICLE WAS EXPERIENCING A REPEATED ACCELERATION PROBLEM. CONSUMER WAS PARKING THE VEHICLE WHEN THE ACCELERATION BEGAN. VEHICLE HIT A BRICK PILLAR. *AK</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10012278  <b>NHTSA GM No:</b> 20041212  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20041212  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2004 TOYOTA HIGHLANDER  <b>Location of Incident:</b> BALTIMORE, MD</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>  WHILE APPLYING THE ACCELERATOR PEDAL, VEHICLE HESITATED TO ACCELERATE. DRIVER APPLIED THE ACCELERATOR PEDAL NUMEROUS TIMES AND THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED INCONSIDERABLY. DRIVER WAS ABLE TO MAINTAIN CONTROL OF THE VEHICLE, AND DROVE IT TO THE DEALER FOR INSPECTION. MECHANIC DETERMINED THAT IT WAS NORMAL FOR THE VEHICLE TO HESITATE WHEN APPLYING THE ACCELERATOR PEDAL. *AK *EP *NM</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10011310  <b>NHTSA GM No:</b> 20041217  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20041217  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2004 TOYOTA CAMRY  <b>Location of Incident:</b> NORTH CLARKEFIELD, OH</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>  WHILE DRIVING THE THROTTLE STICK, THIS CAUSED THE CONSUMER TO HEAR TWO ANOTHER VEHICLE (ONE TIME). VEHICLE WAS TOWED. DEALERSHIP WAS NOTIFIED, BUT DID NOT RESOLVE THE PROBLEM. *AK</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10009774  <b>NHTSA GM No:</b> 20041211  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20041211  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2004 LEXUS RX300  <b>Location of Incident:</b> MT. KLEANSVILLE, OH</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>  ON HIGHWAY 60, CONSUMER THIS CAR HAD ACCELERATED UNEXPECTEDLY WHEN PUTTING IT IN GEAR BOTH FORWARD AND REVERSE. THE LAST OCCURRENCE THE CAR WENT FORWARD, JUMPING A LOW CURB AND HITTING A TREE. *AK *BAD NO CONTROL OVER WHAT HAPPENED AND I AM AFRAID TO DRIVE THIS CAR ANY MORE.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b>  <b>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</b></p> <p>169</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10011223  <b>NHTSA GM No:</b> 20041215  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20041215  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2004 TOYOTA CAMRY  <b>Location of Incident:</b> JACKSON, ND</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>  VEHICLE HESITATED THEN LAUNCHED FORWARD BEFORE ACCELERATING. VEHICLE WAS DRIVEN BY THE DEALER'S THREE YEAR-OLD FEMALE EMPLOYEE. TECHNICALLY THE VEHICLE WAS PERFORMING AS IT SHOULD, BUT THERE WAS A PROBLEM WITH THE NEW DRIVE BY WIRE TECHNOLOGY FOR WHICH MANUFACTURER HAD TO PROVIDE A REMEDY. *AK</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10004416  <b>NHTSA GM No:</b> 20041218  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20041218  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2004 LEXUS RX300  <b>Location of Incident:</b> FENWAUKEE, WI</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>  I HAVE HAD TWO PROBLEMS. ONE BEING YESTERDAY I CAME OUT TO MY CAR IN THE PARKING LOT, REACHED MY KEY CAR, AND THERE WAS NO REACTION. HAD TO PUT CAR IN PARK TO STOP CAR. THE BRAKE WERE LOCKED. THEY SAID IT WAS THE BOOSTER THAT HAD TO BE REPAIRED. THE SECOND PROBLEM IS HAD ALMOST 14 ACCIDENTS, WHEN TRYING TO ACCELERATE FROM A STOP SIGN. I HET THE GAS AND THE CAR DIDN'T GO IT LAUGH AND THEN GOES. THIS REACTION IS VERY VERY RARE AND I HAD NO VERY WORRIED ABOUT DRIVING WITH KIDS. I KNOW THAT THIS CAR FOR THE SAFETY FEATURES, AND NOW I'M SCARED TO DRIVE IT. WHAT IF MY BRAKES FAILED ON THE HIGHWAY? I WAS "OH" WHAT IF MY CAR LAYS IN FRONT OF A TRUCK? *AK</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10008971  <b>NHTSA GM No:</b> 20041227  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20041227  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2004 TOYOTA AVALON  <b>Location of Incident:</b> FOREST HILL, MD</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>  WHILE DRIVING IN STOP AND GO TRAFFIC, THE VEHICLE ENGINE REVVED UP AND THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED FORWARD INTO ANOTHER VEHICLE. *NM. THE REPAIR MANAGER, THE LOST WHEN IT STATES THAT THIS MAKES THE POWER THE VEHICLE HAS. READ THEN DATE. THE CONSUMER REKINDLED 1000000. HEAVY BRAKE CAME FROM THE FRONT OF THE VEHICLE AFTER THE BRAKE. THE CONSUMER READ TO TURN THE KEY TO THE OFF POSITION TO STOP THE ENGINE FROM RACING. *TC *FB</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10005612  <b>NHTSA GM No:</b> 20041220  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20041220  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2004 TOYOTA CAMRY  <b>Location of Incident:</b> LAKESIDE PARK, MO</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p>	<p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b>  <b>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</b></p> <p>170</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10009774  <b>NHTSA GM No:</b> 20041211  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20041211  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2004 LEXUS RX300  <b>Location of Incident:</b> MT. KLEANSVILLE, OH</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>  ON HIGHWAY 60, CONSUMER THIS CAR HAD ACCELERATED UNEXPECTEDLY WHEN PUTTING IT IN GEAR BOTH FORWARD AND REVERSE. THE LAST OCCURRENCE THE CAR WENT FORWARD, JUMPING A LOW CURB AND HITTING A TREE. *AK *BAD NO CONTROL OVER WHAT HAPPENED AND I AM AFRAID TO DRIVE THIS CAR ANY MORE.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10004416  <b>NHTSA GM No:</b> 20041218  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20041218  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2004 LEXUS RX300  <b>Location of Incident:</b> FENWAUKEE, WI</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>  I HAVE HAD TWO PROBLEMS. ONE BEING YESTERDAY I CAME OUT TO MY CAR IN THE PARKING LOT, REACHED MY KEY CAR, AND THERE WAS NO REACTION. HAD TO PUT CAR IN PARK TO STOP CAR. THE BRAKE WERE LOCKED. THEY SAID IT WAS THE BOOSTER THAT HAD TO BE REPAIRED. THE SECOND PROBLEM IS HAD ALMOST 14 ACCIDENTS, WHEN TRYING TO ACCELERATE FROM A STOP SIGN. I HET THE GAS AND THE CAR DIDN'T GO IT LAUGH AND THEN GOES. THIS REACTION IS VERY VERY RARE AND I HAD NO VERY WORRIED ABOUT DRIVING WITH KIDS. I KNOW THAT THIS CAR FOR THE SAFETY FEATURES, AND NOW I'M SCARED TO DRIVE IT. WHAT IF MY BRAKES FAILED ON THE HIGHWAY? I WAS "OH" WHAT IF MY CAR LAYS IN FRONT OF A TRUCK? *AK</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10008971  <b>NHTSA GM No:</b> 20041227  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20041227  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2004 TOYOTA AVALON  <b>Location of Incident:</b> FOREST HILL, MD</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>  WHILE DRIVING IN STOP AND GO TRAFFIC, THE VEHICLE ENGINE REVVED UP AND THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED FORWARD INTO ANOTHER VEHICLE. *NM. THE REPAIR MANAGER, THE LOST WHEN IT STATES THAT THIS MAKES THE POWER THE VEHICLE HAS. READ THEN DATE. THE CONSUMER REKINDLED 1000000. HEAVY BRAKE CAME FROM THE FRONT OF THE VEHICLE AFTER THE BRAKE. THE CONSUMER READ TO TURN THE KEY TO THE OFF POSITION TO STOP THE ENGINE FROM RACING. *TC *FB</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10005612  <b>NHTSA GM No:</b> 20041220  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20041220  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2004 TOYOTA CAMRY  <b>Location of Incident:</b> LAKESIDE PARK, MO</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b>  <b>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</b></p> <p>171</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10009774  <b>NHTSA GM No:</b> 20041211  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20041211  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2004 LEXUS RX300  <b>Location of Incident:</b> MT. KLEANSVILLE, OH</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>  ON HIGHWAY 60, CONSUMER THIS CAR HAD ACCELERATED UNEXPECTEDLY WHEN PUTTING IT IN GEAR BOTH FORWARD AND REVERSE. THE LAST OCCURRENCE THE CAR WENT FORWARD, JUMPING A LOW CURB AND HITTING A TREE. *AK *BAD NO CONTROL OVER WHAT HAPPENED AND I AM AFRAID TO DRIVE THIS CAR ANY MORE.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10004416  <b>NHTSA GM No:</b> 20041218  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20041218  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2004 LEXUS RX300  <b>Location of Incident:</b> FENWAUKEE, WI</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>  I HAVE HAD TWO PROBLEMS. ONE BEING YESTERDAY I CAME OUT TO MY CAR IN THE PARKING LOT, REACHED MY KEY CAR, AND THERE WAS NO REACTION. HAD TO PUT CAR IN PARK TO STOP CAR. THE BRAKE WERE LOCKED. THEY SAID IT WAS THE BOOSTER THAT HAD TO BE REPAIRED. THE SECOND PROBLEM IS HAD ALMOST 14 ACCIDENTS, WHEN TRYING TO ACCELERATE FROM A STOP SIGN. I HET THE GAS AND THE CAR DIDN'T GO IT LAUGH AND THEN GOES. THIS REACTION IS VERY VERY RARE AND I HAD NO VERY WORRIED ABOUT DRIVING WITH KIDS. I KNOW THAT THIS CAR FOR THE SAFETY FEATURES, AND NOW I'M SCARED TO DRIVE IT. WHAT IF MY BRAKES FAILED ON THE HIGHWAY? I WAS "OH" WHAT IF MY CAR LAYS IN FRONT OF A TRUCK? *AK</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10008971  <b>NHTSA GM No:</b> 20041227  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20041227  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2004 TOYOTA AVALON  <b>Location of Incident:</b> FOREST HILL, MD</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>  WHILE DRIVING IN STOP AND GO TRAFFIC, THE VEHICLE ENGINE REVVED UP AND THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED FORWARD INTO ANOTHER VEHICLE. *NM. THE REPAIR MANAGER, THE LOST WHEN IT STATES THAT THIS MAKES THE POWER THE VEHICLE HAS. READ THEN DATE. THE CONSUMER REKINDLED 1000000. HEAVY BRAKE CAME FROM THE FRONT OF THE VEHICLE AFTER THE BRAKE. THE CONSUMER READ TO TURN THE KEY TO THE OFF POSITION TO STOP THE ENGINE FROM RACING. *TC *FB</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10005612  <b>NHTSA GM No:</b> 20041220  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20041220  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2004 TOYOTA CAMRY  <b>Location of Incident:</b> LAKESIDE PARK, MO</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p>	<p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b>  <b>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</b></p> <p>172</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10009774  <b>NHTSA GM No:</b> 20041211  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20041211  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2004 LEXUS RX300  <b>Location of Incident:</b> MT. KLEANSVILLE, OH</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>  ON HIGHWAY 60, CONSUMER THIS CAR HAD ACCELERATED UNEXPECTEDLY WHEN PUTTING IT IN GEAR BOTH FORWARD AND REVERSE. THE LAST OCCURRENCE THE CAR WENT FORWARD, JUMPING A LOW CURB AND HITTING A TREE. *AK *BAD NO CONTROL OVER WHAT HAPPENED AND I AM AFRAID TO DRIVE THIS CAR ANY MORE.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10004416  <b>NHTSA GM No:</b> 20041218  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20041218  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2004 LEXUS RX300  <b>Location of Incident:</b> FENWAUKEE, WI</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>  I HAVE HAD TWO PROBLEMS. ONE BEING YESTERDAY I CAME OUT TO MY CAR IN THE PARKING LOT, REACHED MY KEY CAR, AND THERE WAS NO REACTION. HAD TO PUT CAR IN PARK TO STOP CAR. THE BRAKE WERE LOCKED. THEY SAID IT WAS THE BOOSTER THAT HAD TO BE REPAIRED. THE SECOND PROBLEM IS HAD ALMOST 14 ACCIDENTS, WHEN TRYING TO ACCELERATE FROM A STOP SIGN. I HET THE GAS AND THE CAR DIDN'T GO IT LAUGH AND THEN GOES. THIS REACTION IS VERY VERY RARE AND I HAD NO VERY WORRIED ABOUT DRIVING WITH KIDS. I KNOW THAT THIS CAR FOR THE SAFETY FEATURES, AND NOW I'M SCARED TO DRIVE IT. WHAT IF MY BRAKES FAILED ON THE HIGHWAY? I WAS "OH" WHAT IF MY CAR LAYS IN FRONT OF A TRUCK? *AK</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10008971  <b>NHTSA GM No:</b> 20041227  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20041227  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2004 TOYOTA AVALON  <b>Location of Incident:</b> FOREST HILL, MD</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>  WHILE DRIVING IN STOP AND GO TRAFFIC, THE VEHICLE ENGINE REVVED UP AND THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED FORWARD INTO ANOTHER VEHICLE. *NM. THE REPAIR MANAGER, THE LOST WHEN IT STATES THAT THIS MAKES THE POWER THE VEHICLE HAS. READ THEN DATE. THE CONSUMER REKINDLED 1000000. HEAVY BRAKE CAME FROM THE FRONT OF THE VEHICLE AFTER THE BRAKE. THE CONSUMER READ TO TURN THE KEY TO THE OFF POSITION TO STOP THE ENGINE FROM RACING. *TC *FB</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10005612  <b>NHTSA GM No:</b> 20041220  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20041220  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2004 TOYOTA CAMRY  <b>Location of Incident:</b> LAKESIDE PARK, MO</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p>

<p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b> WHILE DRIVING AT 33 MPH VEHICLE ACCELERATED WITHOUT WARNING. WHEN APPLIED THE BRAKE VEHICLE ACCELERATED EVEN MORE. AS A RESULT, THE VEHICLE COLLIDED INTO TWO PARKED CARS AND A BRICK WALL. DRIVER SUSTAINED HEAD INJURY. *AE. THE CONSUMER RECEIVED A CRASH RECALL IN FIELD EXAMINED FOR AUTO LOSS. WHEN THE CONSUMER PRESSED THE GAS PEDAL THE RPM WERE HIGH. ONE RECALL REPORTED. *TC</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 10107942 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20090912 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2009 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> NEW BERN, NC</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b> WHILE DRIVING THE VEHICLE IN ON PARK THE VEHICLE ACCELERATES WITHOUT WARNING NO IMPACT REPORTED. THE CAUSE HAS YET TO BE DETERMINED. PLEASE PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. *ID</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 10104511 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20090817 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2005 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> LITTLE ELK, TN</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b> WHILE PULLING INTO A RET STORE PARKING LOT, THE VEHICLE SUDENLY ACCELERATED UNCONTROLLABLY CAUSING ME TO CRASH INTO A RESTAURANT WALL IN FRONT OF THE STORE. THERE WERE PERSONS INCIDENTLY INVOLVED. THE ACCELERATION OF THE VEHICLE IN THE HOUR IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE CRASH OCCURRED. *B</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 10103014 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20090817 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2004 LEXUS ES350 <b>Location of Incident:</b> LAKESIDE, IL</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b> WHILE ATTEMPTING TO ACCELERATE THE VEHICLE HEATED, THEN BURST FORWARD WITHOUT WARNING. NO IMPACT REPORTED. PLEASE PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. *B. VEHICLE AIGES EVEN WHEN VEHICLE IS AT A COMPLETE STOP. NO COLLISION. *AE. *TC</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 10100892 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20090912 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2009 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> BAYVIEW, CA</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b> <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i></p>	<p>WHILE THE DRIVER'S FOOT WAS ON THE BRAKE PEDAL VEHICLE SUDENLY ACCELERATED UNCONTROLLABLY APPLIED THE BRAKE PEDAL NUMEROUS TIMES AND THE VEHICLE CONTINUED TO ACCELERATE THOUGH ABLE TO MAINTAIN CONTROL OF THE VEHICLE AND PULLED OVER. THE VEHICLE WAS TAKEN TO THE DEALER FOR INSPECTION. THE CAUSE HAS NOT BEEN DETERMINED. *AE</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 10119217 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20090828 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2009 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> DARTMOUTH, VT</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b> CONSUMER COMPLAINED ABOUT A WIDOMY ACCELERATION PROBLEM. WHILE DRIVING AT APPROXIMATELY 10 MPH AND APPROACHING A TRAFFIC LIGHT THE ACCELERATOR PEDAL STUCK, CAUSING THE VEHICLE TO ACCELERATE WITHOUT WARNING, AND HITTING A GUARD RAIL. UPON IMPACT, AIR BAGS FAILED TO DEPLOY. THE VEHICLE WAS TOTALLED. *AE</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 10118165 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20090801 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 LEXUS ES <b>Location of Incident:</b> ATLANTA, GA</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b> GT. THE CONTACT OWNS A 2001 LEXUS ES330. THE CONTACT STATED THAT UPON ACCELERATION AFTER BLOWING DOWN THE GURCLE WILL SCUR FORWARD. THE DEALERSHIP REPLACED A TRANSMISSION CHIP THAT WAS RETURNED IN A TECHNICAL SERVICE BULLETIN. THE PROBLEM DISMINISHED FOR A WHILE, BUT THE CORRECTION DID NOT REMOVE THE PROBLEM. THE CONTACT STATED THAT THIS DID NOT HAPPEN EVERY TIME WHILE DRIVING THE VEHICLE, BUT ENOUGH TIMES TO CAUSE THE CONTACT TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT THE VEHICLE. THE MANUFACTURER STATED THAT THEY WERE DELIBERATE TO OFFER ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE BECAUSE THE VEHICLE WAS PERFORMING UNDER NORMAL OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS FOR A VEHICLE WITH ECT. *AE</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 10111171 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20090824 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 TOYOTA SIENNA <b>Location of Incident:</b> DOWNEY, NJ</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b> WHILE TRAVELING IN A HIGH SPEEDWAY THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED TO 80 MPH. RESULTS IN A CRASH AND A ROLL OVER. THE CONSUMER WAS NOT INJURED IN THE COLLISION. *AE. *TC *B</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 10117285 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20090828 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 TOYOTA SIENNA <b>Location of Incident:</b> DOWNEY, NJ</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b> THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED TO 80 MPH WHILE ON THE HIGHWAY. THE CONSUMER PRESSED THE BRAKE PEDAL, CHANGING LANE TO AVOID A COLLISION. THE CONSUMER PROCEEDED TO STRIKE A CONCRETE BARRIER. NO INJURIES WERE REPORTED. *AE</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 10118984 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20090824 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> WATERTOWN, NY</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b> WHILE DRIVING IN MATH THE STEERING VEERED TO THE RIGHT AND THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED WITHOUT WARNING. AS A RESULT THE CONSUMER LOST CONTROL OF THE VEHICLE AND COLLIDED INTO A TREE. NO INJURIES REPORTED. THE CAUSE HAS NOT BEEN DETERMINED. PLEASE PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. *B</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 10111822 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 10/09/07 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 TOYOTA COROLLA <b>Location of Incident:</b> FLORENCE, SC</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b> WE WERE TRAVELING FROM NY TO RETURN HOME TO SC. ON MY 2001 TOYOTA COROLLA. REAR WAS NOTED ON THE CC SWITCH ON 2/4/08. ON 8/11/2008 THE CRUISE CONTROL WAS ENGAGED AT 7 MPH. THE CC FAILED TO DISENGAGE WHEN BRAKES WERE APPLIED. CC FAILED TO DISENGAGE AT THE STOP. THE ACCELERATION WOULD NOT STOP DESPITE BRAKE APPLICATION. THE TRANSMISSION SELECTOR WAS PUT INTO NEUTRAL AND THE CAR WAS STOPPED WITH FOOT AND HANDS ON BRAKES. THE ENGINE CONTINUED TO RUN AT 1800 RPM UNTIL THE ENGINE WAS TURNED OFF. AN ILL-LEGAL LAW CONSEQUENTLY, ACCIDENT REPORTED THE CC IT REMOVED THE CC FROM THE VEHICLE CONTINUING TO ACCELERATE THOUGH ABLE TO MAINTAIN CONTROL. A HIGH SPEED COLLISION. THE COROLLA DASH 1027221480 WILL BE SERVICED AT THE TOYOTA DEALERSHIP IN FLORENCE, SC.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 10112409 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20090829 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 TOYOTA SIENNA <b>Location of Incident:</b> NASHVILLE, TN</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b> THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED WHILE DRIVING IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD. THE BRAKE WAS ON, AND THE VEHICLE WENT TO 40 MPH. CONSUMER WAS ABLE TO STOP BY SHIFTING INTO PARK, APPLYING THE EMERGENCY BRAKE, AND TURNING THE KEY OFF. *AE</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b> <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i></p>
<p><b>Date of Incident:</b> 20091007 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2004 LEXUS RX300 <b>Location of Incident:</b> BOSTON, MA</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b> THE ACCELERATOR STUCK, AND CONSUMER WAS NOT ABLE TO STOP THE VEHICLE. CONSUMER LEFT THE VEHICLE AND CONTACTED THE MANUFACTURER. THEY HAD THE VEHICLE TOWED. PROPERTY DAMAGE. REPAIRS BEING CONSIDERED. *AE BECAUSE CONSUMER HAD NO BRAKE KEYS HE HAD TO USE THE EMERGENCY BRAKE WHICH MADE THE CAR DOWN ON TOP OF THE IN PARK WHILE MOVING. THEY TOOK THE CAR OFF THE HIGHWAY. THIS VEHICLE CAME WITH NO CLIPS ON THE KICK PANEL. *B</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 10110114 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20090912 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2009 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> DARNESTOWN, MD</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b> WHILE MY WIFE AND I WERE AT A COMPLETE STOP IN A LINE OF TRAFFIC, OUR ELEVEN MONTH-OLD CAMRY SUDENLY ACCELERATED UNEXPECTEDLY AND WITHOUT WARNING WHILE MY FOOT WAS SQUARELY AND FIRMLY ON THE BRAKE PEDAL. WITHIN A FEW SECONDS, (1) THE CAR VELOCITLY LUNGED FORWARD, (AND) INSTINCTIVELY PRESSED HARDER ON THE BRAKE TO KEEP FROM PLUNGING INTO THE LANE OF VEHICLE IN FRONT OF ME. WE HEARD THE ENGINE ACCELERATING, AND (3) CHECKED THE TACHOMETER AND OBSERVED IT STEADILY INCREASING FROM A NORMAL IDLE SPEED TO ALMOST THE MAXIMUM. INSTANTANEOUS CONTROL OF THE VEHICLE AND PREVENTED THE ENGINE FROM CONTINUING TO ITS PEAK RPM. QUICKLY SHIFTING THE CAR INTO PARK AND TURNING IT OFF. AFTER APPROXIMATELY 20-30 SECONDS I LEFT STARTED THE CAR, AND THE IDLE WAS ONCE AGAIN NORMAL. I TROUBLE SHOT THE CAR TO THE NEAREST DEALERSHIP, APPROXIMATELY 1 HOUR'S WAY. THE CAR WAS NOT RETURN TO THE POSSESSION OF THE TOYOTA DEALER FOR OVER TWO MONTHS, AND THE RECALLS HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO REPLICATE THE EVENT OR FIND ANY RECORD OF THE INCIDENT IN THE UNUSUAL COMPUTER. *AE</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 10120942 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20090915 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2004 TOYOTA HIGHLANDER <b>Location of Incident:</b> HAZARDVILLE, PA</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b> IFT 2001 TOYOTA HIGHLANDER WITH IDENTIFICATION PROBLEM. FOR EXAMPLE, WHEN ENTERING INFORMATION AND HED TO ACCELERATE, IT THEREAFTER THEY QUICKLY RUSHED TO DEALER WHO LAD THEM BY TELLING THEY CANON. THE CAR VEHICLE HAS AN ELECTRIC THROTTLE CONTROL AND IS NOT CONTROLLED BY A THROTTLE CABLE AS PART OF FEDERAL EMISSIONS REGULATION. THE ENGINE CHANGING GEAR A LITTLE LONGER TO DO KNCE THE THROTTLE DOES NOT OPEN ALL THE WAY OUT. *TT</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 10111057 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20090823</p> <p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b> <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i></p>	<p><b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 TOYOTA SIENNA <b>Location of Incident:</b> DOWNEY, NJ</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b> THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED TO 80 MPH WHILE ON THE HIGHWAY. THE CONSUMER PRESSED THE BRAKE PEDAL, CHANGING LANE TO AVOID A COLLISION. THE CONSUMER PROCEEDED TO STRIKE A CONCRETE BARRIER. NO INJURIES WERE REPORTED. *AE</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 10118984 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20090824 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> WATERTOWN, NY</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b> WHILE DRIVING IN MATH THE STEERING VEERED TO THE RIGHT AND THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED WITHOUT WARNING. AS A RESULT THE CONSUMER LOST CONTROL OF THE VEHICLE AND COLLIDED INTO A TREE. NO INJURIES REPORTED. THE CAUSE HAS NOT BEEN DETERMINED. PLEASE PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. *B</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 10111822 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 10/09/07 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 TOYOTA COROLLA <b>Location of Incident:</b> FLORENCE, SC</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b> WE WERE TRAVELING FROM NY TO RETURN HOME TO SC. ON MY 2001 TOYOTA COROLLA. REAR WAS NOTED ON THE CC SWITCH ON 2/4/08. ON 8/11/2008 THE CRUISE CONTROL WAS ENGAGED AT 7 MPH. THE CC FAILED TO DISENGAGE WHEN BRAKES WERE APPLIED. CC FAILED TO DISENGAGE AT THE STOP. THE ACCELERATION WOULD NOT STOP DESPITE BRAKE APPLICATION. THE TRANSMISSION SELECTOR WAS PUT INTO NEUTRAL AND THE CAR WAS STOPPED WITH FOOT AND HANDS ON BRAKES. THE ENGINE CONTINUED TO RUN AT 1800 RPM UNTIL THE ENGINE WAS TURNED OFF. AN ILL-LEGAL LAW CONSEQUENTLY, ACCIDENT REPORTED THE CC IT REMOVED THE CC FROM THE VEHICLE CONTINUING TO ACCELERATE THOUGH ABLE TO MAINTAIN CONTROL. A HIGH SPEED COLLISION. THE COROLLA DASH 1027221480 WILL BE SERVICED AT THE TOYOTA DEALERSHIP IN FLORENCE, SC.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 10112409 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20090829 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 TOYOTA SIENNA <b>Location of Incident:</b> NASHVILLE, TN</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b> THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED WHILE DRIVING IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD. THE BRAKE WAS ON, AND THE VEHICLE WENT TO 40 MPH. CONSUMER WAS ABLE TO STOP BY SHIFTING INTO PARK, APPLYING THE EMERGENCY BRAKE, AND TURNING THE KEY OFF. *AE</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b> <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i></p>





<p>2001 CAMRY XLE V-6, CAR REFLECTED 40 MPH UPON ACCELERATION FROM DEAD STOP. ACCELERATOR PEDAL HAD A LAG BEFORE CAR WOULD ACCELERATE. WHILE MOVING ON THE HIGHWAY, CAR WOULD DECELERATE WHEN DEPRESSING THE ACCELERATOR. BEFORE THE CAR WOULD ACCELERATE, DRIVE ANOTHER 200 CAMRY V-6 AND EXPERIENCED THE SAME THING.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	
<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> <b>Date of Incident:</b> <b>Vehicle:</b> <b>Location of Incident:</b> <b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p>	<p>20122016 2001 TOYOTA HENNA MIDWESTBORO, TN I WAS PULLING OUT OF A PARKING SPACE IN A PARKING LOT. I PUT THE CAR IN REVERSE, PLACED MY FOOT ON THE BRAKE, PUT THE CAR INTO DRIVE, LIFTED MY FOOT OFF OF THE BRAKE AND THE CAR IMMEDIATELY BEGAN TO ACCELERATE WITHOUT MY FOOT EVEN TOUCHING THE ACCELERATOR. WHEN I PUT MY FOOT ON THE BRAKE, THE BRAKE PEDAL WENT ALL THE WAY DOWN TO THE FLOOR WITHOUT STOPPING THE VEHICLE. THE VAN STRUCK ANOTHER VEHICLE THAT WAS PARKED IN THE PARKING LOT, WENT OVER THE CURB OF THE PARKING LOT, DOWN AN EMMENTMENT INTO A ROWING AND BEACHED TOWARD A TREE. THE PASSENGER THAT WAS IN THE FRONT SEAT THEN REACHED OVER AND PUT THE CAR INTO PARK, WHILE I BROUGHT THE CAR TO A STOP. THE WHOLE TIME THE CAR WAS MOVING I WAS TRYING TO STOP THE CAR BY PUMPING THE BRAKES, BUT THEY DID NOT WORK. THE CAR WAS ACCELERATING THE ENTIRE TIME UNTIL THE PASSENGER STOPPED IT BY SHUTTING INTO PARK. THE AIRBAG DID NOT DEPLOY. DAMAGE WAS DONE TO THE FRONT PASSENGER SIDEWHEEL AND SIDE OF THE CAR, THE DRIVER'S SIDE FRONT TIRE EXPLODED. AFTER THE ACCIDENT, THE BRAKE DID FUNCTION.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> <b>Date of Incident:</b> <b>Vehicle:</b> <b>Location of Incident:</b> <b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p>	<p>30120972 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY ROSEMONT, IL ON THE CONSUMER OWNS A 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY. SHE TOOK THE VEHICLE TO THE CAR WASH. THE VEHICLE WAS PUT INTO NEUTRAL, ONLY IT CAME UP THE CONVEYER BELT AND ENTERED IN THE VEHICLE. PUT HER FOOT ON THE GAS AND THE VEHICLE DID NOT MOVE. THE VEHICLE WAS PUT INTO PARK. SHE PUT HER FOOT ON THE GAS. THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED INTO TRAFFIC. THE VEHICLE HIT A MEDIAN STRIP. THE AIRBAG DEPLOYED, AND THE CONSUMER WAS INJURED. SHE WAS TAKEN TO THE HOSPITAL. THE SCOPES, BELENDIA. SHE HAS A FRACTURED L4/L5, L5/S1 AND A TORN ROTATOR CUFF. THE VEHICLE WAS CONSIDERED BEYOND REPAIR AND WAS REPAIRED FOR A NEW. THE CONSUMER IS NOT SURE WHETHER THERE WAS A POLICE REPORT TAKEN. SHE WAS TAKEN TO THE EMERGENCY ROOM IMMEDIATELY AND DID NOT GET THE HOSPITAL SINCE THE VEH WAS NOT AVAILABLE. SHE IS STILL IN HOSPITAL. *N</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> <b>Date of Incident:</b></p>	<p>10121954 2001 TOYOTA Safety Research &amp; Strategic Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</p>
<p>TO A DIFFERENT DEALER FOR A SECOND OPINION WHO DETERMINED THERE WAS A VALVE STICK OPEN IN THE VEE SYSTEM AND REPAIR IT. BUT THE PROBLEM WAS PERMANENT. THE SAME FACTORY WAS CONTACTED BUT REJECTED THE CONTACT. A DEALERMAN THE CONTACT EXPRESSED CONCERN BECAUSE THE ONLY WAY TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE WAS BY DRIVING ON ROAD ON THE BRAKE PEDAL TO PREVENT A COLLISION. UPDATED 12/28/2006 *NM</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	
<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> <b>Date of Incident:</b> <b>Vehicle:</b> <b>Location of Incident:</b> <b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p>	<p>10121240 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY WELLSINGTON, DE DT: CALLER'S DAUGHTER-IN-LAW JUST GOT HER CAR WASHED AND WHEN SHE PULLED OUT OF THE CAR WASH, THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED WITHOUT WARNING. SHE PUMPED THE BRAKES AND TRIED TO STOP THE CAR, AND IT WOULD NOT STOP. THE CAR WENT INTO A LANE HIGHWAY AND WAS HIT BY AN 18 WHEELER AND A PICKUP TRUCK. DRIVER RESTARTED ENGINES AND NO ONE IN THE DRIVER OF THE PICKUP TRUCK. DRIVER RESTARTED REVERSE TREATMENT. VEHICLE WAS TOTALLED. MANUFACTURER WAS CONTACTED, AND WILL BE CREDITED BACK TO CALLER. CALLER STATED HER FIRST POSITION ACT THAT IN THE WRECK HER MOTHER-IN-LAW STARTED THE VEHICLE AND THE ENGINE RACED WHILE IT WAS IN PARK. THE ONLY WAY TO STOP IT WAS TO TURN IT OFF. AFTER THE ACCIDENT THE MACHINIST REPAIRED THE THROTTLE AND THE SPEEDOMETER. DEDUCTED 100 MPH POLICE REPORT WAS FILED *AK</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> <b>Date of Incident:</b> <b>Vehicle:</b> <b>Location of Incident:</b> <b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p>	<p>10124011 2001 LEXUS ES300 DOTHAN, AL AS I WAS PULLING INTO A PARKING SPACE MY SMALLER 10 HOURS V-6 ACCELERATED AND WENT OVER THE CURB AND A SMALL GRASS EMMENTMENT. IMMEDIATELY OPENED BRAKES AND IT DID NOT STOP. I WROTE DOWN. I FINALLY GOT THE CAR STOPPED. HANDEDLY NO ONE WAS IN THAT PARKING LOT. I DON'T KNOW WHAT DAMAGE HAS BEEN DONE TO THE CAR. THIS IS FRUSTRATING BECAUSE THERE WAS ABSOLUTELY NO CONTROL OVER THE CAR.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> <b>Date of Incident:</b> <b>Vehicle:</b> <b>Location of Incident:</b> <b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p>	<p>10121709 2001 TOYOTA COROLLA AUBURN, CA I WAS BRACING FOR A HEADLIGHT. AFTER COMING TO A COMPLETE STOP THE ENGINE BEGAN TO RACE WITH THE ENGINE BEING ABOVE 4000 RPM. I PULSED OFF THE THROTTLE. I HAD TO PRESS DOWN ON THE BRAKE PEDAL AS HARD AS I COULD AND WAS HAPPY I WAS ABLE TO HOLD THE CAR AT THE INTERSECTION. THIS WAS THE SECOND TIME THIS HAD HAPPENED. THE FIRST TIME OCCURRED APPROXIMATELY 2 MONTHS EARLIER.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p>Safety Research &amp; Strategic Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</p>	
<p>Vehicle: 2001 TOYOTA HIGHLANDER Location of Incident: LAKOTA, IL DT: CALLER SAID THAT TWICE THE VEHICLE WOULD NOT ACCELERATE WHEN HITTING THE GAS PEDAL. WHEN PRESSING THE GAS PEDAL TO PARK A CAR NOTHING HAPPENED FOR A FEW SECONDS. DEALER SAID THERE WAS NOTHING THEY COULD DO ABOUT IT, AND THAT WAS THE CAR THE VEHICLE WAS WORKING. DEALER SAID THEY COULD NOT REPLICATE THE PROBLEM. MANUFACTURER HAS NOT BEEN CONTACTED YET *AK <b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	
<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> <b>Date of Incident:</b> <b>Vehicle:</b> <b>Location of Incident:</b> <b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p>	<p>10121917 2001 TOYOTA HIGHLANDER WALDORF, MD DT: 2001 TOYOTA HIGHLANDER V-6. THE CONSUMER DROVE OFF THE LOT ON JUNE 1, 2005. THE CRUISE CONTROL DEACTIVATED IMMEDIATELY AND TO STOP. BUT AS IT WAS ACCELERATING A COUPLE OF MILES BEHIND THE HIGHLANDER SPEED. THE CONSUMER REQUESTED TO PARK THE TRUCK WHICH YIELDED. SUPPORT KIDNEY. THERE WAS SOMETHING A FORWARD DOWN HITTING AND RAPID ACCELERATION WHICH IS PRECEDED BY REVERSATION. THE CONSUMER APPROACHED A VILLAGE OVERSTATION, DOWNHILL WITH HER FOOT ON THE BRAKE. THE CONSUMER TOOK HER FOOT OFF OF THE BRAKE AND BEGAN TO MAKE A LEFT TURN ONTO DEERHILL STREET. THE CONSUMER TRIED TO APPLY A BIT OF GAS AND NOTHING HAPPENED. THE CONSUMER TRIED TO APPLY A BIT MORE GAS AND AGAIN NOTHING HAPPENED. THE THIRD TIME THE CONSUMER ADDED A BIT MORE GAS AND THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED TO A FAST CATCHING THE DEERHILL AND PASSENGER SIDE TO TIP BACK. THIS WAS A NARROW ROAD STREET IN A MAIN VILLAGE. THERE WERE LOTS OF POSSIBLE TARGETS, CARP KIDS BEARS, AND OTHERS. THEN THERE WAS THE UNEXPECTEDLY DOWN HITTING FOR BEARING EFFECT THAT TIPPED HEADS FORWARD, BUT THAT WAS ASSUMED TO BE FOR ANOTHER DAY. AND NO ONE GOT AS ANYONE ON BEHALF OF THE CONSUMER. THE DEALER SERVICE MANAGER DID NOT ADMIT THAT THERE WAS NO ACCESS TO ACCESSIBLE FOR THE MECHANICS. INABILITY TO DO SOMETHING. AFTER APPOINTMENT MORE GAS AND THE HEADLIGHTS OF THE TRANSMISSION. ABSOLUTELY NO IDENTIFICATION. SERVICE BULLETIN, THEN AND FOUND NONE, BUT FOUND ONE FROM JUNE 1, 2005 THAT RELATED TO RECALIBRATION OF THE TRANSMISSION. ABSOLUTELY NO IDENTIFICATION OF EXPRESSIONS OF CONCERN OR EARLIER THAN *AK *NR</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> <b>Date of Incident:</b> <b>Vehicle:</b> <b>Location of Incident:</b> <b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p>	<p>10121802 2001 TOYOTA COROLLA LAJUNTA, ILL. CA DT: THE CONTACT STATED WHILE DRIVING 25 MPH ON NORMAL ROAD CONSIDERED THE VEHICLE IMPAIRED. THE NAME WERE WITHOUT DEPRESSING THE ACCELERATOR PEDAL. THE PROBLEM PERCEIVED AT ANY SPEED. THERE AFTER, THERE WERE NO WARNING LIGHTS ILLUMINATED FROM THE INCIDENT. THE VEHICLE WAS TAKEN TO THE DEALERSHIP WHO OBSERVED NO ABNORMALITIES AFTER A DIAGNOSTIC CHECKUP AND ROAD TEST. THE DEALER ALSO STATED THERE WAS NOT A MECHANISM TO SLOW DOWN THE SPEED AS THERE USED TO BE IN OLDER MODELS. THE VEHICLE WAS TAKEN</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p>Safety Research &amp; Strategic Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</p>	
<p>DETERMINED THAT INCIDENT. THE ENGINE RACED TO OVER 4000 RPM BEFORE I PULSED OFF THE THROTTLE. AFTER HIGH INCIDENTS, I TOOK THE CAR TO LEXUS TOYOTA IN KENNESHA, CA. BOTH TIMES THEY SAID THAT NO BRAKE CABLES WERE HIT AND AFTER THE CAR ENGINE DID NOT RACE DURING THE TEST DRIVE, THERE WAS NO PROBLEM WITH IT. THEY STATED THAT THEY HAD NEVER HEARD OF ANY OTHER TOYOTA VEHICLE BEHAVING IN THIS MANNER, YET FOUND 21 SIMILAR COMPLAINTS REGARDING THE 2004 CAMRY OR THE 2003R, AND 21 OTHER COMPLAINTS FOR 2002 THROTTLE CAR 2003 MODEL YEAR COROLLA.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	
<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> <b>Date of Incident:</b> <b>Vehicle:</b> <b>Location of Incident:</b> <b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p>	<p>10128711 2001 TOYOTA HENNA RAMPTON, IN DT: CONTACT OWNS A 2001 TOYOTA MINNIA. THE VEHICLE HAS SEVERE HURSTATION, ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO DRIVE THE VEHICLE ON A WET ROAD OR ON A SLOPE ROAD. GAS PEDAL AND TRANSMISSION DO NOT SEEM TO CONNECT. NO CHANGES NO POLICE REPORTS. NO OTHER. THE VEHICLE HAS BEEN TOYOTA DEALER THREE TIMES. THE MECHANIC CAME BACK AND SAID THEY FOUND NOTHING WRONG WITH VEHICLE. *AK (LH)B. THE TRANSMISSION WOULD GOVERN BEYOND VERY HARD ON STEER AND ON HILLS. THE SERVICE DEALER PLAYED AN UNBURNED COMPUTER IN THE VEHICLE BUT THE PROBLEM WOULD NOT.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> <b>Date of Incident:</b> <b>Vehicle:</b> <b>Location of Incident:</b> <b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p>	<p>10121521 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY PRINCETON, NJ DT: CONSUMER STATED VEHICLE ACCELERATED WHILE IN REVERSE FOR THE SECOND TIME. THE VEHICLE MADE A LITTLE TURN AND HIT AN ELECTRICAL BOX WHICH CAUSED THE POWER TO GO OUT OF APPROXIMATELY 10 FEET. THE POWER WAS RESTARTED. THE VEHICLE WAS TAKEN TO THE DEALER AND WAS TEST DRIVEN BY THE DEALER. THE CONSUMER THOUGHT IT WAS BECAUSE IT WAS A NEW VEHICLE. ON JULY 1, 2004 A POLICE REPORT WAS FILED, AND THE VEHICLE WAS TOWED AND WAS TAKEN TO BE TOYOTA. WHILE THE VEHICLE WAS IN REVERSE IT CONTINUED TO ACCELERATE. *AK <b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> <b>Date of Incident:</b> <b>Vehicle:</b> <b>Location of Incident:</b> <b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p>	<p>10121562 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY KELSO, WA DT: 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY XLE, CRUISE CONTROL DOES NOT HOLD VEHICLE BACK. THIS IS NOT A PROBLEM ON LEVEL, DOWN OR UP HILL. IF THE VEHICLE IS GOING DOWN HILL, THE CRUISE CONTROL WILL NOT STAY, CAUSING THE VEHICLE TO ACCELERATE AT A FASTER SPEED THAN USABLE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. AFTER THE CONSUMER PURCHASED THE VEHICLE, THE DEALER AND THE MANUFACTURER TOLD CONSUMER</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p>Safety Research &amp; Strategic Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</p>	

<p>THAT WAS THE WAY THE VEHICLE PERFORMED. CONSUMER CONSIDERS THIS IS A SAFETY ISSUE, AND IT IS NOT ACCEPTABLE. CONSUMER FILED A COMPLAINT # 2809796 ON JULY 6, 2007 WITH TOYOTA. THERE ARE NO OTHER KNOWN PROBLEMS WITH THIS VEHICLE AND IT IS STILL UNDER WARRANTY. *AK</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA CRD No: 1029247  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20070706  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY  <b>Location of Incident:</b> SAN JOSE, CA</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>      TS: THE CONTACT OWNS A 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY. THE ACCELERATOR PEDAL BECOMES STUCK WHEN IN FIRST AND SECOND GEAR. TO RELEASE THE ACCELERATOR PEDAL, HE HAS TO STOMP ON THE PEDAL. ALSO HE EXPERIENCES DIFFICULTY STEERING WHILE DRIVING. THE MANUFACTURER WAS NOTIFIED BUT NO ASSISTANCE WAS PROVIDED. THE CURRENT MILEAGE WAS 61,866. THE FAILURE MILEAGE WAS 15,000.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA CRD No: 1011800  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20070711  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2007 TOYOTA SIENNA  <b>Location of Incident:</b> AUGUSTA, GA</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>      CONSUMER STATES HIS CAR HENRATES WHEN HE ACCELERATES. HE JUST BOUGHT THE CAR 2 WEEKS AGO, AND HE HAS BEEN WORRIED SINCE HE BOUGHT THE CAR. IT MAINTLY HAPPENS WHEN HE IS ALLOWING DOWN, WHEN HE RELEASES THE GAS PEDAL. IT TAKES ABOUT 1 OR 2 SECONDS TO ENGAGE. HE IS CONCERNED THIS WILL HAPPEN TO CONVENTED TRAFFIC. HE HAS NOT YET TALKED TO THE DEALER. HE HAS NOT YET TALKED TO THE MANUFACTURER BUT HE PLANS ON DOING THAT TODAY. CONSUMER WAS ONLY ABLE TO PROVIDE THE CITY, STATE AND PHONE NUMBER OF THE DEALER. *ONE</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA CRD No: 1012507  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20070717  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2007 LEXUS LX570  <b>Location of Incident:</b> ANTONIO, CA</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>      2007 LEXUS LX570 HAS SEVERE HESITATION AND SERIOUS PROBLEMS WHEN TRYING TO ACCELERATE. THESE PROBLEMS OCCUR ALL ALONG ABOUT 1000 RPM'S. WHEN YOU NEED MONEY TO GO UP AND THEN ACCELERATE. WE EXPERIENCED DANGEROUS SITUATIONS DUE TO HESITATION AND THEN HOPED BACK. BECAME TOO TO DEALER. AND THEY SAY IT'S A KNOWN PROBLEM AND THERE IS NOTHING THEY CAN DO. I JUST WOULD BE A LITTLE WORRIED AND A LITTLE WORRIED BE INFORMED. LEXUS SEEMS TO THINK IT IS ONLY AN INCONVENIENCE.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b>  <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i> 180</p>	<p><b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 1010894  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20080727  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2007 LEXUS ES350  <b>Location of Incident:</b> SAN FRANCISCO, CA</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>      DT: CONSUMER OWNED A 2007 ES 350. CONSUMER WAS GETTING INTO A PARKING PLACE WHEN HE WENT OVER A SPEED BUMP. HE STOPPED WITH WHEELS IN REVERSE. THEN, PLACED THE CAR IN DRIVE AND THE VEHICLE SURGED FORWARD. CONSUMER TRIED TO APPLY BRAKE AND BRAKES FAILED. THE VEHICLE WOULD NOT STOP EXCEPT BY STRIKING A CONCRETE RELAY. THERE WERE NO INJURIES. NO POLICE REPORT. BUT IT WAS REPORTED TO INSURANCE COMPANY. THE VEHICLE WAS MOVING FORWARD WITH GREAT FORCE AND BRAKES COULD NOT STOP VEHICLE. CONSUMER WAS AWARE OF AN INVESTIGATION THAT WAS IN PROGRESS. ON THIS MATTER, A THROUGH INVESTIGATION WAS OFFICIALLY CLOSED. NHTSA RATED THAT THEY WOULD MONITOR THESE TYPE OF VEHICLES. CONSUMER RATED THAT INVESTIGATION WAS ON THE ELECTRONIC THROTTLE CONTROL. *AK</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA CRD No: 1013179  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20070719  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY  <b>Location of Incident:</b> SPYDERSPRING, MD</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>      DT: ON JULY 19, 2007 WHEN THE CONSUMER PRESSED THE BRAKE PEDAL, THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED. THIS HAD OCCURRED 3 TIMES. THE VEHICLE WAS A LITTLE OVER 1000 MILES ON IT. THE MANUFACTURER GAVE THE CONSUMER A REFERENCE NUMBER TO GIVE TO THE DEALER WHEN HE TAKES THE VEHICLE TO THEM. *ONE</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA CRD No: 1012509  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20080801  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2007 TOYOTA SIENNA  <b>Location of Incident:</b> LAKE TERRELL, IL</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>      I PULLED INTO A PARKING LOT AND MADE A RIGHT TURN TO PULL INTO A PARKING SPOT. I WENT INTO THE SPOT AND AS I WAS ABOUT TO STOP, THE BRAKE FROM WHEN I PUT THE VAN IN PARK, IT THEN SUDDENLY ACCELERATED. WENT OVER THE RAISED CURB BETWEEN THE SPOT AND THE PAVING CENTER. TURNED AROUND BACK INTO THE PARKING LOT. THE WHEEL WAS TURNED TO THE RIGHT. I GOT LIFT THE BUILDING. BEHIND ME A LOT OF PEOPLE AND THEY CAME TO STOP AFTER BEING BARRICADED. I WENT THROUGH THE WAY. ALL THE WHILE I WAS HITTING THE BRAKE, BUT THEY DIDN'T SEEM TO WANT. THE OTHER VEHICLE DRIVER IN THE FRONT. THE FRONT OF THE VAN WAS HEAVILY DAMAGED. TRANSPARENTLY THERE WERE 300 PERSONS IN THE LOT AND I DON'T WANT TO HEAR OTHER VEHICLE AND MY VAN AND I WALKED AWAY WITH MINOR INJURIES. I HAVE CONTACTED TOYOTA. THEY INSPECTED THE VAN LAST WEEK AND I AM WAITING TO HEAR THEIR REPORT. THE VAN HAD BEEN USED VET. I AM WAITING TO HEAR FROM TOYOTA AS TO THE NEXT COURSE OF ACTION. ABOUT AN HOUR BEFORE THE INCIDENT OCCURRED, I WAS TELLING MY OTHER PARKING SPACE IN REVERSE WHEN THE VAN STOPPED AND DIDN'T MOVE. I KEPT STARTED IT. PUT IT IN REVERSE AND THEN IT MOVED. ALTHOUGH ON HOW IT TURNED OUT A TREE</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b>  <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i> 190</p>
<p>WAS FLAT STOPPED AND CHECKED TO SEE ALL OF THEM THEY WERE FINE, AND AFTER THAT ALL WAS SMOOTH AND WELL UNTIL THE CRASH. *08</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA CRD No: 1012508  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20070801  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2007 TOYOTA TACOMA  <b>Location of Incident:</b> EL PASO, TX</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>      PAUL T. APPEL (ACCELERATOR PEDAL POSITION SENSOR) VEHICLE IS DISMOUNTED WITH A COMBINATION OF MECHANICAL AND DRIVE WIRE THROTTLE BODY. WHEN ACCELERATING FROM A STOPPED POSITION ACCELERATOR PEDAL IS DEPRESSURED WITH NO RESPONSE TO ENGINE OR VEHICLE MOVEMENT. THE FORCE A SAFETY TIEBACK DRIVER IS IN A LIFE OR DEATH SITUATION AND CANNOT MOVE VEHICLE OUT OF HARM'S WAY.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA CRD No: 1012244  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20070801  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY  <b>Location of Incident:</b> FLORENCE, BRANCA, GA</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>      2007 TOYOTA CAMRY SE DEVELOPED A PROBLEM WITH BUILDING UP ACCELERATION AFTER SLOWING DOWN. *AK WHEN ACCELERATING FROM A LOW SPEED THE CONSUMER NOTICED HESITATION WHILE TRYING TO RESTART SPEED. *ONE</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA CRD No: 1012105  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20070806  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY  <b>Location of Incident:</b> CRESTWOOD, KY</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>      DT: CONSUMER OWNED 2004 TOYOTA CAMRY WITH V4 ENGINE. CONSUMER WAS PULLING INTO A PARKING SPOT WHEN THE VEHICLE SUDDENLY ACCELERATED AND BOOT THE FOR THE PARKING SPOT, HITTING A METAL POST AND DAMAGING THE PARKING FRONT OF VEHICLE. THE REARVIEW, FRONT FENDER, AND BOTH PARKING FOLDERS WHEN THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED. CONSUMER FELT THAT ACCELERATOR PEDAL LEFT THE BOTTOM OF FOOT AND CONTINUED TO THE FLOORBOARD. WITH NO ASSISTANCE, THIS HAPPENED ON AUGUST 6, 2007 AT ABOUT 10:00 AM IN LOUISVILLE, KY. DOWNSIDE CENTER ON BETHUNE ROAD. CONSUMER WENT TO DEALER, AND DEALER REFUSED TO LOOK AT VEHICLE. THEY SAID THAT THEY WERE NOT FAMILIAR WITH ANY PROBLEMS LIKE THIS, AND TOLD CONSUMER THAT THE FLOOR MAT GOES TO THE PEDAL. CAUSING THE ACCELERATION. THERE WAS NO POLICE REPORT. MANUFACTURER WAS CONTACTED AND NOW THEY OFFERED A CAR AND DEALER WAS REFUSE TO CONTACT CONSUMER IN ABOUT 10 DAYS. *AK</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b>  <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i> 191</p>	<p><b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 1010895  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20080812  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY  <b>Location of Incident:</b> DENVER, AZ</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>      DT: VEHICLE REMAINED IN THE MIDDLE OF THE ROAD ON AUGUST 12, 2008. TOOK THE VEHICLE TO THE DEALER AND THEY COULD NOT FIND ANYTHING. REWIND AND RESET THE CONSUMER. BECAME WITH THE NOTICE. THERE WAS NO FOR WARNING. ABOUT 6 WEEKS BEFORE WHEN I COMING ON THE ACCELERATOR PEDAL. IT SEEMED LIKE IT TOOK A FEW SECONDS FOR THE VEHICLE TO ACCELERATE. *AK</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA CRD No: 1013178  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20080812  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY  <b>Location of Incident:</b> FAIRBURYVILLE, OH</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>      DT: THE CRUISE CONTROL TOOK OFF AND ACCELERATED ON ITS OWN. WENT TWO YARDS AND HIT A TELEPHONE POLE. UPON IMPACT, THE CRUISE CONTROL DEPLOYED. CONTACTED TOYOTA, THERE WERE OFFICERS TO CALL BACK, COME AND LOOK AT VEHICLE. THIS HAPPENED ON AUGUST 12, 2008. THE CONSUMER DID NOT WANT TO GIVE PHONE NUMBER. *AK</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA CRD No: 1010896  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20080813  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2006 TOYOTA CAMRY SOLARA  <b>Location of Incident:</b> CYCERO, NY</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>      THROTTLE LAG AT LOW SPEED AND FROM STOP IN INCONSISTENT AND HAS BEEN THE CAUSE FOR SEVERAL CLOSE CALLS WHEN PULLING INTO TRAFFIC. MANUFACTURER WAS INFORMED. DEAD END INVESTIGATED. STATED THIS IS NORMAL AND NOTHING CAN BE DONE. THAT IS NOT ACCEPTABLE. SOMEbody ACCIDENTALLY HIT THE GAS PEDAL BEFORE ACTUAL THROTTLE RESPONSE. NEVER HAD THE BRAKE ACCELERATION TO COMPENSATE WHEN THIS HAPPENS. THIS IS A SAFETY ISSUE THAT TOYOTA IS AWARE OF. BUT FEELS TO ADMIT IT IS A PROBLEM. DRIVER IS VERY CONCERNED THAT THIS DOESN'T BE CAUSE OF AN ACCIDENT. *08</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA CRD No: 1010810  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20080817  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2006 TOYOTA CAMRY  <b>Location of Incident:</b> MAYFIELD HEIGHTS, OH</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>      DT: THE GAS PEDAL AND THE BRAKE PEDAL ARE TOO CLOSE TOGETHER. THIS HAS CAUSED THE CONSUMER AT LEAST FOUR ACCIDENTS. BECAUSE WHEN THE CONSUMER GOES TO PRESS ON THE BRAKE IT WILL ACCIDENTALLY HIT THE GAS PEDAL. THE CONSUMER WAS SO WORRIED EVERY TIME THIS OCCURRED THAT SHE WAS UNABLE TO STOP THE VEHICLE UNTIL SHE HIT SOMETHING. THREE TIMES THIS OCCURRED. THE</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b>  <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i> 192</p>



<p>CONSUMER WAS TRYING TO STOP IT WHILE BETWEEN OTHER VEHICLES. THE CONSUMER WAS TAKEN TO THE HOSPITAL IN MAY 2005. SHE GOT ANIME INJURIES BECAUSE OF THIS ACCIDENT. A POLICE REPORT WITH THESE TAGS: ON 10/10/05 THE CONSUMER HIT ALBERT POLE. PREVIOUSLY, THE CONSUMER HAD CONTACTED THE MANUFACTURER, AND REPORTED NO ADDITIONAL FROM THEM. ALSO, THE CONSUMER ALSO STATED THAT THERE WAS NOT ENOUGH LEG ROOM IN THE DRIVER SIDE. *AK</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	<p>HAPPENED. IT TOOK A RECORD FOR THE VEHICLE TO REACT TO THE ACCELERATION. THIS HAS HAPPENED MULTIPLE TIMES. *AK</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CDB No:</b> <b>Date of Incident:</b> <b>Vehicle:</b> <b>Location of Incident:</b> <b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p> <p>1 bought a new 2007 Toyota Sienna in Dec. '06. On Aug. '14, it was involved in a crash. I was pulling into a parking space, first on the inside, expecting the van to come to a halt, when I felt a jerk and it suddenly accelerated, went over the speed limit as it went, over the exit lane of the shopping center, back onto the parking lot, hit the side of the building, breaking windows there, hit a horizontal dumpster and then came to a stop. All the while my foot was on the brake and they didn't seem to work. It hit a lamp post within a few seconds. The engine kept chugging. Thankfully, no one was involved except with some minor surface scrapes on pavement in the lot at the time and I did not hit any other vehicle. Unfortunately, due to the accident when I was pulling out of a parking space, I crashed it and put it into reverse and it was fine, although it seemed to be a bit lumpy. I checked all the tires and they were fine. After that I was smooth until the accident of the crash. I called my insurance and got an inspection and said it was over the safety performed as designed? Currently it is being fixed.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CDB No:</b> <b>Date of Incident:</b> <b>Vehicle:</b> <b>Location of Incident:</b> <b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p> <p>ON SEVERAL INSTANCES WHEN YOU LET OFF THE GAS TO GO AROUND A CORNER THEN WHEN YOU ACCELERATE NOTHING HAPPENS THEN THE ENGINE THEN TO COMPENSATE BY OVER REVVING. ON ANOTHER OCCASION PULLED INTO TRAFFIC STOPPED ON THE GAS STOPPED HAPPENED FOR SEVERAL SECONDS, ALMOST RE-STARTED. *NM</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CDB No:</b> <b>Date of Incident:</b> <b>Vehicle:</b> <b>Location of Incident:</b> <b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p> <p>I had the accelerator stuck while parallel parking my 2007 Toyota truck about 1 year ago. I tried to brake, then hit the vehicle to reverse, ended up ramming into the vehicle in front and behind my vehicle. At the time, I didn't understand what had occurred. Now I see others have experienced the same problem. *FK</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CDB No:</b> <b>Date of Incident:</b> <b>Vehicle:</b> <b>Location of Incident:</b> <b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p> <p>AFTER BEING INVOLVED IN A REAR END COLLISION WITH MY CARRY ALL TWO WHEN REVERSING OUT OF A PARKING SPOT AT A BUSY RESTAURANT, I ATTEMPTED TO PULL FORWARD A FOOT OR TWO AND PARK BY PUTTING THE CAR INTO DRIVE, NOT PRESSING THE ACCELERATOR. UPON PRESSING THE BRAKE TO PARK THE CAR ACCELERATED FORWARD (UNCONTROLLABLE) WITHOUT APPLICATION OF THE GAS PEDAL (CAR DRIVEN) INTO THE CAR PARKED IN FRONT OF ME AND PUNCHING THAT CAR INTO THE CAR. DIRECTLY AHEAD, THE PARKING LOT BUILT UP. THE CAR CORRECTLY STOPPED THE PARKING LOT WAS PUSHED OVER THE CONCRETE PARKING BLOCK AND INTO A TREE. AFTER PRESSING THE CAR IN FRONT OF ME, I WAS ABLE TO FREE MYSELF FROM OTHER CARS AND WAS FINALLY ABLE TO STOP THE CAR ONLY BY USING THE EMERGENCY BRAKE. FROM THE TIME THE CAR ACCELERATED FORWARD WITHOUT PRESSING THE GAS PEDAL THE BRAKES DID NOT WORK. AFTER CLIPPING THE CARS I LONDED DOWN TO MAKE SURE I WAS USING THE BRAKE PEDAL. MYSELF WAS, AND IT WAS NOT WORKING AT ALL. DURING THE ENTIRE INCIDENT THERE WAS A VERY LOUD AND CONSISTENT NOISE COMING FROM MY CAR. THE CAR IS CURRENTLY BEING INSPECTED. *NM</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CDB No:</b> <b>Date of Incident:</b> <b>Vehicle:</b> <b>Location of Incident:</b> <b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p> <p>I HAD THE ACCELERATOR STUCK WHILE PARALLEL PARKING MY 2007 TOYOTA TRUCK ABOUT 1 YEAR AGO. I TRIED TO BRAKE, THEN HIT THE VEHICLE TO REVERSE, ENDED UP RAMMING INTO THE VEHICLE IN FRONT AND BEHIND MY VEHICLE. AT THE TIME, I DIDN'T UNDERSTAND WHAT HAD OCCURRED. NOW I SEE OTHERS HAVE EXPERIENCED THE SAME PROBLEM. *FK</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CDB No:</b> <b>Date of Incident:</b> <b>Vehicle:</b> <b>Location of Incident:</b> <b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p> <p>BURGLAND WAS PUSHED A LITTLE WAY INTO THE GARBORH PARKING LOT (NEARLY), DRIVING MY 2007 CAMRY I PRESSED VERY LIGHTLY ON THE ACCELERATOR. THE CAR SUDDENLY RAN A BURGE OF ACCELERATION INTO THE GARBORH PARKING LOT. MYSELF WAS, AND IT WAS NOT WORKING AT ALL. DURING THE ENTIRE INCIDENT THERE WAS A VERY LOUD AND CONSISTENT NOISE COMING FROM MY CAR. THE CAR IS CURRENTLY BEING INSPECTED. *NM</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CDB No:</b> <b>Date of Incident:</b> <b>Vehicle:</b> <b>Location of Incident:</b> <b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p> <p>MY 2007 LEXUS ES 350. THE CAR WAS NOT SHIFTING PROPERLY OR ACCELERATE UPON PRESSING THE GAS PEDAL AND WHEN IT DID ACCELERATE IT LUNCHED FORWARD WHEN ASKING DRIVING AND THEN TRYING TO WHEEL UP WAS TOLD BY THE DEALERSHIP THAT THE COMPUTER COULD NOT READ FAST ENOUGH TO KNOW WHAT TO DO. THIS DIDN'T HAPPEN EVERY TIME, ON SOME OCCASIONS IT HAPPENED AT LEAST 3 TIMES, THEN WAS A SAFETY ISSUE. IN A STOP AND GO TRAFFIC AND CHANGING LANES, NOTHING</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CDB No:</b> <b>Date of Incident:</b> <b>Vehicle:</b> <b>Location of Incident:</b> <b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p> <p>THE SAME PROBLEM EXISTED WHEN YOU MAKE A TURN AND THEN TRY TO ACCELERATE AGAIN. THE OTHER DAY I WAS TRYING TO PULL OUT ONTO A WELL TRAVELLED ROAD I MOVED INTO THE RIGHT LANE AND THEN BACK TO THE LEFT LANE TO CHECK TO MAKE SURE THE NEXT LANE WAS CLEAR. I SAW THERE WERE CARS COMING APPROX. THE CURVE PREPARED FOR THE NEXT LANE I HIT THE GAS AND THE CAR BEHAVED. THEN FINALLY IT STARTED TO MOVE. I BARRELY MISSED BEING BROOKED. I'VE BEEN DRIVING FOR OVER THIRTY YEARS AND HAVE NEVER A NUMBER OF OTHER VEHICLES I HAVE NEVER EXPERIENCED THIS PROBLEM AND AM VERY CONCERNED FOR MY OWNERS SAFETY. I HAVE CONTACTED THE DEALER AND TOYOTA AND THEY SAID THIS IS NORMAL OPERATION, AS FAR AS I'M CONCERNED THIS IS ANYTHING BUT NORMAL AND NEEDS TO BE ADDRESSED. *NM</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CDB No:</b> <b>Date of Incident:</b> <b>Vehicle:</b> <b>Location of Incident:</b> <b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p> <p>1 own a 2007 Toyota Camry. My family bought it in 2007 when we moved to the freeway and pulled into the TRILLIUM CHRYSLER STATION. THE CRUISE CONTROL WAS ON BUT I FORGOT TO TURN IT OFF. I PULLED INTO A PARKING SPOT AT A LOW RATE OF SPEED (1 TO 3 MPH) I WAS ALMOST AT A COMPLETE STOP AND HAD JUST KNOWLEDGE TO MOVE. THAT I COULD NOT STOP TO FOLLOW THE CAR ENGINE ROAD AND A MOMENT LATER FOUND THAT I HAD GIVEN OVER A CONCRETE CURB, UP A TWO FOOT CONCRETE RETAINING WALL, AND THROUGH A CHAIN LINK FENCE. I DON'T KNOW HOW A CAR COULD DO THIS. THE TOTAL SPAC FOR THIS TO HAPPEN WAS ONLY ABOUT 1 LINEAR FEET. I WAS NOT PRESSING THE ACCELERATOR. THERE WAS NO OTHER ACCELERATION BEHIND MY 2007 CAMRY. THE CAR STOPPED, CRASHING THE CONCRETE WALL. THE FRONT ENDS WERE WRECKED. THE GROUND, LOOSE OUT OF THE CAR AND AROUND THE MICHIGAN (ON THE IF I HAD ANY RECALL ON THE 2007 CAMRY). I BELIEVE THIS IS THE VERY FIRST THING I HAD BECAUSE I KNOW THAT I DID NOT CAUSE THE ACCIDENT. THE ACCIDENT WAS CAUSED BY A DEFECT IN THE TOYOTA CAMRY. A TOYOTA TRUCK REMOVED MY VEHICLE FROM THE RETAINING WALL. I THEN DRIFTED THE CAR DIRECTLY TO THE TRILLIUM TOYOTA DEALERSHIP. THEY COULD NOT DUPLICATE THE PROBLEM WITH THE VEHICLE AND INDICATED IT WAS HARD TO DUPLICATE THE CAR INVOLVED IN THE PROBLEM. SEVERAL MONTHS LATER, AND SEVERAL SMALL INQUIRIES, I LEARNED THAT WE WERE VERY CONCERNED ABOUT SAFETY AND ASKED ABOUT RECALLS. THEY INDICATED THAT THERE WERE NOISSUES WITH MY VEHICLE. THEY DID ADMIT AFTER SOME OCCASIONS THAT THEY WOULD NOT KNOW HOW MANY TIMES THIS HAD HAPPENED IN THE PAST BUT THE FACT THAT THE DEALERSHIP DO NOT HAVE INFORMATION AND TOYOTA CORPORATE DOES NOT MAKE THIS INFORMATION WITH THE DEALERSHIP, THE TOYOTA LOYALTY EMPLOYED AT THE PAYMENT DATE VOLUNTEERED THAT SHE HAD ALSO HAD UNEXPECTED ACCELERATION WITH HER TOYOTA CAMRY. I REQUEST THAT A PAINAL INVESTIGATION BE LAUNCHED AND A RECALL PLACED FOR 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY. *JB</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CDB No:</b> <b>Date of Incident:</b> <b>Vehicle:</b> <b>Location of Incident:</b> <b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p> <p>I HAD JUST LEFT ONE AREA OF A PARKING LOT AND WAS TRAVELING TO ANOTHER AT A LOW RATE OF SPEED. I TOOK MY 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY IN A TURNING OVER ELECTRICAL POWER. I HADN'T BEEN TO PULL INTO A PARKING SPACE BETWEEN TWO BUSY CORNERS WITH MY FOOT ON THE BRAKE PEDAL. WHEN I MADE THE TURN, I CALLED TOYOTA DEALERSHIP AND LEFT THEM KNOW. AND THEY SAID THEY HAD NOT HEARD OF A CAR DOING THAT. THE REPAIR WAS A \$1000. *AK</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CDB No:</b> <b>Date of Incident:</b> <b>Vehicle:</b> <b>Location of Incident:</b> <b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p> <p>1 HAVE A 2007 TOYOTA HIGHLANDER LIMITED WITH ENGINE, WENT INTO ACCELERATE AT LOW SPEEDS, THEN LANK MY FOOT OFF THE GAS AND THEN TRY TO ACCELERATE AGAIN. THERE WAS A PROLONGED DELAYATION BEFORE THE VEHICLE START TO ACCELERATE.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CDB No:</b> <b>Date of Incident:</b> <b>Vehicle:</b> <b>Location of Incident:</b> <b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p> <p>AFTER CHANGING TO ME IF MY 11 YEAR OLD SON WAS ALREADY I SAW THAT MY FOOT WAS ON THE BRAKE PEDAL. I HADN'T BEEN TO PULL INTO A PARKING SPACE BETWEEN TWO BUSY CORNERS WITH MY FOOT ON THE BRAKE PEDAL. WHEN I MADE THE TURN, I CALLED TOYOTA DEALERSHIP AND LEFT THEM KNOW. AND THEY SAID THEY HAD NOT HEARD OF A CAR DOING THAT. THE REPAIR WAS A \$1000. *AK</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>

<p>THE BODY AND FRAMEWORK OF THE CAR WERE REPAIRED BUT NOTHING WAS REPAIRED WHICH LED TO THIS OCCURRENCE IN REGARD TO THE ABSENCE OF THE CAR IN ADDITION, AIRBAGS DID NOT DEPLOY ON IMPACT."B</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 15118278 <b>NISSA CR# No:</b> 2001002 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2001 LEXUS ES200 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 LEXUS ES200 <b>Location of Incident:</b> BAYBRIDGE, CA</p> <p><b>NISSA Summary:</b> WHILE DRIVING THE CAR WOULD SPEED UP ON OWN WITHOUT PRESSING ON THE ACCELERATOR. I FOUND MY CAR GIVING FROM 40 TO 60 IN PARK POSITION THE CAR WILL KEY TO MOVE FROM 0 TO 40 AND DRIVE AWAY FROM ME. NOT ACCELERATE TO GET IT TO 10 MPH AND THE TECHNICIAN SAYS THE FUEL INJECT CONTROL VALVE WAS NOT WORKING AND THE REPAIR WORK WOULD BE DONE. "A"</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 15119141 <b>NISSA CR# No:</b> 2001004 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2001 TOYOTA TENDRA <b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 TOYOTA TENDRA <b>Location of Incident:</b> ORANGE CITY, FL</p> <p><b>NISSA Summary:</b> WE OWN "TRUCK" 2001 TOYOTA TENDRA DOUBLE CAB THAT ARE EQUIPPED THE SAME. BOTH OF THESE VEHICLES EXHIBIT THE SAME RAPIDLY BRUE. THE BRUE, WHEN DRIVING WITH CRUISE CONTROL, "NO" AT SPEEDS OF 70 MPH, IN REGULAR, 100 MPH, TRACK, THE CRUISE CONTROL WILL COMMAND THE VEHICLE TO MAINTAIN THROTTLE, MISSING THE TRANSFERING INTO PARKING GEAR. THIS ACTION ON THE 3000 H.P. POWER VEHICLE, CAUSED THE REAR TENDR TO BREAK DOWN ON WET ROADS AND CAN CAUSE LOSS OF CONTROL OF THE VEHICLE, INSTEAD OF THE ROAD OR INTO A DITCH. BOTH VEHICLES WE ONLY EXHIBIT THIS BEHAVIOR AND IT HAS BEEN REPORTED TO TOYOTA CASE # 200100677."A"</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 15149820 <b>NISSA CR# No:</b> 2001001 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2001 TOYOTA TENDRA <b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 TOYOTA TENDRA <b>Location of Incident:</b> DELAND, FL</p> <p><b>NISSA Summary:</b> 2001 TENDRA 4 DOOR OVERHEARD WHEN DRIVING IN CRUISE CONTROL. WHEN DRIVING IN CRUISE, I FEEL THE REAR OPERATOR TO BE OVERHEARD. I FEEL THE VEHICLE WILL DROP INTO PARKING GEAR AND THE THROTTLE WILL GO TO FULL THROTTLE. THIS WILL CAUSE THE VEHICLE TO BE OVERHEARD. THE VEHICLE, ESPECIALLY ON A RAMP/SLICK ROAD. THIS HAS HAPPENED MANY TIMES, AND AT TIMES I AM AFRAID THAT I COULD COLLAPSE. I FEEL I HAVE TO BE WINDING. IT OCCURS IN CLOSE BEHIND ANOTHER VEHICLE. THIS COULD LEAD TO AN REAR END OCCURRENCE. THE NORMAL PROGRESSION SHOULD BE TO DRIVE TO THE OVERSIGHT, WITH A CRUISE/ACCELERATION TO MAINTAIN SET SPEED, AND THEN BACK TO OVERSIGHT WHEN SET SPEED IS OBTAINED. I USUALLY CALLED TOYOTA AND THEY CLAIMED THIS IS NORMAL OPERATION. DOCUMENTED WITH TOYOTA DEALER, AND NOW</p> <p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b> 197 <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i></p>	<p>WITH NISSA. WHEN ACCIDENT OCCURS AS A RESULT OF THIS OVERHEARD, HOPEFULLY TOYOTA WILL RESET THE COMPUTER CONTROL MODULE TO FIX PROBLEM."B</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 15149820 <b>NISSA CR# No:</b> 2001001 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 LEXUS ES200 <b>Location of Incident:</b> CUMBERLAND, FL</p> <p><b>NISSA Summary:</b> PROBLEMS WITH 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY. AUGUST 2001 - DROVE ALONG HUSBAND REQUESTS TO STOP &amp; WAIT TO PULL UP TO A LIGHT AND IT FELT LIKE IT WAS NOT BRAKING BUT CAR CONTINUED TO ACCELERATE SO HUSBAND LET OFF BRAKE AND RELEASED THE BRAKE AND IT FEEL LIKE IT STOPPED. 1. WHILE DRIVING GAS WE WERE DRIVING AROUND IT TO FIND AN UPD. WE WERE PRESSING THE BRAKE AND CAR WAS TRYING TO ACCELERATE AGAINST THE BRAKE. AS IT WAS APPLIED, LET OFF BRAKE AND RELEASED QUICKLY AND CAR STOPPED NORMALLY. JANUARY 2004 HUSBAND INSISTED TO PULL INTO PARKING BRUE AND AS HE STOPPED TO BRAKE AGAIN THE CAR WAS TRYING TO ACCELERATE AND SO HE LET OFF THE BRAKE. REAPPLIED IT LATELY VERY QUICKLY AND WAS AFRAID TO PARK LATELY DRIVING BEHIND VEHICLE NEEDED HER. MARCH 17, 2004, WE TOOK OUR VEHICLE ONCE AGAIN TO DEALERSHIP TO GETTING THE VEHICLE WAS DRIVING WHILE DRIVING. OCTOBER 2001 ON A TRIP TO GAITHERSBURG, TENNESSEE, HUSBAND APPLIED THE BRAKE. CAR CONTINUED TO ACCELERATE IN BRUE. THE BRAKE, HUSBAND ACCELERATION STOPPED. OCTOBER 1, 2001 TRIP TO NORTH CAROLINA ON "A" REPAIR ATE OCCASION THE CAR RESISTED STARTING BACKING AND THE CAR HAD TO BE PUT IN NEUTRAL, AND THE BRAKE HELD PERFECTLY ON ONE OCCASION AS WELL ATTEMPTING TO STOP BEHIND ANOTHER. WITH FULL OF CRUISE, ALMOST MET THE RED FROM BEHIND BECAUSE ACCELERATION WENT TO FULL ACCELERATION AS WE APPLIED THE BRAKE. PARTIALLY, MY HUSBAND PUT THE CAR IN NEUTRAL, AND IT WAS MOVING AT FULL THROTTLE. HE LET ACCELERATOR PEDAL AS WE WERE IN NEUTRAL, AND ACCELERATION WENT BACK TO FULL SPEED. OCTOBER 1, 2001 WHILE IN WET WE WERE STOPPED BY A LINE OF TRAFFIC. BEHIND AT A LIGHT THE ENGINE (ONCE AGAIN) WOULD NOT BACKING BACK MY FEET TO THE PEDAL, AND AGAIN IT FEEL AT FULL THROTTLE WHILE HOLDING BRAKE PEDAL DOWN. HUBBLE 17, "A" OTHER DAYS WOULD HAVE BEEN EXHIBIT CAR IN DRIVE FOR 10 SEC. PUT CAR IN NEUTRAL, RELEASED BRAKE PEDAL AND THEN PRESSED DOWN ON THE ACCELERATOR. ENGINE SPEED WENT TO FULL SPEED. "B"</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 15149820 <b>NISSA CR# No:</b> 2001001 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2001 LEXUS ES200 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 LEXUS ES200 <b>Location of Incident:</b> BAYBRIDGE, CA</p> <p><b>NISSA Summary:</b> MY 2001 LEXUS ES200 HAD A CASE OF SUDDEN UNINTENDED ACCELERATION THAT LED TO A CRASH CAUSING OVER 10,000 WORTH OF DAMAGES TO BOTH MY CAR AND THE OTHER PERSON'S CAR. I HAVE SEEN OTHER REPORTS OF OTHER PEOPLE'S WORSED OFF BY THE ELECTRONIC THROTTLE IN RESPECT TO THESE CASES, HOWEVER I PERSONALLY BELIEVE THAT THE REAL PROBLEM IS ONLY PARTLY TOYOTA'S ELECTRONIC THROTTLE. IN MY OPINION, THE PROBLEM IS THE LOCKED-UP OF THE PEDAL GETTING STUCK. COVER FLOR MATS TO ORDER CLAMMED WITH THE REACTIVE "GAS" SPRING FORCE ON THE GAS PEDAL, BECAUSE IT IS A THROTTLE-DRIVE-WHERE SYSTEM WHICH</p> <p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b> 198 <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i></p>
<p>LEADS TO THE FLOOR MATS EARLY HOLDING THE PEDAL DOWN TO FULL THROTTLE CAUSING AN ACCIDENT. I SAY THAT THIS IS "SOMEWHAT" PEDAL DESIGN ON THE PART OF THE CAR MANUFACTURER. I ALSO BELIEVE THAT THEY EXIST THE WAY AS THEY BECAUSE THEY MADE REFERENCE TO THIS IN THE OWNER'S MANUAL ON "PUSH WHERE THERE IS A CAUTION THAT STATES THAT THERE MAY BE A REAR END COLLISION, PLACED ON THE FLOOR CARPET. IF THE FLOOR MAT SLIPS AND INTERFERES WITH THE MOVEMENT OF THE PEDAL DURING DRIVING, IT MAY CAUSE AN ACCIDENT." NO MANUFACTURER SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO USE THAT CAUTION AS A DISCLAIMER TO GET AWAY WITH A REAR END PEDAL DESIGN. THEY FULLY WELL KNOWING THAT THIS IS A SAFETY ISSUE, SHOULD HAVE RECALLED THOSE CAR MODELS WITH A PEDAL DESIGN THAT WAS A REAR END OF GETTING LAMMED AND REDESIGNED THE PEDAL SO THAT IT CANNOT GET STUCK BY A FLOOR MAT. IN ALL THE CASES THAT I'VE OWNED IN THE PAST IF A MAT KEEPS GETTING PROBLEM FROM APPLYING FULL GAS PEDAL, NOT THE OPPOSITE OF APPLYING FULL PEDAL. I STRONGLY ALIVE THAT TOYOTA COMPANY RECALLS ALL THESE CARS WITH THE POTENTIAL PROBLEM AND TO FULLY PROPERLY BEFORE SOMEONE GET FATAALLY INJURED OR DROPPED FOR LIFE."A"</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 15127970 <b>NISSA CR# No:</b> 2001002 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2001 LEXUS ES <b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 LEXUS ES <b>Location of Incident:</b> FALLSBROOK, CA</p> <p><b>NISSA Summary:</b> DEPRESSING THE ACCELERATION PEDAL CAUSED THE VEHICLE TO BRIGATE FOR ONE, HALF TO ONE FULL SECOND AND THEN LUNCH FORWARD INTERLUY. THIS IS A SAFETY RISK, WHEN CHANGING LANE OR ACCELERATING TO AVOID A COLLISION. THE DEALERS MICHIGAN DISCLOSED THAT THEY HAVE HAD PROBLEMS WITH THIS MODEL'S "ELECTRONIC" ACCELERATION, AND THAT AN INTERNAL COMPUTER IS SUPPOSED TO "CLAMP" FROM THE BODY ELECTRIC AND ADJUST THE ACCELERATION "ACCELERATION". AN ACCIDENT CAN EASILY OCCUR WHEN EXPECTED POWER IS DECREASED DUE TO DEPRESSING THE ACCELERATOR."A"</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 15149820 <b>NISSA CR# No:</b> 2001001 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 LEXUS ES200 <b>Location of Incident:</b> MILWAUKEE, WI</p> <p><b>NISSA Summary:</b> BY THE CONTACT STATE DUE TO THE DESIGN OF THE ACCELERATOR AND BRAKE PEDAL THEY WERE TOO CLOSE TOGETHER. AS A RESULT THE VEHICLE CLAMMED INTO A CEMENT ROAD BATH. THE POLICE WERE NOT NOTIFIED OF THIS INCIDENT."A"</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 15149820 <b>NISSA CR# No:</b> 2001001 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 LEXUS ES200 <b>Location of Incident:</b> ORLANDO, FL</p> <p><b>NISSA Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b> 199 <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i></p>	<p>BY THE CONTACT STATED WHEN DRIVING FAST ON THE BRAKE PEDAL, THE THROTTLE ACCELERATED. IT BECAME AIRBORNE AND DID NOT STOP UNTIL IT CRASHED INTO AN OVERPASS. THE POLICE WERE NOTIFIED OF THIS INCIDENT. A POLICE REPORT WAS TAKEN AT THE SCENE, AND THE VEHICLE WAS TOWAWED."A"</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 15127970 <b>NISSA CR# No:</b> 2001002 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2001 LEXUS ES200 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 LEXUS ES200 <b>Location of Incident:</b> FALLSBROOK, CA</p> <p><b>NISSA Summary:</b> MY 2001 LEXUS ES200 SUDDENLY ACCELERATED AS I WAS HOLDING FORWARD INTO A PARKING SPACE AND CHANGING INTO A RUTTING WHEN DRIVING 30-40 MPH WAS FEELING LIGHTLY ON THE BRAKE, PREPARING TO BRAKE TO A STOP, AND LETTING THE CAR SLID INTO THE SPACE. I HAD A SMALL AIR THING HAPPEN ABOUT 1 MONTH AGO."B"</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 15149820 <b>NISSA CR# No:</b> 2001001 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 LEXUS ES200 <b>Location of Incident:</b> MIAMI LAKES, FL</p> <p><b>NISSA Summary:</b> CRUISE CONTROL GOES CRASH ON HILL. I WANTED TO GO TO ACCELERATE AND THEN IT FLOWS THE GAS AND THE AUTO-MANAGEMENT DOWNSHIFTS AT LEAST TWO GEAR AND AGAIN THE ENGINE WENT FAST THE SPEED TO GO BACK AND THEN IT FINALLY LETS UP AND THE SPEED GOES TO A LOW AND IN VARIOUS REPEAT. DANGEROUS AND ABUSIVELY NOT TO BE USED. HAS BEEN HAPPENING EVER SINCE I'VE OWNED THE CAR. NEW IN 2001."B"</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 15149820 <b>NISSA CR# No:</b> 2001001 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 LEXUS ES200 <b>Location of Incident:</b> MIAMI LAKES, FL</p> <p><b>NISSA Summary:</b> I LEFT MY CAR AND I RELEASED THE BRAKE AND STARTED IN REVERSE. AFTER A FEW SECONDS THE CAR SUDENLY BEGAN TO GO ABOUT 4 MPH IN REVERSE. THE CAR WENT BACK TO GO ON ALL PAVED THE ROAD, AND IT THEN HIT TWO CAR. THAT'S WHEN IT STOPPED. I TRIED TO PUT THE CAR IN DRIVE TO GO BACK INTO THE PARKING SPACE. BUT IT FELT LIKE IT WAS DRIVING FORWARD AND I WAS IN REVERSE. AT THAT TIME, I HAD ANOTHER CAR. AT THAT POINT, I LEFT THE CAR ALONE BEING AS THERE WAS NOTHING CLEARLY WRONG. IN THE END MY CAR WAS DAMAGED TO THE FRONT AND TO THE BACK TOTALING \$11,115. THIS DOES NOT INCLUDE THE DAMAGE TO THE OTHER OTHER CARS. THE POLICE OF DAMAGE OF WHICH I AM NOT AWARE OF. ALTHOUGH THEY ARE CLAIMING MY INSURANCE. I TOOK THE CAR TO A LOCAL TOYOTA DEALER IN MIAMI COUNTY. THE RESEARCHER ON WHAT HAPPENED TO ME. I FOUND THAT THERE HAVE BEEN CLAIMS AGAINST TOYOTA FOR PROBLEMS WITH ELECTRONIC THROTTLE. WHERE THERE IS A SUDEN UNINTENDED ACCELERATION. I CONTACTED THE SERVICE DEPARTMENT ALL THE RESEARCH I HAD GATHERED FROM THE INTERNET. THE</p> <p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b> 200 <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i></p>

<p>DEALER CHECKED THE CAR'S COMPUTER, AND THEY CLAIMED THEY FOUND NOTHING WRONG WITH THE ELECTRONIC THROTTLE OR WITH THE CAR'S COMPUTER. THEY CLAIMED THAT AIR FLOWER BETWEEN THE ACCELERATOR AND THE BRAKE CAUSED THE PROBLEM. AS A RESULT, THEY FIXED THE STRUCTURAL DAMAGE TO MY CAR, BUT THEY MAINTAINED THAT NOTHING WAS WRONG WITH THE ELECTRONIC COMPONENTS, ESPECIALLY THE THROTTLE OF THE CAR. *NM</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	<p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA ODI No:</b> 10442250 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20071108 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> CHELSEA, MA</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p> <p>BT: THE CONTACT WAS PUTTING THE VEHICLE INTO PARK AND THE VEHICLE SUDDENLY ACCELERATED IT WENT FROM 0 MPH TO 100 MPH OUT OF CONTROL. THE VEHICLE BURST AND CRASHED INTO A WOODEN RETAINING WALL. THE CONTACT WAS NOT INJURED IN THE CRASH. THERE WAS PROPERTY DAMAGE TO THE WALL. THE VEHICLE WAS NOT TOTALLED. SHE CONTACTED THE MANUFACTURER, AND THEY SAID THEY WOULD INVESTIGATE THE INCIDENT. THERE HAD NOT BEEN ANY REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE MANUFACTURER IN TOUCH WITH THE CONTACT. A POLICE REPORT WAS TAKEN. *NM</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA ODI No:</b> 10442493 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20081111 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2007 TOYOTA ARISE/HIGHLANDER <b>Location of Incident:</b> WASHINGTON, IL</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p> <p>BT: THE CONTACT STATED WHILE YOLLING INTO A PARKING SLOT HEARD A GRINDING NOISE FOLLOWED BY THE VEHICLE LUNGING INTO ANOTHER PARKED VEHICLE. HE TOOK THE VEHICLE TO THE DEALER. THE DEALER COULD NOT DUPLICATE THE SUDEN ACCELERATION. THE DEALER REPLACED THE MASS AIR FLOW SENSOR, CUTOSS SENSOR, AND REPROGRAMMED THE ECU. THE DEALER COULD NOT DETERMINE WHAT CAUSED THE PROBLEM. *NM</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA ODI No:</b> 10442857 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20071107 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> SACRAMENTO, CA</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p> <p>BT: CONTACT STATES VEHICLE BURST FORWARD, LOST CONTROL, AND HIT ANOTHER VEHICLE. SHE DECREASED THE BRAKES, BUT THE VEHICLE WOULD NOT STOP. THERE WERE NO INJURIES, AND NO POLICE REPORT WAS TAKEN. THE DEALER INSPECTED HER NO OTHER FAILURE OF THIS TYPE HAD BEEN REPORTED. IT WAS THE CRASH OF THE MANUFACTURER THAT IT WAS REPORTED. DEAR, CA, UPDATED 10-14-2008. THE VEHICLE WAS PARKED WHEN IT SUDDENLY ACCELERATED. *NM</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA ODI No:</b> 10442895 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20071124 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> BIRMINGHAM, AL</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p> <p>BT: CONTACT STATED WHILE HIS CAR WAS PARKED, HE PUT HIS FOOT ON THE BRAKE IN ORDER TO SHIFT IT INTO DRIVE AND THE CAR ACCELERATED CAUSING THE VEHICLE TO GO ACROSS TWO RESIDENTIAL AND A HOSPITAL LAWN AND INTO TWO TREES. HE REPORTS HAVING NO PROBLEMS WITH THE CAR PRIOR TO THIS INCIDENT. *NM, UPDATED 12/20/08. *NM</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA ODI No:</b> 10444100 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20071122 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2007 TOYOTA HIGHLANDER <b>Location of Incident:</b> NASHVILLE, TN</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p> <p>BT: THE CONTACT STATED THERE WAS A PROBLEM WITH SUDDEN ACCELERATION. WHILE SHIFTING INTO REVERSE THE VEHICLE SUDDENLY ACCELERATED ON REVERSE. THE FRONT END DID NOT SEPARATE UNTIL NOVEMBER 12, 2008. THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED UNDER THE SAME CONDITIONS. HE WAS ABLE TO STOP THE VEHICLE AFTER IT WAS GONE THROUGH TWO FENCEN AND CLASHED INTO THE CURB OF THE DRIVEWAY. A CAR WAS IN THE VEHICLE IN CURRENTLY AT THE DEALERSHIP FOR DIAGNOSTIC. *NM, UPDATED 12/25/08. *NM</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA ODI No:</b> 10439724 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20071122 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> SCARSDALE, NY</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b> <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i></p>	<p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b> <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i></p>
<p>BT: THE CONTACT STATED WHILE ATTEMPTING TO APPLY BRAKE PRESSURE AT 40 MPH THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED. THIS OCCURRED ON DIRT ROADS BEHIND NORMAL. BEHIND MYSELF. THE VEHICLE WAS TAKEN TO THE DEALERSHIP FOR INSPECTION. UPON INSPECTION, THEY WERE UNABLE TO DUPLICATE THE PROBLEM AND NO REPAIR WORK WAS DONE. THE MANUFACTURER WAS ALERTED.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	<p>REPAIR SHOP FOR INSPECTION. A REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE MANUFACTURER WAS COMING TO THE REPAIR SHOP TO DETERMINE THE CAUSE OF THE INCIDENT. NO REPAIRS HAD BEEN MADE. A POLICE REPORT WAS TAKEN AT THE SCENE OF THE ACCIDENT. *NM</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA ODI No:</b> 10444592 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20071126 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> KALISPELL, MT</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p> <p>I HAD MY CAR INSTALLED BY LOCAL TOYOTA DEALER. LATE ON 12-04, THE CAR BEGAM TO SHUT AND SOUND MARKEDLY. I IMMEDIATELY AFTER DRIVING THE CAR ON THE LEFT WITH THE NEW BATTERY. THERE WAS A LOT OF A CYLINDER. AUTOMATIC. THE 40A TOYOTA CAMRY WAS LEFT IN "D" WITH THE OVERDRIVE BUTTON MAINTAINED. DISCLOSE MY FOOT WAS ON THE BRAKE PEDAL. I WAS NOT LIGHT. MY BODY STOPPED FOR A WHILE AT A "T" INTERSECTION FOR A WHILE AND NOT STOPPED. NOW THERE ARE OTHER VEHICLES MOVING. THE PARTICULAR INTERSECTION IS CONTROLLED BY A LONG SIGNAL LIGHT. I WAS APPROXIMATELY 100 FEET FROM THE THIRD CAR BACK FROM THE STOP LINE. ANNOYING TO THEM LEFT. ALL OF A SUDDEN I HEARD WHAT SOUNDED LIKE AN AIRPLANE ENGINE ROARING. GETTING EVER LOUDER. MY FOOT WAS STILL ON THE BRAKE. THE ENGINE KEPT. RIGHT AFTER I CALLED MY CAR TO ACCELERATE FORCEFULLY INTO THE STOPPED CAR IN FRONT OF ME. THE CAR IN FRONT OF ME WAS PUSHED INTO AN SUV IN FRONT OF IT. THE FORCE OF IMPACT CAUSED MY ENGINE TO SHUT DOWN. THE DRIVER IN FRONT OF ME APPEARED TO HAVE A WHOLE ARM BROKE. ALL TOLD, THERE WAS ABOUT \$1000 WORTH OF DAMAGE TO MY CAR. AND IT WAS DESTROYED THE REAR END AND HIGHER CAR IN FRONT OF ME. I STOPPED ABOUT 500 FEET FROM THE CRASH. I HAD THE CAR TOWED TO THE DEALER. THE LOCAL TOYOTA DEALER INFORMED ME THEY FOUND NOTHING WRONG WITH THE CAR. THE CAR WAS THEN TOWED TO A GROUP FOR BODY REPAIR. WHEN THE BOTTOM OF MY CAR, AT THE REAR, WAS A VIBRATION AND A SHOCKING SENSATION THAT WAS ATYPICAL FOR THE 1 PREVIOUS YEARS. I ALSO REALIZED THAT THE BRAKES WERE MAINTAINED. AT A LATER DATE TO THE DEALER. I HAD TOLD MY MECHANIC WERE ALMOST "COMPLETELY GONE" AND THAT I HAD NEW MECHANICS. HOWEVER, I AM CERTAIN THAT THE MAINTAINED AND INSPECTED MECHANICS IN MY REAR END. THIS WAS A RESULT OF THE BRAKES ATTEMPTING TO HOLD MY CAR BACK AS THE ENGINE BURST FORWARD. *NM</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA ODI No:</b> 10512257 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20071222 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2007 TOYOTA TACOMA <b>Location of Incident:</b> SAINT PETERSBURG, FL</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p> <p>BT: THE CONTACT OWNED A 2007 TOYOTA TACOMA. WHILE DRIVING AT 40-50 MPH BEHIND THE VEHICLE WOULD DRAMATICALLY ACCELERATE WITHOUT WARNING. ALSO, WHEN APPLYING PRESSURE TO THE ACCELERATOR PEDAL, THE VEHICLE WOULD NOT ACCELERATE UNLESS THE PEDAL WAS COMPLETELY DEPRESSSED TO THE FLOOR. THE DEALER STATED THAT THE MASS AIR SENSOR WAS CAUSING THE FAILURE. THE DEALER CLEANED THE SENSOR. THE CONTACT RETURNED TO THE DEALER A WEEK LATER AND DID NOT STATE THAT THE CATALYTIC CONVERTER WAS MELTING AND WAS THE CAUSE OF THE FAILURE. AFTER CARPENT INSPECTION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE CONVERTER WAS NOT MELTING. A PROFESSIONAL MECHANIC STATED THAT THE SUPERCHARGER FOR THE ACCELERATOR PEDAL POSITIONING SENSOR WAS CAUSING THE FAILURE. THE FAILURE MILEAGE WAS 4000 AND CURRENT MILEAGE WAS 17,000.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA ODI No:</b> 10444641 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20071122 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> PHILADELPHIA, PA</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p> <p>BT: THE CONTACT STATED THE ACCELERATOR PEDAL WAS STUCK. SHE WAS PULLING OUT ONTO THE ROAD. AS SHE LIGHTLY PRESSED THE ACCELERATOR PEDAL, THE VEHICLE WENT ACROSS THE ROAD AND CRASHED INTO A METAL POLE. THE FRONT END OF THE VEHICLE WAS PUSHED UNDERNEATH THE WINDSHIELD. THE CONTACT WAS WEARING THE SEAT BELT. THE AIR BAGS DEPLOYED. HOWEVER, SHE WAS TAKEN TO THE HOSPITAL WITH CHEST PAINS AND BURNING. THE VEHICLE WAS TOWED TO A</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA ODI No:</b> 10444708 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20071222 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2007 TOYOTA COROLLA <b>Location of Incident:</b> WATERTOWN, MA</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p> <p>WHILE PARKING THE CAR THE CAR ATTEMPTED TO ACCELERATE ON ITS OWN. I LOCKED DOWN TO MAKE SURE MY FOOT WAS NOT ON THE GAS. MY FOOT WAS PLACED ON THE BRAKE. I HAD TO MAKE AN URGENT CALL TO KEEP THE CAR FROM BEHAVING. THE VEHICLE IN FRONT AS THE ENGINE ALL ON ITS OWN DRAGGED THE CAR FORWARD. THE CAR WAS MOVING AT ABOUT 20 MPH. I WAS NOT WITHIN THE CAR. THE ENGINE BEHAVED AT 11,000 RPM WITH NO ANY PRESENCE ON THE GAS AND SIMPLY DRAGGED THE CAR FORWARD. *NM</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b> <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i></p>	<p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b> <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i></p>



<p>AT THE HOME, THE VEHICLE WAS TOWED TO AN INDEPENDENT REPAIR SHOP AND THEN TAKEN TO THE DEALER. THE DEALER WAS UNABLE TO DUPLICATE THE PROBLEM. THE MAIN FACTOR WAS CONTACTED REFERS TO THE REPAIR TOTALLED \$1048 PLUS SALES TAX.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NEFTA OBN No:</b> <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20060212 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2006 TOYOTA CAMRY XLE <b>Location of Incident:</b> VICTORIA, TX <b>NEFTA Summary:</b> <b>As of Monday my wife was involved in a sudden acceleration incident in the Wal-Mart parking lot here in Victoria, Texas.</b> <b>• the finished shopping</b> <b>• while in the car</b> <b>• Placed the key in the ignition and started the car.</b> <b>• Placed the foot on the brake (that must be on brake to shift into reverse)</b> <b>• Placed the car in reverse and shifted foot slightly on the brake to back up.</b> <b>• The ground was level and we moved far but inside the acceleration gauge</b> <b>• With her foot lightly on the brake, the engine took off.</b> <b>• Although she was attempting to break the car, it quickly surpassed the rest of the pushed vehicles.</b> <b>• The first vehicle was a 1999 white chevy truck.</b> <b>• The chevy took flight in the back and passed around and struck 2 other vehicles.</b> <b>I believe that my wife had her foot on the brake pedal once there were NO idid results. If she had not been shopping in the store, and instead parking on the accelerator, there would have been that much from the foot.</b> <b>this was pushing the truck around.</b> <b>Our car has 52,000 damage to the truck and one quarter people. We are waiting for Toyota to do a formal "suppression" (because, once what have we said I don't like they will actually find nothing. Our vehicle has 6,100 mileage and no other operators of anything was before the incident.</b> <b>We were very lucky, nobody was injured, but a 1999 white Volkswagen Jetta. Vehicle's front end crushed down on people and was propelled upwards.</b> <b>Bottom line, I don't think Toyota has moved up to a buying a sudden acceleration problem and that they have a problem that is in need for a fix. Sincerely, Edward A. Pottinger JR.</b></p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	
<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NEFTA OBN No:</b> 40111122 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20060120 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2006 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> CALIFORNIA, CA <b>NEFTA Summary:</b> 2005 TOYOTA CAMRY VIA STEERING/ACCELERATION PROBLEM. THE VEHICLE'S THROTTLE CONTROL SYSTEM (THCS) ON 20 FEB 2005, 11 APR 2005, 17 APR 2005 AND 20 FEB 2005 AFTER PROLONGED DRIVING AT HIGHWAY SPEEDS WHEN STEERING OFF THE GAS PEDAL TO MAKE A STOP THE ENGINE SPEED WOULD NOT DECREASE AND I WOULD HAVE TO APPLY BRAKE PETER TO THE BRAKE PEDAL TO STOP THE CAR DOWN, AND WHEN TO THE HOME TO AVOID HITTING VEHICLES IN FRONT OF ME. AFTER APPROXIMATELY 5-10 SECONDS THE ENGINE SPEED WOULD DECREASE TO NORMAL AND I WOULD RESTART THE ENGINE. WHILE STRUGGLING TO KEEP CONTROL, DID NOT SHIFT FROM DRIVE TO NEUTRAL. IN EACH INCIDENT NO WARNING LIGHTS, BEHIND THESE 3 EVENTS OCCURRED THE ENGINE STOPPED A CATASTROPHIC FAILURE ON 11 APR 2006 WITH ONLY 1,111 MILES. TOYOTA</p> <p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b></p> <p><i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i></p> <p>209</p>	
<p>OF CARBON GET MY ANA IMPROVED THE REPAIRS TO THE CATASTROPHIC ENGINE FAILURE BY REPLACING THE LOWER BLOCK AND THE CYLINDER HEADS AMONG OTHER COMPONENTS. I TOOK THE CAR TO EVANSTON, CALIFORNIA IN 1 MAR 2005, 20 APR 2005, 5 MAY 2005 AND 13 FEB 2006 FOR THE SPEED CONTROL PROBLEM BUT THEY COULD NOT DUPLICATE IT AND WOULD NOT REPLACE ANY COMPONENTS. AFTER THE COMPUTER DID NOT REGENERATE ANY DIAGNOSTIC FAILURE CODES, I ESOW BY DRIVING IN THE TOWERS SERVICE MANUAL THAT THE ELECTRONIC CONTROL MODULE DOES NOT RECORD ALL FAILURES. I CANNOT TELL IF THIS PROBLEM WAS PRESENT WHEN THE CAR WAS BUILT OR WHETHER IT WAS CAUSED BY REPAIRS FOR THE CATASTROPHIC ENGINE FAILURE. WHAT I DO KNOW IS THAT I HAVE A SERIOUS SAFETY ISSUE. I HAVE CONCERNS ABOUT NOT BEING ABLE TO AVOID HITTING A PEDESTRIAN OR ANOTHER VEHICLE. I HAVE REQUESTED ALL CONSUMER SUPPORT AVAILABLE WITH TOYOTA. A RESEARCHER NICHOLAS ZIMMERMANN WITH TOYOTA CUSTOMER SUPPORT 1-800-221-4311 TODAY 24 FEB 2006 INDICATED THAT THEY WILL NOT DO ANYTHING ELSE. I STRONGLY SUSPECT THAT THERE ARE OTHER DEALERS, HERE, THE THROTTLE BODY IS MALFUNCTIONING INTERMITTENTLY CAUSING THE PROBLEM. BEHIND THE TCM FAILING TO DETECT AND RECORD THE EVENT. "NM"</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NEFTA OBN No:</b> 10117110 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20060214 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2005 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> VICTORIA, TEXAS, TX <b>NEFTA Summary:</b> I WAS DRIVING TURNING LEFT INTO A PARKING SPACE AT ABOUT 3:30 PM, WHEN MY 2005 TOYOTA CAMRY BECAME, AND QUITE RAPIDLY, ACCELERATED WITHOUT ANY INPUT FROM ME. IT CRASHED A CYCLE, CRASHED A BUSHWACK, AND A TREE STOPPED THE CAR. IT FELT LIKE I HAD NO CONTROL OF THE CAR. ALSO, THE STEERING WAS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT. HOWEVER, I MANAGED TO STEER THE CAR AWAY FROM THE APARTMENT BUILDING AND AT DEERBORN ALAN WALKER. THE CAR TRAVELED ABOUT 10 FEET BEFORE THE ACCELERATION STOPPED. I BELIEVE IT LEFT ABOUT 20 FEET OF ROAD MARKS. I WAS NOT HURT IN THE CRASH, THE CAR HAD NO DAMAGE, READY TO THE FRONT BUMPER, COOLANT SYSTEM, AND HOOD, FOR APPROXIMATELY 100 FEET. I WAS IN CONTACT WITH THE TOYOTA CORPORATION, TORRANCE, CALIFORNIA, AND THEY INVESTIGATED THE CAR. THEY ADVERTISED THEY COULD FIND NOTHING WRONG WITH THE CAR, AND THERE WERE NO OTHER FAILURES. THE TOYOTA DEALER, WHERE I HAD BOUGHT THE CAMRY, ADDITIONALLY TESTED THE CAR USING OTHERS, AND ALSO CALLED IN A TOYOTA CARBON REPRESENTATIVE TO TEST THE CAR. THEY COULD FIND NOTHING WRONG WITH THE CAR. I WOULD THE CAMRY BACK TO THE DEALER. THE CAR MAY CRASH AND BE DAMAGED AT THE TIME OF THE CRASH. THE CAR HAD BEEN RUNNING WELL UNTIL THIS INCIDENT, UNEXPLAINED ACCELERATION THAT RESULTED IN A CRASH. "NM"</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NEFTA OBN No:</b> 10117102 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20060212 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2006 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> NORTON, TEXAS, TX <b>NEFTA Summary:</b> I WAS DRIVING A 2006 TOYOTA CAMRY LIMITED 4 CYL. IN JANUARY FEBRUARY OF 2006, I NOTICED A PROBLEM IN ACCELERATION/DRIFTING AFTER DRIVING THE VEHICLE FOR 1000 MILES.</p> <p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b></p> <p><i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i></p> <p>210</p>	
<p>ABOUT A WEEK, I HAVE EXPERIENCED ACCELERATION PROBLEM ON A DARK ROAD. I HAVE BEEN ON THE ACCELERATOR PEDAL NO RESPONSE, OR A KICKER AS THOUGH THE CAR IS ABOUT TO FALL. WHEN THIS OCCURS THE ONLY WAY TO GET THE CAR MOVING IS TO PUSH THE PEDAL ALL THE WAY TO THE FLOOR, AT WHICH POINT THE ENGINE RACES AND THE CAR SPEEDS UP. THIS BEHAVIOR HAPPENS ONLY ONCE THE DAY. THE FIRST TIME THIS OCCURRED I WAS PULLING ONTO A RAMP HIGHWAY FROM A SIDE STREET AND WAS NEARLY REAR-END BY A CAR BEHIND I WOULD NOT GO ON. I SLAMMED THE PEDAL TO THE FLOOR. THIS IS VERY UNSAFE FOR EVERYONE DRIVING. I REPORTED THE PROBLEM TO THE TOYOTA DEALER WHO SAID THAT THE PROBLEM WAS NORMAL FOR TOYOTA'S AND SOMETHING I WOULD NOT GET USED TO. THEY DID INSPECT THE CAR AND SAID NO SERIOUS CODES WERE GENERATED, AND THEY WERE UNABLE TO DUPLICATE THE PROBLEM. "NM"</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NEFTA OBN No:</b> 10117100 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20060101 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2006 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> MEL AND, PA <b>NEFTA Summary:</b> 1017 THE CONTACT STATED THE ENGINE BEVE BY ITSELF. THIS HAS OCCURRED ON FIVE SEPARATE OCCASIONS EITHER DURING OR PARKED. SINCE WERE PARKED WITH THE EMERGENCY BRAKE ENGAGED THE VEHICLE REVVED. ON ANOTHER OCCASION WHILE DRIVING IT FELT AS THOUGH THE ACCELERATOR PEDAL WAS PUSHING DOWN BY ITSELF. THE VEHICLE HAS NOT BEEN TAKEN TO THE DEALERSHIP FOR INSPECTION. UPDATED 07 MAR.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NEFTA OBN No:</b> 10112171 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20060101 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2006 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> ST. THOMAS, VI <b>NEFTA Summary:</b> DURING CAR TO WORK ON DAY OF ACCIDENT WITH NO INCIDENTS PARKED VEHICLE FOR ABOUT 10 HOURS THEN DRIVE TO WORK ON ABOUT 1 HALF HOUR THE CAR, AT 5:30 P.M. LEFT THE OFFICE TO GO HOME ON THE WAY HOME I MADE TWO STOPS, ONE AT THE HOME OFFICE AND ANOTHER AT MY NEIGHBOR'S HOME. ON LEAVING MY NEIGHBOR'S I PROCEEDED TO GO UP HILL WHEN FOOT TO THE TOP OF THE HILL WITH MY FOOT ON THE BRAKE PEDAL I PROCEEDED TO TURN THE VEHICLE LOW GEAR AS I WAS UNCONSCIOUS TO WHEN COMING DOWN A HILL WHICH WAS ABOUT TO BE, AS I PUT THE VEHICLE IN GEAR IT ACCELERATED TO SPEED COMING DOWN THE HILL. I NEEDED SOMEONE TO MAKE SURE MY FOOT WAS ON THE BRAKE PEDAL. IT WAS THE VEHICLE BEGAN RACING DOWN HILL. I RELEASED THE EMERGENCY BRAKE BUT IT DID NOT STOP. I TRIED TO TRY TO STAY THE VEHICLE WITH BOTH HANDS ON THE PEDALS WHILE AS I LOST CONTROL OF THE VEHICLE TO NO AVAIL. I CRASHED INTO A PARKED VEHICLE, REBOUND FROM SIDE TO SIDE THEN HIT A CURB IN THE ROAD AND BECAME AIRBORNE. THE VEHICLE CRASHED IN A OPEN BUSHES AGAIN THEN CRASHED INTO A LIGHT BUSHES AND ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE STREET AT WHICH TIME BOTH THE DRIVERS AND PASSENGERS WERE INJURED. ON JANUARY 4, 2006 I TOOK THE VEHICLE TO THE TOYOTA DEALER HERE ON ISLAND FOR FULL SERVICE. THE FRONT BRAKES WERE CHANGED AS INDICATED ON MY WORK ORDER, AND THE BACK BRAKES WERE CLEANED AND ADJUSTED. ON MARCH 6, 2006, I WENT IN TO THE SERVICE DEPARTMENT TO REPORT</p> <p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b></p> <p><i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i></p> <p>211</p>	
<p>THE ACCIDENT DESCRIBING WHAT HAPPENED I WAS TOLD THAT THE BRAKES WERE NOT THE PROBLEM. WHEN I ASKED WHAT WOULD CAUSE THE VEHICLE TO DO SOMETHING LIKE THAT, THEY TOLD ME THEY DID NOT KNOW AND THAT THEY WOULD ASK A RECALL FROM FORD TO DO A VIN TO LOOK AT THE VEHICLE. I AM WAITING TO HEAR FROM FORD. "NM"</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NEFTA OBN No:</b> 10115719 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20060220 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2005 LEXUS ES <b>Location of Incident:</b> LAGUNA, FL <b>NEFTA Summary:</b> MICHIGAN UNEXPECTED ACCELERATION DUE TO WOMEN'S GOT THROTTLE LAG. PEDAL IN ALMOST TO THE FLOOR BEFORE CAR MOVED, AND THEN GOES NO AS IF YOU HAD THE BRAKE STILL. I PERMITTED IT THAT CAR. ALSO, THEN ACCELERATION, CAR ROLLED FOR ONE TO TWO SECONDS BEFORE DRIVING. THIS HAS CAUSED SEVERAL NEAR COLLISIONS, ONE WITH A DEEP TRUCK. LEXUS CLAIMS THE CAR IS OPERATING AS DESIGNED. "NR"</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NEFTA OBN No:</b> 10115712 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20060101 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2005 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> FOUNTAIN VALLEY, CA <b>NEFTA Summary:</b> AT A STOP, VEHICLE DOES NOT ACCELERATE AFTER DEPRESSING THE GAS PEDAL. IT OCCURRED NEARLY CAUSED AN ACCIDENT. ALSO, AT CRUISE SPEEDS 60-70 MPH VEHICLE WILL DECELERATE WITHOUT ANY CHANGE IN PRESSURE TO THE GAS PEDAL. "NM"</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NEFTA OBN No:</b> 10115240 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20060114 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2002 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> TULSA, OK <b>NEFTA Summary:</b> THE CONTACT STATED THE VEHICLE HAS LURCHED FORWARD SIX TIMES SINCE 10/1/05. THIS HAPPENS WITH THE BRAKE PEDAL DEPRESSED AND WITH THE VEHICLE AT A STOP OR WHILE TRAVELING. THE VEHICLE HAS BEEN TO THE DEALERSHIP, BUT THE PROBLEM COULD NOT BE DUPLICATED. THE MANUFACTURER HAS BEEN ALERTED.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NEFTA OBN No:</b> 10115312 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20060101 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2003 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> KATONAH, OK <b>NEFTA Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b></p> <p><i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i></p> <p>212</p>	

<p>WHILE ROLLING TO A STOP BETWEEN TRAFFIC SIGNALS FOOT OF THE GAS PEDAL MY VEHICLE SUDDENLY REVVED TURBLY UP AND ROLLED FORWARD CREATING A 1 VEHICLE ACCIDENT. THE BRAKE WHEN FULLY THE INITIAL SURGE, BUT FULL THE VEHICLE IN FRONT. SEAT BELTS WERE WORN IN EACH VEHICLE AND MY AIRBAG DIDNOT DEPLOY. MY VEHICLE WAS IMPROVED OVER 40 MPH DAMAGE AND WONT RUN WHILE IT SITS AT AN AUTO BODY SHOP. THE NOSE AND BUMPER ARE BADLY DAMAGED. I WAS TOLD THE NOSE LIKE "NONSTANDARD ACCELERATION". THE VEHICLE IS AWAITING THE PARTS FOR REPAIRS. "PB</p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA ID No:</b> 1012324 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20090109 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2008 TOYOTA TONDOA <b>Location of Incident:</b> KING GEORGE, VA <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> ON THE CONTROL DOWN SHIFTS TWO GEARS ON SLIGHT UPGRADGE. EVEN ELEVATION CHANGES OF LESS THAN 10% FEEL ON THE HIGHWAY CAN TRIGGER THIS. THE SUDDEN UNINTENDED APPLICATION OF FULL THROTTLE ACCELERATION IS ALARMING AND DANGEROUS. THIS BEHAVOR POWER AL WAYS RESULTS TO THE CRUISE CONTROL SHUTTING OFF BUT IT REEDS FULLY BY 10% MILES PER HOUR. DETERMINING ON TONDOA THIS CAN HAPPEN AS OFTEN AS EVERY FIFTEEN SECONDS. "NM"</p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA ID No:</b> 1013410 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20090101 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2008 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> COSTA MESA, CA <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> I CONCERNED OF SUDDEN ACCELERATIONS, THE LAST ONE CAUSING PROPERTY DAMAGE. THE DEALER SAID NOTHING WRONG WITH CAR. I TYPED MANY OTHER PEOPLE ON LINE THAT HAD SAME PROBLEM. SOMEONE IS GOING TO GET SUELED IN A COURTROOM. ON TAKING LOT. THE APRAID TO DRIVE IT OR SELL IT ANOTHER WITH THIS PROBLEM. "NM"</p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA ID No:</b> 1013424 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20090101 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2008 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> BECKMAN, VA <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> SUDDEN ACCELERATION OF OUR 2008 TOYOTA CAMRY XLE AFTER BLOWING DOWN AND MAKING A U TURNER RIGHT TURN INTO THE GARAGE. THE CAR ACCELERATED WITH OWN FOR 10 FEET. RECOVERED OUR JIP PARKED IN THE GARAGE AND THEN TOOK OUT THE CAR AND DROVE AWAY. AT THE REAR PORT OF THE GARAGE. I CAN HEAR ME, MY GUNT AND HAS BEEN GARAGED AT ALL TIMES. INSURANCE ADVERTER SAYS THERE APPEAR TO BE A PROBLEM BUT CANN'T TRACE IT OFF SINCE THIS IS CAR BELONGS TO ELECTRONIC CONTROL THROUGHTOUT. "NM"</p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA ID No:</b> 1013576 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20090104 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2008 TOYOTA TONDOA <b>Location of Incident:</b> ALEXANDRIA, VA <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> MY FATHER - HAVING BEEN DRIVEN ONLY 2 WEEKS AND FOUR ROAD TEST WHEN USING CRUISE CONTROL AND STARTING UP A MCDONALD'S THE VEHICLE WILL LOCK DOWN FROM OVERDRIVE INTO DRIVE. AFTER THROTTLE TO CRUISE VEHICLE CAN HANG A HELL FIVE IN OVERDRIVE. THIS WILL BRING KPMR FROM 100 TO 1000. THIS IS VERY V ANNOYING. AUTOMATIC WILL LOCK DOWN PART DRIVE AND INTO RED FLAG. BRINGING FROM 1000 AND CAME THE VEHICLE TO ACCELERATE RAPIDLY ON HILL. THIS REEMS UNUSAL. ESPECIALLY IN CLUTTERED OR WET CONDITIONS. HAVE PHONED VARIOUS COMPLAINTS FROM OTHER TONDOA OWNERS ONLINE. ALL SAY DEALER AND TOYOTA CLAIM THIS IS "NORMAL". TOYOTA CORPORATION CORVE TOLD ME THEY CONSIDER THIS "NORMAL" AND RECOMMEND I NOT USE CRUISE CONTROL IN HILLY AREAS. MUST NOT HAVE HILLY AREAS WHERE TOYOTA ENGINEERS LIVE. "NM"</p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA ID No:</b> 1014849 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20090107 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2008 TOYOTA CAMRY SOLARA <b>Location of Incident:</b> SAN FRANCISCO, CA <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> THE VEHICLE LAG AT LOW SPEED AND FROM STOP IS INCONSISTENT AND HAS BEEN THE CAUSE FOR SEVERAL CLOSE CALLS WHILE PULING INTO TRAFFIC. SOME INSTANCES HAVE BEEN SEVERAL SECONDS BEFORE ACTUAL THROTTLE RESPONSE. DRIVER HAS TO USE HARSH ACCELERATION TO COMPENSATE WHEN THIS HAPPENS. THIS IS A SAFETY ISSUE THAT TOYOTA IS AWARE OF BUT UNWILLING TO ADMIT IT IS A PROBLEM. DRIVER IS VERY CONCERNED THAT THIS ISSUE WILL BE CAUSE OF AN ACCIDENT WAS PROVIDED SUPPOSED "UPDATE" TO CAR COMPUTER. BUT SAME PROBLEM EXIST. DEALERSTP STATED THAT "UPDATE" DOES NOT HELP ENTIRELY. "NM"</p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA ID No:</b> 10142816 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20090106 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2008 TOYOTA RAV4 <b>Location of Incident:</b> TAMPA, FL <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> VEHICLE BEING CONTROL. THE RAV4 HAS SOME WYED CONTROL PROBLEMS. COMPUTERS IT DOES NOT DOWN SHIFT PROPERLY. THEN, ATTEMPTED TO DOWN SHIFTS AND ACCELERATE EXTREMELY. THERE WAS CERTAIN WAY OF CONTROLLING THE SHIFTS IT MAY CREATE HAZARDOUS SITUATIONS ESPECIALLY MERRING TO THE TRAFFIC. "NM"</p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA ID No:</b> 10244135 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20090103 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2008 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> JEFFERSON, VA <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> WHILE ROLLING TO A STOP BETWEEN TRAFFIC SIGNALS FOOT OF THE GAS PEDAL MY VEHICLE SUDDENLY REVVED TURBLY UP AND ROLLED FORWARD CREATING A 1 VEHICLE ACCIDENT. THE BRAKE WHEN FULLY THE INITIAL SURGE, BUT FULL THE VEHICLE IN FRONT. SEAT BELTS WERE WORN IN EACH VEHICLE AND MY AIRBAG DIDNOT DEPLOY. MY VEHICLE WAS IMPROVED OVER 40 MPH DAMAGE AND WONT RUN WHILE IT SITS AT AN AUTO BODY SHOP. THE NOSE AND BUMPER ARE BADLY DAMAGED. I WAS TOLD THE NOSE LIKE "NONSTANDARD ACCELERATION". THE VEHICLE IS AWAITING THE PARTS FOR REPAIRS. "PB"</p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA ID No:</b> 10245176 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20090106 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2008 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> MERRIAM, KS <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> THE CONTACT STATED WHILE PLACING THE ENGINE INTO DRIVE, THE ENGINE RATED ROAR AND THE VEHICLE SUDDENLY ACCELERATED. THE BRAKE PEDAL WAS DEPRESSED WHEN THE VEHICLE CRASHED INTO A BRICK GARAGE WITH NO PRIOR WARNING. THE VEHICLE HIT AND DAMAGED TO THE FRONT WITH ADDITIONAL DAMAGE TO THE GARAGE. THE POLICE WERE NOT CONTACTED SINCE THIS HAPPENED ON PRIVATE PROPERTY. THE VEHICLE REMAINS AT THE SCENE OF THE INCIDENT AND HAS NOT BEEN INSPECTED.</p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA ID No:</b> 10245149 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20090103 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2008 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> BOYNTON BEACH, FL <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> I WAS PARKED IN A SHOP MALL WHERE I HAD JUST PICKED UP SOME DRY CLEANING. I ENTERED MY CAR, A 2008 TOYOTA CAMRY XLE, AND STARTED THE ENGINE. I THEN PUT THE CAR IN REVERSE GEAR, AND REMOVED MY FOOT FROM THE BRAKE. THE CAR BEGINS TO ACCELERATE IN REVERSE, AND WENT TOTALLY OUT OF CONTROL, HITTING ANOTHER CAR PARKED ACROSS FROM ME, AND CONTINUED IN A BANGWHEEL CIRCULAR PATH UNTIL I WAS ABLE TO APPLY THE BRAKE AND COME TO A STOP. I HAVE CALLED MERRIA TODAY AND WAS TOLD THAT THERE HAVE BEEN 41 PREVIOUS COMPLAINTS FOR THIS THROTTLE ISSUE. VEHICLE SPEED CONTROL, AND IS COMPLAINTS UNDER "VEHICLE SPEED CONTROL, ACCELERATION PEDAL, HANG AND CALLED TOYOTA MOTOR, AS WELL AS 800-334-4343 AND WAS TOLD THAT THEY WOULD MAKE AN APPOINTMENT WITH A SERVICE TOYOTA DEALER TO HAVE MY CAR INSPECTED FOR ANY DEFECTS. I HAVE ALSO GONE TO A AUTO BODY SHOP WHERE THE DAMAGE TO MY CAR HAS BEEN ESTIMATED AT \$400. IN ADDITION, THE POLICE ADVISED AT THE SCENE AND WAS CITED FOR "CARLESS DRIVING" AND PAID A FINE OF \$107.31. I AM I WISH TO HAVE THIS MATTER INVESTIGATED.</p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA ID No:</b> 10260018 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20090112 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2008 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> JANDREVILLE, GA <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> "I" THE CONTACT OWNS A 2004 TOYOTA CAMRY. THE VEHICLE WOULD HESITATE WHEN APPLI THE PRESSURE ON THE ACCELERATOR PEDAL, AND THEN LURCH FORWARD. THE VEHICLE HAS BEEN TAKEN TO THE DEALER SEVERAL TIMES. THE TECHNICIANS STATED THAT THEY COULDN'T PROVIDE A REMEDY BECAUSE IT WAS A COMPUTER FAILURE. BETWEEN THE ACCELERATOR PEDAL AND THE MOTOR. THE FAILURE MESSAGE WAS 4500. THE CURRENT MESSAGE WAS 4000.</p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA ID No:</b> 10273487 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20090124 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2008 TOYOTA COROLLA <b>Location of Incident:</b> RIMMEL, CA <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> "I" THE CONTACT OWNS A 2008 TOYOTA COROLLA. THE CONTACT STATED THAT THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED ON ITS OWN. THE CONTACT TOOK THE VEHICLE TO THE DEALER, AND THEY KEPT IT OVERNIGHT. THEY FOUND NO MALFAS WITH THE VEHICLE. THE FAILURE RECURRED AND THE VEHICLE WAS TAKEN BACK TO THE DEALER. ONCE AGAIN, NO FAULTS WERE FOUND. ON ONE OCCASION, THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED AND KICKED ANOTHER VEHICLE. THE OCCUPANTS IN THE OTHER VEHICLE WERE INJURED. AND THE CONTACT REPORTING THEM FROM THE BACK SEAT. A POLICE REPORT WAS FILED. THE VEHICLE WAS TAKEN TO THE DEALER AND THEY MADE REPAIRS. THE CONTACT DID NOT FEEL SAFE DRIVING THE VEHICLE. THEREFORE, IT WAS REPAIRED WITH A NEW COROLLA. CURRENTLY, THE 2008 COROLLA IS BEING USED. THE SAME FAILURE AS THE 2004 MODEL. THE DEALER STATED THAT SHE COULD BRING IN THE VEHICLE AND PAID HER FOR HOUR FOR A DIAGNOSIS. THE CONTACT APPROD TO DRIVE THE VEHICLE. THE FAILURE AND CURRENT MESSAGE WAS 22,000.</p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA ID No:</b> 10164567 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20090127 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2008 TOYOTA COROLLA <b>Location of Incident:</b> TRUJILLO ALTO, PR <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> ON APRIL 27, 2004 MY DAD STARTED THE ENGINE TO GO TO CHURCH AND THE CAR ACCELERATED IN FORWARD MOTION. CAR WAS TURNED OFF AND STARTED AGAIN. ONCE STARTED IT BROKE FIVE. THE SAME DAY WHEN MY DAD WAS COMING FROM CHURCH HE STARTED THE CAR AND WHEN HE PUT IT IN DRIVE THE CAR ACCELERATED ITSELF AND IT BROKE OUT AND WENT OVER A HOLE OF SAND THAT WAS ON THE SIDE OF THE ROAD. THE CAR FLEWED AND STOPPED AGAINST THE FENCE OF A HOUSE. THE AIR BAGS DID NOT DEPLOY. MY DAD WAS TAKEN TO THE HOSPITAL AND THE CAR WAS A TOTAL LOSS. HE WAS ALLOWED TO HAVE HIS CAR BUILT ON. HIS REVERSED OTHER COMPLAINTS AND IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THIS HAS HAPPENED TOO MANY TIMES TO JUST</p>	
<p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b> <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i> 213</p>	
<p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b> <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i> 214</p>	
<p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b> <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i> 215</p>	
<p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b> <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i> 216</p>	

<p>BE A RANDOM DEFECT. I HAVE THE ACCIDENT INVESTIGATED TO AVOID UNNECESSARY DEATH DUE TO THIS PROBLEM. "06</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	<p>THAT THERE WAS NOTHING WRONG WITH THE VEHICLE. THE DEALER STATED THAT THE FLOOR MATS COULD HAVE CAUSED THE FAILURE. ALTHOUGH THE HOUSE WERE RECALLS HASTENED DUE TO THE FLOOR MATS THE FAILURE OCCURRED IN THIS OCCASION. THE FAILURE RELEASE WAS 4433 AND THE CURRENT RELEASE WAS 73406.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA ODI No:</b> <b>Date of Incident:</b> <b>Vehicle:</b> <b>Location of Incident:</b> <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> DIT - THE CONTACT STATED WHILE DRIVING 11 MPH ON DEERWOOD THE BRAKE PEDAL THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED. THIS OCCURRED FOUR TIMES. THE FIRST THREE THE VEHICLE WAS STOPPED WITH EXCESSIVE PRESSURE TO THE BRAKE PEDAL. THE LAST TIME THE VEHICLE BECAME A FIRE. THERE WAS A POWER ASSIST TACK AT THE SCENE OF THE ACCIDENT. THE VEHICLE WAS TOWED TO AN INDEPENDENT REPAIR SHOP FOR BODY REPAIRS CAUSED BY THE CRASH. WHEN THE VEHICLE WAS INSPECTED FOR FIVE OTHER TIMES DIAGNOSTIC TESTING DID NOT IDENTIFY ANY CODES. ALSO, WHILE CARRYING 125 POUNDS OF BRIDG SOLE IN THE TRUCK, THE VEHICLE BECAME TO VIBRATE TO THE LEFT ON A SLUSHY ROAD. WHEN THE BRIDG SOLE WAS MOVED TO THE FRONT PASSENGER SEAT THE VEHICLE OPERATED NORMALLY. THE MANUFACTURER WAS ALERTED. UPDATED 7/1/2006. THE CONSUMER REPORTED THESE INCIDENTS TO THE DEALER, BUT THEY TOLD HER CONSUMER THAT NOTHING WAS WRONG. "064</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA ODI No:</b> <b>Date of Incident:</b> <b>Vehicle:</b> <b>Location of Incident:</b> <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> IT - THE CONTACT STATED THE HE OWNS A 2006 TOYOTA RAV4 WHILE DRIVING THE VEHICLE AT 1 MPH AND HE WAS TRYING TO COME TO A STOP WHEN THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED. THE CONTACT STATED THAT THIS HAPPENED 3 TIMES BEFORE HE TOOK THE VEHICLE TO A DEALERSHIP. THE DEALERSHIP DID NOT A COMPLETE DIAGNOSTIC AND FOUND NO ERRORS. THE CONTACT STATED THAT THE VEHICLE RAN FINE FOR A WHILE AND ON 12/20/06 WHILE DRIVING THE VEHICLE TRIED TO MAKE A TURN AND TO STOP WHEN THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED AGAIN. HE STATED THAT THIS HAS HAPPENED 4 OTHER TIMES. THE CONTACT STATED THAT THE SECOND TIME THE VEHICLE WOULD NOT COME TO A STOP AND RAN INTO STAIRS WHICH DAMAGED THE GEAR THAT PROTECTS THE ENGINE. THE CONTACT CALLED TOYOTA'S REGIONAL OFFICE IN CHICAGO. THE CONTACT MET AN INVESTIGATOR AT A DEALERSHIP TO RUN MORE DIAGNOSTIC TESTING. THE CONTACT STATED THAT THE INVESTIGATOR FOUND NOTHING WRONG WITH THE VEHICLE, BUT IS WAITING FOR THE OFFICIAL TEST RESULTS. "06 THE CONSUMER STATED THE THIRD TIME THE INCIDENT HAPPENED, HE RAN INTO A DECK, AND CAUSED DAMAGE TO THE VEHICLE. UPDATED 09/07/07 "06</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA ODI No:</b> <b>Date of Incident:</b> <b>Vehicle:</b> <b>Location of Incident:</b> <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> I WAS DRIVING INTO THE AUTOMATIC CAR WASH. BLOWN TO GO UP ALMOST RAMP TO TOP. GAVE THE CAR A LITTLE GAS AND IT STARTED MOVING. DID NOT STOP WHEN BRAKE PEDAL PRESSED. JUMPED THE PLACK AND MET THE SIDE OF THE CAR WASH. THE CAR WAS ABLE TO BE MOVED TO OUTSIDE CARWASH. WHILE REVERSING WAS ABLE TO STOP AND TURN OFF THE ENGINE. THE FRONT BUMPER AND DRIVER SIDE FRONT FENDER WERE KEPT ACHED, AND SUSPENSION DAMAGE APPARED. "06</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA ODI No:</b> <b>Date of Incident:</b> <b>Vehicle:</b> <b>Location of Incident:</b> <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> DIT - THE CONTACT STATED THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED OUT OF CONTROL 3 TIMES WHEN PULLED INTO A PARKING SPACE. THE CONSUMER NEVER KNEW THE REASON OF WHY IT WAS A DIFFERENT BEHAVIOR WITH OTHER MAKE. IN A PARKING LOT, THE CONTACT BELIEVED THAT A DEFECT CAUSED THESE THREE INCIDENTS. UPDATED 06/20/06. "06</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA ODI No:</b> <b>Date of Incident:</b> <b>Vehicle:</b> <b>Location of Incident:</b> <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> DIT - THE CONTACT OWNS A 2005 LEXUS ES330 WHILE DRIVING 15 MPH ON A HILL, THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED IN ITS OWN AND THE PEDAL WAS STUCK TO THE FLOOR. SHE WAS ONLY ABLE TO STOP THE VEHICLE AFTER APPLYING THE BRAKES. THE CONTACT SHUT THE ENGINE OFF AND ATTEMPTED TO EXIT THE VEHICLE. HOWEVER, THE CAR WOULD NOT STOP. SHE STATED THAT THE VEHICLE TRIPPED AS A LOAD WASN'T PRESENT IN THE ENGINE. AFTER RESTARTING THE VEHICLE, HOWEVER, THE VEHICLE BECAME MOVING IN REVERSE. THE VEHICLE WAS TOWED TO THE DEALER WHERE THE VEHICLE WAS RECHARGED. THE DIAGNOSTIC COMPUTER TEST INDICATED</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA ODI No:</b> <b>Date of Incident:</b> <b>Vehicle:</b> <b>Location of Incident:</b> <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> DIT - THE CONTACT STATED WHILE DRIVING ALONLY AT 1 MPH WITH FOOT ON THE BRAKE PEDAL, THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED SURPRISINGLY, CAUSING AN ACCIDENT. THE VEHICLE CRASHED INTO THREE OTHER VEHICLES CAUSING PROPERTY DAMAGE. THE DEALER'S WERE IN USE AT THE TIME. THE AIR BAGS DID NOT DEPLOY. THERE WERE NO PROBLEMS</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA ODI No:</b> <b>Date of Incident:</b> <b>Vehicle:</b> <b>Location of Incident:</b> <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> DIT - THE CONTACT STATED WHILE DRIVING 15 MPH AND MAKING A RIGHT TURN HE EXPERIENCED UNINTENDED VEHICLE ACCELERATION. HE WAS ABLE TO RESUME NORMAL OPERATION AFTER REPEATED BRAKING ATTEMPTS. HE EXPERIENCED IDENTICAL FAILURE ON THREE OCCASIONS. THE FAILURE RELEASE WAS 4080 AND THE CURRENT RELEASE WAS 6306.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA ODI No:</b> <b>Date of Incident:</b> <b>Vehicle:</b> <b>Location of Incident:</b> <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> ON MAY 28, 2006, WHILE ATTEMPTING TO MAKE A ROUTINE STOP IN A COMMERCIAL LOT, THE ENGINE OF THE CAR REVVED, THE CAR ACCELERATED AND JERKED THE CONCRETE STOP AT THE END OF THE PARKING SPACE AND CRASHED INTO A TREE CAUSING EXTENSIVE DAMAGE ALONG THE DRIVER SIDE OF THE CAR. THE CAR WAS TOWED TO THE DEALERSHIP WHO MADE THE REPAIRS. THE DEALERSHIP FROM WHOM I BOUGHT THE CAR INDICATED VERBALLY THAT NOTHING WAS WRONG WITH THE ENGINE. I AM CERTAIN THAT HUMAN ERROR DID NOT PLAY A PART IN THE CAR'S RECENT ACCELERATION. "06</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA ODI No:</b> <b>Date of Incident:</b> <b>Vehicle:</b> <b>Location of Incident:</b> <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> DIT - THE CONTACT STATED AFTER BEING PARKED IN A PARKING LOT FOR 3 HOURS AND 17 MINUTES, THE VEHICLE WAS STARTED. IT WAS PLACED IN REVERSE AND THE VEHICLE WAS PROCEEDED BY AN EXCESSIVE SPEED. IN AN ATTEMPT TO STOP THE MOMENTUM OF THE VEHICLE, THE CONTACT PLACED THE VEHICLE INTO NEUTRAL. DURING THE INCIDENT, THE VEHICLE MADE AN EXTREMELY LOUD NOISE AS IF THE VEHICLE WAS TRAVELING AT 100 MPH. THE BRAKES WERE USED TO STOP THE VEHICLE. THE KEY WAS TURNED TO THE OFF POSITION AND THE VEHICLE WAS LATER DRIVEN HOME. THE VEHICLE IS CURRENTLY AT THE SERVICE DEALER FOR INSPECTION.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA ODI No:</b> <b>Date of Incident:</b> <b>Vehicle:</b> <b>Location of Incident:</b> <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> WHEN MY VEHICLE IS IMMEDIATELY PUT IN DRIVE GEAR FROM REVERSE GEAR, FOOT TAP ON THE BRAKE, AND TAP THE GAS PEDAL, MY VEHICLE JERKS FORWARD AS IF IT IS IN FULL THROTTLE. AS RESULT MY VEHICLE JUMPS THE CURB AND IMPACTED A BRICK WALL, EXPENDED A GASOLY VANE AND A CITY LIGHT BARN. THE VEHICLE SUFFERED FRONTAL DAMAGE AND IS UNDRIVABLE. I HAVE CONTACTED THE AUTO MANUFACTURER. THEY WILL TOW AND INSPECT IT. "06</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA ODI No:</b> <b>Date of Incident:</b> <b>Vehicle:</b> <b>Location of Incident:</b> <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> DIT - THE CONTACT STATED AFTER BEING PARKED IN A PARKING LOT FOR 3 HOURS AND 17 MINUTES, THE VEHICLE WAS STARTED. IT WAS PLACED IN REVERSE AND THE VEHICLE WAS PROCEEDED BY AN EXCESSIVE SPEED. IN AN ATTEMPT TO STOP THE MOMENTUM OF THE VEHICLE, THE CONTACT PLACED THE VEHICLE INTO NEUTRAL. DURING THE INCIDENT, THE VEHICLE MADE AN EXTREMELY LOUD NOISE AS IF THE VEHICLE WAS TRAVELING AT 100 MPH. THE BRAKES WERE USED TO STOP THE VEHICLE. THE KEY WAS TURNED TO THE OFF POSITION AND THE VEHICLE WAS LATER DRIVEN HOME. THE VEHICLE IS CURRENTLY AT THE SERVICE DEALER FOR INSPECTION.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA ODI No:</b> <b>Date of Incident:</b> <b>Vehicle:</b> <b>Location of Incident:</b> <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> WHEN MY VEHICLE IS IMMEDIATELY PUT IN DRIVE GEAR FROM REVERSE GEAR, FOOT TAP ON THE BRAKE, AND TAP THE GAS PEDAL, MY VEHICLE JERKS FORWARD AS IF IT IS IN FULL THROTTLE. AS RESULT MY VEHICLE JUMPS THE CURB AND IMPACTED A BRICK WALL, EXPENDED A GASOLY VANE AND A CITY LIGHT BARN. THE VEHICLE SUFFERED FRONTAL DAMAGE AND IS UNDRIVABLE. I HAVE CONTACTED THE AUTO MANUFACTURER. THEY WILL TOW AND INSPECT IT. "06</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA ODI No:</b> <b>Date of Incident:</b> <b>Vehicle:</b> <b>Location of Incident:</b> <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> DIT - THE CONTACT STATED AFTER BEING PARKED IN A PARKING LOT FOR 3 HOURS AND 17 MINUTES, THE VEHICLE WAS STARTED. IT WAS PLACED IN REVERSE AND THE VEHICLE WAS PROCEEDED BY AN EXCESSIVE SPEED. IN AN ATTEMPT TO STOP THE MOMENTUM OF THE VEHICLE, THE CONTACT PLACED THE VEHICLE INTO NEUTRAL. DURING THE INCIDENT, THE VEHICLE MADE AN EXTREMELY LOUD NOISE AS IF THE VEHICLE WAS TRAVELING AT 100 MPH. THE BRAKES WERE USED TO STOP THE VEHICLE. THE KEY WAS TURNED TO THE OFF POSITION AND THE VEHICLE WAS LATER DRIVEN HOME. THE VEHICLE IS CURRENTLY AT THE SERVICE DEALER FOR INSPECTION.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA ODI No:</b> <b>Date of Incident:</b> <b>Vehicle:</b> <b>Location of Incident:</b> <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> WHEN MY VEHICLE IS IMMEDIATELY PUT IN DRIVE GEAR FROM REVERSE GEAR, FOOT TAP ON THE BRAKE, AND TAP THE GAS PEDAL, MY VEHICLE JERKS FORWARD AS IF IT IS IN FULL THROTTLE. AS RESULT MY VEHICLE JUMPS THE CURB AND IMPACTED A BRICK WALL, EXPENDED A GASOLY VANE AND A CITY LIGHT BARN. THE VEHICLE SUFFERED FRONTAL DAMAGE AND IS UNDRIVABLE. I HAVE CONTACTED THE AUTO MANUFACTURER. THEY WILL TOW AND INSPECT IT. "06</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>









[illegible]

<p><b>Location of Incident:</b> NORTH WEST, DC</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>          1) THE CONTACT OWNS A 2004 TOYOTA CAMRY. THE CONTACT STATED THAT WHEN HE DEPRESSES THE BRAKE PEDAL, THE VEHICLE ACCELERATES INSTEAD OF STOPPING. THE CONTACT HAS REPORTED HIS FOOT PRESSING THE BRAKE PEDAL IN ORDER TO STOP THE ACCELERATION. THE FAILURE CAUSED THE VEHICLE TO CRASH INTO ANOTHER VEHICLE ON MAY 1, 2007. THE POLICE STATED THAT SINCE THE CRASH OCCURRED ON PRIVATE PROPERTY, THERE WAS NO NEED TO FILE A POLICE REPORT. THE MANUFACTURER HAS NOT BEEN NOTIFIED. THE CONTACT WAS REFERRED TO NHTSA BY THE REP'S SHOP. THE ENGINE SIZE WAS UNKNOWN. THE CONSUMER PROVIDED PICTURES OF THE DAMAGED VEHICLE. EXTENDED WARRANTY. "NM"</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA ODI No: 1817027  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2006/05/01  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2004 TOYOTA CAMRY  <b>Location of Incident:</b> VIRBILIA, CA</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>          1) WAS ENTERING A PARKING SPACE. MY TOYOTA CAMRY (2004) HAD A SURGE OF ACCELERATION WHILE I WAS DEPRESSING THE BRAKE. IT WOULD NOT STOP CAUSING MY VEHICLE TO LUNGE FORWARD THROUGH A PARKING ROW AND A CURB CUT CURVE. THE AIR BAGS FAILED TO DEPLOY AT THE TIME TO CRASH. "NM"</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA ODI No: 1818178  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2006/01/23  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2006 TOYOTA RAV4  <b>Location of Incident:</b> WOODBRIDGE, WA</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>          THE LAG AND/OR SPUTTER SURGING OF THE CAR UPON LAST ACCELERATION IS VERY DANGEROUS. WHILE ATTEMPTING TO MAKE A LEFT TURN, THE VEHICLE PASSED THE STOPPED CAR ACCELERATING MUCH FASTER THAN CONDITIONS PERMITTED. I NEARLY HIT ANOTHER VEHICLE BECAUSE I WAS UNPREPARED FOR THE CAR TO NOT FUNCTION IN A CONTROLLED MANNER. "NM"</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA ODI No: 1817019  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2006/01/04  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2004 TOYOTA CAMRY  <b>Location of Incident:</b> MARYSVILLE, WA</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>          MY FRIEND STATED THE VEHICLE EXCESSIVELY ACCELERATED WHILE BACKING OUT OF A PARKING SPACE AT 1 MPH. PRIOR TO THE INCIDENT, THE MOTOR WOULD ROAR UP WHEN MY FRIEND WOULD PRESS THE GAS PEDAL. HE ADDED, "THE VEHICLE WAS TAKEN TO THE DEALER AND THE CONTACT WAS WAITING TO HEAR THE RESULTS OF THE EXAMINATION. THERE WAS AN OIL WARNING THAT APPLIED TO THIS COMPLAINT PERTAINING TO THE VEHICLE SPEED CONTROL MODULE."</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p style="text-align: right;"><i>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</i>  <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i> 237</p>	<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA ODI No: 1817109  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2006/11/10  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2004 TOYOTA CAMRY  <b>Location of Incident:</b> VANDERLY, PA</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>          THE VEHICLE IS A 2004 TOYOTA CAMRY. ON FOUR SEPARATE OCCASIONS, THE VEHICLE SURGED WHEN THE DRIVER DEPRESSES THE BRAKE PEDAL WITHOUT ORDERING THE ACCELERATOR PEDAL. THE TOYOTA DEALER INSPECTED THE VEHICLE AND REPORTED NO PROBLEMS. "NM"</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA ODI No: 1817112  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2006/01/24  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2005 TOYOTA RAV4  <b>Location of Incident:</b> CONNELLY, VT</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>          1) THE CONTACT STATED WHEN THE VEHICLE WAS NOT WARMED UP, THERE WAS LITTLE POWER WHEN ACCELERATING. THEN THE VEHICLE SURGED FORWARD EXTREMELY FAST. THE LAST OCCURRENCE HAPPENED WHILE TRAVELING 15 MPH. THE VEHICLE WAS TAKEN TO THE SERVICE DEALER TWICE FOR THE PROBLEM AND THE MANUFACTURER WAS NOTIFIED.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA ODI No: 1817582  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2006/01/21  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2004 TOYOTA CAMRY  <b>Location of Incident:</b> REIDENBACH, CA</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>          1) THE CONTACT STATED ON THREE SEPARATE OCCASIONS THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED WITHOUT WARNING WHEN PLACED INTO GEAR. THE VEHICLE WAS BROUGHT TO THE DEALER BOTH TIMES HOWEVER THE PROBLEM COULD NOT BE REPLICATED. UPDATED 01/30/07. "JD"</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA ODI No: 1817337  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2006/01/01  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2004 TOYOTA COROLLA  <b>Location of Incident:</b> LITTLE ROCK, AR</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>          1) THE CONTACT STATED WHILE DRIVING 140 MPH SPEED AND RELEASED THE ACCELERATOR PEDAL, THE VEHICLE ONLY SLOWED TO 35 MPH. ALSO, WHEN DEPRESSING THE BRAKE PEDAL, THERE WAS A EXTENDED STOPPING DISTANCE. FURTHERMORE, THE ODOMETER HAD BECOME UNRELIABLE. THE VEHICLE WAS BROUGHT TO THE DEALER WHERE THE CAUSE OF THE PROBLEM COULD NOT BE DETERMINED.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p style="text-align: right;"><i>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</i>  <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i> 238</p>
<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA ODI No: 1817252  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2006/04/01  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2004 TOYOTA RAV4  <b>Location of Incident:</b> GARDEN CITY, NY</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>          MY FRIEND BOUGHT A 2004 TOYOTA RAV4 (4X4 LIMITED) IN MARCH 2006. SINCE THE DAY WE PURCHASED THE VEHICLE, WE HAVE HAD ISSUES WITH THE ACCELERATION EITHER NOT RESPONDING OR LUNGING FORWARD. WHEN TAKING OFF FROM A STOP, IT OCCASIONALLY TAKES THE CAR SEVERAL SECONDS TO ENGAGE AND ACCELERATE. OTHER TIMES, WHEN SLOWING DOWN TO STOP AT A LIGHT OR SIGN, THE CAR CONTINUES TO REV THE ENGINE - 1-2,000 RPM AND LUNGES FORWARD. IN ORDER TO STOP THE CAR FROM LUNGING FORWARD, WE HAVE TO PUT THE CAR IN NEUTRAL AND CLAM ON THE BRAKE. THIS IS VERY HEAVY IF YOU ARE COMING UP TO AN ACTIVE INTERSECTION. THIS LEAVING OTHER COMPLAINANTS TOYOTA NEEDS TO ADDRESS THIS ISSUE. "NM"</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA ODI No: 1817819  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2006/11/15  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY  <b>Location of Incident:</b> HOUSTON, TX</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>          1) THE CONTACT STATED WHILE PARKING THE VEHICLE ON THE UPPER LEVEL OF A MULTILEVEL PARKING GARAGE, THE BRAKE PEDAL WAS DEPRESSED AND THE VEHICLE SURGED FORWARD, BREAKING THROUGH THE SAFETY CABLE AND DAMAGING THE BODY OF THE VEHICLE. THE VEHICLE WAS TAKEN TO A SERVICE DEALER, WHERE THE DEALER WAS UNABLE TO DUPLICATE OR DETERMINE THE CAUSE OF THE PROBLEM. UPDATED 12/26/06. "NM"</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA ODI No: 1818119  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2006/11/01  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2006 ACURA MDX  <b>Location of Incident:</b> ONE JENNY, IL</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>          1) THE CONTACT OWNS A 2006 TOYOTA SCION XD. THE CONTACT STATED THAT THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED TO 40 MPH WITHOUT WARNING. THE DEALER WAS UNABLE TO DUPLICATE THIS FAILURE. THE DEALER DID NOT MAKE ANY REPAIRS. THE CURRENT MILEAGE IS 1,000 AND PHOENIX MILEAGE WAS 1,000.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA ODI No: 1817820  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2006/11/06  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2000 TOYOTA CAMRY  <b>Location of Incident:</b> FARMERSVILLE, TX</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>          TOYOTA CALLED 2006 VIN#MTG1G2G07XXXXXX TODAY 01/04/06, WHILE DRIVING THIS CAR, ENGINE ACCELERATED WITHOUT DRIVER PUSHING GAS PEDALS. I STOPPED THE</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><i>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</i>  <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i> 239</p>	<p>CAR AND HITTED THE GEAR TO PARKED MODE. STILL ENGINE WAS RUNNING AT MORE THAN 1000 RPM. I STOPPED THE ENGINE AND STARTED AGAIN. STILL ENGINE WAS RUNNING AT 1000 RPM. WHILE ON A STOP, I PUNCHED THE GAS PEDAL SEVERAL TIMES AND STARTED THE ENGINE. THEN ENGINE WAS RUNNING AT NORMAL SPEED. AFTER 1 HR, I OPERATED THE SAME PROBLEM. PLEASE ADVISE ME IN THIS REGARD. THANK YOU. REGARDS, VINCENTA. "NM"</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA ODI No: 1817824  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2006/11/05  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY  <b>Location of Incident:</b> MISSOURI CITY, TX</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>          1) WAS SLOWLY TURNING RIGHT TO PARK IN FRONT OF A STORE WITH MY FOOT ON THE BRAKE PEDAL AND TO STOP WHEN MY 2001 CAMRY ACCELERATED. I NOTED THE CAR AND CHANGED INTO A STOREFRONT WINDOW. "JD"</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA ODI No: 1817282  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2006/11/05  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2006 TOYOTA TUNDRA  <b>Location of Incident:</b> CHESTER, VA</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>          2006 TOYOTA TUNDRA WHEN CRUISE CONTROL IS ENGAGED, ANY HILL OR EVEN MINOR DISCLOSURE INITIATES A DOWNSHIFT OF ONE OR TWO GEAR, ACCOMPANIED BY FULL THROTTLE ACCELERATION. THIS DOES NOT OCCUR, EVEN ON MAJOR HILLS SAID GEAR DISCONTROLS ARE NOT NECESSARY. THIS IS NORMAL ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN BEFORE AN ACCIDENT OR CRASH OCCURS.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA ODI No: 1817375  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2006/11/17  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2004 TOYOTA HIGHLANDER  <b>Location of Incident:</b> PITTSBURGH, PA</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b>          1) THE CONTACT STATED AT A CARWASH BEFORE THE VEHICLE DEPARTED WHEN THE ACCELERATOR PEDAL WAS DEPRESSSED. ALSO, THE VEHICLE STOPPED BRUCCALLY. THE DEALER HAD REPROGRAMMED THE COMPUTER MULTIPLE TIMES, BUT THE PROBLEM PERSISTED. "AK"</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA ODI No: 1817379  <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2006/11/15  <b>Vehicle:</b> 2004 TOYOTA CAMRY  <b>Location of Incident:</b> KNOXVILLE, TN</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p> <p style="text-align: right;"><i>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</i>  <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i> 240</p>

<p>BY THE CONTACT STATED WHILE DRIVING 14 MPH IN THE RAIN, THE ACCELERATOR PEDAL BECAME STUCK, CAUSING THE VEHICLE'S SPEED, AND CAUSING IT TO COLLIDE WITH OTHER VEHICLES. IT WAS TURNED BY A SERVICE DEALER, WHO WAS UNABLE TO DETERMINE THE CAUSE OF THE PROBLEM. UPDATED 12/24/04. *04</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10179215 <b>NISSA CDR No:</b> 20001115 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20001115 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2000 TOYOTA CAMRY SOLARA <b>Location of Incident:</b> SAN MARCOS, WA</p> <p><b>NISSA Summary:</b> THROTTLE LAG AT LOW SPEED AND FROM STOP IS INCONSISTENT AND HAS BEEN THE CAUSE FOR SEVERAL CLOSE CALLS WHILE DRIVING IN TRAFFIC. MANUFACTURER WAS INFORMED, DEALER INVESTIGATED. STATES THIS IS NORMAL AND NOTHING CAN BE DONE. THAT LAG IS "ACCEPTABLE." SOME DRIVERS HAVE BEEN SEVERAL SECONDS BEFORE ACTUAL THROTTLE RESPONSE. DRIVER HAS TO USE HARDER ACCELERATION TO COMPENSATE WHEN THIS HAPPENS. THIS IS A SAFETY ISSUE THAT TOYOTA IS AWARE OF BUT UNWILING TO ADMIT IT IS A PROBLEM. DRIVER IS VERY CONCERNED THAT THIS ISSUE WILL BE CAUSE OF AN ACCIDENT. *04</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10174249 <b>NISSA CDR No:</b> 20001125 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20001125 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2000 TOYOTA TUNDRA <b>Location of Incident:</b> DENHAM SPRINGS, LA</p> <p><b>NISSA Summary:</b> AS MY TOYOTA TUNDRA WOULD SUDDENLRY NOT RESPOND ON ITS OWN, THEN IT WOULD BEYN NORMALLY. THIS HAS HAPPEND TWICE NOW. NOW HAVE TO PUSH THE GAS PEDAL, HLE WAY TO THE FLOOR TO GET ANY RESPONSE. IN RESEARCHING THE PROBLEM, I DISCOVERED THAT THERE ARE A LOT OF PEOPLE HAVING THE SAME PROBLEM. IF IT ALL RELATED TO EITHER THE THROTTLE POSITION SENSOR OR THE THROTTLE CABLE SENSOR, THESE PARTS COST AROUND \$25 EACH. TOYOTA MANUFACTURER KNOW THERE IS A PROBLEM HERE BUT TOYOTA WILL DO NOTHING TO HELP. *06</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10174249 <b>NISSA CDR No:</b> 10174249 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20001125 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2000 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> RIVERDALE, CA</p> <p><b>NISSA Summary:</b> THIS MAY BE A REPEAT COMPLAINT BECAUSE I FILLED THIS OUT EARLIER BUT MY CURRENT CHARGE, MY BROTHER AND SISTER HAD A MINOR ACCIDENT FROM 01/25/2005, 11:50 PM, BY WHICH OUR 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY SURGED FORWARD FROM ITS PARKING SPACE TOWARD MY SISTER'S HOME. I HAD TO RUN INTO THE DRIVEWAY TO STOP THE CAR AND INTO A PARKED FORD EXPLORER. MY KNOCKING OFF THE EXPLORER'S FRONT BUMPER PLATE COMPLETELY OFF THE GROUND. MY SISTER HAD HER LOWERED DOWN TO HER BY MY BROTHER'S FOOT WAS ON THE ACCELERATOR AND IT WAS NOT IT WAS ON THE BRAKE PEDAL. SHE HAD MY BROTHER'S FOOT ON THE PEDAL AS HE WAS ON THE BRAKE PEDAL. THE CAR SURGED FORWARD INTO THE PARKED EXPLORER ON</p> <p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b></p> <p><i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i></p> <p>241</p>	<p>ITS OWN ACCELERATION. WE HAD A TOYOTA IN THE EARLY 1990S AND HAD THIS EXACT PROBLEM REPEATING IN ANOTHER CRASH. THIS HAS BEEN A PROBLEM FOR TOYOTA SINCE THEN. TOYOTA SHOULD HAVE TESTED THIS PROBLEM OVER THE LAST 20+ YEARS, SINCE THEN THERE WAS NO INTEREST TO FIX OR REMEDIATE IT AFTER THE CRASH TO COMPLETELY *06</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10175251 <b>NISSA CDR No:</b> 20001125 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20001125 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2000 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> HUNTSVILLE, AL</p> <p><b>NISSA Summary:</b> BY THE CONTACT STATED THIS HE WAS APPLYING THE BRAKE WHILE HE WAS IN A PARKING LOT WHEN THE VEHICLE LUNGED FORWARD. THE CONSUMER CONTINUED TO APPLY THE BRAKE BUT THE VEHICLE CONTINUED VERY SLOWLY FORWARD UNTIL IT WENT THROUGH A STORES GLASS WINDOW. THE POLICE DETERMINED THE CONTACT MUST HAVE ACCIDENTALLY DISOBBED THE ACCELERATOR PEDAL. BUT THE CONTACT DENIED THE DETERMINATION. A POLICE REPORT WAS TAKEN, AND THE VEHICLE WAS NOT TAKEN TO A SERVICE DEALER. CAR, UPDATED 12/24/04. *06</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10175272 <b>NISSA CDR No:</b> 20001125 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20001125 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2000 TOYOTA TUNDRA <b>Location of Incident:</b> AUSTIN, TX</p> <p><b>NISSA Summary:</b> 2001 TOYOTA TUNDRA, WHICH I DRIFTED FROM A CRASH TO DRIVE THE INSIDE REARED TO A FULLY RUNNING ENGINE AND ACCELERATED FORWARD. HARD BRACING COULD NOT STOP THE VEHICLE AND IT HIT THE BACK OF A 2000 HONDA MINN VAN THAT WAS PARKED. DRIVING EXTENSIVE DAMAGE BUT CAUSING NO INJURY. *06</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10176006, 10201222 <b>NISSA CDR No:</b> 20001125 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20001125 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2000 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> ALPHARETTA, GEORGIA, USA</p> <p><b>NISSA Summary:</b> 2/25/05 THE CONTACT OWNS A 2000 TOYOTA CAMRY. WHILE GOING FORWARD INTO THE GARAGE, IT HIT OVER A CURB AND ON A WALL. THE VEHICLE LUNGED FORWARD AND CRASHED THROUGH A WALL. THE VEHICLE STOPPED, KITCHEN CABINETS, DRESS, TABLE, AND CHAIRS WERE DAMAGED. ON A SUBSEQUENT ATTEMPT, THE VEHICLE LUNGED FORWARD, BUT NO CRASH OCCURRED. ON JUNE 15, 2007, THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED FORWARD, HIT THE WALL ON A SUBSEQUENT ATTEMPT, CAUSING EXTENSIVE DAMAGE. THE DEALER HAD THE VEHICLE AFTER EACH FAILURE AND PERFORMED HEAVY WORK ON THE VEHICLE. HOWEVER, THE CONTACT DID NOT KNOW WHAT MECHANICAL WORK WAS PERFORMED. WHEN HE ASKED FOR THE PAPERWORK, HE WAS DENIED. THE POWERTRAIN WAS UNKNOWN. THE CURRENT AND FAILURE MEASURES WERE 24000</p> <p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b></p> <p><i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i></p> <p>242</p>
<p>THROTTLE IN RAIN *06 THE CONSUMER STATED AIRBAGS NEVER DEPLOYED IN BOTH CRASHES. RELATED 001250 *06</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10175251 <b>NISSA CDR No:</b> 20001125 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20001125 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2000 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> LITTLE ROCK, AR</p> <p><b>NISSA Summary:</b> WE OWN A 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY. LAST NIGHT MY WIFE, SON, AND A FRIEND WERE DRIVING AT A STOP LIGHT BEHIND ANOTHER CAR. WITH MY WIFE'S FOOT ON THE BRAKE, THE CAR REVVED UP AND LUNGED INTO THE BACK OF THE CAR IN FRONT OF HER. IMMEDIATELY AFTER HITTING HER CAR, THE ENGINE REVVED UP EVEN FURTHER AND ACCELERATED INTO THE CAR AGAIN. HAD SHE BEEN FURTHER IN LINE AT THE LIGHT, SHE WOULD HAVE BEEN THROWN INTO THE MIDDLE OF A BUSY FOUR LANE INTERSECTION AND MIGHT POSSIBLY NOT BE HERE TODAY. IF SHE HAD ANY MORE INFO ON THIS, COULD YOU PLEASE SEND IT TO ME OR TELL ME WHERE IT COULD BE FOUND. *06</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10201114 <b>NISSA CDR No:</b> 20001125 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20001125 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2000 TOYOTA SIENNA <b>Location of Incident:</b> THE RENTON, CO</p> <p><b>NISSA Summary:</b> MY 2000 TOYOTA SIENNA'S ACCELERATOR KEYS STUCK IN THE ACCELERATION POSITION. I WAS INTERING THE HIGHWAY SO I WAS QUICKLY ACCERATING TO MERGE WITH TRAFFIC. AND ONCE I MERGED WITH TRAFFIC, I RELEASED THE ACCELERATOR PEDAL TO ADJUST MY SPEED AND THE PEDAL REMAINED IN ACCELERATION MODE AND I WAS UNABLE TO STOP IT. I THEN PRESSED THE BRAKE PEDAL TO STOP OR DECREASE THE ACCELERATION AND THAT DIDN'T WORK. I THEN DEPRESSING THE ACCELERATION PEDAL AGAIN TO SEE IF IT WAS STUCK, AND THAT DIDN'T WORK. EVENTUALLY THE ACCELERATION STOPPED ON ITS OWN. THIS HAS HAPPENED TO ME TWICE AND MY BROTHER'S ONCE. SO FAR THE DEALER ACTUALLY THREW THEIR HANDS UP REGARD THE VEHICLE. I THINK IT MUST A TOYOTA DEALER WHERE THEY RECALIBRED THE PEDAL ON THE SERVICE INVOICE ON 11/20/07 AND WERE UNABLE TO DUPLICATE THE ISSUE AND REMOVED THAT MY FLOOR MATS WERE DROPPED DOWN AND THROT SHOULD INSTALL THEM PROPERLY. *06</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10176100 <b>NISSA CDR No:</b> 20001121 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20001121 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2000 TOYOTA SIENNA <b>Location of Incident:</b> TUCULON, AZ</p> <p><b>NISSA Summary:</b> UNEXPLAINED ACCELERATION AT LOW SPEED. ONCE WHEN TRYING TO PARK, VEHICLE ACCELERATED AND WENT OVER CURB AND INTO CURB. AND THEN THE WHEELS STARTING OUT FROM A STOP SIGN. TOOK TO DEALER AND THEY COULD NOT FIND ANY PROBLEMS WITH VEHICLE. *04</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b></p> <p><i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i></p> <p>243</p>	<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10214759 <b>NISSA CDR No:</b> 20001125 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20001125 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2000 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> HOUSTON, TX</p> <p><b>NISSA Summary:</b> BY THE CONTACT OWNS A 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY. IN AN ATTEMPT TO PARK THE VEHICLE, IT SURGED FORWARD AND STRUCK A POST. THE CONTACT PLACED HER FOOT ON THE BRAKE PEDAL, HITTED THE BRAKE, AND RELEASED THE BRAKE WHEN THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED BACKWARD. AFTERWARD A VEHICLE JUMPED A CURVE, AND STRUCK ANOTHER VEHICLE BEFORE COMING TO A STOP. THE POST'S WHEELS WERE SEVERELY DAMAGED AND THE VEHICLE BUSTARD APPROXIMATELY \$9,000 WORTH OF DAMAGE. A POLICE REPORT WAS FILED. THE SPEED WAS UNKNOWN. THE CURRENT AND FAILURE MEASURES WERE 41,600.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10203412 <b>NISSA CDR No:</b> 20001125 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20001125 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2000 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> HOUSTON, TX</p> <p><b>NISSA Summary:</b> FIRST LET ME SAY THAT I AM AND REMAIN A SATISFIED TOYOTA CUSTOMER. HOWEVER, I HAVE EXPERIENCED THE "PECK ACCELERATION" TYPE OF INCIDENT IN MY 2001 CAMRY ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS. AT FIRST, I CONSIDERED IT TO BE SOME SORT OF RARE EVENT. IT DID SEEM TO ME THAT THE FLOOR MAT AND THE ACCELERATOR PEDAL WERE SOMEHOW "LOOSE" WHEN THAT HAPPENED. CURRENTLY, WITH THE NEWS ABOUT OTHERS HAVING THE SAME EXPERIENCE, WITH POWER-ASSISTED CAMRY, I WANT TO ALERT THE FACT THAT THE PROBLEM MAY EXIST IN MODELS YEARS AS FAR BACK AS 2005 *05. RICHARD F. CARLSON, JR., PhD.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10176472 <b>NISSA CDR No:</b> 20001120 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20001120 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2002 TOYOTA AVALON <b>Location of Incident:</b> WALNUT CREEK, CA</p> <p><b>NISSA Summary:</b> THE CAR WOULD ACCELERATE WITHOUT INPUT FROM THE DRIVER. *04</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10177009 <b>NISSA CDR No:</b> 20001123 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20001123 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> BLACKSBURG, VA</p> <p><b>NISSA Summary:</b> ON DEC. 12, 2000, AROUND 11:24 AM, I WAS DRIVING AT ABOUT 1 MPH IN A PARKING LOT. AN MAKE A RIGHT TURN TO THE LEFT TO STRAIGHTEN OUT THE CAR BEHIND ME. I ACCELERATED AND HIT A PARKED CAR. THE BRAKES DID NOT WORK, EVEN WHEN</p> <p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b></p> <p><i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i></p> <p>244</p>



<p><b>Vehicle:</b> 2007 TOYOTA FJ CRUISER <b>Location of Incident:</b> FOXBORO, MA</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b> INSTANTLY ACCELERATES TO 1200 RPM WHEN I TAKE MY FOOT COMPLETELY OFF THE THROTTLE (THIS OCCURS AT 100 MPH UNDER 1000 RPM). THE CAR DOES NOT VIBRATE (MANUAL TRANSMISSION) TO SPARK UP INSTEAD OF SLOWING DOWN, EXACTLY THE OPPOSITE OF THE "ENGINE BRAKE" THAT ONE WOULD EXPECT. FEEL THIS PRESENTS A MAJOR/SEVERE HAZARD WHEN DRIVING IN TRAFFIC AND/OR ON ROAD CONDITIONS "B"</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	<p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Event ID No:</b> NHTSA GEN No: 1021569 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 10/15/07 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2007 TOYOTA RAV4 <b>Location of Incident:</b> CUMBERIDGE CONSUMERS, MD</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b> "I WAS CONTACTED BY A 2007 TOYOTA RAV4 WHILE DRIVING OUT OF THE DRIVEWAY. THE FRONT MAT STARTED TO SLIP UNDER THE BRAKE AND ACCELERATOR PEDALS. THE CONTACT HAD REMOVED THE FLUOR MATS. THE CONTACT IS A MAJOR OF THE SAFETY RISK SINCE THE VEHICLE COULD ACCELERATE AND CAUSE A CRASH. THE CURRENT RELEASE WAS 1000 AND THE VEHICLE RELEASE WAS 1.000."</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA GEN No: 1018148 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20070820 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> SACRAMENTO, CA</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b> "I WAS THE CONTACT PURCHASED ON 07/20/07 A 2007 TOYOTA TACOMA FOUR DOOR DIESEL CAR. THE FIRST FAILURE OCCURRED ON 12/04/07 WHILE SLOWLY PULLING INTO A PARKING PLACE WITH ANOTHER LIGHTLY ACCELERATING. THE ENGINE REVVED SO FAST THE THROTTLE DROVE OVER THE PARKING STOP AND CLIMBED INTO A HILL ON THE SIDEWALK, CAUSING SEVERE DAMAGE TO THE CAR, AND SEVERE DAMAGE TO THE HILL. DURING THE SECOND OCCURRENCE ON 10/04/07 VEHICLE STOPPED AT A RED LIGHT AND THE ENGINE ACCELERATED TO THE CONTACT PUT IT IN TO NEUTRAL, AND ENGINE REVVED FAST. THE DRIVER THEN SHIFTED THE VEHICLE BACK INTO DRIVE AND ENGINE RETURNED TO NORMAL. A COUPLE SECONDS LATER THE CONTACT OCCURRED ON 12/07/07 WHILE STOPPING AT A RED LIGHT. THE ENGINE REVVED AND WENT BACK TO NORMAL. BEFORE THE CONTACT, CONTACTS OFF THE GAS. IF THERE HAD BEEN A CAR IN FRONT OF THE CONTACT, IT WOULD HAVE CAUSED A CRASH. THE FIRST TWO TIMES THE CONTACT TOOK THE VEHICLE TO THE DEALER. EACH TIME THE ENGINE PUT IT INTO NEUTRAL AND REVVED. AFTER THE THIRD FAILURE, THE ACCELERATOR AND BRAKE WERE INTERCHANGED AT THE SAME TIME. FIRST THE CONTACT HAD MADE THE ACCELERATOR, AND THE OTHER CONTACT HAD MADE THE BRAKE. THAT WAS THE FIRST TIME THE CONTACT CHECKED. THE DRIVER MANAGED TO DRIVE BACK TO START THE VEHICLE SO HE HAD TO TAKE A VEHICLE FOR A COUPLE DAYS THEY HAD SOMEONE FROM TOYOTA COME TO CHECK IT OUT, BUT THEY COULD NOT FIND ANYTHING WRONG. "A"</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Event ID No:</b> NHTSA GEN No: 1018148 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20070820 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> SACRAMENTO, CA</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b> "I WAS THE CONTACT PURCHASED ON 07/20/07 A 2007 TOYOTA TACOMA FOUR DOOR DIESEL CAR. THE FIRST FAILURE OCCURRED ON 12/04/07 WHILE SLOWLY PULLING INTO A PARKING PLACE WITH ANOTHER LIGHTLY ACCELERATING. THE ENGINE REVVED SO FAST THE THROTTLE DROVE OVER THE PARKING STOP AND CLIMBED INTO A HILL ON THE SIDEWALK, CAUSING SEVERE DAMAGE TO THE CAR, AND SEVERE DAMAGE TO THE HILL. DURING THE SECOND OCCURRENCE ON 10/04/07 VEHICLE STOPPED AT A RED LIGHT AND THE ENGINE ACCELERATED TO THE CONTACT PUT IT IN TO NEUTRAL, AND ENGINE REVVED FAST. THE DRIVER THEN SHIFTED THE VEHICLE BACK INTO DRIVE AND ENGINE RETURNED TO NORMAL. A COUPLE SECONDS LATER THE CONTACT OCCURRED ON 12/07/07 WHILE STOPPING AT A RED LIGHT. THE ENGINE REVVED AND WENT BACK TO NORMAL. BEFORE THE CONTACT, CONTACTS OFF THE GAS. IF THERE HAD BEEN A CAR IN FRONT OF THE CONTACT, IT WOULD HAVE CAUSED A CRASH. THE FIRST TWO TIMES THE CONTACT TOOK THE VEHICLE TO THE DEALER. EACH TIME THE ENGINE PUT IT INTO NEUTRAL AND REVVED. AFTER THE THIRD FAILURE, THE ACCELERATOR AND BRAKE WERE INTERCHANGED AT THE SAME TIME. FIRST THE CONTACT HAD MADE THE ACCELERATOR, AND THE OTHER CONTACT HAD MADE THE BRAKE. THAT WAS THE FIRST TIME THE CONTACT CHECKED. THE DRIVER MANAGED TO DRIVE BACK TO START THE VEHICLE SO HE HAD TO TAKE A VEHICLE FOR A COUPLE DAYS THEY HAD SOMEONE FROM TOYOTA COME TO CHECK IT OUT, BUT THEY COULD NOT FIND ANYTHING WRONG. "A"</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA GEN No: 1017467 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20060820 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2006 TOYOTA XA <b>Location of Incident:</b> ARLINGTON, VA</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b> <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i></p>	<p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b> <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i></p>
<p><b>Event ID No:</b> NHTSA GEN No: 1021569 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 10/15/07 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2007 TOYOTA RAV4 <b>Location of Incident:</b> CUMBERIDGE CONSUMERS, MD</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b> "I WAS CONTACTED BY A 2007 TOYOTA RAV4 WHILE DRIVING OUT OF THE DRIVEWAY. THE FRONT MAT STARTED TO SLIP UNDER THE BRAKE AND ACCELERATOR PEDALS. THE CONTACT HAD REMOVED THE FLUOR MATS. THE CONTACT IS A MAJOR OF THE SAFETY RISK SINCE THE VEHICLE COULD ACCELERATE AND CAUSE A CRASH. THE CURRENT RELEASE WAS 1000 AND THE VEHICLE RELEASE WAS 1.000."</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA GEN No: 1018148 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20070820 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> SACRAMENTO, CA</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b> "I WAS THE CONTACT PURCHASED ON 07/20/07 A 2007 TOYOTA TACOMA FOUR DOOR DIESEL CAR. THE FIRST FAILURE OCCURRED ON 12/04/07 WHILE SLOWLY PULLING INTO A PARKING PLACE WITH ANOTHER LIGHTLY ACCELERATING. THE ENGINE REVVED SO FAST THE THROTTLE DROVE OVER THE PARKING STOP AND CLIMBED INTO A HILL ON THE SIDEWALK, CAUSING SEVERE DAMAGE TO THE CAR, AND SEVERE DAMAGE TO THE HILL. DURING THE SECOND OCCURRENCE ON 10/04/07 VEHICLE STOPPED AT A RED LIGHT AND THE ENGINE ACCELERATED TO THE CONTACT PUT IT IN TO NEUTRAL, AND ENGINE REVVED FAST. THE DRIVER THEN SHIFTED THE VEHICLE BACK INTO DRIVE AND ENGINE RETURNED TO NORMAL. A COUPLE SECONDS LATER THE CONTACT OCCURRED ON 12/07/07 WHILE STOPPING AT A RED LIGHT. THE ENGINE REVVED AND WENT BACK TO NORMAL. BEFORE THE CONTACT, CONTACTS OFF THE GAS. IF THERE HAD BEEN A CAR IN FRONT OF THE CONTACT, IT WOULD HAVE CAUSED A CRASH. THE FIRST TWO TIMES THE CONTACT TOOK THE VEHICLE TO THE DEALER. EACH TIME THE ENGINE PUT IT INTO NEUTRAL AND REVVED. AFTER THE THIRD FAILURE, THE ACCELERATOR AND BRAKE WERE INTERCHANGED AT THE SAME TIME. FIRST THE CONTACT HAD MADE THE ACCELERATOR, AND THE OTHER CONTACT HAD MADE THE BRAKE. THAT WAS THE FIRST TIME THE CONTACT CHECKED. THE DRIVER MANAGED TO DRIVE BACK TO START THE VEHICLE SO HE HAD TO TAKE A VEHICLE FOR A COUPLE DAYS THEY HAD SOMEONE FROM TOYOTA COME TO CHECK IT OUT, BUT THEY COULD NOT FIND ANYTHING WRONG. "A"</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Event ID No:</b> NHTSA GEN No: 1018148 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20070820 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> SACRAMENTO, CA</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b> "I WAS THE CONTACT PURCHASED ON 07/20/07 A 2007 TOYOTA TACOMA FOUR DOOR DIESEL CAR. THE FIRST FAILURE OCCURRED ON 12/04/07 WHILE SLOWLY PULLING INTO A PARKING PLACE WITH ANOTHER LIGHTLY ACCELERATING. THE ENGINE REVVED SO FAST THE THROTTLE DROVE OVER THE PARKING STOP AND CLIMBED INTO A HILL ON THE SIDEWALK, CAUSING SEVERE DAMAGE TO THE CAR, AND SEVERE DAMAGE TO THE HILL. DURING THE SECOND OCCURRENCE ON 10/04/07 VEHICLE STOPPED AT A RED LIGHT AND THE ENGINE ACCELERATED TO THE CONTACT PUT IT IN TO NEUTRAL, AND ENGINE REVVED FAST. THE DRIVER THEN SHIFTED THE VEHICLE BACK INTO DRIVE AND ENGINE RETURNED TO NORMAL. A COUPLE SECONDS LATER THE CONTACT OCCURRED ON 12/07/07 WHILE STOPPING AT A RED LIGHT. THE ENGINE REVVED AND WENT BACK TO NORMAL. BEFORE THE CONTACT, CONTACTS OFF THE GAS. IF THERE HAD BEEN A CAR IN FRONT OF THE CONTACT, IT WOULD HAVE CAUSED A CRASH. THE FIRST TWO TIMES THE CONTACT TOOK THE VEHICLE TO THE DEALER. EACH TIME THE ENGINE PUT IT INTO NEUTRAL AND REVVED. AFTER THE THIRD FAILURE, THE ACCELERATOR AND BRAKE WERE INTERCHANGED AT THE SAME TIME. FIRST THE CONTACT HAD MADE THE ACCELERATOR, AND THE OTHER CONTACT HAD MADE THE BRAKE. THAT WAS THE FIRST TIME THE CONTACT CHECKED. THE DRIVER MANAGED TO DRIVE BACK TO START THE VEHICLE SO HE HAD TO TAKE A VEHICLE FOR A COUPLE DAYS THEY HAD SOMEONE FROM TOYOTA COME TO CHECK IT OUT, BUT THEY COULD NOT FIND ANYTHING WRONG. "A"</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> NHTSA GEN No: 1018148 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20070820 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> SACRAMENTO, CA</p> <p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b> "I WAS THE CONTACT PURCHASED ON 07/20/07 A 2007 TOYOTA TACOMA FOUR DOOR DIESEL CAR. THE FIRST FAILURE OCCURRED ON 12/04/07 WHILE SLOWLY PULLING INTO A PARKING PLACE WITH ANOTHER LIGHTLY ACCELERATING. THE ENGINE REVVED SO FAST THE THROTTLE DROVE OVER THE PARKING STOP AND CLIMBED INTO A HILL ON THE SIDEWALK, CAUSING SEVERE DAMAGE TO THE CAR, AND SEVERE DAMAGE TO THE HILL. DURING THE SECOND OCCURRENCE ON 10/04/07 VEHICLE STOPPED AT A RED LIGHT AND THE ENGINE ACCELERATED TO THE CONTACT PUT IT IN TO NEUTRAL, AND ENGINE REVVED FAST. THE DRIVER THEN SHIFTED THE VEHICLE BACK INTO DRIVE AND ENGINE RETURNED TO NORMAL. A COUPLE SECONDS LATER THE CONTACT OCCURRED ON 12/07/07 WHILE STOPPING AT A RED LIGHT. THE ENGINE REVVED AND WENT BACK TO NORMAL. BEFORE THE CONTACT, CONTACTS OFF THE GAS. IF THERE HAD BEEN A CAR IN FRONT OF THE CONTACT, IT WOULD HAVE CAUSED A CRASH. THE FIRST TWO TIMES THE CONTACT TOOK THE VEHICLE TO THE DEALER. EACH TIME THE ENGINE PUT IT INTO NEUTRAL AND REVVED. AFTER THE THIRD FAILURE, THE ACCELERATOR AND BRAKE WERE INTERCHANGED AT THE SAME TIME. FIRST THE CONTACT HAD MADE THE ACCELERATOR, AND THE OTHER CONTACT HAD MADE THE BRAKE. THAT WAS THE FIRST TIME THE CONTACT CHECKED. THE DRIVER MANAGED TO DRIVE BACK TO START THE VEHICLE SO HE HAD TO TAKE A VEHICLE FOR A COUPLE DAYS THEY HAD SOMEONE FROM TOYOTA COME TO CHECK IT OUT, BUT THEY COULD NOT FIND ANYTHING WRONG. "A"</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b> <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i></p>	<p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b> <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i></p>

<p>REPORTING FOR A COMPUTER UPDATE. THIS IS ALL THAT IS NEEDED TO CORRECT THE PROBLEM AND I DEMAND THAT IT BE DONE BEFORE AN ACCIDENT HAPPENS. THIS PROBLEM IS VERY DANGEROUS AND HAS THE POTENTIAL TO CAUSE A DEADLY ACCIDENT. I HAVE TAKEN MY 2004 TO TWO TOYOTA DEALERSHIPS IN THE PHOENIX AREA AND HAVE BEEN OUTSIDE THE HELP ROOM FOR OVER 2 HOURS ON THIS MATTER. I AM NOT BLAMING WITH NHTSA TO HELP ME WITH THIS MATTER AND I WANT TO BRING THIS TO THE ATTENTION OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. THE GOVERNMENT AND EVERYONE WHO CAN HELP WITH GETTING THIS MATTER TAKEN CARE OF. I AM IN AN ACCIDENT BECAUSE OF THIS PROBLEM. PLEASE ADVISE YOUR INVESTIGATOR RESPONSIBLE AS I FEEL I AM HAVE TOLD ALL THERE WHO CAN HELP EVERYTHING I CAN AND GET NO RESPONSE. I WANT THIS PROBLEM TO BE TAKEN VERY SERIOUS AND I EXPECT TO BE HEARD AND SOMEONE TO CONTACT ME WITHIN A REASONABLE AMOUNT OF TIME. I KNOW IN FACT TOYOTA IS AWARE OF THIS PROBLEM AND HAS ORDERED THE MECHANICS SERVICE WAITERS AT THE DEALERSHIPS TO WITHHOLD THE INFORMATION FROM CUSTOMERS. I ALSO KNOW THAT TOYOTA HAS CORRECTED THE PROBLEM WITH THE 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY. I ALSO OWN A 2000 TOYOTA AVALON A CUSTOMER AND THE CAR HAD NO SUCH PROBLEM WITH IT. REITERATING, I ALSO DROVE A 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY, I OWNED CAR, THAT DID NOT HAVE THIS PROBLEM.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CR# No:</b> 1010778 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20070717 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2000 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> STONEY POINT, NY <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY ACCELERATED OUT OF CONTROL AND NEAR ENDED SECOND VEHICLE AND THEN A BUILDING BEFORE STOPPING. OPERATOR ATTEMPTED TO STOP THE VEHICLE BY PULL DOWNING BRAKE, PUMPING BRAKES AND SHUTTING TO NEUTRAL TO STOP AVAL. VEHICLE WAS SUBJECT TO GALLERS FOR PROBLEMS IN 2006 AND AGAIN IN 2007. IN 2006, AVALON STAYED IN NEUTRAL FOR A PERIOD OF TIME AND AN INVESTIGATOR WAS THERE. IN 2007, I BELIEVE THAT THE CAR DID NOT HAVE ANY PROBLEM. OPERATOR STATED HE HAD FOUR FAILURE BEFORE SERVICE IN 2006 AND ONE IN 2007. FAILURE BEFORE REPAIRMENT IN 2007. THERE WAS DIRECT POWER LOSS IMPACT THAT CAUSED EXTENSIVE DAMAGE, NEITHER AIR BAG DEPLOYED. "00"</p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CR# No:</b> 1010431 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20070901 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2000 TOYOTA AVALON <b>Location of Incident:</b> SILVER SPRING, MD <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> TOYOTA CONTACT OPENS A 2000 TOYOTA AVALON. WHILE PARKING THE VEHICLE THE ACCELERATOR PEDAL ENGAGES WITHOUT WARNING. THE CONTACT WAS BROKE A WHEEL. THE CONTACT DEPRESSSED THE BRAKE AND THE VEHICLE WOULD NOT STOP, AND THE CLAIMED TO BE A PARKED PICK UP TRUCK. THE ROAD CONDITIONS WERE NOT A FACTOR. THE VEHICLE WAS TOWED AND THE CONTACT WAS UNABLE TO DRIVE THE VEHICLE. THE CONTACT REQUESTED A RECALL AND INQUIRY TO THE DEALER. THE PASSENGER IN THE FRONT SEAT STATED DUE TO THE AVALON DEPLOYMENT SHE WAS HAVING HEARING PROBLEMS AND EXPERIENCED UNCOMFORT TO HER TIGHT. THE PASSENGER IN THE BACK SEAT EXPERIENCED CRIST PAINS. THE VEHICLE WAS NOT BORN</p> <p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b> 253 <i>Toyota Station Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i></p>	<p>INSTRUCTED TO DETERMINE THE REASON FOR THE UNEXPECTED ACCELERATION. THE CURRENT AND FAILURE MESSAGE WAS 1000. "AK"</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CR# No:</b> 1010429 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20070901 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> LONDON, MD <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> TOYOTA CONTACT OPENS A 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY. WHILE COMING OUT OF THE CAR WASH AND STOPPING THE MOTOR ON FROM NEUTRAL TO DRIVE THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED TO ABOUT 10 MPH FOR ABOUT 20-30 SECONDS, CAUSING IT TO CRASH INTO A POLE. THE CONTACT TRIED TO APPLY THE BRAKE, BUT COULD NOT STOP THE VEHICLE. CONTACT CAN PROVIDE PICTURES IF NEEDED. THE CURRENT AND FAILURE MESSAGE WERE BOTH 1000."AK"</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CR# No:</b> 1010610 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20070619 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2007 TOYOTA FT CRIDER <b>Location of Incident:</b> LONDON, MD <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> AFTER VEHICLE EXPERIENCES RPM GAIN WHEN TRYING TO STOP, AND A THREE RPM NEVER RESIDED BETWEEN 1000'S OF GAINS OR UNTIL THE VEHICLE WAS BELOW 7 MPH. ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS DURING EMERGENCY SITUATION, THE VEHICLE HAS ACTUALLY ACCELERATED DURING THE BRAKING PROCESS. TOYOTA EXPLAINED THAT THESE RPM CONDITIONS WERE DUE TO NEW TIRE RUN OUT. BY AUTOMOBILE "AK"</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CR# No:</b> 1010620 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20070727 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> POLYLY BEACH, SC <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> ON THE CONTACT DID NOT OBSERVE ACH UPON PENDING BRAKE PEDAL. HYDRAULIC BRAKES WOULD NOT STOP VEHICLE. METHOD USED TO STOP VEHICLE INCLUDED PULLING VEHICLE TO NEUTRAL AND APPLYING EMERGENCY BRAKING IN BRACE. NEARLY A MINUTE OF CLIMBING WITH OTHER VEHICLES WHEN HAD IT STOPPED BY NOTICED BEHIND THEM AND THE CONTACT MENTION. MY VEHICLE WAS SCRAPPED ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS BY OTHER VEHICLE WAS DAMAGED CRASH, GUST, COULD NOT DUPLICATE "0"</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CR# No:</b> 1010722 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20070628 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2007 TOYOTA COROLLA <b>Location of Incident:</b> WOODWAY, WA, DC <b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b> 254 <i>Toyota Station Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i></p>
<p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b> TOYOTA CONTACT OPENS A 2007 TOYOTA COROLLA. WHILE DRIVING 1 MPH, THE CONTACT EXPERIENCED THE BRAKE PEDAL BUT REPORTED THE ACCELERATOR PEDAL AS WELL. THE CONTACT STATED A POLE. THE BRIDGE WAS BECAUSE, HE STATED THAT THE BRAKE AND ACCELERATOR WERE TOO CLOSE TOGETHER AND THAT THE FAILURE MESSAGE WAS 1 AND CURRENT MESSAGE WAS 1000. UPDATED 02-14-08 "0"</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CR# No:</b> 1010400 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20070701 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2004 LEXUS ES <b>Location of Incident:</b> HENRIKUS, CA <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> ACCELERATOR DELAY OF UP TO 2 FULL REVS. "0"</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CR# No:</b> 1010767 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20070405 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2000 TOYOTA COROLLA <b>Location of Incident:</b> BROOKLYN, NY <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> TOYOTA CONTACT STATED THAT WHILE DRIVING THE 2000 TOYOTA COROLLA WITH 1000 FAILURE MESSAGE AT 15 MPH WITH FOOT ON THE GAS PEDAL THE VEHICLE RACED UP TO 15 MPH, AND THE 1000 RACED BETWEEN 4 AND 1 ON THE GUAGE. THE CONTACT IMMEDIATELY APPLIED THE BRAKE AS HARD AS HE COULD, AND PUT THE VEHICLE INTO NEUTRAL. HE ALSO APPLIED THE GAS, ALLOWING THE VEHICLE TO STOP BEING. THE VEHICLE WAS AT THE DEALER WHO LOOKED AT CONSIDERING THIS PROBLEM. THE CURRENT MESSAGE WAS 1000. "AK. UPDATED 06-09-07 "0"</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CR# No:</b> 1010764 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20070602 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2007 TOYOTA RAV4 <b>Location of Incident:</b> BEEF, OK, LA <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> TOYOTA CONTACT STATED THAT WHEN THE 2007 TOYOTA RAV4 WAS TEST DRIVEN ON 6/2/07, THE CONTACT STATED THAT THE ACCELERATION ON THE VEHICLE WAS NOT STABLE. AT TIMES THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED ABOUT 1/4 INCH IF THE ACCELERATOR WAS SLIGHTLY DEPRESSED. THREE TIMES AFTER THE VEHICLE WAS RECALLED, HE NOTICED THAT WHEN DEPRESSING THE ACCELERATOR PEDAL, THE VEHICLE WOULD ACCELERATE. IT WOULD NOT RECALL THE PEDAL WHEN IT WAS AFTER A FEW SECONDS THE VEHICLE WOULD ACCELERATE AGAIN. THE CONTACT STATED THAT WHEN TURNING CORNERS WITH THE ACCELERATOR WAS DEPRESSED THE VEHICLE WOULD SPEED UP. IT REMAINED STATIONARY FOR A FEW SECONDS AT A CONSTANT SPEED THEN IT PROCEEDED TO ACCELERATE. SOMETIMES, THE CONTACT STATED THAT WHEN DRIVING ON THE HIGHWAY IF ANOTHER VEHICLE SLOWED DOWN IN FRONT OF THE CONTACT VEHICLE, TRYING TO SPEED UP AGAIN WAS ALSO A PROBLEM. THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED AND STAYED READY AT ANY GIVEN SPEED, BUT THIS AFTER A FEW</p> <p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b> 255 <i>Toyota Station Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i></p>	<p>RECORDS IT WOULD ACCELERATE TO A HIGHER SPEED WITHOUT WARNING. THE CONTACT TOLD THE VEHICLE TO THE DEALER, AND WAS TOLD THEIR VEHICLE DID NOT HAVE A GEAR LONG FROM THE DEALER. TO THE MANAGER THAT OVERSAW THE VEHICLE. THIS SYSTEM WAS ELECTRIC IN THE 2007 MODEL. THE FAILURE MESSAGE WAS 1 AND THE CURRENT MESSAGE WAS 1000. "AK. UPDATED 02-14-08"</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CR# No:</b> 1010470 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20070409 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2004 LEXUS RX <b>Location of Incident:</b> WEST MINNEAPOLIS, IA <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> TOYOTA CONTACT OPENS A 2004 LEXUS RX. THE CONTACT STATED THAT THE VEHICLE AUTOMATICALLY ACCELERATED WHILE ATTEMPTING TO PULL INTO A PARKING SPACE. THE CONTACT DEPRESSED THE BRAKE PEDAL, BUT THE VEHICLE CONTINUED TO ACCELERATE. THE VEHICLE STOPPED ONLY AFTER IT RANPED A CORN. THE VEHICLE WAS TOWED TO A DEALER, BUT THE FAILURE WAS FORGOTTEN. THE CONTACT HAS THE REPAIR INVOICE AND PICTURES. THE CURRENT AND FAILURE MESSAGE WERE 10111 "AK"</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CR# No:</b> 1010754 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 10/04/07 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2007 LEXUS RX400 <b>Location of Incident:</b> FREDERICKSBURG, TX <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> TOYOTA CONTACT OPENS A 2007 LEXUS RX400. WHILE DRIVING 10 MPH, THE VEHICLE EXPERIENCED UNEXPECTED VEHICLE ACCELERATION. CORRESPONDENT 1000 RECALLED THE PROCEEDING VEHICLE. BOTH DRIVERS OF EACH VEHICLE RECEIVED BRUISES FROM THE IMPACT. A POLICE REPORT WAS AVAILABLE. THE VEHICLE RECEIVED 25,000 WORTH OF DAMAGES. A REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE MANUFACTURER WAS SENT TO INSPECT THE VEHICLE. THE INSPECTOR COULD NOT LOCATE A DEFECT IN THE VEHICLE. THE FAILURE MESSAGE WAS 12179.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CR# No:</b> 1010722 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20070603 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2004 LEXUS LX400 <b>Location of Incident:</b> FT. LINDSEY, MO <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> TOYOTA CONTACT OPENS A 2004 LEXUS LX400. WHILE DRIVING 10 MPH, THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED WITHOUT WARNING. THE CONTACT BELIEVED THAT THE CAUSE OF FAILURE WAS DUE TO THE FLOOR MATS BEING CAUGHT UNDER THE ACCELERATOR PEDAL. THREE TO FIVE HOURS OF REPAIR FOR THE 2007 LEXUS LX400. THE CONTACT TRIED TO HAVE THE VEHICLE DRIVEN IN THE INVESTIGATION, THE VIN AND ENGINE #22 WERE UNAVAILABLE. THE CURRENT MESSAGE IS 1000 AND FAILURE MESSAGE IS 02-01-08.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b> 256 <i>Toyota Station Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i></p>





<p><b>Location of Incident:</b> CAMDEN HEIGHTS, NJ <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> 1. THE CONTACT OWNS A 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY. THE DEALER STATED THAT THE VEHICLE'S FRONT BRAKES WERE OUT OF ADJUST AND CAUSED THE VEHICLE TO PULSATE. THE DEALER REPAIRED THE VEHICLE AND REPAIRED THE FRONT BRAKE PADS WHILE DRIVING AS NORMAL. DURING THE REPAIR, THE VEHICLE SUDDENL Y ACCELERATED AND CAUSED THE CONTACT TO BE UNABLE TO STEER THE VEHICLE AND CRASHED INTO A CRACKED WALL. THE DRIVER SUFFERED INJURIES ON BOTH L AND R HANDS AND CHEST. THE VEHICLE WAS DESTROYED AND TOWED. THE CURRENT AND FAILURE MILEAGES WERE 10,000. <b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10319796 <b>NHTSA CRN No:</b> 20070524 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20070524 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2007 LEXUS SC <b>Location of Incident:</b> 871000 CITY, CA <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> I AM AN OFFICE OF A LEXUS SC-430. THIS MODEL WITH 1424 MILES ON THE ODOMETER. THE CAR BEHAVES INDEPENDENTLY IN A DANGEROUS MANNER. ON ARRIVING HOME AT 1:10 PM I STOPPED THE V CAR IN FRONT OF THE GARAGE AND THE DOOR WAS CLOSED. I WAS ABOUT TO REENTER THE GARAGE DOOR OPENED BEHIND IN THE CAR WHILE I WENT ONLY AND SUDDENL Y ACCELERATED FULL THROTTLE WITHOUT FOOT ON THE ACCELERATOR. I APPLIED THE BRAKE BUT TO NO EFFECT. THE CAR DROVE THROUGH THE METAL GARAGE DOOR AND STOPPED WHEN IT HIT THE BACK OF THE GARAGE WALL. THE FIRE DEPARTMENT WAS REQUESTED TO OPEN THE DOOR ON MY SIDE. I WAS CARRIED TO THE HOSPITAL BY PARAMEDICS BUT SUFFERED NO INJURIES. WITHSTANDING THIS FROM THE PERSONNEL AND INJURIES FROM THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE AIRBAG, THE CAR HAD A HIGH CHANCE OF BEING DECLARED A TOTAL WRITE OFF. I HAVE REQUESTED MY INSURANCE COMPANY REQUESTLY REFINANCE TO HAVE THE CAR EXAMINED FORENSICALLY IN ORDER TO TRY TO DETERMINE THE CAUSE OF THE MALFUNCTION. AS MY INSURANCE COMPANY THEY HAVE NOT BEEN INTENDING TO PAY MY REPAIRS. I AM A CAMRY'S DRIVER AND HAVE NOT HAD AN ACCIDENT OR A MOVING VIOLATION SINCE 1974. <b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10319751 <b>NHTSA CRN No:</b> 20070531 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20070531 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2007 LEXUS SC430 <b>Location of Incident:</b> SCARSDALE, NY <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> SUDDENL Y ACCELERATION RESULTING IN A CRASH. "AK" <b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10310294 <b>NHTSA CRN No:</b> 20070129 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20070129 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2006 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> MIDDLETOWN, NY <b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b> <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i></p>	<p>261</p>
<p><b>Date of Incident:</b> 20070601 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2003 TOYOTA CAMRY SOLARA <b>Location of Incident:</b> LEXINGTON, MO <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> IN THE CONTACT OWNERS A 2003 TOYOTA CAMRY SOLARA. ON JUNE 1, 2007, THE VEHICLE SLOWED WHILE PULLING INTO A PARKING SPACE AT A MPH. THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED SO QUICKLY THAT IT WHIPPED THE CONTACT'S HEAD BACK AND LEFT HER MOORE ON THE GROUND. SHE HAD TO REMOVE HER FOOT FROM THE BRAKE AND PRESSURE THE WALK PEDAL AGAIN BEHIND THE VEHICLE WALL. STOPPED. THE CONTACT STATED THAT THERE WAS AN INVESTIGATION (4700000 - VEHICLE SPEED CONTROL ACCELERATION) THAT WAS CALLED ON APRIL. THE CONTACT STATED THAT SHE WOULD TAKE HER VEHICLE TO THE DEALER THE FOLLOWING MORNING. THE CURRENT AND FAILURE MILEAGES WERE 6,000. <b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10319584 <b>NHTSA CRN No:</b> 20070601 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20070601 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2003 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> GREEN BAY, WI <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> RELATED RESPONSES OF ENGINE AND FORWARD MOTION OF THE CAR WHEN APPLYING ACCELERATION. FOR LACK OF BETTER WORDS, IT SEEMS TO CREATE A REVING OR RUTLE IN THE ENGINE, LIKE SOMETHING IS OUT OF SYNC. OTHER NOTES RELATE TO PERISTENT PROBLEMS WITH THE VEHICLE BEING AND CRASHING IN THE STEERING COLUMN THAT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED BY THE DEALERSHIP THAT WORKS ON MY CAR AS OF TODAY. I CANNOT SAFELY DRIVE MY CAR BECAUSE I AM NOT CONFIDENT I WILL BE ABLE TO STOP THE CAR. I AM REQUESTED TO REPAIR THE CAR IN THEIR SHOP, BUT WILL NEED TO EXPENSE IT GIVEN THE RAPID CHANGE IN BRAKE RESPONSE IN THE LAST TWO DAYS. "TR" <b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10320771 <b>NHTSA CRN No:</b> 20070706 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20070706 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2006 LEXUS RX350 <b>Location of Incident:</b> 8111111111 WA <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> I ACCELERATED TO AVOID A COLLISION AT LOW SPEED IN AN INTERSECTION. THE CAR BEHAVED ABOUT 1/2 SECOND AFTER I PRESSED THE GAS PEDAL, THEN I LINED UP FORWARD, STOPPED THE DRIVE WHEELS. THE LENGTH OF DELAY OR HESITATION IN RESPONSE TO ACCELERATE WAS ABOUT 1/2 SECOND. THE CAR WAS NOT A COMPLETELY UNPREDICTABLE, MAKING STOP-AND-GO TRAFFIC PERFORMANCE DANGEROUS. POOR PERFORMANCE OF THE ENGINE CONTROL FUNCTION IS PROBABLY RELATED TO THIS DEFECT. THE CAR WAS RETURNED TO THE DEALER FOR SERVICE AT 109 MILES. THE DEALER DID A THOROUGH CHECK OF THE EQUIPMENT AND FOUND NO SERVICEABLE PARTS. DEALER STATED THAT THERE ARE NO SERVICE BULLETINS FOR THE PROBLEM IN spite OF THE FACT THAT TOYOTA HAS A SERVICE BULLETIN FOR THE PROBLEM IN 2007. IT ISN'T DECEMBER 2004. THIS IS A SERVICE PROBLEM. HAD THE PAYMENT BEEN MET, I COULD HAVE LOST CONTROL OF THE VEHICLE. SPOUTINGLY, IN THE INCIDENT, INCIDENTS, THE OTHER DRIVER WAS ABLE TO AVOID A COLLISION. NEXT TIME, I MIGHT NOT BE SO LUCKY. "TR" <b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b> <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i></p>	<p>262</p>
<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10295800 <b>NHTSA CRN No:</b> 20070129 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20070129 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2006 TOYOTA RUNNER <b>Location of Incident:</b> 0000000000 <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> IN THE CONTACT OWNERS A 2006 TOYOTA RUNNER. WHILE DRIVING APPROXIMATELY 15 MPH ON NORMAL ROAD CONDITIONS, PROCEEDING TO A STOP SIGNAL, THE DRIVER WAS APPROXIMATELY 10 FEET FROM A STOP SIGNAL. FOLLOWED BY AN UNEXPECTED AND FORCEFUL ACCELERATION, THE DRIVER WAS ABLE TO COME TO A COMPLETE STOP. THE FAILURE OCCURRED IMMEDIATELY. THE VEHICLE WAS TAKEN TO AN AUTHORIZED DEALER FOR INSPECTION. THE TECHNICIAN WAS UNABLE TO DUPLICATE THE FAILURE. THE VEHICLE WAS NOT REPAIRED. THE FAILURE MILEAGE WAS 15,000. THE CURRENT MILEAGE WAS 111,000. THE VIN WAS UNAVAILABLE. I <b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10304155 <b>NHTSA CRN No:</b> 20070129 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20070129 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2004 LEXUS ES350 <b>Location of Incident:</b> ALBANY, NY <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> IN THE CONTACT OWNERS A 2004 LEXUS ES350. WHILE ATTEMPTING TO MAKE A RIGHT TURN AT 20 MPH, THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED TO APPROXIMATELY 70 MPH. AFTER FOUR LANE CHANGES, THE VEHICLE CRASHED INTO A METAL POLE. THE POLICE, AMBULANCE, AND FIRE DEPARTMENT ARRIVED AT THE SCENE. THE CONTACT REFERRED MEDICAL TREATMENT AND WAS TRANSPORTED TO THE HOSPITAL. APPROXIMATELY ONE HOUR AGO, THE VEHICLE SPEED CONTROL FAILED AND CAUSED A CRASH WHILE DRIVING IN REVERSE. THE INVESTRATOR WAS UNKNOWN. THE APPROXIMATE CURRENT AND FAILURE MILEAGES WERE 10,000. "CONTACTED 12/25/07" RE: UPDATED 12/25/07 "TR" <b>Additional Summary:</b></p> <p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> 10295800 <b>NHTSA CRN No:</b> 20070129 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20070129 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2006 LEXUS LX470 <b>Location of Incident:</b> 1111111111 CT <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> IN THE CONTACT OWNERS A 2006 LEXUS LX470. WHILE PULLING INTO A PARKING SPACE ON AN INTER, THE VEHICLE AUTOMATICALLY ACCELERATED AND CRASHED INTO A WALL. THE DEALER STATED THAT THE FAILURE WAS CALLED AN UN- COMMANDER ACCELERATION. THROUGH RESEARCH, THE CONTACT DISCOVERED A PATTERN FOR THE TYPE OF FAILURE AFFECTS TOYOTA VEHICLES. SHE HAS NOT YET NOTIFIED THE MANUFACTURER. THE VEHICLE IS NOT DEGRADED, HOWEVER, THERE IS 82,000 MILES OF DAMAGE. A POLICE REPORT WAS FILED. WHEN THE VEHICLE WAS STARTED THE DAY BEFORE THE CRASH, THE THROTTLE SPANDED AND THE ENGINE BEGAN TO VIBRATE. THE VEHICLE WAS NOT DRIVEN AND BEGAN TO VIBRATE NORMALLY. THE CONTACT STATED THAT THE VEHICLE DID NOT MOVE UNTIL THE ENGINE DIED DOWN. THE SPEED WAS UNKNOWN. THE FAILURE AND CURRENT MILEAGES WERE 15,000.</p> <p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b> <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i></p>	<p>264</p>

<p>THE CONSUMER PROVIDED PICTURES AND AN ARTICLE PERTAINING TO THE INCIDENT. A CONNECTICUT ACCIDENT REPORT WAS ALSO SUBMITTED. TREATED 02/04/97 *TR</p>	
<p><b>Additional Information:</b></p>	
<p><b>Tape ID No:</b> 10200701 <b>NRFA CDR No:</b> 20070001 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Vehicle:</b> 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> BIRMINGHAM, TN</p>	<p><b>NRFA Summary:</b> "I, THE CONTACT, OWN A 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY. WHILE MAKING A LEFT TURN THE VEHICLE WAS ACCIDENTLY A/CAS A CONSEQUENCE, THE CAR DRAGGED INTO A PARKED VEHICLE. THE VEHICLE WAS COMPLETED AFTER THE LEFT TURN. THE VEHICLE WAS NOT DAMAGED AND A WARNING LIGHT WENT ON. I CALLED TO THE BIRMINGHAM POLICE AND A POLICE CAR WENT TO MY HOME TO INVESTIGATE. THE POLICE CAR TOOK PICTURES OF THE DAMAGE TO THE VEHICLE AND THE VEHICLE WAS TOWED TO A REPAIR SHOP TO EXAMINE THE ELECTRONIC THROTTLE BODY COMPUTER. THE DAMAGE TO THE VEHICLE IMPACTED THE COMPUTER PLETH. THE DAMAGE MEASURE WAS 2.000.</p>
<p><b>Additional Information:</b></p>	<p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Tape ID No:</b> 10200708 <b>NRFA CDR No:</b> 20070008 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Vehicle:</b> 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> KENT, WA</p>	<p><b>NRFA Summary:</b> "I, THE CONTACT, OWN A CAMRY WHEN ANOTHER ACCIDENT OCCURRED AND VEHICLE WAS TAKEN TO A SERVICE CENTER. NO ONE WAS KILLED, BUT THE CAR HAS MAJOR DAMAGE. *TR</p>
<p><b>Additional Information:</b></p>	<p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Tape ID No:</b> 10200709 <b>NRFA CDR No:</b> 20070009 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Vehicle:</b> 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> PAINESVILLE, OH</p>	<p><b>NRFA Summary:</b> "SOMEONE WENT TO PARK DRIVING DOWN THE ROAD ON A 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY. I DRIVEN WITH CAR EVEN WHEN I DID NOT HAVE THE CRUISE ON. AS MY TIRE RUBBED THE CAR FELL. I THOUGHT I WAS WALKING DOWN THE ROAD AND I DID NOT KNOW HOW TO GO ABOUT TENDING THE PROBLEM. THANKS *TR</p>
<p><b>Additional Information:</b></p>	<p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Tape ID No:</b> 10200710 <b>NRFA CDR No:</b> 20070010 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Vehicle:</b> 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> PAINESVILLE, OH</p>	<p><b>NRFA Summary:</b> "I, THE CONTACT, OWN A 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY. WHILE AT A COMPLETE STOP, THE CONSUMER STATED THAT HE WANTED TO TRY TO APPLY THE BRAKE BUT TO NO AVAIL. HE THEN COMPARED TO THE VEHICLE, IT FELLED NO IDENTICAL. THE CAR BRACKETED WHILE DRIVING. THE CAR ACCELERATED THEN CARP FORWARD. SOME PROBLEM WHEN DRIVING TO ADEQUATELY DRIVE. MANY OF THE SALLS AND COMMENTS OF THE MULTIPLE TELEPHONE CALLS. DRIVE IN WERE FOR MORE REPAIRS. THE CAR WAS IN THE MIDDLE. *TR</p>
<p><b>Additional Information:</b></p>	<p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Tape ID No:</b> 10200711 <b>NRFA CDR No:</b> 20070011 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Vehicle:</b> 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> PAINESVILLE, OH</p>	<p><b>NRFA Summary:</b> "I, THE CONTACT, OWN A 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY. WHILE AT A COMPLETE STOP, THE CONSUMER STATED THAT HE WANTED TO TRY TO APPLY THE BRAKE BUT TO NO AVAIL. HE THEN COMPARED TO THE VEHICLE, IT FELLED NO IDENTICAL. THE CAR BRACKETED WHILE DRIVING. THE CAR ACCELERATED THEN CARP FORWARD. SOME PROBLEM WHEN DRIVING TO ADEQUATELY DRIVE. MANY OF THE SALLS AND COMMENTS OF THE MULTIPLE TELEPHONE CALLS. DRIVE IN WERE FOR MORE REPAIRS. THE CAR WAS IN THE MIDDLE. *TR</p>
<p><b>Additional Information:</b></p>	<p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Tape ID No:</b> 10200712 <b>NRFA CDR No:</b> 20070012 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Vehicle:</b> 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> PAINESVILLE, OH</p>	<p><b>NRFA Summary:</b> "I, THE CONTACT, OWN A 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY. WHILE AT A COMPLETE STOP, THE CONSUMER STATED THAT HE WANTED TO TRY TO APPLY THE BRAKE BUT TO NO AVAIL. HE THEN COMPARED TO THE VEHICLE, IT FELLED NO IDENTICAL. THE CAR BRACKETED WHILE DRIVING. THE CAR ACCELERATED THEN CARP FORWARD. SOME PROBLEM WHEN DRIVING TO ADEQUATELY DRIVE. MANY OF THE SALLS AND COMMENTS OF THE MULTIPLE TELEPHONE CALLS. DRIVE IN WERE FOR MORE REPAIRS. THE CAR WAS IN THE MIDDLE. *TR</p>
<p><b>Additional Information:</b></p>	<p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Tape ID No:</b> 10200713 <b>NRFA CDR No:</b> 20070013 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Vehicle:</b> 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> PAINESVILLE, OH</p>	<p><b>NRFA Summary:</b> "I, THE CONTACT, OWN A 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY. WHILE AT A COMPLETE STOP, THE CONSUMER STATED THAT HE WANTED TO TRY TO APPLY THE BRAKE BUT TO NO AVAIL. HE THEN COMPARED TO THE VEHICLE, IT FELLED NO IDENTICAL. THE CAR BRACKETED WHILE DRIVING. THE CAR ACCELERATED THEN CARP FORWARD. SOME PROBLEM WHEN DRIVING TO ADEQUATELY DRIVE. MANY OF THE SALLS AND COMMENTS OF THE MULTIPLE TELEPHONE CALLS. DRIVE IN WERE FOR MORE REPAIRS. THE CAR WAS IN THE MIDDLE. *TR</p>
<p><b>Additional Information:</b></p>	<p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Tape ID No:</b> 10200714 <b>NRFA CDR No:</b> 20070014 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Vehicle:</b> 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> PAINESVILLE, OH</p>	<p><b>NRFA Summary:</b> "I, THE CONTACT, OWN A 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY. WHILE AT A COMPLETE STOP, THE CONSUMER STATED THAT HE WANTED TO TRY TO APPLY THE BRAKE BUT TO NO AVAIL. HE THEN COMPARED TO THE VEHICLE, IT FELLED NO IDENTICAL. THE CAR BRACKETED WHILE DRIVING. THE CAR ACCELERATED THEN CARP FORWARD. SOME PROBLEM WHEN DRIVING TO ADEQUATELY DRIVE. MANY OF THE SALLS AND COMMENTS OF THE MULTIPLE TELEPHONE CALLS. DRIVE IN WERE FOR MORE REPAIRS. THE CAR WAS IN THE MIDDLE. *TR</p>
<p><b>Additional Information:</b></p>	<p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Tape ID No:</b> 10200715 <b>NRFA CDR No:</b> 20070015 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Vehicle:</b> 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> PAINESVILLE, OH</p>	<p><b>NRFA Summary:</b> "I, THE CONTACT, OWN A 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY. WHILE AT A COMPLETE STOP, THE CONSUMER STATED THAT HE WANTED TO TRY TO APPLY THE BRAKE BUT TO NO AVAIL. HE THEN COMPARED TO THE VEHICLE, IT FELLED NO IDENTICAL. THE CAR BRACKETED WHILE DRIVING. THE CAR ACCELERATED THEN CARP FORWARD. SOME PROBLEM WHEN DRIVING TO ADEQUATELY DRIVE. MANY OF THE SALLS AND COMMENTS OF THE MULTIPLE TELEPHONE CALLS. DRIVE IN WERE FOR MORE REPAIRS. THE CAR WAS IN THE MIDDLE. *TR</p>
<p><b>Additional Information:</b></p>	<p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Tape ID No:</b> 10200716 <b>NRFA CDR No:</b> 20070016 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Vehicle:</b> 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> PAINESVILLE, OH</p>	<p><b>NRFA Summary:</b> "I, THE CONTACT, OWN A 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY. WHILE AT A COMPLETE STOP, THE CONSUMER STATED THAT HE WANTED TO TRY TO APPLY THE BRAKE BUT TO NO AVAIL. HE THEN COMPARED TO THE VEHICLE, IT FELLED NO IDENTICAL. THE CAR BRACKETED WHILE DRIVING. THE CAR ACCELERATED THEN CARP FORWARD. SOME PROBLEM WHEN DRIVING TO ADEQUATELY DRIVE. MANY OF THE SALLS AND COMMENTS OF THE MULTIPLE TELEPHONE CALLS. DRIVE IN WERE FOR MORE REPAIRS. THE CAR WAS IN THE MIDDLE. *TR</p>
<p><b>Additional Information:</b></p>	<p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Tape ID No:</b> 10200717 <b>NRFA CDR No:</b> 20070017 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Vehicle:</b> 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> PAINESVILLE, OH</p>	<p><b>NRFA Summary:</b> "I, THE CONTACT, OWN A 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY. WHILE AT A COMPLETE STOP, THE CONSUMER STATED THAT HE WANTED TO TRY TO APPLY THE BRAKE BUT TO NO AVAIL. HE THEN COMPARED</p>

[illegible]





RELEASED THE BRAKE, THE CAR BEGAN TO BUFE UP AGAIN. I MADE REPEATED ATTEMPTS TO BRAKE BUT, EVENTUALLY, THE BRAKE PADDLE LOCKED UP. AT THIS POINT, I PUT THE CAR INTO NEUTRAL, AND THE ENGINE REVVED UP DON'T KNOW WHAT THE MAXIMUM RPM WAS, BUT I KNOW IT WAS WELL ABOVE NORMAL DRIVING RPM. I PULLED OFF ON TO THE SHOULDER AND TURNED THE CAR OFF. I THEN TURNING THE IGNITION ON BUT FOOT WAS NOT ON THE ACCELERATOR PEDAL BUT THE ENGINE NEVER STOPPED IMMEDIATELY TURNED THE CAR OFF. ON THE NEXT STOP, I STOPPED IN THE SAME AREA, BUT THIS TIME, THE SAME REPEAT, BUT I HAD BEEN WAITING FOR 1-1.5 HOURS, A TOW TRUCK ARRIVED. THE DRIVER REPEATED THE LOCATION ON THE CAR STARTED NORMALLY, HOWEVER THE PROBLEM HAD RESOLVED ITSELF SO WE WERE UNABLE TO DETERMINE THE CAUSE. -P28

Toyota ID No: 20019389  
NHTSA CPD No: 20040362  
Date of Incident: 2/20/2004  
Vehicle: 2006 TOYOTA RAV4  
Location of Incident: MEDA, PA  
NHTSA Summary:  
"THE CONTACT OPERING A 2006 TOYOTA RAV4, THE VEHICLE AUTOMATICALLY  
ACCELERATED. THE CONTACT HAD TO DEPRESS HARD ON THE BRAKES AND/OR SHUT  
OFF THE ENGINE IN ORDER TO STOP THE VEHICLE FROM ENTERING INTO TRAFFIC.  
THE FAILURE OCCURRED ON MARCH 2, 2006. THE FAILURE MILEAGE WAS 12,125 AND  
CURRENT MILEAGE WAS 12,135. UPDATED 01/20/06. PJJ

Keynote ID No: 1022408  
 NISRA CDR No: 0000000  
 Date of Incident: 20160608  
 Vehicle: 2007 LEXUS ES350  
 Location of Incident: GREENACRES, FL  
 NISRA Summary:  
 PULLING INTO PARKING SLOT ON LEFT ABOUT STOPPED AND THE CAR ACCELERATED  
 FORWARD ABOUT 100 FT. BEHIND THE SECOND TRUCK HAS STOPPED. I WAS  
 AWARE OF WHERE MY FOOT WAS ON THE BRAKE. LAST COT PULLING INTO PARKING  
 SLOT TO LEFT THE SAME THING HAPPENED. JUST FELT LIKE A NUT. THE TRUCK I AM SURE  
 WAS IN THE 7TH. THE CONTACT WANTED TO ADD THAT THE DRIVERS FOOT MAY  
 WAS IN THE 7TH.

**Typo3 ID No:** 1022292  
**NHTSA Doc No:** 200801073  
**Date of Incident:** 2008/01/07  
**Vehicle:** 2007 TOYOTA SIENNA  
**Location of Incident:** BROOKLYN, NY

**NHTSA Summary:**  
 THIS MEMO WAS SENT VIA EMAIL ON THE TOYOTA WEBSITE OVER A WEEK AGO AND HAVE NOT RECEIVED A RESPONSE FROM THEM. I BELIEVE THE ISSUE IS VERY SERIOUS AND POTENTIALLY LIFE THREATENING. IT IS REGARDS TO A 2007 TOYOTA SIENNA THAT I OWN. AT THE LAST FIVE TIMES IN THE LAST 5 MONTHS I HAVE EXPERIENCED A VERY STRANGE NOISE WHEN MY SIENNA. WHEN MY FOOT IS PRESSING THE BR-AND PEDAL, AND AFTER COMING TO A FULL STOP, THE ENGINE WOULD BEGIN TO ACCELERATE VERY

Safety Research & Strategies  
Toyota Section Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A

RAPIDLY. I NEED TO PUSH DOWN VERY HARD ON THE BRAKE PEDAL IN ORDER NOT TO LURCH FORWARD. I HAVE BEEN FORTUNATE THAT I HAVE NOT HIT ANYTHING. WHAT SHOULD I DO, BECAUSE THE PROBLEM ONLY SEEMS TO OCCUR RANDOMLY ONCE IN A WHILE. A MECHANIC WOULD NOT SEE ANYTHING WRONG. THANK YOU JERRY GREENWALD \*PR

[illegible]

Toyota FD No: \_\_\_\_\_  
 NHTSA CRD No: 10236145  
 Date of Incident: 19900806  
 Vehicle: 1997 TOYOTA RAV4  
 Location of Incident: HAMDEN, CT  
 NHTSA Summary:  
 TL: THE CONTACT OWNS A 1997 TOYOTA RAV 4. WHILE ENTERING A PARKING SPACE  
 THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED WITHOUT INTENTION. HE WAS ABLE TO TURN OFF THE  
 ENGINE TO AVOID A CRASH. THE VEHICLE WAS TAKEN TO A DEALER FOR INSPECTION.  
 AFTER THE INSPECTION COULD NOT DUPLICATE THE FAILURE, HE COULD NOT PROVIDE  
 THE VIN OR THE MAKE/AGE WAS 1996. THE CURRENT MILEAGE WAS 25,000.  
 THE VEHICLE IDENTIFICATION NUMBER WAS UNAVAILABLE.

Typhoon ID No: NHTSA ODI No: 10291161  
 Date of Incident: 20080412  
 Vehicle: 2009 TOYOTA CELICA  
 Location of Incident: SNOHOMISH WA  
 NHTSA Summary:  
 THREE TIMES IN THE PAST 2 YEARS MY TOYOTA 2000 CELICA'S ACCELERATE STUCK  
 WHEN I APPLIED THE BREAKS. I AM NOT SURE WHAT CAUSED THE PROBLEM. "TE

Safety Research & Strategies  
Sudden Unintended Acceleration

Toyota ID#:  
 NHTSA ID# NTSB:  
 Date of Incident: 20090419  
 Vehicle: 2005 TOYOTA CAMRY  
 Location of Incident: FLENT, MI  
 Accident Sequence:  
 "On April 19, 2008, shortly after 2:00 in the afternoon, Plaintiff's Decedent GERALD P. ALBERTO was driving the subject 2005 Toyota Camry on Corporate Boulevard in Flint, Genesee County, Michigan, when the vehicle experienced a sudden, unexplained deceleration. The vehicle maneuvered from an intended lane of travel into the left lane of travel, and then into the right lane of travel, at a speed of approximately 60 miles per hour, despite Grandjuror Alberto's having intentionally and deliberately applied his brakes. As it moved to the right lane of travel for approximately one-fourth (0.25) of a mile, collided with a tree, over a curb, and then collided with another tree. Plaintiff's Decedent, despite having his hands properly secured in his seat belt restraint system, sustained fatal injuries in the accident."  
 Additional Comments:

Toyota ID No: 10205754  
NHTSA CR# No: 20090423  
Date of Incident: 20090423  
Vehicle: 2004 TOYOTA CELICA  
Location of Incident: VERO, IL

**NHTSA Summary:**  
31- THE CONDUCTOR A 2004 TOYOTA CELICA, WHILE DRIVING FLORAMANT INTERFERENCE CAUSED THE ACCELERATOR PEDAL TO STICK. THE MANUFACTURER WAS NOTIFIED, AND A REPRESENTATIVE ADVISED HER THAT THE DEALER COULD INSTALL A NEW CLIP TO SECURE THE FLORAMANT. NO REPAIRS WERE MADE. THE FAIR USE MILEAGE WAS UNKNOWN. THE CORRECT MILEAGE WAS 90,000.

**LEADS:**

**Type:** ID No: 70232413  
**NHTSA ODI No:** 20080426  
**Date of Incident:** 20090426  
**Vehicle:** 2006 TOYOTA SEDNA  
**Location of Incident:** HR 0305, FL  
**NHTSA Summary:**  
 I OWN A TOYOTA SEDANA 2006 MODEL. WHEN IN TRAFFIC THE CAR SOMETIMES HURTS ME WHEN THE ACCELATOR IS PRESSED AND AT OTHER TIMES IT BURGLES FORWARD DANGEROUSLY. THEREFORE CONTROLLING THE CAR IS UNPREDICTABLE. THE EXACT RESPONSE IS ALSO NOTIFIABLE AT A TRAFFIC LIGHT OR A STOP SIGN. THE VEHICLE WARMPS UP WITH "TR"  
**Addtional Remarks:**

Toyota ID No: 10228291  
NHTSA CRASH No: 20000509  
Date of Incident: 20000509  
Vehicle: 2000 TOYOTA CELICA  
Location of Incident: SFOUGHTON, MA  
NHTSA Summary:  
ON MAY 29, 2000 I HAD AN INCIDENT WITH MY 2000 CELICA. CR1 WAS USING CRUISE CONTROL. AT 55MPH I TAPPED MY BRAKES TO DURINGING THE CRUISE CONTROL. AS I EXITED ONE HIGHWAY ONTO ANOTHER, WHEN I CLICKED RESUME ON MY CRUISE

Safety Research & Strategies  
Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A

CONTROL MY CAR ACCELERATED PART 44MPH AND CONTINUED CLIMBING. I TAPPED THE BRAKES BUT MY CAR CONTINUED TO ACCELERATE. TURNED OFF THE CRUISE CONTROL BUT THE CAR CONTINUED TO ACCELERATE PART 44MPH. I PRESSED MY CLUTCH PÉDAL AND THE ENGINE REVVED NEAR REDLINE. I RELEASED THE CLUTCH AND TURNED OFF THE ENGINE IN THE MIDDLE OF THE HIGHWAY. TROUBLE TOLD ME THAT THE THROTTLE CABLE HAD RUST AND STUCK OPEN WHEN THE CRUISE CONTROL REQUESTED ACCELERATION. IN TURN MY CLUTCH/TRANSMISSION WERE BLOWN. I BELIEVE THIS FAILURE MODE IS A SERIOUS SAFETY ISSUE, THE CAR CONTINUOUSLY ACCELERATING AND THE ONLY WAY TO REMEDY IS TO TURN THE CAR OFF AT HIGH SPEED ON A HIGHWAY.

*Additional Comments:*

Toyota ID No: \_\_\_\_\_  
 META ORT No: 1025942  
 Date of Incident: 2004/05/05  
 Vehicle: 2003 TOYOTA CAMRY  
 Location of Incident: LOS ANGELES, CA  
 NHTSA Summary:  
 TP: THE CONTACT OWNS A 2003 TOYOTA CAMRY. WHEN THE CONTACT STARTED THE VEHICLE, MUDGEMY, AN UNINTENDED ACCELERATION OCCURRED WITHOUT APPLICATION TO THE BRAKE AND ACCELERATOR PEDALS. THE ENGINE BURN REGION/STALLING CONTACT COULD NOT STOP THE VEHICLE WITH APPROPRIATE USE OF THE BRAKE PEDAL. THE IDENTICAL FAILURE OCCURRED ON A SEPARATE OCCASION WHILE AT A COMPLETE STOP. THE VEHICLE WAS TAKEN TO AN INDEPENDENT MECHANIC. THE VEHICLE WAS NOT BEEN REPAIRED. THE CONTACT HAS CONCERNS OF THE CAMRY'S RECALL INVOLVED. FAILURE MODEL YEAR WAS UNKNOWN. THE CURRENT MILEAGE WAS 81,660.

[illegible]

Toyota ID No:	
NHTSA ODI No:	10291100
Date of Incident:	20080505
Vehicle:	2005 LEXUS GX470
Location of Incident:	WABEAM, GA

4. IN THE HIGHWAY, THE ENGINE  
THE ACCELERATOR 190% CANNOT









40 1A AND PLANNING ON BOOKING UP TO HIGH SPEED INTEREST ACCESS. THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION TO THIS MATTER. \*TS CHARLES & ALDEN ARMBRIST

Additional Issues:

Report ID No: 1025030  
 NHTSA OIR No: 1025030  
 Date of Incident: 20081010  
 Vehicle: 2004 TOYOTA CAMRY  
 Location of Incident: PLEASANT HARBOR, WA

NHTSA Summary:

THE CONTACT OWNED A 2004 TOYOTA CAMRY. WHILE DRIVING APPROXIMATELY 45 MPH, THE CONTACT PERCEIVED THE ACCELERATOR PEDAL SLIGHTLY AND THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED ABNORMALLY. THE CONTACT STATED THAT THE VEHICLE WAS NOT STUCK, BUT THE CONTACT CHANGING TO ANOTHER VEHICLE. THE VEHICLE'S HORN AND APPROXIMATE 200 MPH. THE CONTACT STATED THAT THE VEHICLE WAS NOT STUCK, BUT THE CONTACT CHANGING TO ANOTHER VEHICLE. THE VEHICLE'S HORN AND APPROXIMATE 200 MPH. THE CONTACT STATED THAT THE VEHICLE WAS NOT STUCK, BUT THE CONTACT CHANGING TO ANOTHER VEHICLE. THE VEHICLE'S HORN AND APPROXIMATE 200 MPH.

Additional Issues:

Report ID No: 1025034  
 NHTSA OIR No: 1025034  
 Date of Incident: 20081111  
 Vehicle: 2008 TOYOTA CAMRY  
 Location of Incident: QUESNINGSBURG, NY

NHTSA Summary:

THE CONTACT OWNED A 2008 TOYOTA CAMRY. WHILE MAKING A RIGHT TURN TO THE RIGHT, THE CONTACT STATED THAT THE VEHICLE WAS NOT STUCK, BUT THE CONTACT CHANGING TO ANOTHER VEHICLE. THE VEHICLE'S HORN AND APPROXIMATE 200 MPH. THE CONTACT STATED THAT THE VEHICLE WAS NOT STUCK, BUT THE CONTACT CHANGING TO ANOTHER VEHICLE. THE VEHICLE'S HORN AND APPROXIMATE 200 MPH.

Additional Issues:

Report ID No: 1025080  
 NHTSA OIR No: 1025080  
 Date of Incident: 20081119  
 Vehicle: 2008 TOYOTA COROLLA  
 Location of Incident: SARASOTA, FL

NHTSA Summary:

THE CONTACT OWNED A 2008 TOYOTA COROLLA. WHILE THE DRIVER STAYED IN THE FOOT OF THE BRAKE, THE CONTACT STATED THAT THE VEHICLE WAS NOT STUCK, BUT THE CONTACT CHANGING TO ANOTHER VEHICLE. THE VEHICLE'S HORN AND APPROXIMATE 200 MPH. THE CONTACT STATED THAT THE VEHICLE WAS NOT STUCK, BUT THE CONTACT CHANGING TO ANOTHER VEHICLE. THE VEHICLE'S HORN AND APPROXIMATE 200 MPH.

Additional Issues:

Report ID No: 1025067  
 NHTSA OIR No: 1025067  
 Date of Incident: 20081116  
 Vehicle: 2008 TOYOTA HIGHLANDER  
 Location of Incident: BARTON, VA

NHTSA Summary:

THE CONTACT OWNED A 2008 TOYOTA HIGHLANDER. WHILE DRIVING APPROXIMATELY 45 MPH, THE CONTACT PERCEIVED THE ACCELERATOR PEDAL SLIGHTLY AND THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED ABNORMALLY. THE CONTACT STATED THAT THE VEHICLE WAS NOT STUCK, BUT THE CONTACT CHANGING TO ANOTHER VEHICLE. THE VEHICLE'S HORN AND APPROXIMATE 200 MPH. THE CONTACT STATED THAT THE VEHICLE WAS NOT STUCK, BUT THE CONTACT CHANGING TO ANOTHER VEHICLE. THE VEHICLE'S HORN AND APPROXIMATE 200 MPH.

Additional Issues:

Report ID No: 1027972  
 NHTSA OIR No: 1027972  
 Date of Incident: 20081010  
 Vehicle: 2007 TOYOTA BIONA  
 Location of Incident: JEFFERSON, OR

NHTSA Summary:

THE CONTACT OWNED A 2007 TOYOTA BIONA. WHILE PLACING THE VEHICLE INTO DRIVE, THE CONTACT EXPERIENCED AN UNWANTED ACCELERATION. THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED FORWARD AND CHANGED INTO A CONCRETE WALL. THERE WERE NO WANDERING INTO THE ROAD. THE CONTACT STATED THAT THE VEHICLE WAS NOT STUCK, BUT THE CONTACT CHANGING TO ANOTHER VEHICLE. THE VEHICLE'S HORN AND APPROXIMATE 200 MPH. THE CONTACT STATED THAT THE VEHICLE WAS NOT STUCK, BUT THE CONTACT CHANGING TO ANOTHER VEHICLE. THE VEHICLE'S HORN AND APPROXIMATE 200 MPH.

Additional Issues:

Report ID No: 1025060  
 NHTSA OIR No: 1025060  
 Date of Incident: 20081019  
 Vehicle: 2007 TOYOTA BIONA  
 Location of Incident: LA VISTA, NE

NHTSA Summary:

THE CONTACT OWNED A 2007 TOYOTA BIONA. WHILE DRIVING APPROXIMATELY 45 MPH, THE CONTACT PERCEIVED THE ACCELERATOR PEDAL SLIGHTLY AND THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED ABNORMALLY. THE CONTACT STATED THAT THE VEHICLE WAS NOT STUCK, BUT THE CONTACT CHANGING TO ANOTHER VEHICLE. THE VEHICLE'S HORN AND APPROXIMATE 200 MPH. THE CONTACT STATED THAT THE VEHICLE WAS NOT STUCK, BUT THE CONTACT CHANGING TO ANOTHER VEHICLE. THE VEHICLE'S HORN AND APPROXIMATE 200 MPH.

Additional Issues:

Report ID No: 1025000  
 NHTSA OIR No: 1025000  
 Date of Incident: 20081010  
 Vehicle: 2008 TOYOTA CAMRY  
 Location of Incident: KANSAS CITY, MO

NHTSA Summary:

THE CONTACT OWNED A 2008 TOYOTA CAMRY. WHILE DRIVING APPROXIMATELY 45 MPH, THE CONTACT PERCEIVED THE ACCELERATOR PEDAL SLIGHTLY AND THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED ABNORMALLY. THE CONTACT STATED THAT THE VEHICLE WAS NOT STUCK, BUT THE CONTACT CHANGING TO ANOTHER VEHICLE. THE VEHICLE'S HORN AND APPROXIMATE 200 MPH. THE CONTACT STATED THAT THE VEHICLE WAS NOT STUCK, BUT THE CONTACT CHANGING TO ANOTHER VEHICLE. THE VEHICLE'S HORN AND APPROXIMATE 200 MPH.

Additional Issues:

Report ID No: 1025106  
 NHTSA OIR No: 1025106  
 Date of Incident: 20081010  
 Vehicle: 2008 TOYOTA CAMRY  
 Location of Incident: KANSAS CITY, MO

NHTSA Summary:

THE CONTACT OWNED A 2008 TOYOTA CAMRY. WHILE DRIVING APPROXIMATELY 45 MPH, THE CONTACT PERCEIVED THE ACCELERATOR PEDAL SLIGHTLY AND THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED ABNORMALLY. THE CONTACT STATED THAT THE VEHICLE WAS NOT STUCK, BUT THE CONTACT CHANGING TO ANOTHER VEHICLE. THE VEHICLE'S HORN AND APPROXIMATE 200 MPH. THE CONTACT STATED THAT THE VEHICLE WAS NOT STUCK, BUT THE CONTACT CHANGING TO ANOTHER VEHICLE. THE VEHICLE'S HORN AND APPROXIMATE 200 MPH.

NHTSA Summary:

THE CONTACT OWNED A 2008 TOYOTA CAMRY. WHILE DRIVING APPROXIMATELY 45 MPH, THE CONTACT PERCEIVED THE ACCELERATOR PEDAL SLIGHTLY AND THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED ABNORMALLY. THE CONTACT STATED THAT THE VEHICLE WAS NOT STUCK, BUT THE CONTACT CHANGING TO ANOTHER VEHICLE. THE VEHICLE'S HORN AND APPROXIMATE 200 MPH. THE CONTACT STATED THAT THE VEHICLE WAS NOT STUCK, BUT THE CONTACT CHANGING TO ANOTHER VEHICLE. THE VEHICLE'S HORN AND APPROXIMATE 200 MPH.

Additional Issues:

Report ID No: 1025133  
 NHTSA OIR No: 1025133  
 Date of Incident: 20081010  
 Vehicle: 2008 TOYOTA CAMRY  
 Location of Incident: KANSAS CITY, MO

NHTSA Summary:

THE CONTACT OWNED A 2008 TOYOTA CAMRY. WHILE DRIVING APPROXIMATELY 45 MPH, THE CONTACT PERCEIVED THE ACCELERATOR PEDAL SLIGHTLY AND THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED ABNORMALLY. THE CONTACT STATED THAT THE VEHICLE WAS NOT STUCK, BUT THE CONTACT CHANGING TO ANOTHER VEHICLE. THE VEHICLE'S HORN AND APPROXIMATE 200 MPH. THE CONTACT STATED THAT THE VEHICLE WAS NOT STUCK, BUT THE CONTACT CHANGING TO ANOTHER VEHICLE. THE VEHICLE'S HORN AND APPROXIMATE 200 MPH.

Additional Issues:

Report ID No: 1025050  
 NHTSA OIR No: 1025050  
 Date of Incident: 20081010  
 Vehicle: 2008 TOYOTA CAMRY  
 Location of Incident: KANSAS CITY, MO

NHTSA Summary:

THE CONTACT OWNED A 2008 TOYOTA CAMRY. WHILE DRIVING APPROXIMATELY 45 MPH, THE CONTACT PERCEIVED THE ACCELERATOR PEDAL SLIGHTLY AND THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED ABNORMALLY. THE CONTACT STATED THAT THE VEHICLE WAS NOT STUCK, BUT THE CONTACT CHANGING TO ANOTHER VEHICLE. THE VEHICLE'S HORN AND APPROXIMATE 200 MPH. THE CONTACT STATED THAT THE VEHICLE WAS NOT STUCK, BUT THE CONTACT CHANGING TO ANOTHER VEHICLE. THE VEHICLE'S HORN AND APPROXIMATE 200 MPH.

Additional Issues:

Report ID No: 1025082  
 NHTSA OIR No: 1025082  
 Date of Incident: 20081010  
 Vehicle: 2008 TOYOTA CAMRY  
 Location of Incident: KANSAS CITY, MO

<p>CONTROL OF THE VEHICLE WHEN IT ACCELERATED ON ITS OWN ON BOTH OCCASIONS. THE GRABBER STATED THAT THERE WERE NO PROBLEMS WITH THE VEHICLE WHEN IT WAS BOULET TO LOCK. THE GRABBER STATED THAT THEY WOULD CONDUCT A SURVEY OF THE DAMAGE AND CHECK FOR A MECHANICAL FAILURE. THE CONTRACT WAS NOT SIGNED BY THE GRABBER. A REPRESENTATIVE HAS ASSIGNED THE DAMAGE. THE FAULT MILEAGE WAS 16,096.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	<p>THEY TOOK THE CAR TO THE DEALER AND TALKED OTHER THINGS AND THEY CHECKED IT OUT. THEY COULD NOT FIND AN PROBLEM AND AFTER CONFERRING WITH THEIR MANAGER, THEY HAD THE CAR TO STOP BY THEM BRACKEN AND THIRID. AFTER HAVING THE PROBLEM, AFTER READING THE FIRST ARTICLE IN A NEWSPAPER ABOUT THIS TYPE OF CAR, THE GRABBER TOOK THE CAR BACK. THE GRABBER TOOK THE CAR TO THE ACCELERATOR PEOPLE.</p>
<p><b>Topic ID No:</b> 1029126 <b>NTSA CUI No:</b> 2009126 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2009126 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2006 LEXUS RX300 <b>Location of Incident:</b> FORT WORTH, TX</p> <p><b>NTSA Summary:</b> I AM A LEXUS RENTAL CAR WITH A PROBLEM WITH THE ACCELERATOR. AFTERMATH GET STUCK AT ABOUT 25MPH AND NOT MOVE DOWN FROM THERE UNTIL WAITING LONGER ON IT. I AM NOT SURE WHY THE CAR WAS NOT BOULET TO LOCK AT A LOW RPM BUT 25MPH. THE ACCELERATOR FEELS HARD AND NO MATHS NO REASON WHY FEEL ON THE SPEED SENSOR AND THE CAR DOES NOT MOVE AND LETS GO. WHEN THEY TEND TO GO FORWARD THE CAR DOES NOT FORWARD ON IT. WHEN I BREAK THEY FEEL READY TO STOP WITH A WARM ON THE BRAKE. I CAN FEEL THAT IT IS NOT WORKING IN STUCK AND THE CAR DOES WHAT IT WANTS WHEN IT LETS GO WHEN IT WOULD IT FEELS. I HAVE NOT BEEN A CRASH TEST, BUT I AM CONCERNED ABOUT IT. *R</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	<p><b>Topic ID No:</b> 1029177 <b>NTSA CUI No:</b> 2009177 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2009126 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2006 TOYOTA RAM <b>Location of Incident:</b> BIRMINGHAM, AL</p> <p><b>NTSA Summary:</b> I WAS AT THE ACCELERATOR WORKSHOP WHEN MY BROTHER STUCK TELL ME THAT AT A LOW RPM, WOULD BE ABLE TO BRING CAR TO STOP BY THEM BRACKEN AND THIRID. AFTER HAVING THE PROBLEM, AFTER READING THE FIRST ARTICLE IN A NEWSPAPER ABOUT THIS TYPE OF CAR, THE GRABBER TOOK THE CAR BACK. THE GRABBER TOOK THE CAR TO THE ACCELERATOR PEOPLE.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Topic ID No:</b> 1029277 <b>NTSA CUI No:</b> 2009277 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2009126 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2006 TOYOTA CARRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> KIRKLEBY, TX</p> <p><b>NTSA Summary:</b> I TOOK MY CAR ON A 2006 TOYOTA CARRY. WHILE DRIVING APPROXIMATELY 15 MPH, THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED WITHOUT WARNING. AS A RESULT, THE CONTACT CRASHED THE VEHICLE INTO A WALL. THE VEHICLE WAS MODERATELY DAMAGED. ONE WEEK LATER, THE FAULTER RENTED THE CAR AND THE VEHICLE CRASHED INTO A BUILDING. THE VEHICLE WAS COMPLETELY DESTROYED AND NONE OF THE AIR BAGS DEPLOYED. THE CONTRACT WAS NOT SIGNED BY THE GRABBER. A REPRESENTATIVE HAS ASSIGNED THE DAMAGE. THE FAULT MILEAGE WAS 50,809 AND CURRENT MILEAGE WAS 50,809.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	<p><b>Topic ID No:</b> 1029305 <b>NTSA CUI No:</b> 2009305 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2009126 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2006 TOYOTA CARRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> CHICAGO, IL</p> <p><b>NTSA Summary:</b> 2006 TOYOTA CARRY REAR END STOPPED. INCREASE IN ENGINE SPEED OCCURRED WHILE THE ACCELERATOR PEDAL IS NOT DEPRESSED. ENGINE REVOLVED WHILE GUIDED VEHICLE TO CRASH INTO OTHER CURBS. UPON IMPACT, AIR BAGS DID NOT DEPLOY. *R</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Topic ID No:</b> 1029176 <b>NTSA CUI No:</b> 2009176 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2009126 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2006 TOYOTA CARRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> FORT WORTH, TX</p> <p><b>NTSA Summary:</b> RACE A 2006 TOYOTA CARRY. THE ENGINE HAS STARTED ACCELERATING THREE TIMES. THE LAST BEING 21400. EACH TIME THE BRAKES WERE USED TO KEEP THE CAR FROM SPEEDING UP AND, AFTER A FEW MINUTES, THE ENGINE WENT BACK TO AN IDLE. TWO.</p>	<p><b>Topic ID No:</b> 1029302 <b>NTSA CUI No:</b> 2009302 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2009126 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2006 TOYOTA CARRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> BIRMINGHAM, AL</p> <p><b>NTSA Summary:</b> I WAS AT THE ACCELERATOR WORKSHOP WHEN MY BROTHER STUCK TELL ME THAT AT A LOW RPM, WOULD BE ABLE TO BRING CAR TO STOP BY THEM BRACKEN AND THIRID. AFTER HAVING THE PROBLEM, AFTER READING THE FIRST ARTICLE IN A NEWSPAPER ABOUT THIS TYPE OF CAR, THE GRABBER TOOK THE CAR BACK. THE GRABBER TOOK THE CAR TO THE ACCELERATOR PEOPLE.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Topic ID No:</b> 1029267 <b>NTSA CUI No:</b> 2009267 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2009126 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2006 TOYOTA CARRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> CHICAGO, IL</p> <p><b>NTSA Summary:</b> I WAS AT THE ACCELERATOR WORKSHOP WHEN MY BROTHER STUCK TELL ME THAT AT A LOW RPM, WOULD BE ABLE TO BRING CAR TO STOP BY THEM BRACKEN AND THIRID. AFTER HAVING THE PROBLEM, AFTER READING THE FIRST ARTICLE IN A NEWSPAPER ABOUT THIS TYPE OF CAR, THE GRABBER TOOK THE CAR BACK. THE GRABBER TOOK THE CAR TO THE ACCELERATOR PEOPLE.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	<p><b>Topic ID No:</b> 1029302 <b>NTSA CUI No:</b> 2009302 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2009126 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2006 TOYOTA CARRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> BIRMINGHAM, AL</p> <p><b>NTSA Summary:</b> I WAS AT THE ACCELERATOR WORKSHOP WHEN MY BROTHER STUCK TELL ME THAT AT A LOW RPM, WOULD BE ABLE TO BRING CAR TO STOP BY THEM BRACKEN AND THIRID. AFTER HAVING THE PROBLEM, AFTER READING THE FIRST ARTICLE IN A NEWSPAPER ABOUT THIS TYPE OF CAR, THE GRABBER TOOK THE CAR BACK. THE GRABBER TOOK THE CAR TO THE ACCELERATOR PEOPLE.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Location of Incident:</b> PRINCETON, NJ</p> <p><b>NTSA Summary:</b> I WAS AT THE ACCELERATOR WORKSHOP WHEN MY BROTHER STUCK TELL ME THAT AT A LOW RPM, WOULD BE ABLE TO BRING CAR TO STOP BY THEM BRACKEN AND THIRID. AFTER HAVING THE PROBLEM, AFTER READING THE FIRST ARTICLE IN A NEWSPAPER ABOUT THIS TYPE OF CAR, THE GRABBER TOOK THE CAR BACK. THE GRABBER TOOK THE CAR TO THE ACCELERATOR PEOPLE.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	<p><b>Topic ID No:</b> 1029302 <b>NTSA CUI No:</b> 2009302 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2009126 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2006 TOYOTA CARRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> BIRMINGHAM, AL</p> <p><b>NTSA Summary:</b> I WAS AT THE ACCELERATOR WORKSHOP WHEN MY BROTHER STUCK TELL ME THAT AT A LOW RPM, WOULD BE ABLE TO BRING CAR TO STOP BY THEM BRACKEN AND THIRID. AFTER HAVING THE PROBLEM, AFTER READING THE FIRST ARTICLE IN A NEWSPAPER ABOUT THIS TYPE OF CAR, THE GRABBER TOOK THE CAR BACK. THE GRABBER TOOK THE CAR TO THE ACCELERATOR PEOPLE.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Topic ID No:</b> 1029267 <b>NTSA CUI No:</b> 2009267 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2009126 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2006 TOYOTA CARRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> CHICAGO, IL</p> <p><b>NTSA Summary:</b> I WAS AT THE ACCELERATOR WORKSHOP WHEN MY BROTHER STUCK TELL ME THAT AT A LOW RPM, WOULD BE ABLE TO BRING CAR TO STOP BY THEM BRACKEN AND THIRID. AFTER HAVING THE PROBLEM, AFTER READING THE FIRST ARTICLE IN A NEWSPAPER ABOUT THIS TYPE OF CAR, THE GRABBER TOOK THE CAR BACK. THE GRABBER TOOK THE CAR TO THE ACCELERATOR PEOPLE.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	<p><b>Topic ID No:</b> 1029302 <b>NTSA CUI No:</b> 2009302 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2009126 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2006 TOYOTA CARRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> BIRMINGHAM, AL</p> <p><b>NTSA Summary:</b> I WAS AT THE ACCELERATOR WORKSHOP WHEN MY BROTHER STUCK TELL ME THAT AT A LOW RPM, WOULD BE ABLE TO BRING CAR TO STOP BY THEM BRACKEN AND THIRID. AFTER HAVING THE PROBLEM, AFTER READING THE FIRST ARTICLE IN A NEWSPAPER ABOUT THIS TYPE OF CAR, THE GRABBER TOOK THE CAR BACK. THE GRABBER TOOK THE CAR TO THE ACCELERATOR PEOPLE.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Topic ID No:</b> 1029267 <b>NTSA CUI No:</b> 2009267 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2009126 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2006 TOYOTA CARRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> CHICAGO, IL</p> <p><b>NTSA Summary:</b> I WAS AT THE ACCELERATOR WORKSHOP WHEN MY BROTHER STUCK TELL ME THAT AT A LOW RPM, WOULD BE ABLE TO BRING CAR TO STOP BY THEM BRACKEN AND THIRID. AFTER HAVING THE PROBLEM, AFTER READING THE FIRST ARTICLE IN A NEWSPAPER ABOUT THIS TYPE OF CAR, THE GRABBER TOOK THE CAR BACK. THE GRABBER TOOK THE CAR TO THE ACCELERATOR PEOPLE.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	<p><b>Topic ID No:</b> 1029302 <b>NTSA CUI No:</b> 2009302 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2009126 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2006 TOYOTA CARRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> BIRMINGHAM, AL</p> <p><b>NTSA Summary:</b> I WAS AT THE ACCELERATOR WORKSHOP WHEN MY BROTHER STUCK TELL ME THAT AT A LOW RPM, WOULD BE ABLE TO BRING CAR TO STOP BY THEM BRACKEN AND THIRID. AFTER HAVING THE PROBLEM, AFTER READING THE FIRST ARTICLE IN A NEWSPAPER ABOUT THIS TYPE OF CAR, THE GRABBER TOOK THE CAR BACK. THE GRABBER TOOK THE CAR TO THE ACCELERATOR PEOPLE.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Topic ID No:</b> 1029267 <b>NTSA CUI No:</b> 2009267 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2009126 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2006 TOYOTA CARRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> CHICAGO, IL</p> <p><b>NTSA Summary:</b> I WAS AT THE ACCELERATOR WORKSHOP WHEN MY BROTHER STUCK TELL ME THAT AT A LOW RPM, WOULD BE ABLE TO BRING CAR TO STOP BY THEM BRACKEN AND THIRID. AFTER HAVING THE PROBLEM, AFTER READING THE FIRST ARTICLE IN A NEWSPAPER ABOUT THIS TYPE OF CAR, THE GRABBER TOOK THE CAR BACK. THE GRABBER TOOK THE CAR TO THE ACCELERATOR PEOPLE.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	<p><b>Topic ID No:</b> 1029302 <b>NTSA CUI No:</b> 2009302 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2009126 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2006 TOYOTA CARRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> BIRMINGHAM, AL</p> <p><b>NTSA Summary:</b> I WAS AT THE ACCELERATOR WORKSHOP WHEN MY BROT</p>



<p>WALL AND STRUCK HER HOME. THE AIR BAGS DID NOT DEPLOY AND THERE WERE NO INJURIES. A POLICE REPORT WAS FILED AND THE VEHICLE WAS DESTROYED. THE DEALER STATED THAT THEY HAD NEVER HEARD OF THIS TYPE OF FAILURE. SHE ATTEMPTED TO NOTIFY THE MANUFACTURER, BUT WAS UNABLE TO REACH ANYONE. THE STREET AND FAILURE MILEAGES WERE 61,112.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 10210057 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20090521 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2007 TOYOTA COROLLA <b>Location of Incident:</b> NHTSA Summary: "I, THE CONTACT OWNS A 2007 TOYOTA COROLLA. AFTER PROCEEDING FROM A STOP LIGHT AT 15 MPH, THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED TO 70 MPH. EVEN AFTER BRAKE APPLICATION, THE VEHICLE CONTINUED TO ACCELERATE. SHE THEN SHIFTED TO THE VEHICLE INTO PARK AND TURNED THE ENGINE OFF. THE VEHICLE WAS TOWED TO HER HOME. A MECHANIC INSPECTED THE VEHICLE, BUT COULD NOT IDENTIFY THE CAUSE OF THE FAILURE. THE MANUFACTURER WAS NOTIFIED, AND SHE WAS ADVISED THAT HER MODEL TYPE DOES NOT HAVE A DEFECT. THE FAILURE MILEAGE WAS 61,000. THE VEHICLE IDENTIFICATION NUMBER WAS UNAVAILABLE."</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p>On May 21, 2005, Lauren Ridgway was driving her 2006 Toyota Highlander on Okavado Blvd., Phoenix, CA with three passengers, when the car began sudden acceleration and traveling in first, she applied the brakes, but the vehicle would not stop or slow down, then there was no further, she attempted to move the steering wheel back and forth in an attempt to slow the vehicle down, it continued and made a noise likeing one propand passenger and severely injuring another passenger. The Phoenix Police Report No. is 00010812.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 10275434 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20080101 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2007 TOYOTA TUNDRA <b>Location of Incident:</b> SPANCA, NY <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> "DURING THE DRIVEWAY, WITH OFFICE CONTROL ENGAGED AND BEGINNING TO CLIMB A GENTLE HILL, ENDSU SUDDENLY ACCELERATES AT FULL THROTTLE, AND THE BRACKENING APPROPRIATE TWO GEAR. IT CHARGES THE VEHICLE TO HIGHEST AND RAMPAGE ACCELERATE. VEHICLE IS VERY DIFFICULT TO CONTROL ON SLOPE, OR RAMP SLOPE INADVISABLE. IF FEELING ANOTHER VEHICLE THAT ABOUT TO HILL, RACE AS A REAR TRACTOR-TRAILER, THERE IS IMPROPER DANGER OF A REAR-AND COLLISION. THIS INJECT AN ISOLATED INCIDENT TO ACCORD EVERY YEAR. THREE CONSIDERAS ARE MET. 1. CRUISE CONTROL IS ENGAGED. 1. VEHICLE DRIVER UP HILL OR HILL. A HIGHWAY SPEED. *R</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 20090328 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20090328 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2006 TOYOTA HIGHLANDER <b>Location of Incident:</b> NHTSA Summary: On May 21, 2005, Lauren Ridgway was driving her 2006 Toyota Highlander on Okavado Blvd., Phoenix, CA with three passengers, when the car began sudden acceleration and traveling in first, she applied the brakes, but the vehicle would not stop or slow down, then there was no further, she attempted to move the steering wheel back and forth in an attempt to slow the vehicle down, it continued and made a noise likeing one propand passenger and severely injuring another passenger. The Phoenix Police Report No. is 00010812.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 10278489 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20080605 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2003 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> MINNETONKA, MN <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> "WHILE MY WIFE DRIVING FOR 40 YEARS WAS BACKING OUT OF THE DRIVEWAY THE CAR ACCELERATED AT FULL THROTTLE, SHOT ACROSS THE STREET AND INTO THE NEIGHBOR'S YARD AND CRASHED INTO A TREE WHICH PREVENTED THE CAR FROM CRASHING INTO THE HOUSE. *R</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 10275244 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20080729 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2006 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> SAN JOSE, CA <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> "I, THE CONTACT OWNS A 2006 TOYOTA CAMRY. WHILE BACKING OUT OF A PARKING SPOT AT AN UNUSUAL SPEED, THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED IN ITS OWN WITHOUT WARNING. THE VEHICLE STRUCK A LAMP POST AND WAS TOWED TO AN AUTO LOT. THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME THIS FAILURE OCCURRED. A POLICE REPORT WAS FILED AND THERE WERE NO INJURIES. THE INSURANCE COMPANY WAS NOTIFIED AND THEY SENT AN ADJUSTER TO INSPECT THE VEHICLE. THE VEHICLE CURRENTLY IN THE INSURANCE COMPANY'S POSSESSION. THE DEALER WAS NOTIFIED AND STATED THAT THEY WOULD BE IN TOUCH. THE FAILURE AND CURRENT MILEAGE WERE 11,000.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 10203032 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20080608 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2008 TOYOTA SOLARA <b>Location of Incident:</b> CENTERVILLE, VA <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> "I, THE CONTACT OWNS A 2008 TOYOTA SOLARA. WHILE RELEASING THE PARKING BRAKE AT A STOP LIGHT, THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED WITHOUT INTENTION. AS A CONSEQUENCE HE ALARM ENDED. ANOTHER VEHICLE, IN ORDER TO STOP THE VEHICLE FROM DRIVING FORWARD HE HAD TO SHIFT INTO THE NEUTRAL GEAR, AND THEN REMOVE THE KEY FROM THE IGNITION. THE CURRENT AND FAILURE MILEAGES WERE 11,000.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b> <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i></p>	<p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b> <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i></p>
<p>"I, THE CONTACT OWNS A 2007 TOYOTA HIGHLANDER. WHILE DRIVING AT 40 MPH WITH THE CRUISE CONTROL ACTIVATED, THE ACCELERATOR BECAME STUCK. AFTER REPEATED BRAKE APPLICATION, THE VEHICLE WOULD NOT STOP. AFTER SHIFTING INTO THE CRUISE CONTROL, SHE WAS ABLE TO STOP THE VEHICLE. THE DEALER WAS NOTIFIED, AND A TECHNICIAN CONCLUDED THAT THE PROBLEM WAS THE CABLE OF THE FAILURE. HOWEVER, SHE BELIEVED THAT THE TECHNICIAN HAD NOT CORRECTLY REPERATED THE CABLE OF THE FAILURE. THE FAILURE MILEAGE WAS 10,475.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	<p>"I, THE CONTACT OWNS A 2006 TOYOTA TUNDRA. WHILE DRIVING 40 MPH AND RELEASED THE ACCELERATOR PEDAL, THE VEHICLE CONTINUED TO ACCELERATE. THE FAILURE ONLY OCCURRED ONCE. THE FAILURE MILEAGE WAS 4700 AND THE CURRENT MILEAGE WAS 15,000.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 10210464 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20090402 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2006 TOYOTA HENNA <b>Location of Incident:</b> GARDENIA, CA <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> "1 MONTH AGO MY SON WAS DRIVING MY CAR AND IT SUDDENLY ACCELERATED AND HE COULD NOT GET THE CAR TO STOP EVEN WHEN HE PUT ON THE BRAKE. WHEN I GOT THE CAR, IT SHOOK THE ENGINE AND IT LUNCHED FORWARD, BUT I PUT THE CAR IN NEUTRAL AND THE ENGINE JUST RACED. I ULTIMATELY TOOK THE CAR TO MY MECHANIC, AND HE TOLD IT SOMETHING ELSE WERE THEY RETURNED THE PROBLEM AFTER TWO ATTEMPTS. MY CAR DID NOT HAVE ANY DRIVER SIDE FLUOR MATH IN IT. *R</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 10274417 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20090217 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2009 TOYOTA TUNDRA <b>Location of Incident:</b> SIMPSONVILLE, SC <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> "ATTEMPTED TO ACCELERATE TO PASS A LARGE TRUCK, AND VEHICLE STARTED ACCELERATING OUT OF CONTROL. THROU TO BRAKE, AND THAT DIDN'T WORK. APPLIED FOOT BRAKE, AND THAT DIDN'T WORK. UPED MAY HAVE DECLARED TO APPROX 70-80 MPH. AFTER 10 METERS SLOW APPROX AT 100 MPH UNABLE TO STEER VEHICLE. IT WAS AS IF THE MOTOR HAD STOPPED AND I HAD NO POWER STEERING. AFTER HITTING 200 VEHICLE AND THEN THE HIGHEST LOSS MILEAGE WALL. THE FRONT TIRE AND STEERING ASSEMBLY BENT FORWARD AND THAT CAUSED THE VAN TO STOP THAT GOD THAT NO ONE WAS INJURED, BUT SOMETHING SERIOUSLY WRONG. I'VE HAD SEVERAL COMPLAINTS OF SUDEN, ACCELERATION IN HENNA VANS AND THIS NEED MUCH ATTENTION. *R</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 10274034 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20090402 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2007 TOYOTA RAV4 <b>Location of Incident:</b> RANDOLPH, VA <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> "THE THROTTLE IN MY 2007 RAV4 VALIMITED HAS STUCK OPEN THREE TIMES IN THE LAST FEW MONTHS. IT HAPPENS AFTER "PLOOR" THE ACCELERATOR. THE FIRST TIME OCCURRED IN MY GARAGE, AS I WAS TRYING TO START THE ENGINE. I HAD TO TURN IT OFF. THE SECOND TIME WAS A WHILE LATER, AS I WAS PASSING A TRUCK, GOING TO A HILL, ON A HILL AND HIGHWAY. I PUT MY FOOT ON THE BRAKE, AND TRIED TO GET THE BRAKE TO HOLD, BUT THE BRAKE DIDN'T HOLD. I THEN TOOK MY FOOT OFF THE BRAKE, AND GOT TO THE SHOULDER. I WAS DISCOMFORT, WITHOUT GETTING INTO AN ACCIDENT, BUT IT WAS A SCARY. I TOOK THE CAR TO A MECHANIC, AND THEY SAID THAT THE THROTTLE BODY HAD A LEAK, SO THEY REPLACED THE REAL. I HAD NOT EXPERIENCE THE PROBLEM AGAIN FOR A COUPLE OF MONTHS, THEN I HAD ANOTHER TWO DAYS AGO. I WAS ACCELERATING TO MERGE WITH TRAFFIC ON A FREEWAY. I APPLIED THE BRAKES, AND THE THROTTLE STAYED STUCK, AND GOT TO A STOPPED TO NORMAL OPERATION. *R</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 10291453 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20090620 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> WARRINGTON, VA <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> "2007 TOYOTA CAMRY INVOLVED IN AN 8 CAR ACCIDENT ON 6/20/09. CAR ACCELERATED UNCONTROLLABLY, AND DRIVER WAS UNABLE TO STOP CAR. *R</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 10211485 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20090628 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> ROCKY HILL, CT <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> "I, THE CONTACT OWNS A 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY. WHILE DRIVING INTO A HILLSIDE DRIVE, THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED WITHOUT WARNING. THE CONTACT APPLIED EXTREME PRESSURE TO THE BRAKE PEDAL. HOWEVER, THE VEHICLE FAILED TO SLOW DOWN. THE CONTACT WAS ABLE TO AVOID CRASHING INTO THE FRONT OF A BUILDING. HOWEVER, HE CRASHED INTO A DUMPSTER AND THE BACK OF THE BUILDING. THE VEHICLE WAS DESTROYED. THE CAR HAD ANOTHER. THE CONTACT REPORTED BROKEN REAR, NUMBER OF RUBBERS AND CONTAINERS. THE CONTACT HAD NOT COMPARED TO THE FLOOR MATS CAUSED THE VEHICLE TO ACCELERATE. THE CURRENT AND FAILURE MILEAGES WERE 91,000.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> 10291453 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 20090620 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> WARRINGTON, VA <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> "2007 TOYOTA CAMRY INVOLVED IN AN 8 CAR ACCIDENT ON 6/20/09. CAR ACCELERATED UNCONTROLLABLY, AND DRIVER WAS UNABLE TO STOP CAR. *R</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b> <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i></p>	<p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b> <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A</i></p>









[illegible]

<p>NIHTA ODR No: 1029101 Date of Incident: 20091001 Vehicle: 2007 TOYOTA PRIUS Location of Incident: 0702003 MELA MD</p> <p>NIHTA Summary: I HAVE A 2007 TOYOTA PRIUS AND IT ACCELERATES RANDOMLY. I USUALLY WHEN I PRESS ON THE BRAKE A LITTLE BIT, BUT NOT ALL THE WAY, IT WILL JUMP FORWARD AND ACCELERATE. I HAVE TALKED ABOUT THE ISSUES WITH THE MAT AND I REMOVED THE MAT ANYWAY AND IT IS STILL UNEXPECTEDLY ACCELERATING. IT HAS HAPPENED MAY 4 TIMES SINCE I BOUGHT THE CAR IN JULY. I AM SCARED TO DRIVE IT AND HAVE BEEN DRIVING MY CRUISE CAR UNTIL SOMETHING IS DONE BY TOYOTA OR SOMEONE ELSE THAT CARES ABOUT THE SAFETY OF DRIVERS. *TR</p> <p>Additional Summary:</p>	<p>Toyota ID No: 1029101 NIHTA ODR No: 1029101 Date of Incident: 20091001 Vehicle: 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY Location of Incident: 1008 ANSELIER CA</p> <p>NIHTA Summary: ON 10/1/09, THE CONTACT OPENED A 2007 TOYOTA 4 RUNNER. SHE STATED THAT WHILE MAKING A LEFT TURN INTO A PARKING SPACE, THE VEHICLE SUDDENLY ACCELERATED, LEANED FORWARD AND CRASHED INTO A BRICK WALL. THE TOYOTA DEALER WAS UNABLE TO DUPLICATE THE FAILURE. THE MECHANICAL FAILURE OCCURRED PREVIOUSLY, HOWEVER, IT DIDN'T RESULT IN A CRASH. NO REPAIRS HAD BEEN MADE TO CORRECT THE FAILURE. THE VIN WAS NOT AVAILABLE. THE CURRENT OWNER PURCHASED THE VEHICLE UNDER 21,000.</p> <p>Additional Summary:</p>
<p>Toyota ID No: 1029102 NIHTA ODR No: 1029102 Date of Incident: 20091006 Vehicle: 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY Location of Incident: MIAMI, FL</p> <p>NIHTA Summary: I AM WRITING THIS LETTER ON BEHALF OF MY MOTHER, ONE DRIVER A 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY. LAST WEEK SHE DISCOVERED THAT HER CAR - THE IT AGAIN, AND THAT SHE IN AFRID TO DRIVE THE CAR. WELL, I DENY IT FULLY AND DON'T WHEN SHE SAID HER CAR WOULD ACCELERATE. IN A HURRY UNTIL I HAD NO OTHER LAST NIGHT FOLLOWING THE TOYOTA FOR A WAT CAR ISSUE. THERE ARE THE INSTRUCTIONS THAT HAVE HAPPENED TO MY MOM. I DON THE WORKING OF SEPTEMBER 1, 2009, SHE WAS BACKING OUT OF HER SPACE AT A SUPERMARKET PARKING LOT AND - THE CAR BACK, SUTTERALLY YANK - SHE WAS BEING ALARMED THAT SHE WAS GOING TO GET SOMEONE, I CHECKED NO ONE WAS BEHIND HER SO NO ONE GOT HURT AND THEN APPLYING THE BRAKES TO HOLD IT AND THEN PRESSED MOVING THE GEAR AND EVENTUALLY THE CAR STOPPED. OCTOBER 20, 2009, SHE WAS BACKING OUT FROM HER SPACE AND THE CAR - TOOK OFF AND WENT BACK REALLY FAST AND THEN SPIN AROUND AND THEN HIT A TREE ACROSS THE STREET - IN THE NEIGHBOR - I SWELL. SHE HIT THE BRAKE PEDAL BUT THE CAR DID NOT STOP. SHE THEN TURNED THE IGNITION OFF AND THE CAR EVENTUALLY STOPPED. 12/08 OCTOBER 4, 2009, SHE WAS BACKING OUT FROM GETTING HER CAR HOME AND - THE CAR ACCELERATED, TURNING AROUND AND WENT THROUGH THE HOUSE ACROSS THE STREET AND THEN WENT STRAIGHT INTO THE BACKYARD OF</p>	<p>Toyota ID No: 1029102 NIHTA ODR No: 1029102 Date of Incident: 20091006 Vehicle: 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY Location of Incident: MIAMI, FL</p> <p>NIHTA Summary: I HAVE A 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY. I READ A RECENT ARTICLE REGARDING THE LEXUS AND TOYOTA VEHICLES THAT HAVE THE PROBLEM OF ACCELERATION. THIS HAS HAPPENED TO A STOP AT A STOP SIGN AND AT A RED LIGHT. I HAD A VERY LONG DRIVE AND THE CAR SUDDENLY ACCELERATED FOR A COUPLE OF SECONDS. I HAD TO PUT A LOT MORE PRESSURE ON THE BRAKE TO STOP. THE THIRD INCIDENT HAPPENED IN A PARKING LOT. I PULLED IN THE LOT BEHIND ANOTHER CAR AND WAS APPLYING THE BRAKE. I WAS REMOVED WITH THE BRAKE APPLIED AND NORMALLY ONE CAR ACCELERATES. USUALLY I STOPPED MY FOOT ON THE BRAKE. OTHERWISE I WOULD HAVE HIT THE CAR IN FRONT OF ME. I HAD A VERY LONG DRIVE. I HAD A VERY LONG DRIVE. I HAD TO PRESS FORWARD ON THE BRAKE. I TOOK IT TO MY MOTHER. THEY CALLED A TOYOTA DEALER IN MIAMI, FL TO SEE THEM. THEY WERE A RECALL FOR THE PROBLEM OR IF THEY HAD HEARD OF A SIMILAR TYPE PROBLEM. THEY SAID THERE WAS NO RECALL FOR THIS PROBLEM AND THERE NOT AWARE OF OTHER INCIDENTS. IT WAS THIS WAS A VERY SCARY SITUATION. WHEN YOU APPLY THE BRAKE YOU WOULD EXPECT TO STOP. NOT HAVE THE CAR ACCELERATE. THIS COULD HAVE EASILY RESULTED IN A CRASH. *TR</p> <p>Additional Summary:</p>
<p>Toyota ID No: 1029103 NIHTA ODR No: 1029103 Date of Incident: 20091001 Vehicle: 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY SOLARA Location of Incident: 0702003 MELA MD</p> <p>NIHTA Summary: ON 10/1/09, THE CONTACT OPENED A 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY SOLARA. THE FLOOR MATS WERE SHIFTING UNDER THE ACCELERATION PEDAL. THE MATS WERE ENGAGED WITH THE BRAKE AND A REVERSELY ANOTHER TO REMOVE THE FLOOR MATS. FLOOR MATS. THE VEHICLE WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THE TOYOTA FLOOR MAT RECALL. THE FLOOR MATS WERE 175 LBS.</p> <p>Additional Summary:</p>	<p>Toyota ID No: 1029103 NIHTA ODR No: 1029103 Date of Incident: 20091001 Vehicle: 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY SOLARA Location of Incident: 0702003 MELA MD</p> <p>NIHTA Summary: ON 10/1/09, THE CONTACT OPENED A 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY SOLARA. THE FLOOR MATS WERE SHIFTING UNDER THE ACCELERATION PEDAL. THE MATS WERE ENGAGED WITH THE BRAKE AND A REVERSELY ANOTHER TO REMOVE THE FLOOR MATS. FLOOR MATS. THE VEHICLE WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THE TOYOTA FLOOR MAT RECALL. THE FLOOR MATS WERE 175 LBS.</p> <p>Additional Summary:</p>
<p>Toyota ID No: 1029104 NIHTA ODR No: 1029104 Date of Incident: 20091001 Vehicle: 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY Location of Incident: WOODBRIDGE VA</p> <p>NIHTA Summary: WHILE DRIVING MY 2007 TOYOTA MATRIX WITH 64,000 MILES, I WAS PULLING INTO A PARKING SPACE. CAR WAS NOT EVEN 100 FT. MILE AN HOUR. HAD TAKEN MY FOOT OFF OF THE GAS PEDAL, DID NOT EVEN HAVE A CHANCE TO PUT MY FOOT ON THE BRAKE, WHEN THE CAR REVERSEDLY ACCELERATED, MADE A NOISE, JERKED THE CURB AND CRASHED INTO A BUILDING. THE CAR HAD 100 WORTH IN DAMAGE. LEAVING A CRACK IN THE BRICK WALL OF THE BUILDING (CAUSING STRUCTURAL DAMAGE). THE DRIVER, CONTINUING ACCELERATION HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THE FLOOR MAT. NOTHING HAD BEEN DONE TO CORRECT THE FAILURE AS TOYOTA WOULD NOT ADDRESS THE ISSUE. AT ALL, SAYING THAT THE MATRIX WAS NOT PART OF THE RECALL. TOYOTA HAS NOT ACCOMMODATED ME AT ALL WITH THIS INCIDENT. I AM TERRIFIED WHEN I DRIVE NOW THAT IT WILL HAPPEN AGAIN. NOT TO MENTION THE POWER OF THE CAR BECAUSE OF THE INCIDENT. DUE TO THIS I AM LOOKING FOR ANOTHER VEHICLE. *TR</p> <p>Additional Summary:</p>	<p>Toyota ID No: 1029104 NIHTA ODR No: 1029104 Date of Incident: 20091001 Vehicle: 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY Location of Incident: WOODBRIDGE VA</p> <p>NIHTA Summary: WHILE DRIVING MY 2007 TOYOTA MATRIX WITH 64,000 MILES, I WAS PULLING INTO A PARKING SPACE. CAR WAS NOT EVEN 100 FT. MILE AN HOUR. HAD TAKEN MY FOOT OFF OF THE GAS PEDAL, DID NOT EVEN HAVE A CHANCE TO PUT MY FOOT ON THE BRAKE, WHEN THE CAR REVERSEDLY ACCELERATED, MADE A NOISE, JERKED THE CURB AND CRASHED INTO A BUILDING. THE CAR HAD 100 WORTH IN DAMAGE. LEAVING A CRACK IN THE BRICK WALL OF THE BUILDING (CAUSING STRUCTURAL DAMAGE). THE DRIVER, CONTINUING ACCELERATION HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THE FLOOR MAT. NOTHING HAD BEEN DONE TO CORRECT THE FAILURE AS TOYOTA WOULD NOT ADDRESS THE ISSUE. AT ALL, SAYING THAT THE MATRIX WAS NOT PART OF THE RECALL. TOYOTA HAS NOT ACCOMMODATED ME AT ALL WITH THIS INCIDENT. I AM TERRIFIED WHEN I DRIVE NOW THAT IT WILL HAPPEN AGAIN. NOT TO MENTION THE POWER OF THE CAR BECAUSE OF THE INCIDENT. DUE TO THIS I AM LOOKING FOR ANOTHER VEHICLE. *TR</p> <p>Additional Summary:</p>
<p>Toyota ID No: 1029105 NIHTA ODR No: 1029105 Date of Incident: 20091001 Vehicle: 2007 TOYOTA PRIUS Location of Incident: 0702003 MELA MD</p> <p>NIHTA Summary: ON OCTOBER 1, 2009, I WAS DRIVING OVER A POTHOLE THAT WAS ABOUT 4 INCHES DEEP AND CROSSED THE ENTIRE WIDTH OF THE LANE. THERE WAS NO OTHER VEHICLE BEHIND ME. THE BACK WHEEL HIT THE POTHOLE ON THE TOP OF THE POTHOLE. MY CAR SUDDENLY ACCELERATED AND I HAD A VERY EVIDENTLY THAT IT WASN'T A HOLE. I HAD TO GO BACK INTO THE CAR IN FRONT OF ME. I WAS NOT ABLE TO. IT WASN'T HAPPENED SINCE - THE POTHOLE WAS APPARENTLY THE RESULT OF WORK ON THE ROAD. BUT WAS INQUIRY, LIKE THE PAVEMENT HAD BE RECONSTRUCTED ONLY. *TR</p> <p>Additional Summary:</p>	<p>Toyota ID No: 1029105 NIHTA ODR No: 1029105 Date of Incident: 20091001 Vehicle: 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY Location of Incident: 0702003 MELA MD</p> <p>NIHTA Summary: ON OCTOBER 1, 2009, I WAS DRIVING OVER A POTHOLE THAT WAS ABOUT 4 INCHES DEEP AND CROSSED THE ENTIRE WIDTH OF THE LANE. THERE WAS NO OTHER VEHICLE BEHIND ME. THE BACK WHEEL HIT THE POTHOLE ON THE TOP OF THE POTHOLE. MY CAR SUDDENLY ACCELERATED AND I HAD A VERY EVIDENTLY THAT IT WASN'T A HOLE. I HAD TO GO BACK INTO THE CAR IN FRONT OF ME. I WAS NOT ABLE TO. IT WASN'T HAPPENED SINCE - THE POTHOLE WAS APPARENTLY THE RESULT OF WORK ON THE ROAD. BUT WAS INQUIRY, LIKE THE PAVEMENT HAD BE RECONSTRUCTED ONLY. *TR</p> <p>Additional Summary:</p>
<p>Toyota ID No: 1029106 NIHTA ODR No: 1029106 Date of Incident: 20091001 Vehicle: 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY Location of Incident: OAKDALE, CA</p> <p>NIHTA Summary: ON OCTOBER 1, 2009, I WAS DRIVING OVER A POTHOLE THAT WAS ABOUT 4 INCHES DEEP AND CROSSED THE ENTIRE WIDTH OF THE LANE. THERE WAS NO OTHER VEHICLE BEHIND ME. THE BACK WHEEL HIT THE POTHOLE ON THE TOP OF THE POTHOLE. MY CAR SUDDENLY ACCELERATED AND I HAD A VERY EVIDENTLY THAT IT WASN'T A HOLE. I HAD TO GO BACK INTO THE CAR IN FRONT OF ME. I WAS NOT ABLE TO. IT WASN'T HAPPENED SINCE - THE POTHOLE WAS APPARENTLY THE RESULT OF WORK ON THE ROAD. BUT WAS INQUIRY, LIKE THE PAVEMENT HAD BE RECONSTRUCTED ONLY. *TR</p> <p>Additional Summary:</p>	<p>Toyota ID No: 1029106 NIHTA ODR No: 1029106 Date of Incident: 20091001 Vehicle: 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY Location of Incident: OAKDALE, CA</p> <p>NIHTA Summary: ON OCTOBER 1, 2009, I WAS DRIVING OVER A POTHOLE THAT WAS ABOUT 4 INCHES DEEP AND CROSSED THE ENTIRE WIDTH OF THE LANE. THERE WAS NO OTHER VEHICLE BEHIND ME. THE BACK WHEEL HIT THE POTHOLE ON THE TOP OF THE POTHOLE. MY CAR SUDDENLY ACCELERATED AND I HAD A VERY EVIDENTLY THAT IT WASN'T A HOLE. I HAD TO GO BACK INTO THE CAR IN FRONT OF ME. I WAS NOT ABLE TO. IT WASN'T HAPPENED SINCE - THE POTHOLE WAS APPARENTLY THE RESULT OF WORK ON THE ROAD. BUT WAS INQUIRY, LIKE THE PAVEMENT HAD BE RECONSTRUCTED ONLY. *TR</p> <p>Additional Summary:</p>
<p>Toyota ID No: 1029107 NIHTA ODR No: 1029107 Date of Incident: 20091001 Vehicle: 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY Location of Incident: 0702003 MELA MD</p> <p>NIHTA Summary: ON OCTOBER 1, 2009, I WAS DRIVING OVER A POTHOLE THAT WAS ABOUT 4 INCHES DEEP AND CROSSED THE ENTIRE WIDTH OF THE LANE. THERE WAS NO OTHER VEHICLE BEHIND ME. THE BACK WHEEL HIT THE POTHOLE ON THE TOP OF THE POTHOLE. MY CAR SUDDENLY ACCELERATED AND I HAD A VERY EVIDENTLY THAT IT WASN'T A HOLE. I HAD TO GO BACK INTO THE CAR IN FRONT OF ME. I WAS NOT ABLE TO. IT WASN'T HAPPENED SINCE - THE POTHOLE WAS APPARENTLY THE RESULT OF WORK ON THE ROAD. BUT WAS INQUIRY, LIKE THE PAVEMENT HAD BE RECONSTRUCTED ONLY. *TR</p> <p>Additional Summary:</p>	<p>Toyota ID No: 1029107 NIHTA ODR No: 1029107 Date of Incident: 20091001 Vehicle: 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY Location of Incident: 0702003 MELA MD</p> <p>NIHTA Summary: ON OCTOBER 1, 2009, I WAS DRIVING OVER A POTHOLE THAT WAS ABOUT 4 INCHES DEEP AND CROSSED THE ENTIRE WIDTH OF THE LANE. THERE WAS NO OTHER VEHICLE BEHIND ME. THE BACK WHEEL HIT THE POTHOLE ON THE TOP OF THE POTHOLE. MY CAR SUDDENLY ACCELERATED AND I HAD A VERY EVIDENTLY THAT IT WASN'T A HOLE. I HAD TO GO BACK INTO THE CAR IN FRONT OF ME. I WAS NOT ABLE TO. IT WASN'T HAPPENED SINCE - THE POTHOLE WAS APPARENTLY THE RESULT OF WORK ON THE ROAD. BUT WAS INQUIRY, LIKE THE PAVEMENT HAD BE RECONSTRUCTED ONLY. *TR</p> <p>Additional Summary:</p>

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

BACK INTO GEAR (MAYBE A TRANSMISSION) AND THE CRASH WAS OVER. ABOUT AN HOUR LATER, WHILE ON THE GRAPEVINE PORTION OF HWY 1, AFTER THE SUMMIT, IT DID THE SAME THING WITH LESSER FREQUENCY. I PUT IT INTO NEUTRAL THIS TIME, HIT THE BRAKE, SLOWED A LITTLE, PUT IT BACK INTO GEAR AND SENCE THIS WAS NOT OCCURRING, I ADJUSTED PARAGRAPH ONE OF THE PAST 13 PAGES, THEY HAVE BEEN A LITTLE MORE AGGRESSIVE SINCE THE CRASH. I DON'T KNOW IF THE CRASH HAD ANY EFFECT ON THE ACCIDENT, OR CAUSING THE CRASH. WHEN IN NEUTRAL IN THE DRIVEWAY OR A STOPLIGHT IT DOES; BECAUSE THE PEDALS ARE SMALL AND VERY CLOSE TO ONE ANOTHER, AND, 2) OCCASION WHEN THE ACCELERATOR HAS GOT STUCK UNDER THE FLOOR MAT WHEN THE FLOOR MAT WAS IN PLACE AND CAUSING THE TIRE TO ACCELERATE. REGARDING THE HIGHWAY

Toyota D No  
 NHTSA DOD No: 10293879  
 Date of Incident: 20091125  
 Vehicle: 2004 TOYOTA RUNNER  
 Location of Incident: MANNINGTON, WY  
 NHTSA Summary:  
 TL: \* THE CONTACT OWNS A 2004 TOYOTA RUNNER. WHILE DRIVING 35 MPH, THE VEHICLE  
 ACCELERATED UP TO 100 MPH WITHOUT INTENTION. AFTER REPEATED BRACE  
 MANEUVERS, HE WAS ABLE TO PULL OVER. THE VEHICLE WAS TAKEN TO THE DEALER  
 BUT THEY COULD NOT REPLICATE THE FAILURE. THE TOYOTA MANUFACTURER WAS  
 NOTIFIED, AND HE WAS ADVISED THAT A REMEDY WOULD NOT BE AVAILABLE UNTIL  
 APRIL 2010. THE FAILURE MILEAGE WAS 7,500.

Toyota ID No: 10294229  
 MFRSA ID# No: 20851125  
 Date of Incident: 20851125  
 Vehicle: 2006 TOYOTA CAMRY  
 Location of Incident: HINGHAM, MA  
 T-1: MFRSA Summary:  
 "THE CONTACT OWNED A 2006 TOYOTA CAMRY. AS THE CONTACT WAS DRIVING IN  
 REVERSE OFF 0670S THE DRIVEWAY, THE VEHICLE SUDDENLY ACCELERATED WITHOUT  
 THE DRIVER'S KNOWLEDGE OR CRASHED INTO A TREE. THE VEHICLE WAS NOT DAMAGED BY THE  
 DEALER AND THERE WERE NO OTHER WITNESSES. THE CURRENT AND FAILURE MILEAGE  
 WERE 34,000.  
 A Additional Summary:

Report ID No: 10292915  
 NHSTA OIR No: 20091127  
 Date of Incident: 20091127  
 Vehicle: 2002 TOYOTA CAMRY  
 Location of Incident: APPLETON, WI  
 NHSTA Summary:  
 TL: THE CONTACT OWNED A 2002 TOYOTA CAMRY. IMMEDIATELY AFTER STARTING THE VEHICLE, THE RPM'S INCREASED TO 3,000. THE ENGINE WAS SHUT OFF AND TOWED TO AN AUTOMOTIVE REPAIR FOR INSPECTION. THE TECHNICIAN STATED THAT THE FAILURE WAS CONTRIBUTED TO THE ACCELERATOR PEDAL WARNING SENSOR. THE VEHICLE IS IN THE PROCESS OF BEING REPAIRED. THE CONTACT HAD CONCERNS OF THE SAFETY RISK.

Safety Research & Strategies 34  
Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A

YEAR BEFORE I AMUSE MYSELF TO PURCHASE ANOTHER TRUCK. I ALWAYS TRUSTED TOYOTA BUT NO MORE. \*FR

Tazeta ID No:   
 NHSTA CUI No: 10290250   
 Date of Incident: 10/29/10   
 Vehicle: 2008 TOYOTA CAMRY   
 Location of Incident: FORT ORANGE, FL   
 NHSTA Summary:   
 I JUST LEFT A CAR WASH AND WENT TO PULL INTO THE AREA WHERE YOU CAN VACUUM   
 YOUR CAR. THE CAR SUDDENLY ACCELERATED ON ITS OWN AND STRUCK A WALL.   
 NOTHING HAS BEEN DONE YET SINCE THE INCIDENT JUST OCCURRED TODAY. \*TR   
 Additional Summary:

Toyota ID No:	
NHTSA OBI No:	
Date of Incident:	20091206
Vehicle:	2002 TOYOTA CAMRY
Location of Incident:	WORCESTER, MA

[illegible]

Report ID No:	
NHTSA ODI No:	
Date of Incident:	2009/1206
Vehicle:	2005 LEXUS IS 350
Location of Incident:	BRUNSVILLE, FL
NHTSA Summary:	

SEA - VEHICLE STRUCK BRICK WALL AND FLIPPED. MERGING ONTO HIGHWAY. VEHICLE  
SUDDENLY CROSSED BOTH LANES AND STRUCK CONCRETE BARRIER IN MEDIAN.  
UNSURE IF ACCELERATOR STUCK BUT IT'S THE ONLY THING SHE CAN THINK COULD  
HAVE HAPPENED.

Teysse ID No:	10295954
NHTSA ODI No:	2000-1-166

Safety Research & Strategies 34  
Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A

INVOLVED. THE VIN WAS UNAVAILABLE. THE FAILURE AND CURRENT MILEAGES WERE 112,000.

**Additional Summary:**

Toyota ID No:	
NHTSA ODI No:	10254006
Date of Incident:	20091127
Vehicle:	2004 TOYOTA SIENNA
Location of Incident:	POSSIBLE IN
NHTSA Summary:	

SHYNA COMPLAINT:  
TOYOTA SIENNA LE 2004 SUDDENLY ACCELERATED WHILE BRAKE PEDAL WAS PRESSED ON A PARKING CAR CRASHED INTO THE WALL BECAUSE IT WAS ONLY A FEW FEET IN FRONT OF THE VEHICLE. "TR  
WIFE WAS GOING TO PARK  
WAS CRASHED INTO  
WAS DAMAGED TO RIGHT  
TOYOTA SIENNA LE 2004 SUDDENLY ACCELERATED WHILE BRAKE PEDAL WAS PRESSED ON A PARKING CAR CRASHED INTO THE WALL BECAUSE IT WAS ONLY A FEW FEET IN FRONT OF THE VEHICLE.

Toyota ID No:	
NHTSA ODI No:	10291008
Date of Incident:	20091127
Vehicle:	2006 TOYOTA TUNDRA
Location of Incident:	WYOMING, OTTUMWA, IA

[illegible]Safety Research & Strategies 246  
Tanya Shellen: Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A

Vehicle:	2002 TOYOTA GENUA
Location of Incident:	BIRMINGHAM, AL

**NTSA Summary:**  
TOYOTA MIENNA VAN APPEARED TO HAVE SUDDEN ACCELERATION PROBLEM WHEN STOPPED AT STOP SIGN. ENGINE REVVED UP AS ACCELERATOR WAS ABOUT TO BE APPLIED, SO I HAD TO APPLY BRAKES AS CAR WAS MAKING SUDDEN MOVEMENTS. QUICKLY PUT CAR INTO NEUTRAL POSITION. \*TR

Toyota ID No:	
NHTSA ODI No:	10046729
Date of Incident:	20091209
Vehicle:	2001 TOYOTA CAMRY
Location of Incident:	PORTLAND, OR

NH F&A Summary:  
 TL\* THE CONTACT OWNS A 2001 TOYOTA CAMRY, WHILE IN A DRIVE-THRU  
 ESTABLISHMENT HE APPLIED PRESSURE TO THE BRAKE PEDAL, AND THEN THE VEHICLE  
 ACCELERATED WITHOUT INTENTION. AS A CONSEQUENCE, HE CRASHED INTO A BRICK  
 WALL. HE WAS MODERATELY INJURED. THE FIRE DEPARTMENT AND POLICE WERE  
 CALLED TO THE SCENE. THE VEHICLE WAS COMPLETELY DESTROYED. THE VEHICLE  
 WAS TOWED TO A COLLISION CENTER. THE FAMILIAR AND CURRENT MILEAGE WERE  
 62,000

Toyota ID No:	
NHTSA ODI No:	10235478
Date of Incident:	20091219
Vehicle:	2010 TOYOTA PRIUS
Location of Incident:	ASTORIA, NV

NYTSA Summary: "On 12/15/2010, when the car hits a bump in the road it will accelerate so fast by itself which can be very dangerous and fatal. It can render a cause an accident if the driver cannot step on the brakes in time to stop the car acceleration. I went to my local Toyota dealer here in Queens New York and they told me that they have a recall on the car because of that complaint and did not pursue the matter at all. Another safety concern is that it's a small vehicle and the whole tire was damaged on my brand new 2010 prius which I have been driving for barely two months. I am very concerned about these safety problems and do not really know where to start getting assistance. Thank you very much." (R)

Toyota ID No:	
NHTSA GDI No:	1029951
Date of Incident:	20091211
Vehicle:	2009 TOYOTA COROLLA
Location of Incident:	PHILADELPHIA, PA
NHTSA Summary:	

31. THE (COMPLAINT) DURING A 2009 TO 2010 COMPLAINT, WHICH DEPARTMENTS WERE 2010 IN  
MPS, THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED INTO ONCOMING TRAFFIC WHEN HE ATTEMPTED TO  
STOP AT A TRAFFIC LIGHT. THE FAILURE OCCURRED ON DECEMBER 9, 2009 WHEN HE  
ENGAGED THE BRAKE PEDAL. THE FAILURE REOCCURRED SIX TIMES CONTINUOUSLY TWO

Safety Research & Strategies 349  
Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A

DAYS LATER ON DECEMBER 11, 2009 THE CONTACT WAS ABLE AVOID A CRASH. HOWEVER, HE IS CONCERNED ABOUT THE SAFETY RISK. THE FAILURE MILEAGE WAS 12060 AND THE CURRENT MILEAGE WAS 12060.

**Additional Inquiry:**

Keynote ID No: NHTSA 0021 No  
Date of Incident: 20091112  
Vehicle: 2009 TOYOTA COROLLA  
Location of Incident: MICHIGAN, PHA, A  
NHTSA Summary:  
PROSECUTION LIABILITY - TOYOTA ACCELERATION - He has a Toyota Corolla. The first time he experienced a problem was in October. He came to a stop sign and instead of slowing down, it accelerated. He called 911. He called the Toyota Dealership and on 12/11/2009 they inspected it. One dealer, he was driving in normal traffic, and the car accelerated again. He almost went into oncoming traffic. The car started to stall. Driveway and he is scared to drive it again.  
DIAGNOSTIC DONE BY COROLLA TOYOTA IS CONSIDERABLE, HAS TEST, NO TEST REVEAL. ADVICE: NO PROBLEM, MR. MOORE HAS RECEIPT FOR THIS. PAST.

Toyota ID No:   
 NHTSA ODI No: 10295617   
 Date of Incident: 20091212   
 Vehicle: 2004 LEXUS RX330   
 Location of Incident: NASHUA, ID   
 NHTSA Summary:   
 NO FAILURE, JUST APPARENT STIFFNESS IN ACCELERATOR. OCCASIONALLY, WHILE   
 PELLING OUT FROM SIGNALS, PEDAL FEELS AS IF IT IS STICKING, THEN WILL POP LOO   
 AND CAR LURCHES FORWARD. \*TR   
 Additional Summary:

[illegible]

Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A

me to take the vehicle back, saying they can find nothing wrong. A specialist is supposed to be looking today, but I am confident he will say there is nothing wrong either. The drummer does not qualify for the lowest tax, and I am stuck with a vehicle I won't drive and won't sell to someone else. Do you have an idea on how I can get Toyota to buy the vehicle back? They have said they cannot fix anything.

Toyota ID No: 16764312  
NADA Old No: 20091212  
Date of Incident:  
Vehicle: 2001 TOYOTA HARRIER  
Location of Incident: CHEVIE COEDR, IL  
SWUSA Summary:  
TL: A CONTACT OCCURRED ON 2001 TOYOTA HARRIER, WHILE DRIVING 35 MPH SE. HE  
ATTEMPTED TO BRAKE, BUT THE VEHICLE SUDDENLY ACCELERATED WEST AND BORN  
AND LANDED DOWN A RAMP. THE DRIVER FORTH AIR RAGGED NOT DEPLOYED. SHE  
DID NOT KNOCK ANY BODYPARTS AFTER CARPIL 12-AMMATION HE EXPLODED THAT  
ACCELERATOR PEDAL WAS TRAPPED BY THE FLOOR MAT. SHE RECEIVED POLICE REP  
NUMBER 97547. SHE RECEIVED A THOCT FOR FAILURE TO REDUCE SPEED. THE VEHIC  
AND DRIVER WERE RELEASED. THE DRIVER WAS NOT INJURED. THE VEHICLE WAS  
TOWED TO THE POLICE STATION. THE VEHICLE WAS NOT INSURED. THE VEHICLE WAS  
NOT RECOVERED. THE VEHICLE WAS NOT RECOVERED. THE VEHICLE WAS NOT RECOVERED.

Toyota ID No: 10296314  
 NHISA ID No: 20001211  
 Date of Incident: 2/10/01  
 Vehicle: 2000 TOYOTA COROLLA  
 Location of Incident: PHILADELPHIA, PA  
 NHISA Summary:  
 The contact owned a 2000 Toyota Corolla. While driving 25 mph the vehicle accelerated without warning. The vehicle did not crash but the contact was very concerned about this possibility that a crash could have occurred. The dealer diagnosed the failure and confirmed that it was not related to the vehicle speed control. The contact stated that this is a first time occurrence. The contact was concerned on more than one occasion the contact also has concerns that he could sustain minor injuries if a crash occurred. The failure mileage was 12,000.

Teyana 10 No: 10205193  
 NUTRA GRI NO: 20091214  
 Date of Incident: 2009/03/24  
 Location of Incident: KJ GENIE, OR  
 NUTRA Summary:  
 TO TAYANA 0001: I WAS PULLING INTO A PARKING SPACE IN A PARKING GARAGE. BELIEVE I HAD PUT THE CAR IN REVERSE TO BACK UP TO STRAIGHTENED THE CAR AND PUT MY FOOT ON THE BRAKE. THE CAR RITONELY SHOT FORWARD FULL FORCE AND WAS STOPPED BY A CONCRETE AND WIRE RETAINING WALL. THE ENGINE DIED AT IMPACT. THE CAR WAS NOT DRIVABLE AND WAS TOWED. I WENT STOPPED. I WENT TO THE BUILDING AND AFTER A SHORTER TIME FELT CHEST PAIN AND SHORTNESS OF BREATH. I WENT TO THE EMERGENCY ROOM AND WAS TREATED AND RELEASED. I RECEIVED TWO INTRAVENOUS INJECTIONS OF CRACKED BIRAN. MY PAIN CONTINUES AND I HAVE LOST A LARGE BRISTLE FROM THE SEAT BELT. I WAS GIVEN XCODEN FOR PAIN. THE CAR WAS

Safety Research & Strategies  
Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix A

TOWED TO A TOYOTA DEALERSHIP BUT THE DAMAGE HAS NOT BEEN ESTIMATED YET. AM AWARE THAT THE PROBLEM OF UNCONTROLLED ACCELERATION IN TOYOTA SIENNAS HAS BEEN REPORTED TO BOTH THIS AGENCY AND TOYOTA BEFORE (NHTSA REPORT #40245-2003). THIS HAS NOT BEEN ADDRESSED OR THE VEHICLE RECALLS ARE YOU WAITING FOR ANOTHER TRAGEDY LIKE THE ONE PREVIOUSLY REPORTED ON BY THE MEDIA? I COULD HAVE BEEN KILLED "OK

Additional Information:

Toyota ID No: 60296972  
NHTSA ODI No: 20091125  
Date of Incident: 2009 TOYOTA HIGHLANDER  
Vehicle: 2009 TOYOTA HIGHLANDER  
Location of Incident: PORT ALEXIA, LA  
NHTSA Summary:  
TITLE: THE CONTACT OWNS A 2009 TOYOTA HIGHLANDER. WHILE ENTERING A PARKING SPACE, JUST BEFORE APPLYING THE BRAKE, THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED INTO A CONCRETE STEP. NO ONE WAS INJURED DURING THE CRASH BUT THE VEHICLE WAS DAMAGED TO THE FRONT END. HE CALLED THE MANUFACTURER AND THE "COLLECTED" ALL THE INFORMATION REGARDING THE INCIDENT. HOWEVER HIS VEHICLE WAS EXCLUDED FROM RECALL. 400900 (VEHICLE SPEED CONTROL/ACCELERATOR PEDAL) THE CURRENT AND FAILURE MODES WERE 40092.

Additional Summary:

Tegeta ID No: 50296312  
 NHSTA OPI No: 20091129  
 Date of Incident: 20091129  
 Vehicle: 2008 TOYOTA CAMRY  
 Location of Incident: LYNN, MA  
 NHSTA Summary:  
 FL THE CONTACTING ON A 2008 TOYOTA CAMRY, WHILE DRIVING APPROXIMATELY 1/4 MILE WEST OF THE VEHICLE ACCIDENTED AND CRASHED INTO A 500-4000 GRADE INTO DRIVE AND THE VEHICLE CONTINUED TO ACCELERATE AND CRASHED IN A WALL. THERE WERE NO INJURIES. THERE WAS EXTENSIVE DAMAGE TO THE FRONT AND BACK END OF THE VEHICLE. THE VEHICLE WILL BE TOWED TO A PRIVATE DEALER TO BE REPAIRED. FURTHER, THE POLICE AND FIRE DEPARTMENT WERE NOTIFIED. HOWEVER, NO POLICE REPORT WAS FILED. THE FAILURE MILITARY WAS 100.000.

Toyota ID No: 1  
NHTSA ODI No: 20081119  
Date of Incident: 2008  
Vehicle: 2006 TOYOTA CAMRY  
Location of Incident: CHICAGO, IL

NHTSA Summary:  
"LA" THE CONTACT OWNED A 2006 TOYOTA CAMRY. WHILE ATTEMPTING TO SHIFT THE VEHICLE FROM PARK TO DRIVE, THE ACCELERATOR PEDAL BECAME STUCK. SUBSEQUENTLY SHE O/DROVE INTO THE WALL OF A GARAGE. SHE WAS TAKEN TO A HOSPITAL FOR A STAINED NECK AND SHOULDER. A POLICE REPORT WAS AVAILABLE. THE INSURANCE COMPANY WILL CALL THE TOYOTA MANUFACTURER. THE VEHICLE RECEIVED MAJOR DAMAGES. THE VEHICLE WAS TOWED TO THE DEALER. THE FARM

## Safety Research & Strategies

Toyota ID No:	
NHTSA ODI No:	10291272
Date of Incident:	20091220
Vehicle:	2002 TOYOTA SEQUOIA
Location of Incident:	VAN NUYS, CA

**Troyota TD No:**  
NHTSA ODI File # 1027467  
**Date of Incident:** 10/27/2012  
**Vehicles:** 2010 TOYOTA PRIUS  
**Name of Insured:** SANTA MONICA  
**NHTSA Summary:**

I HAD A NEW TOYOTA PRIUS AND HAVE EXPERIENCED THE LOSS OF BRAKING CAPABILITY IN TWO SEPARATE SITUATIONS ABOUT 4 OTHERS NOW IT IS INCREDIBLY SCARY. I HAVE NEVER HAD THIS HAPPEN ON ANY OTHER CAR THAT EVER DRIVEN. IT HAPPENED WHEN I PUT A RUMP IN THE REAR. I NOW KNOW THAT MANY PEOPLE ARE EXPERIENCING THIS. DON'T HAVE AN ARTICLE ON NEWSMAGAZINE.COM. I NOW FEAR OTHERS ARE EXPERIENCING THE SAME PROBLEM. THERE HAS TO BE SOMETHING TO THIS. I DON'T WANT TO GO TO WORK OR SHOPPING ALONE. MY WIFE DOES NOT DRIVE. I AM A SINGLE MOTHER WITH ONE DAUGHTER AND WOULD HAVE GONE INTO THE CLIFFE AND PROBABLY WOULD HAVE PERISHED. THEY ARE ASKING FOR ACCIDENTS TO HAVEN AND SOMETHING MUST BE DONE TO MAKE THESE CARS SAFE. I CAN'T SAY HOW MANY OF THEM CAN BE FIXED BUT I DO NOT HAVE THE WIN NUMBER ON HAND. HOT WILL ADD IT TOMORROW. THEN I WAS ASKED TO SIGN THE FORM. THE CAR ACCELERATES AT THE SAME TIME THAS LEAVING CAPABILITY. \*R

Toyota 19 Year  
NHTSA CRD No: 10299466  
Date of Incident: 20091228  
Vehicle: 2002 TOYOTA CAMRY  
Location of Incident: PHILADELPHIA, PA  
NHTSA Summary:  
IN THE AFTERNOON OF 2002 TOYOTA CAMRY, THE CONTACT STATED THAT AS SHE WAS DRIVING ON I-76, SHE FELT A VIBRATION AND A NOISE. SHE STATED THAT THE VEHICLE SHOOK OVER THE CURB AND INTO A KNOW EMBANKMENT BEFORE CRAMMING INTO A RETAIN WALL. THE CONTACT DID NOT CALL THE POLICE OR NEED TO GO TO A HOSPITAL. THE CONTACT'S INSURANCE COMPANY TOWED THE VEHICLE TO A LOT WHERE IT COULD BE REPAIRED. THE CONTACT STATED THAT SHE WAS NOT INJURED. SHE FILED A COMPLAINT. THE CONTACT WAS CONCERNED SINCE A FANSGRIP COULD HAVE BEEN SECURELY BUCKLED WHEN THE CRASH OCCURRED. THE FAILURE REPAIR WAS 6,000.

Traysta ID No:	
NHTSA ODI No:	10297079
Date of Incident:	20091227
Vehicle:	2008 TOYOTA CAMRY

Safety Research &amp; Strategies



[illegible]









**Safety Research & Strategies, Inc.**  
340 Anawan Street / Suite 200  
Rehoboth, MA 02769  
Ph. 508-252-2333, Fax 508-252-3137  
[www.safetyresearch.net](http://www.safetyresearch.net)

***Appendix B: A Sampling of Incidents of Unintended Acceleration in Recalled Vehicles not Explained by Pedal and Mat Failures***

The attached appendix is comprised of a sampling consumer complaints to NHTSA of unintended acceleration incidents occurring in recalled vehicles that are characterized by failure modes that appear to be outside of the scope of the floor mat and accelerator pedal recalls. Sources for these incidents include:

- Consumer complaints to NHTSA
- Toyota-submitted claims from several NHTSA investigations into SUA
- Incidents reported by media organizations
- Consumer contacts made to Safety Research & Strategies, Inc., and other organizations who are reporting incidents that they have received.

<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> <b>Date of Incident:</b> <b>Vehicle:</b> <b>Location of Incident:</b> <b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p> <p>NOV. 12, 2004, IN REPRESENTING MY 2007 AYALON AS IN THE INTEREST OF MY CUSTOMER, I ONLY PULLED FORWARD TO RE-PARK, AND APPLIED THE BRAKES TO STOP AND THE ACCELERATOR IMMEDIATELY WENT TO HIGH RPM. I HAD TO BRACE VERY HARD TO KEEP FROM HITTING MY BROTHER-IN-LAW AND HER HOUSE. I WAS BRACING, AND THEN GOT THE LIGHTS ON DEC. 12, 2004 THE SAME DAY I WAS OCCURRED TWO BLOCKS IN A ROW IN ONE CONGESTED DOWNTOWN AREA. THE 1ST TIME, I WAS STOPPING VERY SLOWLY, THE SECOND TIME I WAS BRACING TO WAIT FOR A PARKING SPACE. THE 1ST TIME I REED CHANGING GEAR AND THEN TURNED OFF THE IGNITION. THE SECOND TIME IMMEDIATELY TURNED OFF THE IGNITION. MY WIFE WAS A WITNESS. I DROVE THIS CAR FOR THE MONTH AFTER ITS PURCHASE NEW RED A 2004. EVERY THING WAS FINE THE MONTH OF OCTOBER, AND PROVED OPENING NOV. 2004. BECAUSE THIS PROBLEM I TOLD THE LOCAL SUSPECT TOYOTA PERSONNEL, THAT I COULD NOT TRUST THIS PARTICULAR VEHICLE. IT HAS BEEN PARKED SINCE AT THE DEALERSHIP OR IN MY GARAGE ALMOST EVERY DAY SINCE DEC. 21, 2004. THE DIRECT TOYOTA PERSONNEL SAID THAT THEY DID NOT CONSIDER MY CAR TRASHY BECAUSE THEY COULD NOT FIND ANY ERROR CODES IN THE CAR SYSTEM, AND ON THE 10 MILE TEST DRIVE THEY DID, WITHOUT ME PRESENT. THIS I DID NOT EXPERIENCE MY PROBLEM, THEY DID IMMEDIATELY BY STOPPING IN THE BRAKE AND ACCELERATOR AT THE SAME TIME. I WAS ON THE BUS STOP, ALTHOUGH THE SECOND TIME IT HAPPENED ON OCTOBER, 2004 MY FOOT WAS NOT ON THE ACCELERATOR. I WAS BRACING ALL THREE TIMES - ON THE 1ST STOPPING ONLY MY WOULD HAVE BEEN IN THE HIGH RPM RANGE, AND CAR ACCELERATING. I RESENT THE INFORMATION THAT I WAS BRACING WITH BRAKE ALL THREE TIMES, NO EXPLANATION WHY I HAD NOT EXPERIENCED THIS PROBLEM IN THE BRAKE. THEREFORE, I REAGREE WITH THE INFORMATION THE PERSON FIRST ASKED TOYOTA CLOSED MY PROBLEM REPORT AS SOLVED EVEN THOUGH THE LOCAL SERVICE MANAGER YOU'D HEED NOT CONSIDER IT SOLVED. WHY? YES.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	<p><b>Location of Incident:</b> <b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p> <p>PHILADELPHIA, PA.</p> <p>SUSPECT ACCELERATION OF MY 2007 TACOMA, MORE THAN ONCE WHEN I CAME TO A STOP. THE TRUCK WOULD SUDDELYLY ACCELERATE, IT HAPPENED AT A STOP JUST BEFORE MY CUSTOMER'S A 2004 BUICK WAS GOING THROUGH THE INTERSECTION. WHEN I GOT OUT OF MY TRUCK AT A PUBLIC STORAGE GATE A MINUTE LATER AND GOT BACK IN AND WAITED FOR THE GATE TO OPEN I NOTICED I HAD A CONGESTED ACCELERATION OF MY 2007 TOYOTA TACOMA, WHEN I HIT THE BREAK IT WENT FAST, I HAD TO PUT MY HAND TO STOP THE CAR WHEN I WAS STOPPING. THE GATE WAS TOTALLED FROM MY TRUCK. I WAS NOT EVER DRIVING AND IT WOK ON ITS OWN. I HAD TOYOTA SUSPECT THAT THEY COULD NOT FIND ANYTHING WRONG. I HAVE NOT HAD ANY ACCIDENTS FOR 20 YEARS, NOW MY INSURANCE RATES ARE HIGH PLEASE INTERESTED THIS, IT IS NOT A WORKING PEOPLE PROBLEM. IT ALSO HAPPENED ONCE BEFORE AND I HAD LESS THAN 100 MILES ON THE TACOMA, BUT THE ROAD WAS NOT SO I WAS NOT ASKED IF IT WAS THE ROAD, IT WAS LIKE THEN A YEAR OR WHEN IT HAPPENED AGAIN, AND I WAS GONE TO TAKE IT TO THE DEALER. AFTER I ALMOST HIT THE SCHOOL BUS, BUT FIRST I GOT THE CHANCE I HAD TO STOP AT THE STOPPAGE PLACE AND THAT WAS WHEN I RAN INTO THE GATE. I HAD A VOLUNTARY REPAIR AND GATE DAMAGE, I WOULD NOT DRIVE IT ANY MORE SAFE AGAIN. YES.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> <b>Date of Incident:</b> <b>Vehicle:</b> <b>Location of Incident:</b> <b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p> <p>10124401 20061022 2007 TOYOTA PRIUS SALT LAKE CITY, UT</p> <p>CAR ACCELERATED WITHOUT PRESSING ON THE GAS PEDAL. HAD TO APPLY THE BRAKE SO HARD THAT THEY WERE LEFT HOPING TO STOP THE CAR. TURNED IT TO MAKE SELLER TOYOTA, THEY ALSO TOLD ME TO CLAIM THE GAS PEDAL AND BRAKE WERE APPLIED AT THE SAME TIME, IMPLYING THAT THE PROBLEM WAS BEING CAUSED BY ME. I HAVE BEEN DRIVING FOR 20 YEARS PLUS, SO THIS IS A CONCERN. THE DEALER THAT WE WERE GOING TO THE ACCELERATOR FOR BEING AND IF I UNDERSTAND THE COMPANY'S REPORTER THAT THE PRESSURE WAS APPLIED TO THE PEDAL, BUT THE COMPUTER DID NOT RECORD IT. WE ALSO EXPERIENCED THIS OCCURRING ON AT LEAST TWO OTHER OCCASIONS. YES.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> <b>Date of Incident:</b> <b>Vehicle:</b> <b>Location of Incident:</b> <b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p> <p>10124401 20061022 2007 TOYOTA PRIUS SALT LAKE CITY, UT</p> <p>CAR ACCELERATED WITHOUT PRESSING ON THE GAS PEDAL. HAD TO APPLY THE BRAKE SO HARD THAT THEY WERE LEFT HOPING TO STOP THE CAR. TURNED IT TO MAKE SELLER TOYOTA, THEY ALSO TOLD ME TO CLAIM THE GAS PEDAL AND BRAKE WERE APPLIED AT THE SAME TIME, IMPLYING THAT THE PROBLEM WAS BEING CAUSED BY ME. I HAVE BEEN DRIVING FOR 20 YEARS PLUS, SO THIS IS A CONCERN. THE DEALER THAT WE WERE GOING TO THE ACCELERATOR FOR BEING AND IF I UNDERSTAND THE COMPANY'S REPORTER THAT THE PRESSURE WAS APPLIED TO THE PEDAL, BUT THE COMPUTER DID NOT RECORD IT. WE ALSO EXPERIENCED THIS OCCURRING ON AT LEAST TWO OTHER OCCASIONS. YES.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> <b>Date of Incident:</b> <b>Vehicle:</b> <b>Location of Incident:</b> <b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p> <p>10224580 20070104 2007 TOYOTA PRIUS BAKER, WISCONSIN</p> <p>ON THE CONTACT OPENS A 2007 TOYOTA PRIUS, WHILE DRIVING APPROXIMATELY 70 MPH WITH THE OVER DRIVE SYSTEM ACTIVATED, THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED WITHOUT WARNING BEING BRAKE PEDAL ENGAGED. IMMEDIATELY, THE OVERDRIVE CONTROL SWITCH WAS DEACTIVATED AND THE VEHICLE SLOWED DOWN. THE CONTACT WAS ABLE TO RESUME NORMAL OPERATION. THE FAILURE RETURNED ANYWAY NOT BEEN REPAIRED. THE CONTACT HAD CONCERN OF THE SAFETY RISK INVOLVED. THIS VIN WAS UNAVAILABLE. THE FAILURE AND CURRENT MILEAGE WERE UNKNOWN.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> <b>Date of Incident:</b> <b>Vehicle:</b> <b>Location of Incident:</b> <b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p> <p>10243016 20080421 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY PHOENIX, AZ</p> <p>IN FEBRUARY 2008, I PURCHASED A NEW TOYOTA HIGHLANDER. ON TWO SEPARATE OCCASIONS SINCE PURCHASING THE VEHICLE, WHEN GOING YIELDING INTO A PARKING SPACE THE VEHICLE UNEXPECTEDLY ACCELERATED. ON THE FIRST OCCASION (APRIL 2008), THE INCIDENT ENDED IN AN ACCIDENT AS THE VEHICLE LANDED INTO A WALL. THE SECOND INCIDENT OCCURRED APPROXIMATELY A MONTH LATER AND NEARLY CAUSED ANOTHER ACCIDENT. AGAIN, AS I WAS YIELDING INTO A PARKING SPACE THE VEHICLE UNEXPECTEDLY ACCELERATED. HOWEVER, THE VEHICLE WAS STOPPED BY A PARKING LOTTER BEFORE HITTING A WALL. I HAVE ALSO THE VEHICLE REPORTED BY THE LOCAL DEALER-DEP AND THEY CLAIM THAT THEY CANNOT FIND ANY ISSUES WITH</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> <b>Date of Incident:</b> <b>Vehicle:</b> <b>Location of Incident:</b> <b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p> <p>10261884 20080503 2007 TOYOTA TACOMA</p> <p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b> <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix B</i></p>	<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> <b>Date of Incident:</b> <b>Vehicle:</b> <b>Location of Incident:</b> <b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p> <p>10261884 20080503 2007 TOYOTA TACOMA</p> <p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b> <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix B</i></p>
<p>VEHICLE. BASED ON MY RESEARCH THIS DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE AN ISOLATED PROBLEM AS OTHER TOYOTA VEHICLES ARE NOTED AS HAVING THE SAME ISSUE. I FEEL THAT THE VEHICLE IS A RISK NOT ONLY TO THE HAPPY OF MY FAMILY, BUT TO OTHERS ON THE ROAD. UPDATED 08/08/08. YES.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	<p><b>Vehicle:</b> <b>Location of Incident:</b> <b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p> <p>2007 TOYOTA AYALON BANNING, CA</p> <p>GOING VERY SLOWLY AND BRACING INTO A CURB IN A PARKING LOT. I STOPPED ON THE BRAKE, AND INSIDE THE CAR ACCELERATED AND STOPPED ONLY WHEN IT HIT A CURB OF A LARGE BUSH. IT LEFT A DENT IN MY FRONT BUMPER. THIS HAS HAPPENED ONLY ONE TIME. YES.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> <b>Date of Incident:</b> <b>Vehicle:</b> <b>Location of Incident:</b> <b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p> <p>10265917 20081110 2006 TOYOTA TACOMA WEAVER, TEXAS</p> <p>ON THE CONTACT OPENS A 2006 TOYOTA TACOMA, WHILE ATTEMPTING TO PARK WITH THE BRAKE PEDAL DEPRESSSED, THE VEHICLE BEGINS TO CRASH FORWARD INTO A BUILDING. THE AIR BAGS FAILED TO DEPLOY. THE CONTACT AND PASSENGER WERE UNINJURED AND BOTH WERE WEARING THEIR SEATBELTS. THE FRONT WHEEL AND GEAR WERE DAMAGED INTO THE VEHICLE. A POLICE REPORT WAS FILED. THE CONTACT WAS ABLE TO DRIVE AWAY FROM THE SCENE. THE SPEED WAS UNKNOWN. THE FAILURE MILEAGE WAS 11,111.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> <b>Date of Incident:</b> <b>Vehicle:</b> <b>Location of Incident:</b> <b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p> <p>10296442 20090719 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY MONTICELLO, NY</p> <p>ON THE CONTACT OPENS A 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY, SHE STATED THAT WHILE DRIVING 15 MPH AND MAKING A LEFT TURN, THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED AND CRASHED INTO A CURB OVER AN EXHANGMENT. THE CONTACT HAD LOST MAPS INSIDE AND A BROKEN ANGLE. THE VEHICLE WAS TOWED. THE VEHICLE WAS REPAIRED. THE DEALER WHERE THE CONTACT PURCHASED THE VEHICLE WAS NOTIFIED AND THE POLICE THAT THEY WOULD REPORT IT TO TOYOTA. THE VEHICLE HAS NOT TOWED. THE VEHICLE SINCE THE CLAIM OCCURRED. THE FAILURE AND CURRENT MILEAGE WERE 4075.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> <b>Date of Incident:</b> <b>Vehicle:</b> <b>Location of Incident:</b> <b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p> <p>10273326 20090101 2006 TOYOTA TACOMA SALAM, VA</p> <p>WHILE ATTEMPTING TO STOP AT THE END OF A PARKING LOT, THE ENGINE ACCELERATED. THE VEHICLE CRASHED FORWARD APPROXIMATELY, COULD NOT BE STOPPED BY BRAKING. THE VEHICLE CRASHED OVER A CURB, SHROUD, AND THROUGH A CHAIN LINK FENCE BEFORE IT WAS ABLE TO BE STOPPED. THIS IS THE SECOND TIME THIS HAS OCCURRED. THE FIRST INCIDENT DID NOT RESULT IN ANY DAMAGE. SINCE THE INCIDENT OCCURRED, THIS EVENING SO COMING TOYOTA MILEAGE WAS 20,000 MILES. YES.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> <b>Date of Incident:</b> <b>Vehicle:</b> <b>Location of Incident:</b> <b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p> <p>10278487 20090725 2007 LEXUS ES350 NORTH BAVEN, CT</p> <p>ON THE CONTACT OPENS A 2007 LEXUS ES350, THE CONTACT STATED THAT THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED WITHOUT WARNING. SHE STATED THAT THE ENGINE MADE A NOISE WHEN SHE PRESSED THE PEDAL TO START MOTION. SHE DEPRESSSED THE BRAKE PEDAL, AS ACCORD THE VEHICLE STOPPED. AND THE VEHICLE SPEED UP AND WENT TO NOT STOP. SHE DEPRESSSED THE BRAKE PEDAL, WITH ALL OF HER STRENGTH, BUT THE VEHICLE WOULD NOT STOP. IT FINALLY CAME TO A STOP WHEN IT STRUCK THE SIDE OF A BUILDING. THE CONTACT WAS INJURED AND STARTED A POLICE REPORT WAS FILED. THE SPEED WAS UNKNOWN. THE FAILURE MILEAGE WAS 10,000.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> <b>Date of Incident:</b> <b>Vehicle:</b> <b>Location of Incident:</b> <b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p> <p>10291240 20090102 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY MARTINEZ, CA</p> <p>ON THE CONTACT OPENS A 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY WHILE APPROACHING A RED TRAFFIC LIGHT THE VEHICLE SUDDENLY BEGAN TO ACCELERATE ON ITS OWN. HOWEVER, SHE WAS ABLE TO CONTROL THE VEHICLE. THE FAILURE OCCURRED ON TWO OCCASIONS. THE CURRENT AND THE FAILURE MILEAGES WERE 11,000.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> <b>Date of Incident:</b> <b>Vehicle:</b> <b>Location of Incident:</b> <b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p> <p>10297517 20090623 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY NORWALK, CT</p> <p>ON THE CONTACT OPENS A 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY, WHILE DRIVING APPROXIMATELY 5 MPH INTO A PARKING SPACE THE VEHICLE SUDDENLY ACCELERATED WITHOUT WARNING CAUSING THE VEHICLE TO CRASH INTO A BUILDING. THE CONTACT WAS NOT INJURED. A POLICE REPORT WAS FILED. THE VEHICLE WAS TAKEN TO THE DEALER, AND</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> <b>Date of Incident:</b> <b>Vehicle:</b> <b>Location of Incident:</b> <b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p> <p>10297517 20090623 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY NORWALK, CT</p> <p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b> <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix B</i></p>	<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA CRD No:</b> <b>Date of Incident:</b> <b>Vehicle:</b> <b>Location of Incident:</b> <b>NHTSA Summary:</b></p> <p>10297517 20090623 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY NORWALK, CT</p> <p><b>Safety Research &amp; Strategies</b> <i>Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Appendix B</i></p>

[illegible]

<p><b>NHTSA Summary:</b> "I WERE CONTACT OPENED A 2007 ESS10 LEXUS, WHILE DRIVING 60 MPH. ALL OF A SUDDEN THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED WITHOUT TOUCHING THE ACCELERATOR PEDAL. HE APPLIED THE BRAKES. HOWEVER, THE VEHICLE WOULD NOT STOP. HE WAS FORCED TO SHIFT GEAR AND TRY TO STOP THE VEHICLE. ALTHOUGH THE VEHICLE STOPPED THE ENGINE WAS STILL REVVING. THE CONTACT HAD TO ENGAGE THE ACCELERATOR PEDAL. A COUPLE OF TIMES AND IT WAS STILL IN PLACE. THE DEALER COULD NOT DUPLICATE THE FAILURE. WITHIN THE LAST THREE TO FOUR WEEKS THE FAILURE HAD HAPPENED TO OTHER OWNERS BECAUSE THE DEALER'S WORK. THE DEALER WILL MAKE ANOTHER ATTEMPT TO DIAGNOSE THE FAILURE AND THE MANUFACTURER WAS NOTIFIED OF THE ACCELERATION PROBLEM. THE FAILURE AND CURRENT MILEAGE WAS 6000.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA ODI No:</b> 1029102 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2009102 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> RICHMOND, PA <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> OVER 2000 TOYOTA CAMRY HYBRID HAS EXPERIENCED THREE SEPARATE INCIDENTS OF SUDDEN UNINTENDED ACCELERATION DURING THE PAST NINE MONTHS. THE CAR WAS PURCHASED IN APRIL OF 2008. THE FIRST EVENT OCCURRED IN FEBRUARY 2009. THE SECOND AND THIRD EVENTS OCCURRED IN JULY 2009 AND OCTOBER 2009, RESPECTIVELY. IN ALL THREE EVENTS THE ACCELERATOR IS GRABBED, AND BEGINS TO SPEED. UNEXPECTEDLY, DURING THE FIRST EVENT, THE CAR CONTINUED TO ACCELERATE EVEN AFTER I REMOVED MY FOOT FROM THE ACCELERATOR. DURING THE SUBSEQUENT TWO EVENTS, THE CAR ACCELERATED WITHOUT MY FOOT EVEN BEING ON THE GAS PEDAL. IN ALL INSTANCES, IT FELT AS IF THE RELEASE BUTTON OF THE CRUISE CONTROL (OFFICE WAS OFF AT ALL TIMES) WAS PUSHED. SPEED REACHED INTERLUDE OF 60 MPH IN EACH EVENT. DURING THE FIRST TWO EVENTS, A COMBINATION OF EXHAUST-PIPE/ENGINE BRASSING AND HITTING THE CAR INTO NEUTRAL, WORKED TO STOP THE CAR. THANKFULLY, WITHOUT INCIDENT. DURING THE THIRD EVENT, AFTER APPROX. FIVE TO TEN SECONDS OF ACCELERATION, A "POW" WAS HEARD, AT WHICH TIME THE CAR'S ACCELERATION CEASED AND RETURNED TO NORMAL. THE CAR WAS TAKEN TO THE DEALER AFTER EACH INCIDENT. ALL THREE TIMES DIAGNOSTICS WERE PERFORMED AND ALL THREE TIMES THE SAME ANSWER, "FOOT NOT CRUISED OR PEDAL NOT FULLY CLOSED". THE FIRST TIME IT WAS REPAIRED ON AN AFTER-MARKET FLOOR MAT. WHILE ONE WAS INSTALLED, IT WAS THE TYPE WITH "GRABBER" STRIPS ON THE UNDERBELLY TO PREVENT MOVEMENT. MADE AT 70+ MPH. I KNOW THAT THIS WAS NOT THE "CALLER" AS A AFTER-MARKET, I REMOVED THE AFTER-MARKET FLOOR MAT. FOR THE SECOND EVENT, AGAIN, THE DEALER FOUND NO FAULTS AND, AGAIN, SUGGESTED FLOOR MAT. THIS TIME, FLOOR MAT WAS THE FACTORY-INSTALLED MAT. THE FACTORY-INSTALLED CARPETED FLOOR MAT WHICH WAS SECURED BY THE FACTORY-INSTALLED MYSTANGING ROCKS. FLOOR MATS WERE NOT THE ISSUE. AS AN EXTRA PRECAUTION, HOWEVER, I REMOVED THE CARPETED MAT. THE THIRD EVENT OCCURRED ON OCTOBER 12, 2009. CAR WAS TAKEN TO DEALER. FACTORY TECHNICIAN WAS BROUGHT IN. NO PROBLEM FOUND. "TR</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA ODI No:</b> 1028870 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2009104 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2009 TOYOTA TACOMA <b>Location of Incident:</b> HUNTINGDON VALLEY, PA <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> I WAS ON MY WAY TO WORK IN MY NEW (4 MONTH OLD) 2009 TOYOTA TACOMA. I WAS ABOUT ONE BLOCK FROM HOME WHEN I WAS APPROACHING A RED LIGHT AND WAS BRAKING FOR THE RED LIGHT AND THE ENGINE SUDDENLY SPED UP ON ITS OWN. I HAD TO PRESS DOWN VERY HARD ON THE BRAKE TO STOP THE CAR, BUT WHEN I WERE STILL STOPPING CAUSE THE BRAKES TO SHAKE. I COULD SEE THE SHAKE IN MY REAR VIEW MIRROR. I HAD TO PUT THE CAR IN PARK TO COMPLETELY STOP THE FORWARD MOVEMENT OF THE CAR. THE ENGINE CONTINUED TO RUN AT VERY HIGH RPM. I THEN SHUT THE VEHICLE OFF. I STARTED THE CAR AGAIN IN PARK, THE ENGINE AGAIN RACED UP MUCH HIGHER THAN NORMAL. I SHUT THE CAR OFF AGAIN AND RESTARTED AND EVERYTHING WAS NORMAL. I HAD THE CAR TOWED TO THE TOYOTA DEALER AND THEY TOLD ME TO DRIVE FROM IT (BUT NOT TO DRIVE). I CHECKED THE GAS PEDAL AND THERE WERE NO "GRABBERS" ANYWHERE. THE DEALER COULD NOT FIND ANY FAULTS OTHER THAN "GAS PEDAL" AND THEY ASKED ME TO PUT A "TRIP" IN THE SERVICE MANAGER (SUGGESTED) ACCIDENTALLY I PUT MY FOOT ON THE GAS INSTEAD OF THE BRAKE. WHEN THEY REALIZED THEY HAD THE SAME ISSUE, I SAW THEIR REACTION TO THE INCIDENT SIMILAR TO THEIR FOR THE TACOMA. NO ONE BELIEVED TO NOTIFY YOU. KNOW, I REMEMBER THAT YOU LOOK INTO THIS MATTER AS SOMETHING COULD EVENTUALLY GET SERIOUSLY HEAT OR KILLED. MYSELF I WAS NOT USING CRUISE CONTROL AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT. "TR</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA ODI No:</b> 1029103 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2009103 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2008 TOYOTA AVALON <b>Location of Incident:</b> JACKSON, NJ <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> WHILE PULLING INTO A MARKED PARKING SPACE VEHICLE SUDDENLY ACCELERATED. IT JERKED TWO WHEELS, STOPPED, WENT UP A SMALL HILL, AND WITHIN A COUPLE OF FEET OF FINISHING INTO A CEMENT BUILDING BEFORE I COULD STOP IT. VERY VERY SCARY SITUATION. I CALLED GERMANY TOYOTA IN NAPLES, FLORIDA, AND HAD THE VEHICLE TAKEN THERE. AT THIS POINT IN TIME, I DON'T KNOW HOW THEY ARE GOING TO CORRECT THE PROBLEM. "TR</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA ODI No:</b> 1029246 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2009103 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2008 TOYOTA AVALON <b>Location of Incident:</b> JACKSON, NJ <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> WHILE PULLING INTO A MARKED PARKING SPACE VEHICLE SUDDENLY ACCELERATED. IT JERKED TWO WHEELS, STOPPED, WENT UP A SMALL HILL, AND WITHIN A COUPLE OF FEET OF FINISHING INTO A CEMENT BUILDING BEFORE I COULD STOP IT. VERY VERY SCARY SITUATION. I CALLED GERMANY TOYOTA IN NAPLES, FLORIDA, AND HAD THE VEHICLE TAKEN THERE. AT THIS POINT IN TIME, I DON'T KNOW HOW THEY ARE GOING TO CORRECT THE PROBLEM. "TR</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA ODI No:</b> 1029246 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2009103 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2008 TOYOTA AVALON <b>Location of Incident:</b> JACKSON, NJ <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> WHILE PULLING INTO A MARKED PARKING SPACE VEHICLE SUDDENLY ACCELERATED. IT JERKED TWO WHEELS, STOPPED, WENT UP A SMALL HILL, AND WITHIN A COUPLE OF FEET OF FINISHING INTO A CEMENT BUILDING BEFORE I COULD STOP IT. VERY VERY SCARY SITUATION. I CALLED GERMANY TOYOTA IN NAPLES, FLORIDA, AND HAD THE VEHICLE TAKEN THERE. AT THIS POINT IN TIME, I DON'T KNOW HOW THEY ARE GOING TO CORRECT THE PROBLEM. "TR</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA ODI No:</b> 1029102 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2009102 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> PHOENIX CITY, AL <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> CAR ACCELERATION DROVE OFF WHILE PARKED AT DRIVE-IN BANK. "TR</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA ODI No:</b> 1029102 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2009102 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY <b>Location of Incident:</b> PHOENIX CITY, AL <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> "I WERE CONTACT OPENED A 2007 TOYOTA CAMRY, WHILE SHIFTING THE VEHICLE INTO REVERSE, THE VEHICLE SUDDENLY ACCELERATED BACKWARDS. HE ATTEMPTED TO STOP THE VEHICLE INTO NEUTRAL, BUT THE ENGINE CONTINUED TO REVVE. EVENTUALLY HE TURNED THE ENGINE OFF AND THE VEHICLE STOPPED. ALSO WHILE AT A STOP, AFTER THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED WITHOUT INTENTION. HE CONTACTED THE MANUFACTURER AND WAS NOT PROVIDED WITH ANY ASSISTANCE. THE VEHICLE WAS TAKEN TO THE DEALER SEVERAL TIMES. THE FIRST TECHNICIAN COULD NOT IDENTIFY THE CAUSE OF THE FAILURE. AT THE SECOND INSPECTION THE TECHNICIAN STATED THE FLOOR MATS WERE NOT CAUSE THE FAILURE. HOWEVER, HE CONCLUDED THAT THE COMPUTER NEEDED TO BE REPROGRAMMED. NO REPAIRS WERE MADE. THE FAULT CODE AND CURRENT MILEAGE WERE 10000.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA ODI No:</b> 1029042 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2009102 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2007 LEXUS ES350 <b>Location of Incident:</b> WESTLAK, WILSON, CA <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> FAULTY ACCELERATOR ON 2007 ES350. VEHICLE SPED UP WITH FOOT OFF THE ACCELERATOR. ONLY ONE OCCURRENCE. WAS ABLE TO BREAK TO SLOW DOWN. VEHICLE ACCELERATOR FULLY STOPPED. IMMEDIATELY CHECKED FLOOR MATS WHEN WERE DETECTED AND REPORTED. "TR</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA ODI No:</b> 1029042 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2009102 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2007 LEXUS ES350 <b>Location of Incident:</b> WESTLAK, WILSON, CA <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> FAULTY ACCELERATOR ON 2007 ES350. VEHICLE SPED UP WITH FOOT OFF THE ACCELERATOR. ONLY ONE OCCURRENCE. WAS ABLE TO BREAK TO SLOW DOWN. VEHICLE ACCELERATOR FULLY STOPPED. IMMEDIATELY CHECKED FLOOR MATS WHEN WERE DETECTED AND REPORTED. "TR</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA ODI No:</b> 1029101 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2009101 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2008 LEXUS ES250 <b>Location of Incident:</b> PHOENIX, AZ <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> I WAS DRIVING MY 2008 LEXUS ES250 OUT OF A PARKING LOT WHEN MY FOOT WAS ON THE BRAKE THE CAR ACCELERATED. I NOW CLAIMED MY FOOT ON THE BRAKES AND THE CAR CONTINUED TO ACCELERATE. THE ONLY THING THAT STOPPED MY CAR WAS THE CAR IN FRONT OF IT WITH VERY LITTLE DAMAGE. IF THE CAR WAS NOT IN FRONT OF ME, MY CAR WOULD HAVE GONE INTO ON COMBO TRAFFIC. MY FLOOR MAT IS NOT ON THE FLOOR AS AFTER THE CAR DRAG INCIDENT THAT WAS TOYOTA'S REASONING. WE WERE TWO VEHICLES. A SHORT AND I HAD TO TAKE THE MAT OUT, WHICH I DID RIGHT AWAY. THEY CAN DENY IT ALL THEY WANT THIS CAR.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA ODI No:</b> 1029101 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2009101 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2008 LEXUS ES250 <b>Location of Incident:</b> PHOENIX, AZ <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> I WAS DRIVING MY 2008 LEXUS ES250 OUT OF A PARKING LOT WHEN MY FOOT WAS ON THE BRAKE THE CAR ACCELERATED. I NOW CLAIMED MY FOOT ON THE BRAKES AND THE CAR CONTINUED TO ACCELERATE. THE ONLY THING THAT STOPPED MY CAR WAS THE CAR IN FRONT OF IT WITH VERY LITTLE DAMAGE. IF THE CAR WAS NOT IN FRONT OF ME, MY CAR WOULD HAVE GONE INTO ON COMBO TRAFFIC. MY FLOOR MAT IS NOT ON THE FLOOR AS AFTER THE CAR DRAG INCIDENT THAT WAS TOYOTA'S REASONING. WE WERE TWO VEHICLES. A SHORT AND I HAD TO TAKE THE MAT OUT, WHICH I DID RIGHT AWAY. THEY CAN DENY IT ALL THEY WANT THIS CAR.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>
<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA ODI No:</b> 1029101 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2009101 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2008 LEXUS ES250 <b>Location of Incident:</b> PHOENIX, AZ <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> I WAS DRIVING MY 2008 LEXUS ES250 OUT OF A PARKING LOT WHEN MY FOOT WAS ON THE BRAKE THE CAR ACCELERATED. I NOW CLAIMED MY FOOT ON THE BRAKES AND THE CAR CONTINUED TO ACCELERATE. THE ONLY THING THAT STOPPED MY CAR WAS THE CAR IN FRONT OF IT WITH VERY LITTLE DAMAGE. IF THE CAR WAS NOT IN FRONT OF ME, MY CAR WOULD HAVE GONE INTO ON COMBO TRAFFIC. MY FLOOR MAT IS NOT ON THE FLOOR AS AFTER THE CAR DRAG INCIDENT THAT WAS TOYOTA'S REASONING. WE WERE TWO VEHICLES. A SHORT AND I HAD TO TAKE THE MAT OUT, WHICH I DID RIGHT AWAY. THEY CAN DENY IT ALL THEY WANT THIS CAR.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>	<p><b>Toyota ID No:</b> <b>NHTSA ODI No:</b> 1029101 <b>Date of Incident:</b> 2009101 <b>Vehicle:</b> 2008 LEXUS ES250 <b>Location of Incident:</b> PHOENIX, AZ <b>NHTSA Summary:</b> I WAS DRIVING MY 2008 LEXUS ES250 OUT OF A PARKING LOT WHEN MY FOOT WAS ON THE BRAKE THE CAR ACCELERATED. I NOW CLAIMED MY FOOT ON THE BRAKES AND THE CAR CONTINUED TO ACCELERATE. THE ONLY THING THAT STOPPED MY CAR WAS THE CAR IN FRONT OF IT WITH VERY LITTLE DAMAGE. IF THE CAR WAS NOT IN FRONT OF ME, MY CAR WOULD HAVE GONE INTO ON COMBO TRAFFIC. MY FLOOR MAT IS NOT ON THE FLOOR AS AFTER THE CAR DRAG INCIDENT THAT WAS TOYOTA'S REASONING. WE WERE TWO VEHICLES. A SHORT AND I HAD TO TAKE THE MAT OUT, WHICH I DID RIGHT AWAY. THEY CAN DENY IT ALL THEY WANT THIS CAR.</p> <p><b>Additional Summary:</b></p>







HAPPENED WHILE DRIVING INTO THE GARAGE AND ENGAGING THE BRAKES TO SLOW DOWN. THE CURRENT AND FAILURE MILEAGES WERE 41687.

**Additional Summary:**

---

**Toyota ID No:**  
**NHTSA ODI No:** 10298159  
**Date of Incident:** 20100104  
**Vehicle:** 2009 TOYOTA TACOMA  
**Location of Incident:** AMES, IA

**NHTSA Summary:**

PULLING INTO A PARKING SPACE AT HY-VEE GROCERY STORE IN MOUNT PLEASANT, IA AT A LOW RATE OF SPEED(<5MPH) MY 09' TOYOTA TACOMA ACCELERATED INTO A GROCERY CART STALL. I HAD APPLIED THE BRAKES WITH NO RESULTS AND AFTER A ONE SECOND LULL THE TRUCK ACCELERATED QUICKLY INTO THE MOVABLE OBSTRUCTION. I HAVE HAD PREVIOUS CONCERNS ABOUT THE RATE OF ACCELERATION BY THE AMOUNT OF PRESSURE APPLIED TO THE ACCELERATOR. THERE HAVE BEEN TIMES WHERE LIGHT PRESSURE ACCELERATES THE CAR AT A FASTER RATE AND TIMES WHERE HEAVIER PRESSURE DOESN'T GET ENOUGH RESPONSE IN ACCELERATION. FLOORMATS ARE SECURED DOWN AND NO ISSUES HAVE BEEN FOUND BY THE DEALERSHIP I HAD PURCHASED IT FROM. \*TR

**Additional Summary:**

---

APPENDIX C:  
Toyota Vehicles with ETCS-i

<i>Year</i>	<i>Make</i>	<i>Model</i>	<i>Engine</i>	<i>ETCS-i</i>
1998	Lexus	GS300	2JZ-GE	Yes
1998	Lexus	GS400	1UZ-FE	Yes
1998	Lexus	IS400	1UZ-FE	Yes
1998	Lexus	LX470	2UZ-FE	Yes
1998	Lexus	SC300	2JZ-GE	Yes
1998	Lexus	SC400	1UZ-FE	Yes
1998	Lexus	SC400	2JZ-GE	Yes
1998	Toyota	Land Cruiser	2UZ-FE	Yes
1998	Toyota	Sienna	1MZ-FE	No
1998	Toyota	Supra	2JZ-GE	Yes
1998	Toyota	Supra	2JZ-GTE	No
1999	Lexus	ES300	1MZ-FE	No
1999	Lexus	GS300	2JZ-GE	Yes
1999	Lexus	GS400	1UZ-FE	Yes
1999	Lexus	IS400	1UZ-FE	Yes
1999	Lexus	LX470	2UZ-FE	Yes
1999	Lexus	RX300	1MZ-FE	No
1999	Lexus	SC300	2JZ-GE	Yes
1999	Lexus	SC400	1UZ-FE	Yes
1999	Toyota	Camry	1MZ-FE	No
1999	Toyota	Camry	5S-FE	No
1999	Toyota	Land Cruiser	2UZ-FE	Yes
1999	Toyota	RAV4	3S-FE	No
1999	Toyota	Sienna	1MZ-FE	No
1999	Toyota	Tacoma	2RZ-FE	UNK
1999	Toyota	Tacoma	3RZ-FE	UNK
1999	Toyota	Tacoma	5VZ-FE	UNK
2000	Lexus	ES300	1MZ-FE	No
2000	Lexus	GS300	2JZ-GE	Yes
2000	Lexus	GS400	1UZ-FE	Yes
2000	Lexus	IS400	1UZ-FE	Yes
2000	Lexus	LX470	2UZ-FE	Yes
2000	Lexus	RX300	1MZ-FE	No
2000	Lexus	SC300	2JZ-GE	Yes
2000	Lexus	SC400	1UZ-FE	Yes
2000	Toyota	Avalon	1MZ-FE	No
2000	Toyota	Camry	1MZ-FE	No
2000	Toyota	Camry	5S-FE	No
2000	Toyota	Camry	5S-FNE	No
2000	Toyota	Celica	1ZZ-FE	No
2000	Toyota	Celica	2ZZ-GE	No
2000	Toyota	Corolla	1ZZ-FE	No
2000	Toyota	Echo	1NZ-FE	No
2000	Toyota	Land Cruiser	2UZ-FE	Yes
2000	Toyota	MR2 Spyder	1ZZ-FE	No
2000	Toyota	RAV4	3S-FE	UNK
2000	Toyota	Sienna	1MZ-FE	No
2000	Toyota	Tacoma	2RZ-FE	UNK
2000	Toyota	Tacoma	3RZ-FE	UNK
2000	Toyota	Tacoma	5VZ-FE	UNK

Safety Research Strategies

\*Based on Toyota Motor Sales Inc., technical service documents

APPENDIX C:  
Toyota Vehicles with ETCS-i

2000	Toyota	Tundra	2UZ-FE	Yes
2000	Toyota	Tundra	5VZ-FE	No
2001	Lexus	ES300	1MZ-FE	No
2001	Lexus	GS300	2JZ-GE	Yes
2001	Lexus	GS430	3UZ-FE	Yes
2001	Lexus	IS300	2JZ-GE	Yes
2001	Lexus	LS430	3UZ-FE	Yes
2001	Lexus	LX470	2UZ-FE	Yes
2001	Lexus	LX470	2UZ-FE	Yes
2001	Lexus	RX300	1MZ-FE	No
2001	Toyota	4Runner	5VZ-FE	Yes
2001	Toyota	Avalon	1MZ-FE	No
2001	Toyota	Camry	1MZ-FE	No
2001	Toyota	Camry	5S-FE	No
2001	Toyota	Camry	5S-FNE	No
2001	Toyota	Celica	1ZZ-FE	No
2001	Toyota	Celica	2ZZ-GE	No
2001	Toyota	Corolla	1ZZ-FE	No
2001	Toyota	Echo	1NZ-FE	No
2001	Toyota	Highlander	1MZ-FE	No
2001	Toyota	Highlander	2AZ-FE	No
2001	Toyota	Land Cruiser	2UZ-FE	Yes
2001	Toyota	MR2 Spyder	1ZZ-FE	Yes
2001	Toyota	Prius	1NZ-FXE	Yes
2001	Toyota	RAV4	1AZ-FE	No
2001	Toyota	Sequoia	2UZ-FE	Yes
2001	Toyota	Sienna	1MZ-FE	No
2001	Toyota	Solara	5S-FE	UNK
2001	Toyota	Solara	1MZ-FE	UNK
2001	Toyota	Tacoma	2RZ-FE	UNK
2001	Toyota	Tacoma	3RZ-FE	UNK
2001	Toyota	Tacoma	5VZ-FE	UNK
2001	Toyota	Tundra	2UZ-FE	Yes
2001	Toyota	Tundra	5VZ-FE	No
2002	Lexus	ES300	1MZ-FE	Yes
2002	Lexus	GS300	2JZ-GE	Yes
2002	Lexus	GS430	3UZ-FE	Yes
2002	Lexus	IS300	2JZ-GE	Yes
2002	Lexus	LS430	3UZ-FE	Yes
2002	Lexus	LX470	2UZ-FE	Yes
2002	Lexus	RX300	1MZ-FE	No
2002	Lexus	SC430	3UZ-FE	Yes
2002	Toyota	4Runner	5VZ-FE	Yes
2002	Toyota	Avalon	1MZ-FE	No
2002	Toyota	Camry	1MZ-FE	Yes
2002	Toyota	Camry	2AZ-FE	Yes
2002	Toyota	Celica	1ZZ-FE	No
2002	Toyota	Celica	2ZZ-GE	No
2002	Toyota	Corolla	1ZZ-FE	No
2002	Toyota	Echo	1NZ-FE	No
2002	Toyota	Highlander	2AZ-FE	No
2002	Toyota	Land Cruiser	2UZ-FE	Yes

Safety Research Strategies

\*Based on Toyota Motor Sales Inc., technical service documents

APPENDIX C:  
Toyota Vehicles with ETCS-i

2002	Toyota	MR2 Spyder	1ZZ-FE	Yes
2002	Toyota	Prius	1NZ-FXE	Yes
2002	Toyota	RAV4	1AZ-FE	No
2002	Toyota	Sequoia	2UZ-FE	Yes
2002	Toyota	Sienna	1MZ-FE	No
2002	Toyota	Solara	2AZ-FE	Yes
2002	Toyota	Solara	1MZ-FE	No
2002	Toyota	Tacoma	2RZ-FE	No
2002	Toyota	Tacoma	3RZ-FE	No
2002	Toyota	Tacoma	5VZ-FE	No
2002	Toyota	Tundra	2UZ-FE	Yes
2002	Toyota	Tundra	5VZ-FE	No
2003	Lexus	ES300	1MZ-FE	Yes
2003	Lexus	GS300	2JZ-GE	Yes
2003	Lexus	GS430	3UZ-FE	Yes
2003	Lexus	GX470	2UZ-FE	Yes
2003	Lexus	IS300	2JZ-GE	Yes
2003	Lexus	LS430	3UZ-FE	Yes
2003	Lexus	LX470	2UZ-FE	Yes
2003	Lexus	RX300	1MZ-FE	No
2003	Lexus	SC430	3UZ-FE	Yes
2003	Toyota	4Runner	1GR-FE	Yes
2003	Toyota	4Runner	2UZ-FE	Yes
2003	Toyota	Avalon	1MZ-FE	No
2003	Toyota	Camry	1MZ-FE	Yes
2003	Toyota	Camry	2AZ-FE	Yes
2003	Toyota	Celica	1ZZ-FE	No
2003	Toyota	Celica	2ZZ-GE	Yes
2003	Toyota	Corolla	1ZZ-FE	No
2003	Toyota	Echo	1NZ-FE	No
2003	Toyota	Highlander	1MZ-FE	No
2003	Toyota	Highlander	2AZ-FE	No
2003	Toyota	Land Cruiser	2UZ-FE	Yes
2003	Toyota	Matrix	1ZZ-FE	No
2003	Toyota	Matrix	2ZZ-GE	No
2003	Toyota	MR2 Spyder	1ZZ-FE	Yes
2003	Toyota	Prius	1NZ-FXE	Yes
2003	Toyota	RAV4	1AZ-FE	No
2003	Toyota	Sequoia	2UZ-FE	Yes
2003	Toyota	Sienna	1MZ-FE	No
2003	Toyota	Solara	2AZ-FE	Yes
2003	Toyota	Solara	1MZ-FE	No
2003	Toyota	Tacoma	2RZ-FE	No
2003	Toyota	Tacoma	3RZ-FE	No
2003	Toyota	Tacoma	5VZ-FE	Yes
2003	Toyota	Tundra	2UZ-FE	Yes
2003	Toyota	Tundra	5VZ-FE	Yes
2004	Lexus	ES330	3MZ-FE	Yes
2004	Lexus	GS300	2JZ-GE	Yes
2004	Lexus	GS430	3UZ-FE	Yes
2004	Lexus	GX470	2UZ-FE	Yes
2004	Lexus	IS300	2JZ-GE	Yes

Safety Research Strategies

\*Based on Toyota Motor Sales Inc., technical service documents

APPENDIX C:  
Toyota Vehicles with ETCS-i

2004	Lexus	LS430	3UZ-FE	Yes
2004	Lexus	LX470	2UZ-FE	Yes
2004	Lexus	RX330	3MZ-FE	Yes
2004	Lexus	SC430	3UZ-FE	Yes
2004	Scion	xA	1NZ-FE	No
2004	Scion	xB	1NZ-FE	No
2004	Toyota	4Runner	1GR-FE	Yes
2004	Toyota	4Runner	2UZ-FE	Yes
2004	Toyota	Avalon	1MZ-FE	No
2004	Toyota	Camry	1MZ-FE	Yes
2004	Toyota	Camry	2AZ-FE	Yes
2004	Toyota	Camry	3MZ-FE	Yes
2004	Toyota	Celica	1ZZ-FE	No
2004	Toyota	Celica	2ZZ-GE	Yes
2004	Toyota	Corolla	1ZZ-FE	No
2004	Toyota	Echo	1NZ-FE	No
2004	Toyota	Highlander	2AZ-FE	Yes
2004	Toyota	Highlander	3MZ-FE	Yes
2004	Toyota	Land Cruiser	2UZ-FE	Yes
2004	Toyota	Matrix	1ZZ-FE	No
2004	Toyota	Matrix	2ZZ-GE	No
2004	Toyota	MR2 Spyder	1ZZ-FE	Yes
2004	Toyota	Prius	1NZ-FXE	Yes
2004	Toyota	RAV4	2AZ-FE	Yes
2004	Toyota	Sequoia	2UZ-FE	Yes
2004	Toyota	Sienna	3MZ-FE	Yes
2004	Toyota	Solara	3MZ-FE	Yes
2004	Toyota	Tacoma	2RZ-FE	No
2004	Toyota	Tacoma	3RZ-FE	No
2004	Toyota	Tacoma	5VZ-FE	Yes
2004	Toyota	Tundra	2UZ-FE	Yes
2004	Toyota	Tundra	5VZ-FE	Yes
2004	Toyota	Yaris	1SZ-FE	Yes
2005	Lexus	ES330	3MZ-FE	Yes
2005	Lexus	GS300	2JZ-GE	Yes
2005	Lexus	GS430	3UZ-FE	Yes
2005	Lexus	GX470	2UZ-FE	Yes
2005	Lexus	IS300	2JZ-GE	Yes
2005	Lexus	LS430	3UZ-FE	Yes
2005	Lexus	RX330	3MZ-FE	Yes
2005	Lexus	SC430	3UZ-FE	Yes
2005	Scion	tC	2AZ-FE	Yes
2005	Scion	xA	1NZ-FE	No
2005	Scion	xB	1NZ-FE	No
2005	Toyota	4Runner	1GR-FE	Yes
2005	Toyota	4Runner	2UZ-FE	Yes
2005	Toyota	Avalon	2GR-FE	Yes
2005	Toyota	Camry	1MZ-FE	Yes
2005	Toyota	Camry	2AZ-FE	Yes
2005	Toyota	Camry	3MZ-FE	Yes
2005	Toyota	Celica	1ZZ-FE	No
2005	Toyota	Celica	2ZZ-GE	Yes

Safety Research Strategies

\*Based on Toyota Motor Sales Inc., technical service documents

APPENDIX C:  
Toyota Vehicles with ETCS-i

2005	Toyota	Corolla	1ZZ-FE	Yes
2005	Toyota	Corolla	2ZZ-GE	No
2005	Toyota	Echo	1NZ-FE	No
2005	Toyota	Highlander	2AZ-FE	Yes
2005	Toyota	Highlander	3MZ-FE	Yes
2005	Toyota	Land Cruiser	2UZ-FE	Yes
2005	Toyota	Matrix	1ZZ-FE	Yes
2005	Toyota	Matrix	2ZZ-GE	No
2005	Toyota	MR2 Spyder	1ZZ-FE	Yes
2005	Toyota	Prius	1NZ-FXE	Yes
2005	Toyota	RAV4	2AZ-FE	Yes
2005	Toyota	Sequoia	2UZ-FE	Yes
2005	Toyota	Sienna	3MZ-FE	Yes
2005	Toyota	Solara	2AZ-FE	Yes
2005	Toyota	Solara	3MZ-FE	Yes
2005	Toyota	Tacoma	1GR-FE	Yes
2005	Toyota	Tacoma	2TR-FE	Yes
2005	Toyota	Tundra	1GR-FE	Yes
2005	Toyota	Tundra	2UZ-FE	Yes
2005	Toyota	Yaris	1SZ-FE	Yes
2006	Lexus	ES330	3MZ-FE	Yes
2006	Lexus	GS300	3GR-FSE	Yes
2006	Lexus	GS430	3UZ-FE	Yes
2006	Lexus	GX470	2UZ-FE	Yes
2006	Lexus	IS250	4GR-FSE	Yes
2006	Lexus	IS350	2GR-FSE	Yes
2006	Lexus	LS430	3UZ-FE	Yes
2006	Lexus	LX470	2UZ-FE	Yes
2006	Lexus	RX330	3MZ-FE	Yes
2006	Lexus	RX400h	3MZ-FE	Yes
2006	Lexus	SC430	3UZ-FE	Yes
2006	Scion	tC	2AZ-FE	Yes
2006	Scion	xA	1NZ-FE	No
2006	Scion	xB	1NZ-FE	No
2006	Toyota	4Runner	1GR-FE	Yes
2006	Toyota	4Runner	2UZ-FE	Yes
2006	Toyota	Avalon	2GR-FE	Yes
2006	Toyota	Camry	1MZ-FE	Yes
2006	Toyota	Camry	2AZ-FE	Yes
2006	Toyota	Camry	3MZ-FE	Yes
2006	Toyota	Corolla	2ZZ-GE	No
2006	Toyota	Corolla	1ZZ-FE	Yes
2006	Toyota	Corolla	1ZZ-FE	Yes
2006	Toyota	Highlander	2AZ-FE	Yes
2006	Toyota	Highlander	3MZ-FE	Yes
2006	Toyota	Highlander HV	3MZ-FE	Yes
2006	Toyota	Land Cruiser	2UZ-FE	Yes
2006	Toyota	Matrix	1ZZ-FE	Yes
2006	Toyota	Matrix	1ZZ-FE (4WD)	No
2006	Toyota	Matrix	1ZZ-FE (4WD)	No
2006	Toyota	Matrix	1ZZ-FE (4WD)	No
2006	Toyota	Matrix	2ZZ-GE	No

Safety Research Strategies

\*Based on Toyota Motor Sales Inc., technical service documents



APPENDIX C:  
Toyota Vehicles with ETCS-i

2006	Toyota	Prius	1NZ-FXE	Yes
2006	Toyota	RAV4	2AZ-FE	Yes
2006	Toyota	RAV4	2GR-FE	Yes
2006	Toyota	Sequoia	2UZ-FE	Yes
2006	Toyota	Sienna	3MZ-FE	Yes
2006	Toyota	Solara	2AZ-FE	Yes
2006	Toyota	Solara	3MZ-FE	Yes
2006	Toyota	Tacoma	1GR-FE	Yes
2006	Toyota	Tacoma	2TR-FE	Yes
2006	Toyota	Tundra	1GR-FE	Yes
2006	Toyota	Tundra	2UZ-FE	Yes
2006	Toyota	Yaris	1NZ-FE	Yes
2007	Lexus	ES350	2GR-FE	Yes
2007	Lexus	GS350	2GR-FSE	Yes
2007	Lexus	GS430	3UZ-FE	Yes
2007	Lexus	GS450h	2GR-FSE	Yes
2007	Lexus	GX470	2UZ-FE	Yes
2007	Lexus	IS250	4GR-FSE	Yes
2007	Lexus	IS350	2GR-FSE	Yes
2007	Lexus	LS460	1UR-FSE	Yes
2007	Lexus	LX470	2UZ-FE	Yes
2007	Lexus	RX350	2GR-FE	Yes
2007	Lexus	RX400h	3MZ-FE	Yes
2007	Lexus	SC430	3UZ-FE	Yes
2007	Scion	tC	2AZ-FE	Yes
2007	Toyota	4Runner	1GR-FE	Yes
2007	Toyota	4Runner	2UZ-FE	Yes
2007	Toyota	Avalon	2GR-FE	Yes
2007	Toyota	Avanza	3SZ-VE	No
2007	Toyota	Avanza	K3-VE	No
2007	Toyota	Camry	2AZ-FE	Yes
2007	Toyota	Camry	2GR-FE	Yes
2007	Toyota	Camry HV	2AZ-FXE	Yes
2007	Toyota	Corolla	1ZZ-FE	Yes
2007	Toyota	FJ Cruiser	1GR-FE	Yes
2007	Toyota	Highlander	2AZ-FE	Yes
2007	Toyota	Highlander	3MZ-FE	Yes
2007	Toyota	Highlander HV	3MZ-FE	Yes
2007	Toyota	Land Cruiser	2UZ-FE	Yes
2007	Toyota	Matrix	1ZZ-FE	Yes
2007	Toyota	Prius	1NZ-FXE	Yes
2007	Toyota	RAV4	2AZ-FE	Yes
2007	Toyota	RAV4	2GR-FE	Yes
2007	Toyota	Sequoia	2UZ-FE	Yes
2007	Toyota	Sienna	2GR-FE	Yes
2007	Toyota	Solara	2AZ-FE	Yes
2007	Toyota	Solara	3MZ-FE	Yes
2007	Toyota	Tacoma	1GR-FE	Yes
2007	Toyota	Tacoma	2TR-FE	Yes
2007	Toyota	Tundra	1GR-FE	Yes
2007	Toyota	Tundra	2UZ-FE	Yes
2007	Toyota	Tundra	3UR-FE	Yes

Safety Research Strategies

\*Based on Toyota Motor Sales Inc., technical service documents

APPENDIX C:  
Toyota Vehicles with ETCS-i

2007	Toyota	Yaris	1NZ-FE	Yes
2008	Lexus	ES350	2GR-FE	Yes
2008	Lexus	GS350	2GR-FSE	Yes
2008	Lexus	GS450h	2GR-FSE	Yes
2008	Lexus	GS460	1UR-FSE	Yes
2008	Lexus	GX470	2UZ-FE	Yes
2008	Lexus	IS F	2UR-GSE	Yes
2008	Lexus	IS250	4GR-FSE	Yes
2008	Lexus	IS350	2GR-FSE	Yes
2008	Lexus	LS460	1UR-FSE	Yes
2008	Lexus	LS600h	2UR-FSE	Yes
2008	Lexus	LX570	3UR-FE	Yes
2008	Lexus	RX350	2GR-FE	Yes
2008	Lexus	RX400h	3MZ-FE	Yes
2008	Lexus	SC430	3UZ-FE	Yes
2008	Scion	tC	2AZ-FE	Yes
2008	Scion	tC	2AZ-FE	Yes
2008	Scion	xB	2AZ-FE	Yes
2008	Scion	xD	2ZR-FE	Yes
2008	Toyota	4Runner	1GR-FE	Yes
2008	Toyota	4Runner	2UZ-FE	Yes
2008	Toyota	Avalon	2GR-FE	Yes
2008	Toyota	Avanza	3SZ-VE	No
2008	Toyota	Avanza	K3-VE	No
2008	Toyota	Camry	2AZ-FE	Yes
2008	Toyota	Camry	2GR-FE	Yes
2008	Toyota	Camry HV	2AZ-FXE	Yes
2008	Toyota	Corolla	1ZZ-FE	Yes
2008	Toyota	FJ Cruiser	1GR-FE	Yes
2008	Toyota	Highlander	2GR-FE	Yes
2008	Toyota	Highlander HV	3MZ-FE	Yes
2008	Toyota	Land Cruiser	3UR-FE	Yes
2008	Toyota	Matrix	1ZZ-FE	Yes
2008	Toyota	Prius	1NZ-FXE	Yes
2008	Toyota	RAV4	2AZ-FE	Yes
2008	Toyota	RAV4	2GR-FE	Yes
2008	Toyota	Sequoia	2UZ-FE	Yes
2008	Toyota	Sequoia	3UR-FE	Yes
2008	Toyota	Sienna	2GR-FE	Yes
2008	Toyota	Solara	2AZ-FE	Yes
2008	Toyota	Solara	3MZ-FE	Yes
2008	Toyota	Tacoma	1GR-FE	Yes
2008	Toyota	Tacoma	2TR-FE	Yes
2008	Toyota	Tundra	1GR-FE	Yes
2008	Toyota	Tundra	2UZ-FE	Yes
2008	Toyota	Tundra	3UR-FE	Yes
2008	Toyota	Yaris	1NZ-FE	Yes
2009	Lexus	ES350	2GR-FE	Yes
2009	Lexus	GS350	2GR-FSE	Yes
2009	Lexus	GS450h	2GR-FSE	Yes
2009	Lexus	GS460	1UR-FSE	Yes
2009	Lexus	GX470	2UZ-FE	Yes

Safety Research Strategies

\*Based on Toyota Motor Sales Inc., technical service documents

APPENDIX C:  
Toyota Vehicles with ETCS-i

2009	Lexus	IS F	2UR-GSE	Yes
2009	Lexus	IS250	4GR-FSE	Yes
2009	Lexus	IS350	2GR-FSE	Yes
2009	Lexus	LS460	1UR-FSE	Yes
2009	Lexus	LS600h	2UR-FSE	Yes
2009	Lexus	LX570	3UR-FE	Yes
2009	Lexus	RX350	2GR-FE	Yes
2009	Lexus	SC430	3UZ-FE	Yes
2009	Scion	xB	2AZ-FE	Yes
2009	Scion	xD	2ZR-FE	Yes
2009	Toyota	4Runner	1GR-FE	Yes
2009	Toyota	4Runner	2UZ-FE	Yes
2009	Toyota	Avalon	2GR-FE	Yes
2009	Toyota	Avanza	3SZ-VE	No
2009	Toyota	Avanza	K3-VE	No
2009	Toyota	Camry	2AZ-FE	Yes
2009	Toyota	Camry	2GR-FE	Yes
2009	Toyota	Camry HV	2AZ-FXE	Yes
2009	Toyota	Corolla	2AZ-FE	Yes
2009	Toyota	Corolla	2ZR-FE	Yes
2009	Toyota	FJ Cruiser	1GR-FE	Yes
2009	Toyota	Highlander	1AR-FE	Yes
2009	Toyota	Highlander	2GR-FE	Yes
2009	Toyota	Highlander HV	3MZ-FE	Yes
2009	Toyota	Land Cruiser	3UR-FE	Yes
2009	Toyota	Matrix	2AZ-FE	Yes
2009	Toyota	Matrix	2ZR-FE	Yes
2009	Toyota	Prius	1NZ-FXE	Yes
2009	Toyota	RAV4	2AR-FE	Yes
2009	Toyota	RAV4	2GR-FE	Yes
2009	Toyota	Sequoia	2UZ-FE	Yes
2009	Toyota	Sequoia	3UR-FBE	Yes
2009	Toyota	Sequoia	3UR-FE	Yes
2009	Toyota	Sienna	2GR-FE	Yes
2009	Toyota	Tacoma	1GR-FE	Yes
2009	Toyota	Tacoma	2TR-FE	Yes
2009	Toyota	Tundra	1GR-FE	Yes
2009	Toyota	Tundra	2UZ-FE	Yes
2009	Toyota	Tundra	3UR-FBE	Yes
2009	Toyota	Tundra	3UR-FE	Yes
2009	Toyota	Venza	1AR-FE	Yes
2009	Toyota	Venza	2GR-FE	Yes
2009	Toyota	Yaris	1NZ-FE	Yes
2010	Lexus	ES350	2GR-FE	Yes
2010	Lexus	GS350	2GR-FSE	Yes
2010	Lexus	GS450h	2GR-FSE	Yes
2010	Lexus	GS460	1UR-FSE	Yes
2010	Lexus	HS250h	2AZ-FXE	Yes
2010	Lexus	IS F	2UR-GSE	Yes
2010	Lexus	IS250	4GR-FSE	Yes
2010	Lexus	IS250C	4GR-FSE	Yes
2010	Lexus	IS350	2GR-FSE	Yes

Safety Research Strategies

\*Based on Toyota Motor Sales Inc., technical service documents

APPENDIX C:  
Toyota Vehicles with ETCS-i

2010	Lexus	IS350C	2GR-FSE	Yes
2010	Lexus	LS460	1UR-FSE	Yes
2010	Lexus	LX570	3UR-FE	Yes
2010	Lexus	RX350	2GR-FE	Yes
2010	Lexus	RX450h	2GR-FXE	Yes
2010	Lexus	SC430	3UZ-FE	Yes
2010	Scion	tC	2AZ-FE	Yes
2010	Scion	xB	2AZ-FE	Yes
2010	Scion	xD	2ZR-FE	Yes
2010	Toyota	4Runner	1GR-FE	Yes
2010	Toyota	4Runner	2TR-FE	Yes
2010	Toyota	Avalon	2GR-FE	Yes
2010	Toyota	Avanza	3SZ-VE	No
2010	Toyota	Avanza	K3-VE	No
2010	Toyota	Camry	2AR-FE	Yes
2010	Toyota	Camry	2GR-FE	Yes
2010	Toyota	Camry HV	2AZ-FXE	Yes
2010	Toyota	Corolla	2AZ-FE	Yes
2010	Toyota	Corolla	2ZR-FE	Yes
2010	Toyota	FJ Cruiser	1GR-FE	Yes
2010	Toyota	Highlander	1AR-FE	Yes
2010	Toyota	Highlander	2GR-FE	Yes
2010	Toyota	Highlander HV	3MZ-FE	Yes
2010	Toyota	Land Cruiser	3UR-FE	Yes
2010	Toyota	Matrix	2AZ-FE	Yes
2010	Toyota	Matrix	2ZR-FE	Yes
2010	Toyota	Prius	2ZR-FXE	Yes
2010	Toyota	RAV4	2AR-FE	Yes
2010	Toyota	RAV4	2GR-FE	Yes
2010	Toyota	Sequoia	1UR-FE	Yes
2010	Toyota	Sequoia	3UR-FBE	Yes
2010	Toyota	Sequoia	3UR-FE	Yes
2010	Toyota	Sienna	2GR-FE	Yes
2010	Toyota	Tacoma	1GR-FE	Yes
2010	Toyota	Tacoma	2TR-FE	Yes
2010	Toyota	Tundra	1GR-FE	Yes
2010	Toyota	Tundra	1UR-FE	Yes
2010	Toyota	Tundra	3UR-FBE	Yes
2010	Toyota	Tundra	3UR-FE	Yes
2010	Toyota	Venza	1AR-FE	Yes
2010	Toyota	Venza	2GR-FE	Yes
2010	Toyota	Yaris	1NZ-FE	Yes

Safety Research Strategies

\*Based on Toyota Motor Sales Inc., technical service documents

APPENDIX D:  
Consumer Complaints to NHTSA, 2007-2008 MY Lexus ES350 Unintended Acceleration Incidents Occurring Jan. 2009-Jan. 2010

ODI Number	Make	Model	Vehicle Year	Crash Year	Date of Incident	Injury	Deaths	Component	Complainant's City	Complainant's State	VIN	Number of Occurrences	NHTSA ODSIC
10261660	LEXUS	ES350	2007N		20090203/0	0		VEHICLE SPEED CONTR			JTHBJ46G	1	
10263408	LEXUS	ES350	2007N		20090203/0	0		OL	PLYMOUTH MN	072	JTHBJ46G	1	
DRIVING HOME FROM WORK, I EXPERIENCED A SUDDEN UNCONTROLLABLE SURGE IN ACCELERATION CAUSING MY SPEED TO INCREASE FROM ABOUT 60 MPH TO 80+ MPH. IMMEDIATELY I BEGAN TO BRAKE HARD AS I WAS RAPIDLY APPROACHING TRAFFIC JUST AHEAD OF ME. FORTUNATELY THE INSIDE LEFT LANE WAS UNOCCUPIED AND I WAS ABLE TO MAKE AN IMMEDIATE LANE CHANGE. INITIALLY I DEPRESSED THE BRAKE PEDAL AS HARD AS I COULD USING BOTH FEET BUT ONLY MANAGED TO SLOW THE VEHICLE TO 40-45 MPH. PUMPING THE ACCELERATOR PEDAL AND PULLING UP ON IT FROM THE UNDERSIDE WITH MY RIGHT FOOT AS IT BECAME CLEAR THAT THE THROTTLE WAS STUCK IN AN OPEN POSITION. THE VEHICLE CONTINUED TO SPEED BACK UP TO OVER 65 MPH WITH LESS PRESSURE ON THE BRAKE PEDAL. WITH TRAFFIC JUST AHEAD OF ME, I MOVED OVER TO THE LEFT SHOULDER NEXT TO THE CENTER BARRIER AND CONTINUED TO TRY TO RELEASE THE OPEN THROTTLE. THERE WERE CLOUDS OF SMOKE AROUND THE VEHICLE AND THE SMELL OF BURNING MATERIALS FROM THE OVERHEATING BRAKES. AFTER FINALLY GETTING THE VEHICLE SLOWED DOWN TO ABOUT 25-30 MPH, I SHIFTED INTO													

APPENDIX D:  
Consumer Complaints to NHTSA, 2007-2008 MY Lexus ES350 Unintended Acceleration Incidents Occurring Jan. 2009-Jan. 2010

10280824	LEXUS	ES350	2007	N	20090218	0	VEHICLE SPEED CONTROL	LATHAM NY	JTHB46G 372	1	THERE IS A SAFETY RECALL OUT FOR THE 2007 LEXUS ES 350 IN RESPECT TO ALL WEATHER FLOOR MATS POTENTIALLY CAUSING A JAMMED ACCELERATOR (NHTSA ACTION # EA07010). THE RECALL WAS INITIATED IN SEPT. 2007. THE LAST REPORT FILED BY LEXUS WITH YOUR OFFICE INDICATED THAT THERE WERE OVER 32,000 OWNERS OUT OF 55,000 THAT THEY WERE UNABLE TO CONTACT. MY VEHICLE WAS TAKEN IN FOR SERVICING AT THE LOCAL LEXUS DEALER BY THE PREVIOUS OWNER IN AUG. 2008 AND THE DEFECTIVE MAT WAS IN PLACE. WHEN I PURCHASED THIS VEHICLE IN JANUARY OF THIS YEAR, I IMMEDIATELY CALLED THIS SAME DEALER TO HAVE MY NAME INDICATED AS THE OWNER OF RECORD. I SPECIFICALLY ASKED IF I HAD TO DO ANYTHING ELSE FOR RECALL NOTIFICATION ETC. AND WAS TOLD NO. LAST WEEK MY WIFE EXPERIENCED THE JAMMED ACCELERATOR DUE TO THE FAULTY MAT AND WAS EXTREMELY FORTUNATE THAT SHE WAS ABLE TO BRING A RUNAWAY VEHICLE DOING 80 OR 90 MPH TO A STOP WITHOUT AN ACCIDENT. I CALLED THE LEXUS DEALER IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE INCIDENT AND WAS TOLD ABOUT THE MAT PROBLEM BUT NOT ABOUT A RECALL. I FOUND OUT ABOUT THE RECALL FROM YOUR WEBSITE. I ALSO WENT TO THE NATI
10286150	LEXUS	ES350	2007	N	20090522	0	VEHICLE SPEED CONTROL	SAN RAMON CA	JTHB46G 472	1	WHILE DRIVING ON I10 IN CA, MY MOTHER ACCELERATED TO PASS A TRUCK AND WHEN SHE EASED UP ON THE ACCELERATOR NOTHING HAPPENED. IN FACT, SHE STARTED TO ACCELERATE. SHE TRIED TO BRAKE AND PUT THE EMERGENCY BRAKE ON AND SHE KEPT GOING IN EXCESS OF 90 MPH. SHE DROVE THROUGH A REST AREA BUT WAS UNABLE TO STOP. FINALLY SHE HIT THE GAS PEDAL AGAIN AND THAT DID IT - SHE FINALLY HAD CONTROL AND SLOWED WAY DOWN. SHE DID SO MUCH DAMAGE TO THE ENGINE WHILE TRYING TO GET IT TO STOP THAT CATHEDRAL CITY LEXUS REPLACED THE WHOLE ENGINE. SHE WAS TOLD THE PROBLEM WAS CAUSED BY HER ALL WEATHER FLOOR MAT. SHE WAS NOT AWARE OF ANY RECALL ON FLOOR MATS NOR HAD TUSTIN LEXUS, WHO ALWAYS SERVICES HER CAR, EVER SAID ANYTHING TO HER AND THE MATS HAVE BEEN IN THE CAR SINCE SHE PURCHASED IT. *TR

APPENDIX D:  
Consumer Complaints to NHTSA, 2007-2008 MY Lexus ES350 Unintended Acceleration Incidents Occurring Jan. 2009-Jan. 2010

10293670	LEXUS	ES350	2007N	20090609	0	VEHICLE SPEED CONTR OL	SAN MATEO	CA	1	JUNE 9, 2009 MY 2007 ES 350 LEXUS TOOK OFF WITH ME REACHING A FRIGHTENING SPEED OF 95 MILES AN HR WHEN I REACHED THE MAT UNDER MY RIGHT KNEE AND YANKED THE CARPET AND AT LAST FREED THE GAS AND BRAKE PEDAL. I KNOW THE WHERE BOTH INVOLVED AS I HIT THE BRAKES TO NO AVAIL AS THE SPEED BECAME FRIGHTENING AND KEEPING IT ON THE ROAD WAS A MIRACLE. I THINK IT IS UNACCEPTABLE THAT I DID NOT RECEIVE ANY RECALL NOTICE FOR ALMOST 4 MONTHS AFTER THIS INCIDENT. *TR
10291375	LEXUS	ES350	2007N	20090721	0	VEHICLE SPEED CONTR OL	EVANSTON	IL	1	MY 2007 LEXUS ES 350 ACCELERATED ON ITS OWN WHILE DRIVING ON AN IL HIGHWAY. EARLIER THAT DAY ONE OR TWO WARNING LIGHTS APPEARED AND I CALLED THE LEXUS SERVICE DEPT. A FEW QUESTIONS WERE ASKED BY THE RECEPTION OPERATOR AND I WAS TOLD THE CAR WAS SAFE TO DRIVE. ON MY RETURN HOME, THE ACCELERATION HAPPENED. MY BRAKES DID NOT SLOW THE CAR DOWN. I PUT THE CAR IN NEUTRAL WHILE PRESSING THE BRAKES AND WAS ABLE TO GET OUT OF THE TRAFFIC LANE ONTO THE SHOULDER. THE CAR FINALLY CAME TO A STOP AND I TURNED OFF THE ENGINE, CALLED AAA, AND WAS TOWED TO THE NEAREST LEXUS DEALER. AT THE SERVICE DEPT I WAS TOLD IT WAS MY FLOOR MAT AND THE MAT WAS REPLACED. THIS DID NOT SEEM A LIKELY EXPLANATION BECAUSE THE GAS PEDAL HAD SIMPLY LOCKED AND ACCELERATED ON ITS OWN. MY BRAKES WERE CHECKED AND IT WAS DETERMINED I NEEDED NEW REAR BRAKES WHICH WAS NOT A SURPRISE SINCE IT SEEMED LIKE I WAS "KILLING" THEM IN MY ATTEMPT TO CONTROL AND SLOW DOWN THE CAR. THE MATS WERE TO HAVE BEEN EXCHANGED EARLIER WHEN THE CAR WAS TAKEN IN FOR SERVICE APPT BUT SOMEHOW THAT WAS NEGLECTED BY A DIFFERENT LEXUS DEALER. *TR

APPENDIX D:  
Consumer Complaints to NHTSA, 2007-2008 MY Lexus ES350 Unintended Acceleration Incidents Occurring Jan. 2009-Jan. 2010

10278567	LEXUS	ES350	2007Y	20090725	10	VEHICLE SPEED CONTR OL	NORTH HAVEN	CT	JTHBJ46G 072	TL"THE CONTACT OWNS A 2007 LEXUS ES350. THE CONTACT STATED THAT THE VEHICLE ACCELERATES WITHOUT WARNING. SHE STATED THAT THE ENGINE MADE A SQUEALING NOISE WHEN SHE PRESSED THE PUSH TO START BUTTON. SHE DEPRESSED THE BRAKE PEDAL, PLACED THE VEHICLE INTO REVERSE, AND THE VEHICLE SPED UP AND WOULD NOT STOP. SHE DEPRESSED THE BRAKE PEDAL WITH ALL OF HER STRENGTH, BUT THE VEHICLE WOULD NOT STOP. IT FINALLY CAME TO A STOP WHEN IT STRUCK THE SIDE OF A GARAGE. THE CONTACT WAS BRUISED AND STARTLED. A POLICE REPORT WAS FILED. THE SPEED WAS UNKNOWN. THE FAILURE MILEAGE WAS 39,000.
10282215	LEXUS	ES350	2007Y	20090827	0	VEHICLE SPEED CONTR OL	LAKE OSWEGO	OR	JTHBJ46G 072	OUR 2007 LEXUS ES 350 ABRUPTLY AND WILDLY ACCELERATED WHILE MY WIFE WAS DRIVING ON THE FREEWAY. SHE STOOD ON THE BRAKES AND DEPRESSED THE PARKING BRAKE WHILE MOVING INTO THE SLOW LANE AND TOOK THE NEXT EXIT RAMP. THE CAR FINALLY SLOWED SOMEWHAT BEFORE REAR ENDING A STOPPED CAR. FORTUNATELY, NO ONE WAS HURT. THE CAR WAS TOWED TO THE LEXUS DEALER. THEIR DIAGNOSTIC COMPUTER SYSTEM DID NOT "CALL OUT" ANY PROBLEMS. THEY IMMEDIATELY BLAMED THE FLOOR MATS. HOWEVER, THE FLOOR MATS WERE TWO INCHES AWAY FROM THE GAS PEDAL. THEY THEN TRIED TO BRUSH ME OFF BY ASKING ME WHERE I WANTED THE CAR TOWED TO GET BODY WORK PERFORMED. I REFUSED AND ESCALATED TO LEXUS USA. THEY ARE NOW TRYING TO DETERMINE IF THEY CAN FIND A PROBLEM. THIS REMINDS ME OF THE AUDI ACCELERATION PROBLEM AND WARRANTS AN COMPLETE AND FULL INVESTIGATION. THE INTERNET IS FULL OF UNINTENTIONAL ACCELERATION PROBLEMS WITH THE 2007 LEXUS ES 350. I KEEP THINKING THAT THE 2007 MODEL IS THE FIRST OF THE NEW'S BODY STYLES AND THERE IS SOMETHING TERRIBLY WRONG. *TR



APPENDIX D:  
Consumer Complaints to NHTSA, 2007-2008 MY Lexus ES350 Unintended Acceleration Incidents Occurring Jan. 2009-Jan. 2010

10290886	LEXUS	ES350	2008	N	20091001	0	VEHICLE SPEED CONTROL	PICKERING TON	JTHB46G OH 282	1	ON OCTOBER 1, 2009 MY 2008 LEXUS ES 350 EXPERIENCED UNCONTROLLED ACCELERATION. UPON ENTERING THE HIGHWAY THE VEHICLE INCREASED IN SPEED TO APPROX. 90 MPH WITHOUT DEPRESSING THE ACCELERATOR. THE VEHICLE DID NOT STOP OR SLOW/DOWN EVEN AFTER STEPPING FORCEFULLY ON THE BRAKES. I PUSHED THE START/STOP BUTTON ON THE DASHBOARD NUMEROUS TIMES AND THE CAR WOULD NOT STOP OR CUT OFF. SOMEHOW, THROUGH THE GRACE OF GOD I BEGIN SHIFTING THE GEARS. ONCE THE GEAR WAS PLACED IN NEUTRAL THE SPEED FINALLY BROKE AND THE CAR SLOWED DOWN. THE VEHICLE WAS STEERED TO THE SIDE OF THE ROAD WHERE THE CAR HAD DIFFICULTY COMING TO A COMPLETE STOP. ONCE THE CAR ACTUALLY STOPPED I CALLED THE LEXUS DEALERSHIP AND A FLATBED WAS SENT AND THE CAR WAS TOWED TO THE DEALERSHIP FOR SERVICE. THE LEXUS SERVICE DEPARTMENT DETERMINED THE DAMAGE CONSISTED OF BURNT FRONT PADS AND ROTORS, AND BURNT REAR PADS AND ROTORS THAT ALL OCCURRED WHILE TRYING TO STOP THE RUNAWAY VEHICLE. "TR
10298153	LEXUS	ES350	2007	N	20091005	0	VEHICLE SPEED CONTROL	HILLSBORO BEACH	JTHB46G FL 382		TL"THE CONTACT OWNS A 2007 ES350 LEXUS. WHILE DRIVING 60 MPH ALL OF A SUDDEN THE VEHICLE ACCELERATED WITHOUT TOUCHING THE ACCELERATOR PEDAL. HE APPLIED THE BRAKES; HOWEVER, THE VEHICLE WOULD NOT STOP. HE WAS FORCED TO SHIFT GEARS INTO NEUTRAL TO STOP THE VEHICLE; ALTHOUGH, THE VEHICLE STOPPED THE ENGINE WAS STILL REWINDING. THE CONTACT HAD TO ENGAGE THE ACCELERATOR PEDAL A COUPLE OF TIMES SINCE IT WAS STUCK IN PLACE. THE DEALER COULD NOT DUPLICATE THE FAILURE. WITHIN THE LAST THREE TO FOUR WEEKS THE FAILURE HAS HAPPENS 3 TO 4 TIMES AND HAS BECOME PROGRESSIVELY WORSE. THE DEALER WILL MAKE ANOTHER ATTEMPT TO DIAGNOSE THE FAILURE AND THE MANUFACTURER WAS NOTIFIED OF THE ACCELERATION PROBLEM. THE FAILURE AND CURRENT MILEAGE WAS 6000

APPENDIX D:  
Consumer Complaints to NHTSA, 2007-2008 MY Lexus ES350 Unintended Acceleration Incidents Occurring Jan. 2009-Jan. 2010

10289953	LEXUS	ES350	2007	N	2009	1027	0	VEHICLE SPEED CONTR	ROUND ROCK	TX	JTHBJ46G	TL* THE CONTACT OWNS A 2007 LEXUS ES350. THE FLOOR MATS SHIFTED UNDER THE ACCELERATED PEDAL, WHICH CAUSED THE VEHICLE TO ACCELERATE FROM 45 TO 55 MPH. THE DEALER WAS NOTIFIED, AND A TECHNICIAN STATED THAT IF THEY COULD DUPLICATE THE FAILURE, THEY COULD NOT PROVIDE A REMEDY. THE FAILURE MILEAGE WAS 45,000. ... FAULTY ACCELERATOR ON 2007 ES 350. VEHICLE SPED UP WITH FOOT OFF THE ACCELERATOR. ONLY ONE OCCURRENCE. WAS ABLE TO USE BRAKE TO SLOW DOWN VEHICLE. ACCELERATOR FINALLY STOPPED. IMMEDIATELY CHECKED FLOOR MATS WHICH WERE SECURED AND HOOKED. *TR
10290983	LEXUS	ES350	2007	N	2009	1028	0	VEHICLE SPEED CONTR	WESTLAKE VILLAGE	CA		1
10291614	LEXUS	ES350	2008	N	2009	1109	0	VEHICLE SPEED CONTR	HARDEEVILLE	SC		TL* THE CONTACT OWNS A 2008 LEXUS ES 350. WHILE DRIVING APPROXIMATELY 55 MPH, THE VEHICLE BEGAN TO ACCELERATE WITHOUT INTENTION. AFTER REPEATED BRAKE APPLICATION, THE VEHICLE STARTED TO DECELERATE. THE VEHICLE WAS IN THE PROCESS OF BEING TAKEN TO AN AUTHORIZED DEALER FOR DIAGNOSTIC TESTING. THE FAILURE AND CURRENT MILEAGES WERE 19,000. THE VEHICLE IDENTIFICATION NUMBER WAS UNAVAILABLE.
10295518	LEXUS	ES350	2008	Y	2009	1209	0	VEHICLE SPEED CONTR	PITTSBURGH	PA	JTHBJ46G	2008 LEXUS 350 UNEXPECTED ACCELERATION, MOVING SLOW IN PARKING LOT PULLING INTO PARKING SPACE. LIGHT PRESSURE ON BRAKE, ENGINE WENT TO HIGH RPM CAR ACCELERATED PUSHED HARD ON BRAKE. PUT IN NEUTRAL, ENGINE WENT BACK TO IDLE. MY BUMPER HIT UNOCCUPIED PARKED CAR IN FRONT OF ME. DEALER DENIES ANYTHING WRONG. *TR

APPENDIX E:  
Consumer Complaints to NHTSA of Unintended Acceleration in Lexus IS Models

ODI Number	Make	Model	Vehicle Year	Crash Date of Incident	Death	Vehicle Component	Complainant's City	Complainant's State	Miles	Incident Description/Injuries
8015387	LEXUS	IS300	2001 N	20000930	0	VEHICLE SPEED CONTROL	HUNTING TON STATION NY	JTHB D182 110		WHILE DRIVING VEHICLE WOULD HESITATE WHEN ACCELERATING. VEHICLE BEEN TO DEALER ON THREE OCCASIONS, AND PROBLEM REOCCURRED. FEEL FREE TO PROVIDE ANY FURTHER INFORMATION *AK
										ON THREE SEPARATE OCCASIONS WITHIN PRIOR THREE MONTHS OF INCIDENT DATE, WHEN TAPPING ACCELERATOR TO THE FLOOR BRIEFLY (FRACTION OF A SECOND) AND THEN RELEASING, CARS THROTTLE REMAINED COMPLETELY OPEN (MAXIMUM RPM'S) EVEN WITH FOOT OFF OF THE ACCELERATOR PEDAL. CARS THROTTLE SYSTEM EQUIPPED WITH "DRIVE BY WIRE" OR A WIRELESS COMPUTER CONTROLLED THROTTLE. ON PRIOR TWO OCCASIONS, VEHICLE'S IGNITION HAD TO BE SHUT OFF BY REMOVING KEYS FROM IGNITION WHILE DRIVING IN THE MIDDLE OF THE STREET. ON THIRD OCCASION, DUE TO TRYING TO AVOID OBSTACLES DRIVER HAD NO TIME TO SHUT CAR OFF. CAR STRUCK ROCKS AND VEERED OFF INTO LAKE. CAR TOTALED *JB
10060036	LEXUS	IS300	2001 Y	20040227	0	VEHICLE SPEED CONTROL ACCELERATOR PEDAL	DARIEN IL	JTHB D182 110	29200	INTERMITTENTLY WHEN ACCELERATOR PEDAL IS DEPRESSED IT STICKS. WHEN THIS OCCURS VEHICLE ACCELERATES AT A HIGH SPEED. THE BRAKE PEDAL FAILS TO STOP THE ACCELERATION. IGNITION HAS TO BE TURNED OFF TO STOP THE ACCELERATION. VEHICLE HAD BEEN SERVICED SEVERAL TIMES BY THE DEALERSHIP, BUT WAS NOT ABLE TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM *AK
10065012	LEXUS	IS300	2002 N		0	VEHICLE SPEED CONTROL ACCELERATOR PEDAL	SKOKIE IL	JTHB D192 020	23000	

APPENDIX E:  
Consumer Complaints to NHTSA of Unintended Acceleration in Lexus IS Models

10119774	LEXUS	IS300	2001	N	20050301	0	VEHICLE SPEED CONTROL ACCELER ATOR PEDAL	HUNTING TON STATION	NY	JTHB D182 310	165000	SINCE I HAVE OWNED THE VEHICLE, I HAVE HAD TWO INCIDENTS, WHICH BOTH OCCURRED RANDOMLY WITH NO PRIOR ENGINE PROBLEMS OR INDICATIONS OF ISSUES WITH THE CAR. IN WHICH AS I WAS ACCELERATING, THE GAS PEDAL WOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS DOWN AND PIN ITSELF TO THE FLOOR. BOTH TIMES, THE GAS PEDAL WAS LITERALLY STUCK TO THE FLOOR AND NOT ABLE TO BE LOOSENED. THE FIRST TIME IT OCCURED, I PULLED THE EMERGENCY BRAKE AND JAMMED ON MY BRAKE PEDAL UNTIL THE GAS PEDAL POPPED BACK UP AFTER ABOUT A MINUTE PINNED TO THE GROUND. THE SECOND TIME, I LUCKILY HAD SOMEONE WITH ME WHO INSTRUCTED ME TO PUT THE CAR IN NEUTRAL AND QUICKLY TURN OFF THE ENGINE ONE CLICK SO THAT I COULD BRAKE AND STEER MYSELF TO SAFETY. THANK GOD NO ONE WAS INJURED IN THESE INCIDENTS, BUT BOTH OCCURENCES COULD HAVE BEEN HORRIBLE ACCIDENTS. THE CAR IS A 2001 LEXUS IS 300. MILEAGE AT TIME OF INCIDENTS: 1ST INCIDENT-ABOUT 85-70,000 MILES. 2ND INCIDENT-ABOUT 80-85,000 MILES. BOTH INCIDENTS OCCURED WITHIN ABOUT 2-4 MONTHS OF EACH OTHER AND THE LAST INCIDENT FROM TODAY WOULD HAVE OCCURED ABOUT 1.12-3 MONTHS AGO. I HAVE ONLY OWNED
----------	-------	-------	------	---	----------	---	---	---------------------------	----	---------------------	--------	--

Safety Research Strategies, Inc.

10139528	LEXUS	IS300	2002	Y	2005100710	0	VEHICLE SPEED CONTROL	RICHMOND	JTHB D192 X20	35420	<p>MY 2002, LEXUS IS300 HAD A CASE OF SUDDEN UNINTENDED ACCELERATION THAT LED TO A CRASH CAUSING OVER \$10,000 WORTH OF DAMAGES TO BOTH MY CAR AND THE OTHER PERSONS CAR. I HAVE SEEN OTHER REPORTS OF OTHER PEOPLE WONDERING IF THE ELECTRONIC THROTTLE IS SUSPECT IN THESE CASES, HOWEVER I PERSONALLY BELIEVE THAT THE REAL PROBLEM IS ONLY PARTLY TO BLAME ON THE ELECTRONIC THROTTLE. IN MY OPINION, THE PROBLEM IS THE LIKELIHOOD OF THE PEDAL GETTING STUCK UNDER FLOOR MATS IS TOO HIGH, COMBINED WITH THE RELATIVELY "LIGHT" SPRING FORCE ON THE GAS PEDAL BECAUSE IT IS A THROTTLE-BY-WIRE SYSTEM WHICH LEADS TO THE FLOOR MAT EASILY HOLDING THE PEDAL DOWN TO FULL THROTTLE CAUSING AN ACCIDENT. I SAY THAT THIS IS "NEGLIGENT PEDAL DESIGN ON THE PART OF THE CAR MANUFACTURER". I ALSO BELIEVE THAT THEY KNEW THIS WAS AN ISSUE BECAUSE THEY MAKE REFERENCE TO THIS IN THE OWNERS MANUAL ON PG 76 WHERE THERE IS A CAUTION THAT STATES "MAKE SURE THE FLOOR MAT IS PROPERLY PLACED ON THE FLOOR CARPET. IF THE FLOOR MAT SLIPS AND INTERFERES WITH THE MOVEMENT OF THE PEDALS DURING DRIVING, IT MAY CAUSE AN ACCIDENT."</p>
----------	-------	-------	------	---	------------	---	-----------------------	----------	---------------	-------	--

APPENDIX E:  
Consumer Complaints to NHTSA of Unintended Acceleration in Lexus IS Models

10167016	LEXUS	IS300	2002	N	20060828	0	VEHICLE SPEED CONTROL	QUINCY	CA	JTHB D192 420	26000	ON 8/28/06, AT APPROXIMATELY 8:50 AM I WAS DRIVING TO WORK ON A TWO LANE LEVEL, STRAIGHT PAVED COUNTY ROAD. I WAS DRIVING MY 2002 LEXUS IS 300 THAT HAD JUST REACHED 26,000 MILES. (THIS CAR HAS RECEIVED ALL REGULARLY SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE SERVICES FROM LEXUS OF RENO AND HAS NOT HAD ANY PROBLEMS WHATSOEVER. I AM THE ORIGINAL OWNER OF THIS VEHICLE) THE ROAD WAS CLEAR AND DRY. I WAS TRAVELING AT APPROXIMATELY 45 MPH WHEN I ACCELERATED TO PASS ANOTHER VEHICLE. AS I PASSED, MY CAR KEPT ON ACCELERATING EVEN AS I LET UP ON THE ACCELERATOR. I ATTEMPTED TO APPLY THE BRAKES. THE ENGINE ACCELERATION WAS SO POWERFUL, THE CAR DID NOT RESPOND WELL TO MY ATTEMPT TO BRAKE. SO I TOOK MY FOOT OFF THE BRAKE. THE SPEED ON THE DASHBOARD WAS 60 MPH AND ACCELERATING. I APPLIED THE BRAKES AGAIN WITH ALL THE STRENGTH I HAD AND WAS ABLE TO PULL THE CAR SAFELY OFF THE ROAD. THE ENGINE WAS RACING EVEN WHEN STOPPED. I MOVED THE SHIFT INTO PARK. EVEN IN PARK THE ENGINE WAS RACING. I TURNED THE ENGINE OFF. MY HUSBAND WAS FOLLOWING ME AND STOPPED. HE DROVE IT 1.5 MILES OUR OFFICE WITHOUT INCIDENT. I THEN ACCELERATOR PEDAL STUCK DOWN GOING AT A SPEED OF LESS THAN 5 MILES AN HOUR WHILE TURNING OUT OF A PARKING LOT. FOOT BRAKE AND EMERGENCY BRAKE WERE APPLIED BUT THE CAR WOULD NOT STOP WHICH RESULTED IN AN ACCIDENT. WHEN MY CAR HIT THE OTHER CAR, THE ACCELERATOR POPPED BACK UP. *JB
10169969	LEXUS	IS250	2006	Y	20060925	0	VEHICLE SPEED CONTROL ACCELERATOR PEDAL	AGANA	GU	JTHB K262 462	4800	

APPENDIX E:  
Consumer Complaints to NHTSA of Unintended Acceleration in Lexus IS Models

10171756	LEXUS	IS250	2006	N	2006	1020	0	VEHICLE SPEED CONTROL	TOLEDO OH	JTHC K262 285	5310	WIFE WAS DRIVING ON THE INTERSTATE WITH THE CRUISE ON DOING ABOUT 65 MPH, AND SHE DECIDED TO PASS A TRUCK. SHE ACCELERATED SLIGHTLY, AND THE CAR SUDDENLY "FLOORED" TO OVER 90 MPH AND THE RPM'S WENT ALL THE WAY UP. SHE TRUNED OFF THE CRUISE, BUT IT WOULDN'T SLOW DOWN. SHE TRIED TO BRAKE, BUT THE ENGINE WAS STILL REVING AT THE HIGHEST SPEED. SHE FORCED HERSELF OFF INTO THE GRASSY MEDIAN AND SAT ON THE BRAKE UNTIL SHE COULD JAM THE TRANSMISSION INTO PARK AND TURN OFF THE ENGINE. VEH TOWED TO LEXUS DEALER. TECH COULDN'T FIGURE OUT WHAT WAS CAUSING THIS, BUT AFTER TALKING TO LEXUS HEADQUARTERS, THEY FOUND THAT THE RUBBER CAR MAT AND THE BACK OF THE ACCELERATOR SOMEHOW CONNECTED AND FORCED THE CAR TO BE "FLOORED". YOU COULD NOT TELL BY LOOKING AT THE MAT THAT IT WAS CONNECTED TO THE ACCELERATOR. MY WIFE WOULD OF DIED IF THERE HAD BEEN ANOTHER VEHICLE CLOSE TO HER, NO ACCIDENT OR INJURY. I HAVE NO COMPLAINT WITH THE DEALER. THEY DID EVERYTHING THEY COULD TO HELP. *NM
10201175	LEXUS	IS250	2007	Y	2007	0814	1	VEHICLE SPEED CONTROL :ACCELER ATOR PEDAL	GERMAN TOWN MD	JTHC K262 075	3400	I WAS DRIVING MY LEXUS IS 250 AWD (2007) AT 30 MPH ON ROUTE 27 IN MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD. AT 7 AM ON AUGUST 14, 2007, MY GAS PEDAL BECAME STUCK AND I CRASHED INTO A TREE. MY CAR IS TOTALED AND I SUSTAINED NECK AND BACK INJURIES. *JB THE CONSUMER LEARNED THERE WAS A RECALL REGARDING THE DEFECT. UPDATED 10/09/07. *JB

APPENDIX E:  
Consumer Complaints to NHTSA of Unintended Acceleration in Lexus IS Models

10244204	LEXUS	IS300	2004	N	2008	0010	0	VEHICLE SPEED CONTROL	MADISON, AL	JTHB D182 740	58400	CAR FAILED TO STOP AT A RED LIGHT UNDER NORMAL BRAKING BECAUSE ENGINE FAILED TO DECELERATE WHEN PRESSURE WAS REMOVED FROM THE PEDAL. MAXIMUM FORCE WAS APPLIED TO THE BRAKE PEDAL. THE BRAKE ANTI-LOCK FEATURE WAS ACTIVATED AND A COLLISION WITH THE STOPPED CAR AHEAD WAS BARELY AVERTED. WHEN STOPPED, THE ENGINE REVERTED TO NORMAL IDLE. THE PROBLEM DID NOT RECUR. EXAMINATION BY A MECHANIC AT THE DEALERS SHOP FAILED TO IDENTIFY A COMPUTER FAULT OR OTHER CAUSE. THE CAR WAS RETURNED WITHOUT REPAIR. I AM NOT SATISFIED THAT A STUCK THROTTLE IS NOT A REPAIRABLE OR ABNORMAL CONDITION. IT SEEMS TO ME BE HIGHLY DANGEROUS AND MERITS MORE THAN A "WELL, ITS WORKING NOW SO COME BACK WHEN IF IT HAPPENS AGAIN," SORT OF RESPONSE. "TR
												TL "THE CONTACT OWNS A 2006 LEXUS IS250. WHILE DRIVING 50 MPH, THE VEHICLE BEGAN ACCELERATING ON ITS OWN TO 80 MPH. THE VEHICLE FAILED TO COMPLETELY SLOW DOWN WHEN THE BRAKE PEDAL WAS DEPRESSED. THE CONTACT WAS ABLE TO KEEP THE SPEED AT APPROXIMATELY 50 MPH; HOWEVER, THE VEHICLE WAS CONTINUOUSLY ACCELERATING TO HIGHER SPEEDS. SHE WAS UNABLE TO SLOW THE VEHICLE DOWN AND CRASHED INTO A CURVE. THE CONTACT NOTICED THAT THE ROTORS WERE ORANGE AND THE REAR BRAKE PADS WERE MELTED INTO THE ROTORS. THE AXLE FAILED AND FRACTURED. THE CONTACT WAS NOT INJURED. A POLICE REPORT WAS FILED AND THE VEHICLE HAS NOT BEEN REPAIRED. THE MANUFACTURER STATED THAT THEY WOULD SEND A FIELD INSPECTOR TO INSPECT THE VEHICLE. THE FAILURE AND CURRENT MILEAGES WERE 31,200.
10254688	LEXUS	IS250	2006	Y	2009	0110	0	VEHICLE SPEED CONTROL	AUSTIN, TX	JTHB K282 862	31200	



APPENDIX E:  
Consumer Complaints to NHTSA of Unintended Acceleration in Lexus IS Models

10278006	LEXUS	IS250	2007	N	20090705	0	VEHICLE SPEED CONTROL	NORTH JUDSON	IN	JTHC K282 472	2007 LEXUS IS250. TRAVELING AT 55 MPH ON HWY. HIT CRUISE. CAR SUDDENLY ACCELERATED TO NEARLY 105 MPH BY ITSELF. BRAKES UNRESPONSIVE. DID NOT RESPOND TO PUTTING IN NEUTRAL. HAD TO PLACE IN PARK. LEXUS BLAMES ON FLOORMAT INTERFERENCE. DRIVER DISAGREES. CRUISE WOULD NOT TURN OFF. 911 CALLED. ADVISED TO DRIVE INTO FIELD. 2ND TIME THIS HAPPENED SINCE PURCHASING CAR IN MAR 2009. ALTHOUGH CAR UNDER WARRANTY, LEXUS REFUSES TO PAY. INSURANCE ADJUSTER SENT TO DEALERSHIP TO INSPECT. WAITING ON RESULTS. *TR. CONSUMER IS ADDING PHOTOS. 7/29/09 *NJ RECEIVED PHOTO. UPDATED 08/05/09 *JB
10282360	LEXUS	IS250	2008	Y	20090807	0	VEHICLE SPEED CONTROL	WALTHAM	MA	JTHC K282 385	I WAS PULLING INTO A PARKING SPACE WITH MY FOOT ON THE BRAKE. ALMOST TO A COMPLETE STOP WHEN THE CAR SUDDENLY ACCELERATED & I WENT UP OVER A CURB & HIT A TRANSFORMER. THE DISTANCE WAS ONLY ABOUT 8 FEET. I DO NOT KNOW HOW FAST I WAS GOING PROBABLY ABOUT 15 - 30 MPH. I MOVED THE TRANSFORMER ABOUT 3 FEET. (THE TRANSFORMER WEIGHED ABOUT 1/2 - 1 TON) I DO NOT KNOW HOW THE CAR ACCELERATED. *TR
10285810	LEXUS	IS250	2008	Y	20090716	0	VEHICLE SPEED CONTROL ACCELERATOR PEDAL	CANTON	OH	JTHC K282 X62	TL *THE CONTACT OWNS A 2008 LEXUS IS 250. WHILE DRIVING 50 MPH THE ACCELERATOR PEDAL WAS STUCK UNDER THE FLOOR MAT. AS A CONSEQUENCE, HE HAD TO SHIFT THE VEHICLE INTO PARK TO DECELERATE WHICH CAUSED A TRUCK TO CRASH INTO THE REAR OF THE VEHICLE. THE VEHICLE WAS EXTENSIVELY DAMAGED. THERE WERE NO INJURIES. AN AUTHORIZED TECHNICIAN STATED THAT THE FAILURE WAS NOT CAUSED BY A DEFECT. THE VEHICLE IDENTIFICATION NUMBER WAS UNAVAILABLE. THE FAILURE AND CURRENT MILEAGES WERE 35000. UPDATED 10/13/09. *LJ UPDATED 10/14/09

10284798	LEXUS	IS250	2007	20090807	0	VEHICLE SPEED CONTROL	TORRANCE	CA	JTHB K262 872	28000	WIFE'S 2007 LEXUS IS 250 EXPERIENCED SUDDEN ACCELERATION ON THE NORTHBOUND 405 FREEWAY IN LONG BEACH CALIFORNIA. AFTER SHE ACCELERATED ONTO THE FREEWAY SHE ENTERED THE FAST LANE AND EASED UP ON THE GAS PEDAL BUT THE CAR CONTINUED TO ACCELERATE OUT OF CONTROL WITH HER FOOT COMPLETELY OFF THE GAS PEDAL. SHE BEGAN PRESSING ON THE BRAKE PEDAL IN AN EFFORT TO STOP THE VEHICLE. ALL THE WHILE THE CAR WAS TRYING TO ACCELERATE. LUCKILY SHE WAS ABLE TO MAINTAIN CONTROL AND MOVED OVER TO THE RIGHT LANE. THEN ONTO THE SHOULDER OF THE HIGHWAY. SHE THREW THE AUTO TRANSMISSION LEVER INTO NEUTRAL. SHE WAS THEN ABLE TO BRING THE CAR TO A STOP. EVEN WHILE THE ENGINE WAS RACING AT HIGH RPM. SHE TURNED OFF THE IGNITION AND THE ENGINE STOPPED. WE HAD THE CAR FLAT-BEDDED TO SOUTH BAY LEXUS IN TORRANCE. CALIFORNIA WHERE THEY GAVE HER A LOANER FOR THE WEEKEND AND PROMISED TO HAVE ONE OF THEIR MECHANICS DRIVE THE CAR OVER THE WEEKEND TO SEE IF THEY COULD REPEAT THE PROBLEM. ON MONDAY THEY CALLED ME AND TOLD ME THAT THEY COULD NOT FIND ANYTHING WRONG WITH IT. TELLING ME THAT MORE INFORMATION WAS NORMALLY DRIVING ON THE ROAD AND ON GOOD WEATHER CONDITIONS. MY CAR ACCELERATOR PEDAL GOT STUCK. THE CAR ACCELERATED VERY FAST AND WAS RAPIDLY APPROACHING A RED LIGHT. I QUICKLY REACTED AND WAS ABLE TO PULL BACK THE ACCELERATOR WITH MY SHOES AND HAND. *TR
10286330	LEXUS	IS250	2007	20090830	0	VEHICLE SPEED CONTROL	LAUREL	MD	JTHC K262 472	34500	CAR SUDDENLY BEGAN ACCELERATING BY ITSELF. WOULD NOT SLOW DOWN. BRAKES WOULD NOT WORK. TACH. RED-LINED. REACHED SPEED OF 110 MPH. PUSHED KILL SWITCH. EMBRA. REAGAINS TO CLUT. CAR OFF. B.
10285443	LEXUS	IS250	2007	20090821	0	VEHICLE SPEED CONTROL	MILLERS CREEK	NC	JTHC K262 X26	14940	

APPENDIX E:  
Consumer Complaints to NHTSA of Unintended Acceleration in Lexus IS Models

10291091	LEXUS	IS250	2008	Y							VEHICLE SPEED CONTROL	FREEHOL D	JTHC K262 085	NJ	9800	I WAS DRIVING MY WIFE'S LEXUS 2008 IS 250 OUT OF A PARKING LOT WHEN APPLYING MY FOOT ON THE BRAKE THE CAR ACCELERATED. I NOW SLAMMED MY FOOT ON THE BRAKES AND THE CAR CONTINUED TO ACCELERATE. THE ONLY THING THAT STOPPED MY CAR WAS THE CAR IN FRONT OF IT WITH VERY LITTLE DAMAGE IF THE CAR WAS NOT IN COMING TRAFFIC. MY FLOOR MAT IS NOT ON THE FLOOR AS AFTER THE SAN DIEGO INCIDENT THAT WAS TOYOTA'S REASONING. WE WERE TOLD ROUGHLY A MONTH AND HALF AGO TO TAKE THE MAT OUT, WHICH I DID RIGHT AWAY. THEY CAN DENY IT ALL THEY WANT THIS CAR WAS ACCELERATING AND GETTING FASTER WHEN APPLYING THE BRAKE. THE POLICEMAN AT THE SCENE INSTRUCTED US TO NOT DRIVE THIS VEHICLE AND TO GET A LOANER WHICH WE DID. THE CAR WAS PICKED UP AND SENT TO LEXUS IN FREEHOLD. FIRST WE WERE TOLD NOTHING IS WRONG AND THEY TEST DROVE IT AND SUCH, THEY WERE KEEPING IT FOR 3 DAYS NOW THEY ARE TELLING US THEY ARE KEEPING IT FOR 3 WEEKS. THERE ARE REPORTS ALL OVER THE WEB ON THIS WITH OVER 2000 COMPLAINTS. IT IS OBVIOUS THERE IS A MAJOR DEFECT IN THEIR COMPUTER SYSTEM. THEY REALLY N
110292577	LEXUS	IS250	2008	Y							VEHICLE SPEED CONTROL	NEWBUR Y PARK	JTHB K262 365	CA	70000	TL*THE CONTACT OWNS A 2006 LEXUS IS250. WHILE THE CONTACT WAS APPROACHING A STOP SIGN WITH HIS FOOT ON THE BRAKE PEDAL, THE VEHICLE SUDDENLY ACCELERATED FORWARD WHICH CAUSED THE CONTACT TO REAR END THE VEHICLE IN FRONT OF HIM. THE VEHICLE WAS TAKEN TO THE DEALER WHO INFORMED HIM TO REMOVE THE MATS FROM THE VEHICLE. THERE WERE NO PRIOR WARNINGS. THE CURRENT AND FAILURE MILEAGES WERE 70000.

APPENDIX E:  
Consumer Complaints to NHTSA of Unintended Acceleration in Lexus IS Models

10292715	LEXUS IS	2009N	20090910	0	VEHICLE SPEED CONTROL	WOODLA ND HILLS CA	JTHB K262 195	900	FOUR INCIDENTS OF UNINTENDED ACCELERATION. ON FOUR OCCASIONS THE 2000 LEXUS IS250 I PURCHASED ON SEPTEMBER 3, 2009 HAD UNINTENDED ACCELERATION OF UP TO 5000 RPM. THREE TIMES THIS OCCURRED WHEN STARTING THE CAR IN PARK. THE FOURTH TIME WAS WHEN THE CAR WAS STOPPED AND IDLING. TWICE I HAD THE DEALER, THOUSAND OAKS, CA LEXUS, EXAMINE THE PROBLEM AND WAS TOLD NO DEFECT COULD BE FOUND. ON THE FOURTH OCCURRENCE I NOTICED MY FOOT WAS ON THE EDGE OF THE BRAKE PEDAL AND DEPRESSING THE ACCELERATOR SIMULTANEOUSLY. I WEAR ONLY A SIZE 9 SHOE. HAVE BEEN A LICENSED DRIVER FOR OVER 65 YEARS AND HAVE NEVER HAD ANY EXPERIENCES SUCH AS THESE. I HAVE CONCLUDED THAT EITHER THE BRAKE AND ACCELERATOR PEDALS ARE TOO CLOSE TO EACH OTHER OR THEY HAVE BEEN POSITIONED TOO FAR TO THE LEFT, THAT IS, TOO CLOSE TO THE STEERING COLUMN CAUSING ONE'S FOOT TO BE ON THE EDGE OF THE BRAKE PEDAL. SINCE UNINTENDED ACCELERATION HAS BEEN REVEALED AS A PROBLEM WITH THE LEXUS, I SHALL APPRECIATED YOUR RESPONSE TO THE PROBLEM I HAVE DESCRIBED *TR THANK YOU.
10292738	LEXUS IS	2003N	20090317		VEHICLE SPEED CONTROL	REDOND O BEACH CA	JTHB D192 130	18000	WAS SLOWLY PULLING INTO PARKING SPACE WHEN CAR SUDDENLY ACCELERATED FULL THROTTLE. CAR WAS CARRIED OVER PARKING BUMPER INTO BUSHES BEYOND, WITH DAMAGES TO BODY AND UNDERCARRIAGE OVER SIX THOUSAND DOLLARS. *TR

Safety Research Strategies, Inc.

# Toyota Electronic Throttle Control Investigation

---

## Preliminary Report

David W. Gilbert, Ph.D.

Omar Trinidad

2/21/2010

This preliminary research study report outlines the procedures and partial data collected from the investigation of the circuit malfunction detection capabilities of four Toyota Electronic Throttle Controlled vehicles.

Preliminary Report

## Introduction

Historically, vehicle engine speed was mechanically controlled by use of a linkage or cable to the throttle valve assembly. The introduction of computerized engine controls has given vehicle engineers the added capability to electrically control fuel delivery, ignition, and most recently the throttle valve. By providing electrical throttle control through the means of an on-board vehicle computer, or Electronic Control Module (ECM), a number of engineering advantages were realized. Vehicle manufacturers were able to increase vehicle stability, achieve better fuel economy, reduce emissions, and eliminate components such as cruise control. One of the downside trade-offs for these beneficial performance advantages, was increased electrical and electronic complexity. Vehicle manufacturers clearly recognized the important requirement for ETC systems to perform exactly as they intended. A failure of the electrical circuits, sensors, wiring, or actuators could potentially result in a runaway engine. Electronic Throttle Control (ETC) systems needed the added redundancy of certain sensors and electrical circuits to ensure safe and reliable operation. In addition, the ECM's were programmed to detect operational abnormalities or defects in ETC components and their related electrical circuits. The intent was to build an ETC system that would always "fail-safe" in the event of potential problem.

Vehicle engineers also needed to build in driver warning capability for ETC systems. In the event that a vital ETC component or electrical circuit defect has been detected, the Malfunction Indicator Lamp (MIL) is illuminated to inform the vehicle operator of a problem. At the same time, to aid in vehicle diagnostics and repair, a Diagnostic Trouble Code (DTC) will have been recorded in the ECM memory. Each possible DTC has an identifying alpha-numeric code to aid vehicle repair of computer associated components. The recorded DTC, along with a "freeze-frame" of captured vehicle data, could be retrieved later by technicians using a diagnostic scan tool. Depending on the seriousness of the ETC malfunction, the ECM will typically have been preprogrammed to operate the engine with limited RPM or substantially reduced power. In the event that mechanical components in the throttle body were to fail, the ECM has

the added fail-safe capability to cut-off fuel delivery to limit engine speed. In the most serious cases of component failure, the ECM's fail-safe strategy could have the engine speed reduced to idle. This reduced power mode of operation would remain in the vehicle until proper repairs are made. All of these ETC fail-safe strategies were logically put in place to keep the vehicle safe and driver controllable at all times. However, for fail-safe vehicle operation, the ECM must have the programmed ability to detect a number of potential ETC malfunctions.

The ECM, in addition to operating the engine for optimum performance and emissions, is constantly monitoring sensors and circuits for incorrect or illogical values. Current production vehicles are required to meet standards for the second generation of On-Board Diagnostics (OBD II). An OBD II vehicle runs self-tests or monitors of the ECM circuitry that are typically classified as one or two trip faults. If a sensor or output circuit was to exceed the ECM's programmed threshold values, the computer should set a DTC. However, depending on the component being monitored, a MIL may not illuminate until the ECM sees the component fail a second time. Two trip fault detection logic is used for less definitive and less serious failures that are not easily distinguished as a problem area. One trip fault detection logic is used for more serious or readily identifiable problems. One trip fault monitors will set a DTC and turn on the MIL after only one instance of detection. Typically, one trip faults include electrical component, electrical circuit malfunctions, detected values that could cause engine damage, or potential safety concerns. Properly operating ETC system circuits and components are vital to safe vehicle operation. All DTC's for Toyota's ETC systems are identified in the service literature as "1 trip detection logic" with ECM code setting ability within seconds of circuit fault detection.

### **Purpose of the Study**

The purpose of this research study was to contribute to a better understanding of electronic throttle control system malfunctions and the fail-safe detection capabilities of selected vehicles equipped with electronic throttle controls. More specifically, this research primarily examined the fail-safe detection capabilities of electrical circuitry designed to prevent sudden or unintended acceleration of electronic throttle controlled vehicles manufactured by Toyota Motor Co. The Accelerator Pedal Position (APP) sensor was identified in the review of manufacturers' service literature as a significantly important ETC input for all vehicles used in the study. Since vehicle driver demands are electrically conveyed through this high priority sensor, basic testing was focused on the APP sensor, voltages, and associated wiring circuits. A secondary purpose was to identify areas of further research of ETC fail-safe detection capabilities of Toyota Motor Co. vehicles and other manufactured brands of vehicles. This limited analysis attempted to identify and characterize potential safety concerns of Toyota Motor Co. vehicles, as well as other vehicle manufacturers using electronic throttle control systems.

### **Statement of the Problem**

What are the malfunction detection and fail-safe capabilities of Toyota vehicles equipped with electronic throttle control systems?

### **Research Questions**

This research study attempts to answer the following questions:


1. Are the malfunction detection strategies of Toyota Electronic Throttle Control systems sufficient to identify fundamental APP sensor and/or circuit malfunctions?




2. Does the possibility exist for Toyota Electronic Throttle Control systems to operate with undetected APP sensor and/or circuit malfunctions?

### Electronic Throttle Control Logic

Toyota's TIS service literature served as an obvious first means to understand the complex electrical and mechanical aspects of the ETC system. Claims of vehicle problems without stored DTC's in the ECM, suggested that a possible fail-safe detection condition may have been overlooked in the diagnostics. A thorough review of the available TIS service information for ECT system operation and diagnostics was conducted.




**APP Sensor Circuit**




Of particular interest were the APP signal inputs to the ECM. According to the Toyota TIS service information, the APP sensor is a non-contact type that uses two independent Hall-effect elements. As described, the APP sensor will have two completely separate sensing circuits: Voltage Pedal Accelerator (VPA), and Voltage Pedal Accelerator 2 (VPA2). Each sensing circuit will have a separate voltage supply circuit (Voltage Constant Pedal, or VCP), a separate ground circuit (Earth Pedal Angle, or EPA), and separate signal circuits (VPA and VPA2). The ETC system description further defines the two signal circuits as VPA (main) and VPA2 (sub). As TIS describes the circuit, the signal from VPA (main) "indicates the actual accelerator pedal opening

angle and is used for engine control” (Appendix: TIS Service Document, p. 1). Voltage limits for VPA, range from 0.4 to 4.8 Volts or more. The signal from VPA2 (sub) “conveys the status of the circuit and is used to check the APP sensor itself” (Appendix: TIS Service Document, p. 1). Voltage limits for VPA2, range from 1.2 to 4.8 Volts or more. Of important note, are the *overlapping* voltage values of the two APP signal inputs to the ECM.



Normal Toyota APP



### Potential Loss of APP Sensor Redundancy

Because their important role to accurately convey vehicle driver demands for throttle opening, APP sensor voltage inputs should always be confirmable by the ECM as absolutely correct. It was noted in the service literature that the threshold limits for a voltage difference of “0.02 Volts or less” between the two APP signal circuits should set a DTC P2138 (Appendix: TIS Document, p. 3). This voltage appeared to be an unusually close threshold value for a short between circuits. In other words, these two signal voltages could have been *almost* identical, and remain safely within the parameters of the P2138 DTC threshold limits. The VPA and VPA2 normally operate through a common range of parallel planes of voltage values. In addition, the two signal voltage values are normally supposed to rise and fall in unison with each other. If the two signal voltages

were in some fashion to become interconnected (shorted) through a certain amount of circuit resistance, the lower VPA voltage could be pulled up slightly in value. The higher VPA2 voltage could be affected in the opposite manner and pulled down slightly in value. At the same time, both sensors could conceivably stay within the upper voltage boundary of 4.8 Volts or more for the P2123 and P2128 DTC criteria. Similarly, the VPA2 1.2 Volt low threshold limit value for a P2127 DTC would not be reached, and the VPA 0.4 Volt low threshold limit value for a P2122 DTC would not be reached. Signal interconnection through resistance could then potentially tie the two circuits together without setting a DTC. At that point, APP signal circuit redundancy is lost and neither signal circuit is verifiable by the ECM as defective. The ECM will only react to defective voltages outside of the range of programmed limitations-so if the circuit is not defective; it must be good. Without a DTC set, the ECM will not logically enter into a fail-safe mode of operation.

### **Vehicle Testing Methodology**

The Automotive Technology Department at Southern Illinois University Carbondale (SIUC) has a long history of teaching the technical aspects of vehicles. Working closely with the automotive industry, SIUC has the privileged position of receiving a considerable number of manufacturer donated vehicles for educational and research purposes only. The vehicles used in this research study were purposely selected from the SIUC fleet because of the experimental nature of the testing methodology. As a standard safety and liability requirement of manufacturer vehicle donations, all vehicles used for educational training cannot be licensed, titled, or driven on a public roadway. In addition, when the useful life of the vehicle is exhausted they are destroyed. The SIUC fleet vehicles were clearly a most valuable asset to ensure the safety and control limitations of this unique study.

Test vehicles selected for use in this study were required to meet certain predetermined technical and mechanical requirements. Since ETC was the major emphasis of this investigation, all SIUC vehicles *not* equipped with electronic throttles


were logically excluded. Fortunately, the SIUC fleet had four Toyota manufactured ETC vehicles that could be included for testing. Since engine displacement and number of cylinders is not a determining factor in basic ETC operation, vehicles with different engine sizes and configurations were included. Prior to ETC testing procedures, all vehicles used in the study were checked for proper engine performance, electrical system operation, and absence of existing DTC's. Vehicle problems or servicing needs were repaired as necessary before initiating ETC testing procedures.

For each of the test vehicles, ETC specific technical service information was well researched. Collected service information included (but was not limited to) basic ETC operational characteristics, wiring diagrams, electrical connector pin designations, component descriptions, DTC repair procedures, and fail-safe mode criteria. The primary information source for Toyota vehicles was the Technical Information System (TIS), which provides service support for all Toyota produced vehicles in the United States. To ensure technical accuracy before and during testing procedures, hard copies of vehicle service information were printed for laboratory use as needed.

Instruments and test equipment used in this study were typical of those used by automotive service professionals. Tools utilized for circuit testing and evaluation included; Fluke 88 digital multi-meters, Pico Automotive Oscilloscopes, IET decade resistance substituters (variable resistance boxes), connector back-probing devices, and common jumper wires. The high impedance Fluke 88 digital multi-meter was used for testing circuit resistance, grounded circuits, short circuits to power, and shorts between circuits. For purposes of observing and evaluating ETC operational characteristics, a laptop computer based Pico four channel Automotive Oscilloscope was utilized to display and capture waveforms. Simple varying resistance boxes were used to simulate poor circuit connections, short circuits, and mimic defective sensor inputs. Generic OBD II and manufacturer specific scan tools were used to identify the types of DTC's and view the ECM data values for sensor inputs and actuator outputs. Because of availability and versatility to work with many different makes and models of vehicles, the Actron AutoScanner Plus scan tool was used extensively to read DTC's, erase DTC's, and view generic OBD II data during testing.


The first step in the research process was the validation of normal operation of the ETC system in each of the selected test vehicles. Establishment of a solid baseline of proper operation was imperative to evaluate changes in the ETC systems due to the direct effects of testing. As a preconditioning requirement to prevent high idle from cold start-up, each engine was started and allowed to reach normal operating temperature before initiating testing methods. General overall engine performance and condition was noted. Scan tools were used to verify the proper operation of the vehicle's MIL and the ECM's capability to detect and record DTCs. Normal scan tool information, scope patterns, and voltage parameters were observed and recorded for all test vehicles used in the study. In addition, general notations were made of the engine speed and response rate with accelerator pedal depression. Engine response was observed during both: accelerator pedal depression with brake pedal released, and accelerator pedal depression with the brake pedal depressed.

Using the vehicle service information as a guide, APP connectors were initially back-probed to tap into the supply, signal, and ground circuits of the sensor. Voltmeter readings were used to verify the circuit integrity of the test connections. Once a solid connection to the circuit was verified, the oscilloscope was connected to visually monitor voltage changes in the APP circuits. Starting from this point, potential types of circuit abnormalities and experimental combinations were examined. Following the fail-safe monitor strategies and the typical malfunction thresholds from the Toyota TIS service literature, DTC detection conditions were painstakingly examined and tested for validity (Appendix: TIS Document).




Validation testing began with DTC P2138, which is intended to detect abnormal conditions concerning the APP sensor, the ECM, and short circuits between VPA and VPA2 circuits. While monitoring APP signal voltages with the ignition “Key ON-Engine OFF” (KOEO), various resistances between the two APP signal circuits were introduced for trial. The effects of the different resistance values were recorded to determine the ECM’s actual circuit detection capabilities for this type of circuit malfunction. Ample time duration of “2.0 seconds or more” was allowed, as listed in the service literature for one trip detection logic. MIL illumination was used to signal the presence of ECM fault detection and subsequent DTC storage. It was soon realized that certain short circuit resistances between VPA and VPA2 were undetectable by the ECM. Once initial fault limitations were roughly established, “Key ON-Engine Running”(KOER) trials were conducted with similar fault detection procedures. Of particular interest was vehicle engine operation within the ECM acceptable voltage zone of a compromised VPA to VPA2 circuit short. The test vehicles generally ran well, in spite of the simulated signal circuit malfunction.

While running the engine in a VPA to VPA2 short circuit state, without MIL illumination or stored DTCs, accelerator pedal response rate and range was noted. Accelerator pedal observations were made with simultaneous brake pedal application, and without simultaneous brake pedal application. Recorded data, observations, and results were listed in detail for each specific test vehicle. To further test the absence of fault detection, experimentation was done to determine if the ECM would set a DTC with a combination of additional circuit abnormalities. Two combination tests were performed to include VPA and VPA2 shorted together (operating undetected), and circuit continuity to ground and power. The VPA and VPA2 signals operating in a short circuit state (undetected by the ECM)



were given a circuit path to EPA AND EPA2 (ground). Additionally, the shorted VPA and VPA2 signal circuits (undetected by the ECM) were tested with a circuit path to the VCPA and VCP2 (5 Volt supply). These tests were made during both: KOEO, and KOER conditions. Several different combinations of trials were made before discovering that when VPA and VPA2 were shorted together, with an undetectable resistance, and a connection was made from either VCPA or VCP2 to the VPA2 circuit *only* – both VPA voltages would rise together in unison. As a direct result of the connection to the VCP 5 volt supply circuit, the ECM responded by opening the engine's throttle. Surprisingly, the ECM was repeatedly unable to detect this serious circuit fault abnormality. The vehicle showed no MIL illumination nor stored DTC in the ECM. Most alarming during KOER trials, the engine speed increased almost instantaneously to the full operating RPM limits of the engine. The resulting condition was also present with or without brake pedal application.

At this point, the back-probing of the APP circuits and ETC testing procedures were re-evaluated. All Toyota test vehicles were considered operationally unstable, with the known potential to reach Wide Open Throttle (WOT) anytime after the engine was started. For more extensive investigation on the research vehicles, wire test leads were tapped directly into the APP wiring harness. The decisive reasoning for installing wire taps was to provide more secure and stable connections to the APP circuitry. By providing more accessible and manageable "pin-out" connections of the APP circuits, testing methods were enhanced with more reliable voltage and resistance measurements. Plus, secure and clearly labeled circuit connections



provided for a much safer laboratory testing environment. Evaluation tests were now more narrowly focused on the capabilities of the ECM to detect fault conditions to set a DTC P2138. DTC P2138 is the code used to detect the presence of a short between VPA and VPA2 signal circuits. Resistance values for shorted VPA and VPA2 signal circuits,

in combination with a short to the VCP 5 Volt supply circuit, were examined and recorded for threshold parameters. In addition, vehicles were tested to see if these shorted signal circuit conditions and WOT, could be active while the vehicle transmission was in drive and service brakes applied and released. For obvious safety reasons, these more extreme tests were performed outside the laboratory in an uninhabited open parking area.

### Summary


After completing preliminary tests for APP sensor signal voltages for the Toyota Electronic Throttle System, it was determined that ECM malfunction detection strategies were not sufficient to identify all types of fundamental APP sensor and/or circuit malfunctions. Some types of ETC circuit malfunctions were detectable by the ECM, and some were not. Most importantly, the Toyota detection strategies were unable to identify malfunctions of the APP sensor signal inputs to the ECM. APP sensor signal circuits must be undeniably correct to electrically convey the appropriate driver commands to the ECM.

With the two APP sensor signals shorted together through a varying range of resistances, all four Toyota vehicles reacted similarly and were unable to detect the purposely induced abnormality. The types of signal faults introduced into the APP circuit should have triggered the vehicles' ECM to illuminate a MIL within seconds. The ECM should have then set a DTC, entered the vehicle "fail-safe" mode, and reduced engine speed and/or power. When the two APP signal circuits are shorted together, the redundancy of the APP circuit design is effectively nullified and lost. In other words, neither of the shorted APP signal circuits can be verified by the ECM as either; correct or incorrect. The condition then exists for a serious concern for driver safety. In the tested Toyota ETC vehicles, incorrect or corrupted APP sensor signal inputs could potentially result in unwanted engine speeds. Additional research should be done to determine if other vehicle manufacturers may have similar inconsistencies in ETC circuit fault detection.




Using shorted APP signal circuit fault conditions purposely installed on the test vehicles, and with known resistance values that would not set a DTC, vehicle operational behaviors were also noted. It was observed that all test vehicles could be operated without the ECM detecting the induced malfunction. Depending on the resistance value of the APP signal circuit fault, a vehicle may or *may not* experience noticeable changes in accelerator pedal operational behavior. Observed accelerator pedal operational characteristics included: normal response, sluggish response, and travel with inconsistent engine speeds. It is conceivable that a driver of an ETC vehicle may not appreciatively notice that an APP sensor and/or circuit malfunction currently exists. Without the aid of an illuminated MIL, a driver could be unaware of electrical problems within the ETC system. In addition, the shorted APP signal circuits were connected momentarily to the sensor's 5 Volt supply circuit with the vehicle in drive. In all test vehicles, the ECM did not set a DTC and the engine speed increased rapidly to full throttle. This result shows that unusual or sudden unintended acceleration of the vehicle was possible in the ETC test vehicles. It should be noted that in all test vehicle cases, the electronic throttle valve *instantaneously* moved to wide-open position when the fault was introduced. More research should be done to determine the extent of Toyota ETC vehicles that could be affected by this condition.

In review of the TIS service information, collected vehicle data, and performance observations; some general assumptions can be drawn from the research completed to date. The inability of the Toyota ECM to detect certain types of short circuit malfunctions could fall back to the basic design of the normal APP signal voltage limitations. The parameters for APP signal short circuit fault detection are apparently too lenient. In the Toyota ETC system, the APP sensor signal voltages rise simultaneously in direct response to accelerator pedal depression. With this design, interconnected signal circuits could be more difficult to identify with a circuit fault detection strategy that uses only threshold voltage limitations.



A more conclusive circuit fault detection strategy could use APP signal voltages (see A & B) that have rising slope, but with offset voltages that increase at slightly different rates. Several vehicle manufacturers currently use this fault detection strategy for APP sensor signal circuits.



The obvious advantage, of using two different angles of increasing voltages from the APP signal circuits, is that the signal voltages are never consistently rising at the same rate. In this design, short circuit connections between the two APP signal circuits would ultimately be detected by the ECM because the signal voltages should never increase at the same rate or angle.

### Recommendations

In this preliminary report, the initial findings question the integrity and consistency of Toyota ECMs to detect potential ETC system circuit malfunctions. The importance of these issues raised in the ETC system fail-safe strategies should not be underestimated. Sudden unintended acceleration of a vehicle is a very serious safety concern that should be addressed without delay. While the small sample of Toyota vehicles cannot be representative of all, these primary findings most certainly warrant further investigation and study. Additional Toyota vehicles of different build years and models should be evaluated for their capabilities of ETC system circuit malfunction detection.

A second recommendation should be a thorough technical investigation and evaluation of ETC fail-safe strategies of Toyota, and possibly other vehicle manufacturers, that experience sudden unintended acceleration that do not appear to be caused by floor-mats or sticking pedals. Priority would be studies of identified vehicles with a high rate of ETC system related incidences, concerns, or failures involving sudden unintended acceleration.

## Appendices

### Toyota Electronic Throttle Control Investigation Vehicles

---

- 1) 2005 Toyota Avalon (4T1BK36B55U001024)
- 2) 2006 Lexus IS350 (JTHBE262762001849)
- 3) 2007 Toyota Tundra (5TBBV54177S449783)
- 4) 2009 Toyota Matrix (2T1GE40E19C001003)

**Additional Appendices and supporting data will be provided when completed.**

Neil Hannemann  
Automotive Engineer  
7212 Durango Circle  
Carlsbad, CA 92011

February 21, 2010

One Hundred Eleventh Congress  
Congress of the United States  
House of Representatives  
Committee on Energy and Commerce  
2125 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515-6115

Attention: The Honorable Henry Waxman, Chairman, Energy and Commerce  
Committee  
The Honorable Bart Stupak, Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight and  
Investigation

RE: Exponent Inc. Test Report, *Testing and Analysis of Toyota and Lexus  
Vehicles and Components for Concerns Related to Unintended  
Acceleration.*

Dear Chairman Waxman and Chairman Stupak,

I have reviewed the referenced report, and I have assessed the findings of the report. I am assessing this report as a stand-alone document; I have not been provided with any other supporting documents. There are statements that the work is ongoing, so there may be additional information that is not included in this report.

There are potentially broader causes of sudden unintended acceleration than the sticking pedals and floor mats that have been the subject of the recent Toyota recalls. The Exponent report is not limited to these specific items and, in fact, actually ignores both of these causes to explore other possibilities.

#### **Scientific Method**

Overall this report does not follow a scientific method. A typical scientific method is composed of the following 6 steps; Problem, Data collection, Hypothesis, Experiment, Observation, Conclusion.

There is no effective statement of the problem. This should have included an FMEA (Failure Mode Effects Analysis). This is standard practice in the automotive industry,

and while not performed on all components it is certainly required for new technology such as the Toyota ETCS-I system. Considering the safety aspect of the new technology of “throttle by wire” is another factor that would demand an FMEA. If Exponent were not provided with the FMEA that Toyota had performed as part of their product creation process, then they should have started their analysis by performing their own FMEA. Exponent jumps directly to purchasing vehicles and components and performing evaluations.

The Data Collection step of a scientific process should have included the customer reports and claims, or at least a summary of the analysis of the NHTSA database that Exponent states was performed. There should also have been an analysis of Toyota’s own customer complaint and warranty database. It would have also been useful to study a vehicle or components that exhibit the behavior that resulted in the Toyota recall for the accelerator pedal.

There is no statement of a hypothesis. Exponent jumps directly to evaluating only the 2 electrical outputs of the throttle, the 2 outputs of the throttle position sensor and the throttle position motor. There is no discussion of the conditions under which these evaluations are performed.

While the testing and observations appear quite extensive and follow a well defined protocol, it is not clear if the testing is appropriate to the issue, since the extent of the problem was not defined. There are also major categories of testing that were not addressed such as; EMI/RFI (electromagnetic interference/Radio frequency interference), environmental conditions, and underhood operating environment conditions.

To even have a conclusion with such a poorly stated problem is inappropriate. If there is still testing in progress then the stated conclusion is actually more a progress status rather than a conclusion.

#### **Assessment of report content:**

Overall, rather than an evaluation of vehicles and components as the title states, this evaluation seems limited primarily to the electrical signals of two sets of sensors. There appears to be no attempt to evaluate the ETCS-i as a system. There are also other components that make up the ETCS-i as a system. These would include the throttle body hardware, the wiring and the ECM. The software algorithms in the ECM also make up part of the total system. There was no testing or analysis of the throttle body hardware, the wiring, the ECM or the software.

Additional assessment of report findings:

1. Regarding the Honda pedal that was evaluated, the statement that “The functionality was found to be very similar to that of the Toyota and Lexus pedals” is not one with which I agree. The Honda pedal characteristics include diverging slopes for the high and low sensor signals. The Toyota and Lexus pedals all

appear to have identical slopes. The Honda pedal reaches a maximum signal well before the maximum travel of the pedal is reached--different than most of the Toyota or Lexus pedals.

2. Reviewing the photos of the pedals characterized as hall effect, it appears that only one of the pedals (2007 Camry) operates in a linear fashion; the rest operate in a rotary fashion. There is no identification on the report of the pedal manufactured by CTS.
3. The 2007 Camry was the only vehicle of the 7 vehicles purchased for testing that is included in the Toyota pedal recall. There were 8 different vehicles subject to the recall. The explanation of the vehicle selections, "because they represented a cross-section of models and model-years, including vehicles with elevated and lower rates of complaints of unintended acceleration," does not seem to support the selection of only one vehicle subject to the recall.
4. Exponent did not make an attempt to study the pedal condition that was subject to the recall. As part of defining the issue it would have been a basic step to understand and recreate the condition of the recall.
5. There was no study at all of the components at a system level. The ECM component was not studied at all. There are "other vehicle state parameters" mentioned on page 2 of the report that affect the current that the ECM sends to the throttle control motor to control the position of the throttle plate, but Exponent did not even identify what inputs these might be, or the algorithms controlling them. A study of competitors systems rather than just components would have identified features and inputs such as brake switch controlled throttle cut out that could be used.
6. Exponent states that their "testing included a wide variety of perturbations and anomalies imposed on the electrical signals". My assessment is that the variety was rather limited. There were "short" conditions, "open" conditions and increases/decreases to the voltages. There was no consideration to voltage spikes or any type of frequency modulation that could occur. There could also be an intermittent nature to the short, open or increasing and decreasing voltage conditions. There was also no study of any EMI effects.

**To address your specific questions:**

1. Exponent did not use adequate methodology as explained above in the discussion about lack of a scientific method.
2. Exponent did not evaluate an adequate sample size. As stated in (3) above, of the 8 vehicles in the Toyota pedal recall only one of these was included in the 7 vehicles that Exponent evaluated.
3. The component tests were not likely to identify the potential cause of unintended acceleration. In fact, as stated in (4) above, Exponent did not even attempt to understand or recreate the pedal conditions that were the subject of the Toyota recall.

4. The environmental conditions were not discussed in this report. Therefore, it is difficult to state if the test conditions represented an appropriate sample of real world driving. However, there was no attempt to study any EMI effects.
5. Exponent makes the statement in their conclusions that "When Exponent induced failures of the position sensor in the accelerator pedals or throttle bodies, or caused a significant shift in the calibrations of these sensors, these changes were detectable by the ECM". This does not allow one to conclude that this would record all unintended acceleration events in Toyota vehicles. In fact, there were no unintended acceleration events induced by Exponent or that occurred at any point in the testing.

**Summary:**

While the testing that Exponent did appears to be technically accurate there are major flaws in the methodology and almost nothing added to the overall understanding of the concerns of the unintended acceleration phenomenon that is the subject of a massive Toyota recall.

In the conclusion of the Exponent report it is stated that they were unable to induce unintended acceleration and that the vehicles behaved normally in all cases. This goes against the concept that "Absence of proof is not proof of absence" [1]. This report alone does very little to prove that there are no other potential causes of unintended acceleration in Toyota vehicles.

Sincerely,



Neil Hannemann

[1] "Absence of proof is not proof of absence" Keith Armstrong, The EMC Journal, September 2008.

**The Honorable Marsha Blackburn**

*1. Mr. Gilbert, you were on TV where you presented a theory that moisture, corrosion or wear could cause a condition that would result in sudden, unwanted acceleration. If moisture, corrosion and wear were to cause this specific condition you demonstrated last night, wouldn't a technician be able to find evidence of this moisture, corrosion and wear after a sudden acceleration incident. And if this is happening as often as we are being led to believe, wouldn't we have a warehouse full of these worn and corroded parts?*

Dear Honorable Representative Blackburn,

It is my sincere desire to answer your question to the fullest extent. In an attempt to do so, I have divided your written question so that I may respond more clearly.

*Mr. Gilbert, you were on TV where you presented a theory that moisture, corrosion or wear could cause a condition that would result in sudden, unwanted acceleration.*


**Response:**

The statement concerning moisture, corrosion or wear was truly intended to be presented as just few common examples of how electrical problems could occur. In addition to moisture, corrosion or wear, other factors that can cause electrical problems should also be considered. Some potential causes of electronics failures could also include: poor connections, manufacturing defects, extreme temperature variations, excessive electrical current, vehicle vibrations, voltage spikes, and electrostatic discharges just to name a few.

*If moisture, corrosion and wear were to cause this specific condition you demonstrated last night, wouldn't a technician be able to find evidence of this moisture, corrosion and wear after a sudden acceleration incident.*

**Response:**


Maybe. There are some types of electrical connection and component failures that are clearly visible, but there are also electrical component failures that cannot be readily spotted. Depending on the extent and severity of the corrosion, outward evidence can sometimes be identified with a simple visual inspection. The example shown at the right is a defective wiring connector for to an "air bag" deployment module. Inside the red circle, green corrosion can be easily noticed on the inside of the connector wiring cavity. After determining the problem area with electrical tests, it was an easy task to unplug this connector and visually inspect it for signs of corrosion.






Some damaged parts may take more effort for a technician to inspect. At the right and below is an example of a damaged electronic throttle body assembly.


While in service, this particular electronic throttle body would occasionally stick. Luckily, it usually stuck in the closed position and with the engine at idle speed. I might also add that it did not always stick, and it did not always set a diagnostic trouble code for this mechanical malfunction.



In order to actually see the rust and corrosion damage inside this component, the cover rivets had to be drilled off to gain access. There is evidence of water intrusion inside the red circles. To disassemble this part is not a particularly difficult task, but one that does takes some time. This vehicle had just passed beyond the manufactures' normal warranty period. Due to the high cost of this part, this vehicle owner chose to replace it with a used part from a salvage yard.




Some defective parts show no outward signs of failure, and can only be identified through more complicated electrical testing procedures. Generally speaking, electronic modules (or computers) are identified as good or bad, after all wiring and connections have been eliminated as a potential problem. Below is a typical example of an engine control computer that is defective.



This computer looks perfectly fine on the outside, with no visible sign or evidence proving it to be defective.

Most computers are not designed to be disassembled for inspection, and many are sealed tight against the elements. In addition, there are not serviceable parts inside to typically replace.

As you can see in the photo below, there is a great deal of very small integrated circuits inside. One of these tiny circuits is bad-but I honestly cannot identify which one. They all look the same.



Vehicle computers may have numerous electronic devices combined (or integrated) into a small plastic housing or chip. When they fail, the evidence may be impossible to see visually. This is what makes automotive diagnostics much more difficult with today's vehicles.

*And if this is happening as often as we are being led to believe, wouldn't we have a warehouse full of these worn and corroded parts?*

**Response:**

Yes, if all parts failed due to corrosion, maybe we would. As I have attempted to show, defective electronic parts are not always worn and corroded. And, some failed or corroded parts are not always easy to see without major disassembly of an otherwise sealed unit. Electrical diagnostics may be the only means to clearly identify a defective electronic component. Even more challenging, electronic parts do not always fail completely and/or may fail intermittently. I have personally witnessed some bizarre intermittent problems that have eluded positive diagnosis for days, months, and in a few cases - years.

I sincerely hope that your excellent question has been answered satisfactorily. If you have any additional questions, comments, or wish to discuss this further; please contact me as needed.

Sincerely

David W. Gilbert

HENRY A. WAXMAN, CALIFORNIA  
CHAIRMAN

JOE BARTON, TEXAS  
RANKING MEMBER

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS  
**Congress of the United States**  
**House of Representatives**  
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE  
2125 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING  
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6115

Majority (202) 225-2027  
Minority (202) 225-3841

March 11, 2010

James E. Lentz  
President and Chief Operating Officer  
Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.  
19001 South Western Avenue  
Torrance, CA 90501


Dear Mr. Lentz:

Thank you for appearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations on February 23, 2010, at the hearing entitled "Response by Toyota and NHTSA to Incidents of Sudden Unintended Acceleration."

Pursuant to the Committee's Rules, attached are written questions for the record directed to you from certain Members of the Committee. In preparing your answers, please address your response to the Member who submitted the questions.

Please provide your responses by March 25, 2010, to Earley Green, Chief Clerk, in Room 2125 of the Rayburn House Office Building and via e-mail to [Earley.Green@mail.house.gov](mailto:Earley.Green@mail.house.gov). Please contact Earley Green or Jennifer Berenholz at (202) 225-2927 if you have any questions.

Sincerely,



Henry A. Waxman  
Chairman

Attachment

**KING & SPALDING**

King & Spalding LLP  
1700 Pennsylvania Ave, NW  
Suite 200  
Washington, D.C. 20006-4707  
Tel: (202) 737-0500  
Fax: (202) 626-3737  
www.kslaw.com

Theodore M. Hester  
Direct Dial: 202-626-2901  
thester@kslaw.com

March 26, 2010

The Honorable Bobby L. Rush  
U.S. House of Representatives  
2416 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, D.C. 20515-6115


Dear Congressman Rush:

I am writing on behalf of Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. ("TMS" or "Toyota") to follow-up on a question you raised at the February 23, 2010 hearing that addressed a number of issues related to unintended acceleration in various Toyota models. Toyota welcomes the opportunity to clarify the matters you and other members of the Committee have raised, and has asked me to provide the following response to your question.

Specifically, during the hearing you asked for further information on the recent crash in Dallas, Texas. The December 26, 2009 accident occurred in Southlake, Texas (a suburb northwest of Dallas) and involved a 2008 Toyota Avalon. Monty Hardy, age 56, was driving with 3 passengers in the vehicle; Sharon Ransom, age 56, Hadassah Vance, age 35 and Wendy Akion, age 38. The Avalon was subject to both the floor mat and sticky pedal recalls. Hardy was approaching a stop sign at a T intersection when he went through the stop sign at the top of the T, through a fence, struck a tree, and then the vehicle flipped upside down into a pond. All of the occupants in the vehicle drowned. The accident was investigated by the Southlake police department. Mr. Hardy's wife told the Southlake police that they had problems with the accelerator pedal sticking and that they had received a recall on the vehicle and taken it to a dealer. Mrs. Hardy also told the police that Mr. Hardy had epilepsy and had recently started a new medication. A witness who saw the Avalon proceed through the stop sign said that she did not see anyone behind the steering wheel, and the police indicated Mr. Hardy may have been having some kind of medical event. NHTSA contacted the Southlake police and asked them to remove the accelerator pedal from the vehicle. Police personnel oversaw removal of the pedal. They noted that it was free from obstruction. The driver's floor mat was found in the trunk, so entrapment of the mat could not have been a factor. Toyota has cooperated with the Southlake Police and at their request downloaded the EDR data and also provided it to representatives of all of the deceased parties. This EDR did not have any pre-crash data.

The Honorable Bobby L. Rush  
March 26, 2010  
Page 2

If you have any questions regarding this matter, or need additional information, please call me at 202-626-2901.

Sincerely,  
  
Theodore M. Hester

cc: The Honorable Henry A. Waxman, Chairman  
Committee on Energy and Commerce

The Honorable Bart Stupak, Chairman  
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations

The Honorable Joe Barton, Ranking Member  
Committee on Energy and Commerce

The Honorable Michael C. Burgess, Ranking Member  
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations

# KING & SPALDING

King & Spalding LLP  
1700 Pennsylvania Ave. NW  
Suite 200  
Washington, D.C. 20006-4707  
Tel: (202) 737-0500  
Fax: (202) 626-3737  
www.kslaw.com

Theodore M. Hester  
Direct Dial: 202-626-2901  
thester@kslaw.com

March 26, 2010

The Honorable Marsha Blackburn  
U.S. House of Representatives  
217 Cannon House Office Building  
Washington, D.C. 20515-6115

Dear Congresswoman Blackburn:

I am writing on behalf of Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. ("TMS" or "Toyota") to you in response to your written follow-up questions to the February 23, 2010 hearing that addressed a number of issues related to unintended acceleration in various Toyota models. Toyota welcomes the opportunity to clarify the matters you and other members of the Committee have raised, and has asked me to provide the following responses to your questions.

- 1) **In addition to Toyota going beyond recalling vehicles and voluntarily halting US sales and production of 8 models, what other subsequent remedial measures is Toyota taking to ensure that these safety issues are being fixed as quickly as possible?**

Toyota engineers quickly developed and rigorously tested solutions for the accelerator pedal issues that led to the recalls. The remedies are simple, effective and durable. Toyota's dealers have been working around the clock to fix vehicles on the road, servicing more than a million vehicles to date.

To facilitate the repairs and reduce any inconvenience, Toyota is providing unprecedented services for Toyota owners nationwide. These include expedited scheduling of the repair, pick up and return of the vehicle by a dealership representative, driving the customer to his or her place of work, and where necessary providing alternate transportation, such as a rental car or taxi reimbursement for the reasonable period that the customer is unable or unwilling to use his or her car.

Moreover, Toyota is taking additional steps to bolster customer confidence in the safety and reliability of its vehicles. Toyota is installing a brake-override system, which cuts engine power in case both the accelerator and brake pedals are applied at the same time, in seven existing vehicle models. Toyota is also installing the brake-override system in all its new models sold in North America, and will be one of the first full-line automakers to make this standard across its fleet. Toyota's hybrid vehicles, including the Prius, have a function that is designed to reduce engine power, and, as a result, has a similar effect to the brake-override system.

The Honorable Marsha Blackburn  
 March 26, 2010  
 Page 2

To further validate the safety of Toyota vehicles' electronics, Toyota has asked Exponent, a leading engineering and scientific consulting firm, to conduct a comprehensive independent evaluation of Toyota's electronic throttle control system and will make their findings public. Finally, Toyota is making greater use of event data recorders and other on-board vehicle diagnostic tools, and is sending teams of technicians on-site to promptly inspect reported UA incidents so that Toyota can aggressively assess and address any safety concerns.

**2) What efforts has Toyota made in communicating what the company and its dealers are doing regarding the recalls? Has this been enough in your estimation?**

Toyota is improving communications about safety issues within the company, with regulators, and with the American public. Toyota appreciates the opportunity that its executives had to inform the House committee you serve on as well as two other Congressional panels about the recalls and its efforts to ensure that its cars are safe and reliable.

Toyota is providing timely, regular updates about defects and recall procedures to dealers and directly to consumers on Toyota.com. Toyota created a designated recall website. Toyota has made executives and experts available to media for in-depth explanations and demonstrations about Toyota's safety measures to prevent unintended acceleration and electromagnetic interference, among other issues.

Toyota has pledged its full cooperation with Congress and NHTSA, and has proposed regular quarterly meetings with the agency in addition to special meetings, as needed.

Toyota is committed to maintaining open and robust channels of communication about safety issues with regulators and the public.

**3) What kind of feedback has Toyota received from customers concerning the recall and its efforts to fix the safety issues?**

Some of Toyota's customers reacted initially the same way Toyota's employees and management did over the recent recalls: They were disappointed that Toyota had not lived up to the high standards they had come to expect from Toyota regarding safety and reliability. More recent feedback ranging from customer emails to independent surveys show that the underlying confidence in Toyota – built up over 50 years of commitment to serving U.S. consumers – and the safety of Toyota's products remains strong.

One of the clearest expressions of that confidence is the strong message from Toyota's dealers. Not only are loyal customers coming back and expressing comfort with Toyota now that the facts are coming out, but Toyota is also seeing many first-time Toyota shoppers. Many of the customers who have brought their vehicles to Toyota dealers during the recalls told them that Toyota produces many of the best vehicles on the road, and Toyota deeply appreciates their loyalty.



The Honorable Marsha Blackburn  
 March 26, 2010  
 Page 3

- 4) **At this point in time, is Toyota planning to lay off any U.S. workers as a result of the current recall? Given the difficulties facing the entire auto industry in the recent past, and Toyota in light of the recent recalls, how many employees has Toyota laid off in the recent past?**

Despite the downturn in the U.S. auto market and the recent recalls, Toyota has not laid off any permanent employees. While Toyota has adjusted some production schedules to keep inventory at acceptable levels, Toyota has not furloughed any workers.

- 5) **What kind of impact do you think these recalls will have on the Toyota Company in the long term?**

Toyota acknowledges that it have not lived up to its own high standards, but Toyota believes that it has learned lessons and is responding in ways that will strengthen Toyota now and for the long term.

The changes that President Akio Toyoda has announced as part of a top-to-bottom review of global operations are aimed at reaffirming safety as Toyota's top priority, eliminating quality and communications gaps that have come with growth and bringing us closer to regulators and consumers so that Toyota can respond more quickly to any concerns.

Importantly for the U.S. market, Toyota's North American operations will also have more autonomy and decision-making power with regard to recall and other safety issues.

- 6) **Why did Toyota stop production on so many of its vehicles last month? What happened to the people who work in Toyota's factories? Were they laid off? Furloughed?**

Toyota temporarily halted production of the eight models subject to the accelerator pedal recall in order to focus fully on fixing this problem in the vehicles that are on the road. Toyota's entire organization of 172,000 North American employees and dealership personnel mobilized to help with its efforts. Because Toyota was able to receive the parts for the reinforced pedal earlier than originally expected, it resumed production one week after it was suspended.

The approximately 14,000 workers affected by the temporary shutdown received additional training or worked on improvements to their assembly lines. They also had the option to take vacation or unpaid leave. The same terms applied for subsequent brief production suspensions at Toyota's Kentucky and Texas plants, which Toyota undertook to keep inventory at acceptable levels. In no case were any of Toyota's workers furloughed. In fact, despite the downturn in the U.S. auto market, and the temporary production halt, Toyota has not laid off any permanent employees.

The Honorable Marsha Blackburn  
 March 26, 2010  
 Page 4

- 7) **In addition to fixing the current safety issues, what efforts has Toyota made to spot safety issues sooner in the manufacturing process?**

Toyota has launched a comprehensive review of its quality-control processes from design to production, sales and service. Toyota has formed a new North American Quality Task Force, led by senior automobile manufacturing executive Steve St. Angelo, which will work closely with a North American Quality Advisory Panel of distinguished independent experts, led by former U.S. Secretary of Transportation Rodney Slater, that is being assembled to advise Toyota's North American affiliates on quality and safety issues (see Attachment A). Since appearing before Congress in February, Toyota President Akio Toyoda has visited assembly lines in Kentucky and Japan to meet workers and personally reinforce the message that Toyota must put customer safety first.

In the U.S., Toyota is establishing the new position of Regional Product Safety Executive as well as an Automotive Center of Quality Excellence, where a team of engineers will be dedicated to studying quality and safety issues in Toyota's vehicles and North American manufacturing facilities. Toyota's North American operations will also have more autonomy and decision-making power with regard to recall and other safety issues.

- 8) **Two weeks ago in the Washington Post, Mr. Toyoda highlighted a plan to bring transparency to the company's efforts to remedy the problem. Can you shed some light on what's been done and what will be done? How is the company working to ensure that this doesn't happen again, and what are you doing to reassure Toyota owners that their vehicles are safe to drive?**

As stated above, Toyota has begun a top-to-bottom review of all its operations, led by President Akio Toyoda. Toyota is making fundamental changes in the way the company operates in order to ensure that Toyota sets an even higher standard for vehicle safety and reliability, responsiveness to customers and transparency with regulators.

At a global level, Toyota has established a Special Committee for Global Quality, led by Mr. Toyoda. It will thoroughly review Toyota's operations and make changes to ensure problems of this magnitude do not happen again. In addition, the North American Quality Task Force will work in concert with the Special Committee. Toyota is also putting a system in place to better share important quality and safety information across its global operations and to work more closely with government agencies, including NHTSA in the United States.

At a regional level, Toyota will ensure that its customers' voices will be heard and acted upon in a timely manner. In the United States, Toyota has already begun to investigate consumer complaints more aggressively by quickly deploying teams of technicians to make on-site inspections of unintended acceleration reports. As noted above, Toyota is establishing the new position of Regional Product Safety Executive, and the North American operations will have more autonomy and decision-making power with regard to recall and other safety issues. And, an independent North American Quality Advisory Panel led by former Transportation Secretary Rodney Slater will advise the company on quality and safety issues.

The Honorable Marsha Blackburn  
March 26, 2010  
Page 5

At the customer level, Toyota is taking significant steps to bolster confidence in the safety and reliability of Toyota vehicles. Toyota will be one of the first full-line automakers to make brake-override systems standard on all its new models sold in North America. Toyota hybrids already have a system that achieves a similar result, and Toyota is installing brake override on seven existing models.

Toyota's dealers are making an extraordinary effort to carry out repairs on recalled cars quickly and effectively. Toyota is confident that with the fixes its engineers have developed, Toyota vehicles are among the safest on the road today. Toyota will work vigorously and unceasingly to restore the trust of its customers by further improving on the quality of Toyota vehicles and fulfilling the principle of putting its customers first.

If you have any questions regarding this matter, or need additional information, please call me at 202-626-2901.

Sincerely,



Theodore M. Hester

cc: The Honorable Henry A. Waxman, Chairman  
Committee on Energy and Commerce

The Honorable Bart Stupak, Chairman  
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations

The Honorable Joe Barton, Ranking Member  
Committee on Energy and Commerce

The Honorable Michael C. Burgess, Ranking Member  
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations

Attachment A

**FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE**

Contact: Mike Goss (859) 746-6676

**St. Angelo to lead Toyota's North American quality assurance***Chief Quality Officer will oversee new Task Force in concert with President Akio Toyoda's Special Committee for Global Quality**Regional Product Safety Executive Dino Triantafyllos will play key North American role in recall and other safety decisions*

ERLANGER, Ky. (March 25, 2010) – Toyota announced today that it has formed a new North American Quality Task Force led by senior automobile manufacturing executive Steve St. Angelo, who is Executive Vice President of Toyota Motor Engineering & Manufacturing North America (TEMA). He will guide the implementation of regional improvements in concert with the Special Committee for Global Quality led by Toyota Motor Corporation President Akio Toyoda.

Mr. St. Angelo was appointed to the new role of Chief Quality Officer for North America. He will serve with counterparts from the other regions on Mr. Toyoda's committee, which meets for the first time on March 30 in Japan.

Each regional task force is specifically charged with executing a six-point action plan outlined by Mr. Toyoda on February 5. Its elements include improved quality assurance; enhanced customer research; strengthened quality management training; incorporation of best practices through outside professionals; closer cooperation with regulatory authorities; and improved regional autonomy.

"We are making fundamental changes in the way our company operates in order to ensure that Toyota sets an even higher standard for vehicle safety and reliability, responsiveness to customers, and transparency with regulators," Mr. St. Angelo said. "The new organization will open the lines of communication globally and enable us to respond faster here in North America to any concerns about our vehicles. In keeping with Akio Toyoda's mandate, North America will have greater autonomy and play a critical role in decision making on recalls and other safety issues."

The North American Quality Task Force will bring together the senior executive management of Toyota's research and development, manufacturing, sales, and regulatory divisions and include a newly appointed Regional Product Safety Executive. Dino Triantafyllos, the vice president of quality at TEMA, will oversee the processes that improve the visibility of customer concerns, expedite North American safety-related proposals, and play a key role in decision-making with regard to recalls and other safety issues in the field.

"The aim of our new quality task force is to assure that all of us in North America listen and respond to the voice of the customer," said Mr. Triantafyllos. "My primary responsibility is to assure that we utilize all of the data at our disposal and that we promptly decide the appropriate action."

Attachment A

The North American Quality Task Force will work closely with former U.S. Transportation Secretary Rodney Slater, whom Toyota named on March 2 to lead an independent North American Quality Advisory Panel. Mr. Slater is working with Toyota to appoint four more independent members to the panel.

Toyota (NYSE:TM) established operations in North America in 1957 and currently operates 14 manufacturing plants. There are more than 1,800 Toyota, Lexus and Scion dealerships in North America which sold more than 2.05 million vehicles in 2009. Toyota directly employs more than 40,000 in North America and its investment here is currently valued at more than \$23 billion, including sales and manufacturing operations, research and development, financial services and design. Toyota's annual purchasing of parts, materials, goods and services from North American suppliers totals more than \$25 billion. Toyota currently produces 12 vehicles in North America, including the Avalon, Camry, Corolla, Highlander, Matrix, RAV4, Sienna, Sequoia, Tacoma, Tundra, Venza and the Lexus RX 350. For more information about Toyota, visit [www.toyota.com](http://www.toyota.com) or [www.toyotanewsroom.com](http://www.toyotanewsroom.com).

# # #

# KING & SPALDING

King & Spalding LLP  
1700 Pennsylvania Ave, NW  
Suite 200  
Washington, D.C. 20006-4707  
Tel: (202) 737-0500  
Fax: (202) 626-3737  
www.kslaw.com

Theodore M. Hester  
Direct Dial: 202-626-2901  
thester@kslaw.com

March 26, 2010

The Honorable John D. Dingell  
U.S. House of Representatives  
2328 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, D.C. 20515-6115

Dear Congressman Dingell:

I am writing on behalf of Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. ("TMS" or "Toyota") to you in response to your written follow-up questions to the February 23, 2010 hearing that addressed a number of issues related to unintended acceleration in various Toyota models. Toyota welcomes the opportunity to clarify the matters you and other members of the Committee have raised, and has asked me to provide the following responses to your questions.

**1) What is the date that Toyota first heard of incidents of sudden acceleration in its vehicles sold in the U.S.?**

All major vehicle manufacturers, including Toyota, have received allegations of sudden unintended acceleration in their vehicles. Unintended acceleration complaints are not new or confined to vehicles with Electronic Throttle Control System With Intelligence ("ETCS-i"). Unintended acceleration can occur in any vehicle, regardless of manufacturer, and may have multiple causes, some involving human factors such as pedal confusion and misapplication, and some involving pedal interference or mechanical causes. Toyota has searched its complaint files back to January 1, 2000. The first unwanted acceleration complaint in the files was dated January 3, 2000.

**2) What is the date on which Toyota commenced the first recall to address this problem in the United States?**

Toyota conducted its first safety recall on January 11, 2001 to address a possible accelerator cable problem in certain 1998-2001MY Camry vehicles.

**3) Since 2001, how many complaints of sudden unintended acceleration in vehicles sold in the United States has Toyota Motor Sales, USA received?**

At NHTSA's request, Toyota is in the process of performing a detailed review of the customer contacts in its customer relations database that potentially relate to unintended acceleration. As previously reported, the number of potential UA-related complaints was

The Honorable John D. Dingell  
 March 26, 2010  
 Page 2

overstated due to the fact that it included customer contacts in which it is clear that the customer was not claiming that a UA event occurred, such as inquiries about the scope of the recalls relating to UA, the operation of the ETCS-i, and other unrelated drivability concerns. Toyota will provide the requested information to the Committee in the form of a more detailed analysis of these customer contacts as soon as it is available. Toyota expects to be able to do so within the next two weeks.

**4) How many of these complaints has Toyota Motor Sales, USA forwarded to NHTSA?**

As to complaints reported to NHTSA, complaint reporting principally takes two forms. The first is in quarterly reports to NHTSA under the TREAD Act. We are currently gathering this information, and will provide it as soon as our review concludes.

The second form of complaint reporting to NHTSA is in response to Information Requests from NHTSA on defect investigations. Please note that the investigation, scope and content of each NHTSA investigation are specified each time by NHTSA, and therefore Toyota has submitted to NHTSA the pertinent complaints from among all claims received by Toyota. As the information below makes clear, not all NHTSA investigations on unwanted acceleration included requests by NHTSA for Toyota to provide complaint information.

◦ DP03-003	No request from NHTSA for complaints
◦ DP04-003, PE04-021	Customer Complaints: 123
◦ DP05-002	Customer Complaints: 2
◦ DP06-003	No request from NHTSA for complaints
◦ PE07-016, EA07-010	Customer Complaints: 43
◦ DP08-001	Customer Complaints: 478
◦ PE08-025, EA08-014	Customer Complaints: 21
◦ DP09-001	No request from NHTSA for complaints

**5) Yes or no. Prior to the recalls in late-2009 and early-2010, were you empowered to authorize recalls for Toyota products manufactured or sold in the United States? If not, who is?**

Mr. Lentz was not empowered to authorize recalls for Toyota vehicles.

The Honorable John D. Dingell  
 March 26, 2010  
 Page 3

- 6) **Yes or no. Is it true that the Toyota recall process for vehicles manufactured and/or sold in the United States requires the decisions concerning these recalls to be made in Japan or with Japanese oversight?**

Recall decisions are made at the quality problem review meeting that is held in Japan. Going forward, the North American quality chief will be represented at this meeting and will have input in the decision whether to issue a recall. There will be an appeal process from decisions made at these meetings that did not previously exist.

- 7) **Yes or no. Is it true that Toyota had not reached a decision about whether to recall vehicle models linked to sudden unintended acceleration prior to being visited by Acting NHTSA Administrator Ron Medford in December 2009?**

The Toyota recall addressing unintended acceleration due to floor mat entrapment was announced prior to Acting NHTSA Administrator Ron Medford's visit to Japan in December 2009. This recall, "Floor Mat Entrapment," concerns the potential for an unsecured or incompatible driver's floor mat to interfere with the accelerator pedal and cause it to become entrapped in a wide-open or near wide-open position. On September 29, 2009, Toyota issued a consumer safety advisory to address the risk of floor mat entrapment of accelerator pedals in certain Toyota and Lexus models. On October 5, 2009, Toyota announced its decision to recall approximately 3.8 million vehicles. At that time, Toyota notified owners of affected vehicles to take out any removable driver's floor mat and not replace it with any other floor mat, pending the development of model-specific remedies. On November 25, 2009, Toyota announced the details of vehicle-based remedies to address the problem of potential pedal entrapment that included cutting the pedal, modifying the floor pan in certain vehicles to enlarge the distance between the pedal and the floor, and making shorter pedals that could be installed in vehicles.

The second recall, "Pedal," involves the slow return of the accelerator pedal to the idle position or, in very rare cases, the pedal may stick leaving the throttle partially open. This issue was not discussed by the participants at the meeting between NHTSA and Toyota in December 2009 in Japan. Toyota issued this recall on January 21, 2010.

- 8) **Yes or no. Did Acting Administrator Medford's December 2009 visit to Japan and discussions with Toyota executives have any influence on the decision to recall vehicle models linked to sudden unintended acceleration?**

It is Toyota's understanding that NHTSA had a long-planned visit to Japan in December 2009, during which it was scheduled to, and did in fact, meet with personnel from Toyota, other Japanese car makers, and the Japan regulatory entity (the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism). In its meetings with NHTSA officials in December in Japan, Toyota and NHTSA personnel exchanged views on many subjects, and the meetings were cordial and productive. As noted above, Toyota had already made the decision to recall vehicles at risk of floor mat pedal entrapment. As explained above, with regard to the CTS pedals, the participants did not discuss the CTS pedal issues; therefore, Toyota does not believe that NHTSA's visit impacted the decision to recall its vehicles in either situation.



The Honorable John D. Dingell  
 March 26, 2010  
 Page 4

- 9) **In correspondence addressed to this Committee, certain elected officials have communicated their concern that the U.S. government's financial stake in Chrysler and General Motors represents a conflict of interest in its regulation of Toyota. Do you believe this is true? Yes or no.**

No.

- 10) **Yes or no. Are the reporting requirements for early warning of possible vehicle safety defects different in Japan than in the United States?**

In Japan, TMC reports the details and investigation results of accidents and/or fires in which Toyota vehicles are involved every quarter. This includes the details of defective parts or phenomena which might be attributable to the accidents and/or fires. Other information, including field reports, is subject to a yearly audit by the Japanese regulatory authority.

Toyota reports to NHTSA on a quarterly basis about the number of consumer complaints, warranty claims, property damage claims, field reports, injuries and fatalities in any Toyota (10 years old or younger) sold in the U.S., categorized by vehicle component (e.g. vehicle speed control), or certain types of events (fires, rollovers). In addition, all field reports are provided in hard copy to NHTSA; injuries and fatalities are provided with some additional information about the incident. The quarterly report includes fatalities in foreign countries in any Toyota vehicle that is "substantially similar" to a model sold in the United States. Toyota must also report foreign recalls or other safety campaigns involving "substantially similar" vehicles within five business days.

- 11) **Are the Japanese requirements in regard to this matter more or less stringent than American standards?**

- 12) **If the Japanese requirements are less stringent, does that affect how Toyota evaluates potential defects in its vehicles and influence what information the company provides to U.S. regulators? Yes or no.**

There are some differences in items to be reported between Japanese requirements and the U.S. requirements, but both countries impose periodic reporting obligations on vehicle manufacturers. Toyota cannot categorically say which requirements are more stringent than the other.

- 13) **Yes or No. Has Toyota definitely ruled out non-mechanical failures as the source of sudden unintended acceleration in vehicles recalled in late-2009 and early-2010?**

Unwanted acceleration claims are not new or confined to vehicles with ETCS-i. Unwanted acceleration claims can occur in any vehicle, regardless of manufacturer, and may have multiple causes, some involving human factors issues such as pedal confusion and misapplication, and some involving pedal interference or mechanical causes.

The Honorable John D. Dingell  
 March 26, 2010  
 Page 5

Toyota's design process is exhaustive and robust. Toyota does not believe there are any problems with the electronic throttle control system in its vehicles. The ETCS-i system in Toyota and Lexus vehicles has built-in redundancies to the system and failsafe modes that allow Toyota to say with confidence that the ETCS-i is not the cause of unintended or unwanted acceleration. The ETCS-i is designed to cause the engine power to shut off or operate at reduced power in the event of a system failure.

Exponent, a leading engineering and scientific consulting firm, is systematically evaluating the performance of the ETCS-i system in Toyota and Lexus vehicles when subjected to abnormal and fault conditions. In its interim report, previously provided to the Committee, Exponent concluded: "[D]uring extensive testing on multiple vehicles, where different electrical and mechanical [changes] were imposed on the components comprising the ETCS-i system, Exponent did not observe any instances of unintended acceleration or any circumstances that might lead to unintended acceleration. To the contrary, imposing these [changes] resulted in a significant drop in power rather than an increase. In all cases, when a fault was imposed, the vehicle entered a failsafe mode consistent with descriptions provided in the technical manuals for Toyota and Lexus vehicles."

In addition, Toyota test reports documenting the extensive developmental testing of the ETCS-i system were enclosed as an index to our March 15, 2010 letter to Chairmen Waxman and Stupak.

Finally, Toyota understands that NHTSA and NASA are also conducting their own evaluations of the ETCS-i system to determine whether there is any basis to believe that it is a cause of unwanted or unintended acceleration.

- 14) Has Toyota definitively determined that electromagnetic interference with or other failures in electronic throttle controls are the cause of sudden unintended acceleration in vehicles recalled in late-2009 and early 2010? Yes or no.**

Toyota's testing discussed above confirms that the ETCS-i system is not susceptible to electromagnetic interference. Toyota's testing has confirmed that unwanted or unintended acceleration does not occur due to electromagnetic interference or any other electronic problem in Toyota and Lexus vehicles. Exponent's examination of electromagnetic interference is ongoing and Toyota will provide Exponent's findings to the Committee and the public as soon as these are finalized and made available to Toyota. In addition, Toyota understands that NHTSA and NASA will also evaluate the potential for electromagnetic interference with the ETCS-i.

- 15) I understand Toyota recently commissioned Exponent to conduct tests on certain Toyota vehicles to determine possible causes of sudden unintended acceleration. Is that true? Yes or no.**

As noted, Toyota recently commissioned Exponent, a well-respected engineering and scientific consulting firm, to study Toyota and Lexus vehicles and components for concerns

The Honorable John D. Dingell  
 March 26, 2010  
 Page 6

related to unwanted acceleration. Exponent was not restricted by scope or by budget considerations in this review. Although its work is still ongoing, to date Exponent has found that the ETCS-i systems have performed as designed and have not exhibited any acceleration or precursor to acceleration, despite concerted efforts to induce unwanted acceleration. In all vehicles and systems tested and reported on by Exponent so far, the vehicle either behaved normally or entered the fail-safe mode.

- 16) Did the report conclude that electromagnetic interference was a potential cause of sudden unintended acceleration? Yes or no.**

Exponent's interim report confirmed that the ETCS-i fail safes work as designed and that there were no instances of unwanted or unintended acceleration or any circumstances that might lead to unintended acceleration. Exponent's evaluation is ongoing and it is Toyota's understanding that Exponent will subject Toyota, Lexus, and competitor vehicles to rigorous electromagnetic interference testing.

- 17) I understand that Exponent did not subject Toyota vehicles to tests as rigorous as those of other automakers when determining if electromagnetic interference can cause failures in vehicle electronic throttle controls. Is this true? Yes or no.**

As stated above, Exponent is still testing for the potential of electromagnetic interference to cause unwanted or unintended acceleration in Toyota and Lexus vehicles. When Exponent has completed its analysis of the potential for electromagnetic interference in Toyota and Lexus vehicles, the results will be provided and will contain the data and information necessary to validate Exponent's conclusions. It is Toyota's understanding that the methodology used by Exponent to evaluate the potential for electromagnetic interference with the ETCS-i will also be assessed by NHTSA and NASA.

- 18) How many models of Toyota vehicles did Exponent test?**

In its testing of the fail safes of the ETCS-i, Exponent tested seven Toyota vehicles and one competitor vehicle for comparison. To evaluate the failure detection system of the electronic throttle control system, the following vehicles were tested: 2002 Camry, 2007 Camry, 2007 FJ Cruiser, 2008 Sienna, 2006 IS250, 2006 IS350, 2010 Avalon, and 2008 Honda Accord EX. If Exponent, NHTSA and/or NASA believe that the ETCS-i fail safes need to be evaluated on additional vehicles, it is Toyota's understanding that Exponent will perform any such additional testing.

It is Toyota's understanding that Exponent will perform component level testing of the ETCS-i for electromagnetic interference. In addition, Toyota understands that Exponent is also in the process of performing whole vehicle electromagnetic interference testing on the following vehicles: 2003 Camry, 2007 Camry, 2007 ES 350, 2010 Corolla, 2010 Prius, 2010 Tacoma, 2007 Honda Accord, 2010 Civic Hybrid, 2007 Hyundai Sonata, 2007 Nissan Altima, and 2007 VW Jetta. Consistent with the fact that Exponent is not constrained by Toyota in the evaluation

The Honorable John D. Dingell  
 March 26, 2010  
 Page 7

of the ETCS-i, Toyota also understands that Exponent may perform electromagnetic testing on additional vehicles either on its own accord or at the request of NHTSA and/or NASA.

**19) Yes or no. Do you feel this is an adequate sample of vehicles for the purposes of Exponent's tests?**

Toyota believes the testing, as described, was and is appropriate and adequate. When Exponent has completed its analysis, the results will be provided and will contain the data and information necessary to validate Exponent's conclusions.

**20) Yes or no. Are event data recorders (EDRs) installed in all Toyota vehicles sold in the United States?**

All Toyota vehicles contain at least one type of Event Data Recorders (EDRs). As the attached chart shows (Attachment A), a few Toyota vehicles contain EDRs that record post-crash data only, whereas the majority of Toyota and Lexus vehicles, contain EDRs that record pre- and post-crash data.<sup>1</sup> For those models that only contain post-crash data, Toyota is planning to install the capability to record pre-crash data on these models by the end of 2010.

**21) Would these EDRs contain information, such as recordings of vehicle component failures, that would be useful to investigators in determining the cause of an accident?**

The amount and types of data recorded have evolved over time, and there may be slight variations from vehicle model to vehicle model depending on, for example, what types of airbags the model is equipped with. In general, for vehicles equipped with EDRs that record pre-crash data, the following pre-crash data is recorded by the most-recent EDR model for up to 5 seconds before the crash: vehicle speed (mph), engine speed (rpm), accelerator pedal position (off/middle/full), and brake status (off/on). When a collision is triggered that meets certain criteria, other vehicle status information is generally recorded by the most-recent EDR model, including shift position (which is not recorded in the case of post-crash only EDRs), seatbelt information, driver's seat position, passenger seat occupant information, and airbag diagnostic information. Post-crash, the type and amount of data recorded depends on the type of collision. In general, the following types and amounts of data are recorded by the most-recent EDR model: longitudinal change in velocity is recorded every 10 milliseconds for frontal or rear collision from an interval of approximately .15 to .20 seconds post-collision; lateral change in velocity is recorded every 4 milliseconds for a side collision for approximately .07 seconds post-collision; and roll angle and lateral G force every 128 milliseconds for a rollover collision for about two seconds following collision. Post-crash airbag deployment information is also recorded.

---

<sup>1</sup> In general, the EDRs only record data for collisions that meet certain criteria that are tied to the severity of the collision.

The Honorable John D. Dingell  
 March 26, 2010  
 Page 8

- 22) **Yes or no. Can data from EDRs installed in Toyota vehicles be easily read by non-Toyota personnel, such as NHTSA investigators?**

23) **If not, please submit an explanation for the record.**

On March 3, 2010, NHTSA was provided with an EDR read-out tool for Toyota vehicles, and NHTSA staff were trained how to use it. Toyota plans to provide three additional EDR read-out tools to NHTSA as soon as they become available, which will enable NHTSA or other public safety officials working with NHTSA to access EDR data on Toyota/Lexus/Scion vehicles. In addition, Toyota plans to expand the number of EDR read-out tools in North America to 150 by the end of April 2010. When the additional EDR read-out tools become available, Toyota will provide the appropriate training to recipients.

- 24) **Prior to Toyota recalls this year and last, by whom and where could such data from Toyota EDRs be read in the United States?**

A dedicated team of Toyota personnel promptly responded to any request by law enforcement, NHTSA, and court orders to read Toyota EDRs, and have assisted NHTSA and law enforcement in understanding the information recorded by the vehicle's EDR.

- 25) **Did NHTSA require Toyota in 2006 to conduct a test on an electronic throttle component for a 2006 Toyota Camry?**

26) **If so, did Toyota or a designated third party conduct the test? If it was conducted by a third party, please tell the Committee its name.**

27) **Yes or no. Was this report submitted to NHTSA?**

In 2006, NHTSA requested Toyota to provide the results of any testing conducted by or for Toyota that was related to a pending petition, NHTSA DP06-003. The background is as follows:

Toyota refers you to documents that relate to that petition. NHTSA's denial of that petition for a defect investigation was published in the Federal Register, 72 Fed. Reg. 10815 *et seq.* (March 9, 2007). In the ODI Resume summarizing NHTSA's analysis of the alleged defect, NHTSA describes the alleged defect as "a short duration (1 to 2 second) increase in engine speed occurring while the accelerator pedal is not depressed." NHTSA also states that the Petitioner "reports that the brake system is effective in overcoming the surge." NHTSA evaluated the throttle actuator from the petitioner's vehicle, but found no component problem. NHTSA also concluded that "[T]he fault detection and reaction strategy described in Toyota's technical documents indicates that a loss of throttle control due to a component or system failure would be detected within a one second period after which engine power would be limited." NHTSA also road-tested the petitioner's vehicle and observed that the "brake system overcomes full engine power at easily achievable brake pedal forces."

The Honorable John D. Dingell  
March 26, 2010  
Page 9

In its denial report, NHTSA states that ODI "arranged with Toyota to have the suspect throttle actuator sent to a facility owned by the component supplier. An analysis was conducted which included a physical inspection (including X-ray), mechanical testing, electrical testing, environmental testing, and destructive tear down. The component supplier's final investigation report, [footnote omitted] submitted to NHTSA under request for confidentiality by Toyota, concluded there was no problem associated with the component." (The component supplier's test report was submitted to NHTSA as an attachment to Response 6 of Toyota's December 20, 2006 letter to NHTSA, which responded to NHTSA's October 30, 2006 letter requesting information.)

If you have any questions regarding this matter, or need additional information, please call me at 202-626-2901.

Sincerely,  
  
Theodore M. Hester

cc: The Honorable Henry A. Waxman, Chairman  
Committee on Energy and Commerce

The Honorable Bart Stupak, Chairman  
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations

The Honorable Joe Barton, Ranking Member  
Committee on Energy and Commerce

The Honorable Michael C. Burgess, Ranking Member  
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations

# EDR current release status in N.A.

	Model Name	Type A) Post-crash data only										Type B) Pre- & Post-crash data									
		2000CY	2001CY	2002CY	2003CY	2004CY	2005CY	2006CY	2007CY	2008CY	2009CY	2010CY	2011CY	2012CY	2013CY	2014CY	2015CY	2016CY	2017CY	2018CY	2019CY
Lexus	LS																				
	LS HV																				
	GS																				
	GS HV																				
	SC																				
	ES																				
	LX																				
	GX																				
	RX																				
	RX HV																				
Toyota	IS																				
	IS-F																				
	IS-C																				
	HS																				
	Avalon																				
	Camry																				
	Camry Solara																				
	Corolla																				
	Echo																				
	4Runner																				
Scion	RAV4																				
	Sienna																				
	Plus																				
	Highlander																				
	Highlander HV																				
	Tacoma																				
	Tundra																				
	SEQUOIA																				
	Yaris																				
	FJ Cruiser																				
GM	Venice																				
	Matrix																				
	IC																				
	KA																				
	XB																				
	XD																				
	VIBE																				

Note1: Type B EDR of Tacoma, FJ Cruiser, Avalon and Scion tC will be available by the end of 2010.  
 Note2: Readout tool software will be completed to prepare for all Toyota/Lexus/Scion models by the middle of April in 2010.

Secretary Ray LaHood  
Questions for the Record  
House Committee on Energy and Commerce  
February 23, 2010 Hearing

**Questions from Congressman Dingell**

**QUESTION I: Toyota Compliance with Statutory, Regulatory Mandates**

1. Yes or no. To your knowledge, has Toyota complied with its statutory and regulatory obligations, whether mandated under the TREAD Act or otherwise, in conducting its 2009 and 2010 recalls related to sudden unintended acceleration?

RESPONSE: At this time, we are not able to provide a yes or no answer. Please see Response #2 below.

2. If Toyota has not complied with its statutory and regulatory obligations related to these recalls, please submit for the record a description of how and what punitive action the Department of Transportation has taken as a result of this non-compliance.

RESPONSE: At this time, NHTSA is not aware of any noncompliances by Toyota related to its 2008 and 2010 recalls. However, NHTSA is addressing three queries to Toyota that may provide information responsive to this question. NHTSA has opened two Timeliness Query investigations (one for the pedal entrapment recall and one for the sticky pedal recall). These investigations are aimed at uncovering what Toyota knew about these two problems that led to the recalls and when Toyota knew it. Please note that we recently began receiving information from Toyota in response to the two Timeliness Query investigations. If we determine that Toyota knew, or should have known, of the existence of a defect that posed an unreasonable risk to safety, the agency will pursue civil penalties against Toyota.

Additionally, NHTSA has opened a Recall Query investigation into both recalls that is aimed at assessing whether the scope of each recall was appropriate or whether one or both of the recalls should have been expanded to additional vehicles. The Recall Query investigation is also examining whether the remedies developed by Toyota for both of these recalls are effective.

**QUESTION II: Recall Statistics and NHTSA Delegation to Japan**

3. Since 2001, how many reports of sudden unintended acceleration has the Department of Transportation received from Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.? Please submit a list and description of each and every one of these reports for the record.

RESPONSE: By way of background, NHTSA receives significant information from manufacturers that report Early Warning Reporting (EWR) data. Light vehicle manufacturers producing 5,000 or more vehicles annually are required to report U.S. and



foreign death incidents, U.S. injury incidents and total counts of warranty claims, consumer complaints, property damage claims, and field reports (including dealer reports). In addition, these manufacturers are required to submit copies of non-dealer field reports.

Manufacturers report information in EWR under 20 general component or system categories. Sudden unintended acceleration issues normally would fall under the speed control component. However, not all speed control issues are unintended acceleration. Speed Control means the systems and components of a motor vehicle that control vehicle speed either by command of the operator or by automatic control, including, but not limited, to the accelerator pedal, linkages, cables, springs, speed control devices (such as cruise control) and speed limiting devices. Speed control may include other acceleration issues such as problems with the cruise control. In addition, incidents of sudden unintended acceleration may also have been reported under another component, such as brakes.

Since mid-2003, Toyota has reported 17 deaths and 352 injuries under the speed control component in EWR through the fourth quarter of 2009. Under the EWR regulations, these figures are based upon claims and notices received by the manufacturer. For some death and injury incidents, ODI asks the manufacturers to send the agency more detailed information. In addition, Toyota reported a death incident that may be related to sudden unintended acceleration under the structure component.

Toyota has reported 141,141 warranty claims, 11,321 consumer complaints, 1,328 field reports (including dealer field reports), and 622 property damage claims in the EWR aggregate data for speed control.

Toyota has also submitted reports on two foreign safety campaigns related to unintended acceleration.

Toyota has submitted 381 speed control field reports through the fourth quarter of 2009. We have identified 9 field reports submitted by Toyota under different components that allege or involve unintended acceleration using key word and text string searches.

Additionally, Toyota has provided consumer reports, field reports, property damage claims, law suits, and warranty claim data in response to information request letters issued during investigations or defect petitions related to allegations of unwanted or sudden acceleration (PE04021, DP05002, DP06003, PE07016, DP08001 and PE08025).

We have included copies of information mentioned in this response in the enclosed CD. Please note that early warning reporting information, other than information on vehicle production, deaths, injuries and property damage claims, is confidential. The last six characters of a vehicle identification number also are confidential. In addition, some of the information received in response to information request letters during investigations or defect petitions may be confidential. We request that you treat the information provided in this CD accordingly.

4. Yes or no. Are the Secretary of Transportation and NHTSA Administrator empowered under statute to visit foreign automakers in their home countries?

RESPONSE: Yes.

5. Yes or no. Have Secretaries of Transportation or NHTSA Administrators done so in the past?

RESPONSE: Yes.

6. Would you describe such visits as routine or commonplace? Yes or no.

RESPONSE: Yes, such visits are not unusual. However, the nature of the visit by NHTSA's Acting Deputy Administrator to Japan in December 2009 was unusual because a major purpose of the visit was to convey the importance of Toyota's responsiveness to the agency's concerns regarding the defects program.

#### **QUESTION III: Japanese vs. U.S. Requirements**

7. Yes or no. Are the reporting requirements for early warning of possible vehicle safety defects different in Japan than in the United States?

RESPONSE: It is our understanding that the reporting requirements in Japan differ from those in the United States, based on communications with our Japanese counterpart. At this time, we have made inquiries with our Japanese counterpart for an English translation of the reporting requirements in Japan. We will evaluate the relevant documents and supplement our response.

8. Are the Japanese requirements in this regard more or less stringent?

RESPONSE: Please see Response #7.

9. Yes or no. If the Japanese requirements are less stringent, is it your experience this affects the manner in which Toyota evaluates potential defects in its vehicles and influence what information the company provides to U.S. regulators?

RESPONSE: Please see Response #7.

#### **QUESTION IV: Event Data Recorders**

10. Yes or no. Is data contained in vehicle event data recorders (EDRs) useful to NHTSA investigators in determining the cause of an accident?

RESPONSE: Yes. Certain EDR data can add information to be considered in addition to other field investigation items to confirm crash reconstruction data. However, the data in the current generation of EDRs is predominately related to the crash itself with very limited pre-

crash information. Accordingly, it is not always possible to determine the single “cause” of a crash. Factors, such as human (drowsy), vehicular (bald tires) and environmental (wet road), also play critical roles in a crash. The EDR data may help a crash investigator focus on factors involved in a crash sequence as well as related safety feature deployment and timing issues.

11. Yes or no. Is data from EDRs installed in Toyota vehicles easily read by NHTSA investigators?

RESPONSE: Yes, although until recently, NHTSA investigators could not read EDRs installed in Toyota vehicles because proprietary equipment necessary to read their EDRs was available only from Toyota. As of this month, NHTSA has been able to read EDRs installed on Toyota vehicles because NHTSA received four interface units and one set of cables.

12. If not, please submit an explanation for the record.

RESPONSE: Not applicable.

13. Yes or no. Is data from EDRs installed in other manufacturers’ vehicles easily read by NHTSA investigators?

RESPONSE: Yes, NHTSA is able to read EDR data from light passenger vehicles for most post-1994 GM products, many post-2001 Ford products, and some post-2004 Chrysler products with the use of a commercially available EDR reader, and NHTSA is now able to read EDR data from Toyota vehicles. NHTSA’s Crash Investigation Division has equipped its field researchers with the commercially available units. However, NHTSA cannot read EDRs installed on most manufacturers’ vehicles because they lack commercially available EDR readers. For these vehicles, NHTSA currently sends EDRs to the manufacturers to retrieve data from those EDRs. Please note that for vehicles produced after September 1, 2012 (or the 2013 model year), manufacturers are required to make EDR readers commercially available to the public within 90 days of introducing the vehicle, for vehicles that have EDRs.

#### **QUESTION V: Exponent Study**

14. Yes or no. Has the Department of Transportation received a copy of the report Toyota commissioned Exponent to perform in order to determine potential causes of sudden unintended acceleration?

RESPONSE: Yes. We have received two Exponent reports from Toyota. We received the first, “Testing and Analysis of Toyota and Lexus Vehicles and Components for Concerns Related to Unintended Acceleration, February 4, 2010,” by e-mail on February 8, 2010. We received the second, “Evaluation of the Gilbert Demonstration, March 1, 2010,” by e-mail on March 2, 2010.

15. Did Exponent **not** subject Toyota vehicles to tests as rigorous as those of other automakers when determining if electromagnetic interference can cause failures in vehicle electronic throttle controls? Yes or no.

**RESPONSE:** We are unable to answer this question. We are not aware of any Exponent test reports that describe testing to determine if electromagnetic interference can cause failures in vehicle electronic throttle controls.

**QUESTION VI: 2006 Camry Testing**

16. Yes or no. Did NHTSA require Toyota in 2006 to conduct a test on an electronic throttle component for a 2006 Camry?

**RESPONSE:** Yes. During a 2006 investigation (DP06003), NHTSA arranged to have a suspect throttle body assembly removed from the Petitioner's vehicle for inspection.

17. If so, did Toyota or a designated third party conduct that test? If it was conducted by a third party, please tell the Committee its name.

**RESPONSE:** Aisan Industry Company, Ltd., Toyota's supplier that manufactured the component, conducted the test.

18. What were the results of this test?

**RESPONSE:** The inspection did not reveal a defect or other problem with the throttle body component.

19. Yes or no. Has NHTSA had to compel Toyota to perform similar tests on other models Toyota manufactures?

**RESPONSE:** No, NHTSA has not asked or compelled Toyota to inspect any other throttle body components.

20. Yes or no. Was this report submitted to NHTSA?

**RESPONSE:** Yes.

21. Yes or no. Were the contents of this report made publicly available in their entirety? If not, please explain why.

**RESPONSE:** No. The report was submitted with a request for confidentiality. Because the confidentiality request was granted in accordance with the agency's confidential business information regulation (49 CFR Part 512), the document has not been made publicly available.